

The Civil War in the United States

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1864 AND 1865

by

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and

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
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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

This book, which is a minor classic in its own field, has been out of print for some years. It has, however, always been in moderate demand and on the approach of the hundredth anniversary of the outbreak of the Civil War it has been thought fit to reprint it. The present edition is identical with that of 1937.



PREFACE TO 1937 EDITION

OVER thirty years have passed since the first edition of *The Civil War in the United States* was published, and during that interval much fresh light has been thrown upon the military operations and new angles of vision have been opened up. Within the last decade several books of great value and interest to the military student have been published: D. S. Freeman's monumental biography in four volumes of *R. E. Lee*, Eckenrode and Conrad's *James Longstreet*, Thomason's *Jeb Stuart*, A. L. Conger's *The Rise of U. S. Grant*, Captain Liddell Hart's *Sherman*, and Major-General J. F. Fuller's *The Generalship of Ulysses Grant*. All these have been laid under contribution for the present volume, so far as they deal with the campaigns of 1864-5.

England was the only European country of pre-war days in whose Staff College the American Civil War was studied. It was due to Colonel G. F. R. Henderson's inspiring influence and enthusiasm that it became one of the most important subjects in the curriculum. His *Stonewall Jackson* will always continue a military classic, not only for the fascinating presentation of his hero, but still more for the wealth of strategical lessons therein contained. But it is now generally admitted that Colonel Henderson over-stressed the importance of the Eastern theatre of war and did not allow its full significance to the Western, where, whilst the main fighting force of the South was penned down in Virginia, a campaign was conducted which throughout retained a considerable number of Southern troops and slowly but surely reduced the territory and economic resources of the Confederacy, numbers allowing the North to achieve success in both theatres.

The years have wrought a great change in military reputations. Grant and Sherman have come into their own. *Jackson's* tactical successes in the Shenandoah Valley are no longer so highly appreciated, because he encountered such incompetent opponents. His Valley campaign is still a classic example of what may be achieved by a detached force in a subordinate area, but it is now viewed as only one, if the most important, measure in *Lee's* programme for the discomfiture of McClellan. *Lee's* stock had


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been gradually falling until Freeman's biography raised it again almost to its old height. The moral grandeur of the man cannot entirely conceal his fatal weakness in disciplining his subordinates. But his campaign of 1864 against Grant from the Rapidan to the James has never been surpassed as a masterpiece of defensive tactics. As long as he retained the power of manœuvre he parried every thrust of a foe vastly his superior in resources. Yet of all the leaders, Federal and Confederate, there is none whose reputation has risen so high in recent years as Grant's. He is no longer the 'mathematical butcher,' who disdained manœuvre and sought to crush his antagonist by sheer attrition, regardless of the price he had to pay. He is now accounted a strategist of the highest order, who disregarding text-book 'principles' acquired his mastery of the art by aid of a most uncommon 'common sense' and by never failing to learn from his own experience. In his person unity of command was at last achieved on the Federal side, and the overwhelming resources of the North, instead of being dissipated in a dozen different directions, were concentrated upon the one object, viz. the destruction of the Confederacy's economic system.

In the text of this volume the bulk of the last ten chapters of the original edition of 1905 has been reproduced with only the minimum of necessary alterations. The facts, as there presented, are, it is believed, accurate, but a considerable number of notes have been added to make clear the interpretation now to be put on those facts in the light of the further knowledge derived from the study of later authorities. The Introduction contains a brief sketch of the outbreak of war and the principal campaigns of the first three years. Some acquaintance with those campaigns is necessary for the correct appreciation of the closing campaigns of the war.

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LIST OF WORKS TO WHICH REFERENCE IS MADE IN THE FOOTNOTES

War of the Rebellion, Official Records and Atlas	Quoted as Official Records.
Massachusetts Military Historical Society	„ M. H. S.
<i>Battles and Leaders</i> , 4 vols.	„ B. & L.
Pond's <i>The Shenandoah Valley</i> , 1864	„ Pond.
Cox's <i>Atlanta</i> .	
Cox's <i>March to the Sea</i>	Quoted as Cox.
Humphreys' <i>The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865</i>	„ Humphreys.
Livermore's <i>Numbers and Losses in the Civil War</i>	„ Livermore.
Mahan's <i>The Gulf and the Inland Waters</i>	„ Mahan.
General J. B. Gordon's <i>Reminiscences of the Civil War</i>	„ Gordon.
Taylor's <i>Destruction and Reconstruction</i>	„ Taylor.
Fitzhugh Lee's <i>General Lee</i>	„ Lee's <i>Lee</i> .
White's <i>Lee and the Southern Confederacy</i>	„ White's <i>Lee</i> .
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Ropes' <i>Story of the Civil War</i> , 2 vols.	Quoted as Ropes.
Sheridan's <i>Memoirs</i> , 2 vols.	„ Sheridan.
J. E. Johnston's <i>Narrative</i>	„ Johnston.
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H. W. Wilson's <i>Ironclads in Action</i>	Quoted as Wilson.
Burgoyne's <i>Submarine Navigation</i> .	
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Channing's <i>History of the United States</i> , Vol. VI	„ Channing.
T. B. van Horne's <i>Life of Major-General George H. Thomas</i>	„ van Horne.
Captain B. H. Liddell Hart's <i>Sherman</i>	„ Liddell Hart.
Major-General J. F. C. Fuller's <i>Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant</i>	„ Fuller.
H. J. Eckenrode and Bryan Conrad's <i>James Longstreet</i>	Quoted as Eckenrode and Conrad.
Dr. D. S. Freeman's <i>R. E. Lee</i>	Quoted as Freeman.
A. L. Conger's <i>Rise of U. S. Grant</i>	„ Conger.



DIARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN THE TWO THEATRES OF WAR

1861

- Mar. 4. Inauguration of President
Lincoln.
April 12. Bombardment of Fort
Sumter.

EASTERN THEATRE OF WAR

- May 10.
July 21. Battle of Bull Run.
Nov. 1. McClellan appointed General-
in-Chief.
„ 19.

WESTERN THEATRE OF WAR

- Lyon compels surrender of
Camp Jackson.
Halleck takes command of
Department of the Mis-
souri, and Buell of Depart-
ment of the Ohio.

1862

- Jan. 19.
Feb. 6.
„ 16.
Mar. 9. Battle of the *Monitor* and
Merrimac.
„ 16.
„ 17. Embarkation of troops for the
Yorktown Peninsula com-
menced.
„ 23. [*Jackson* attacks Shields at
Kernstown.]
„ 29.

- Battle of Mill Springs.
Grant captures Fort Henry.
Surrender of Fort Donelson.

Halleck appointed to supreme
command in the West.

Albert Johnston assumes com-
mand of the Army of the
Mississippi.

- April 2. McClellan arrives at Fortress
Monroe.
„ 6-7.
May 1.

- Battle of Shiloh and death of
Albert Johnston.
New Orleans occupied by
Federals.

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- May 8. [*Jackson* defeats *Milroy* and *Schenck* at *McDowell*.]
- „ 25. [*Jackson* defeats *Banks* at *Winchester*.]
- „ 31. Battle of *Seven Pines*.
- June 1. *Lee* takes command in the field.
- „ 8. [*Jackson* defeats *Frémont* at *Cross Keys*.]
- „ 9. [*Jackson* defeats *Shields* at *Port Republic*.]
- „ 17. [*Jackson* leaves the *Shenandoah Valley*.]
- „ 26. *Jackson* arrives on *McClellan's* flank.
Battle of *Beaver Dam Creek*, commencement of the “*Seven days' fighting*.”
- „ 26. *Pope* placed in command of *Army of Virginia*.
- „ 27. *Bragg* appointed to command *Confederates* in the *West*.
- July 1. Battle of *Malvern Hill*.
- „ 2. *McClellan* reaches the *James River*.
- „ 11. *Halleck* appointed *General-in-Chief*. *Grant* takes command of the *Armies of the Tennessee and Mississippi*.
- August. *Kirby-Smith* invades *Kentucky*.
- „ 29-30. Second battle of *Bull Run* or *Manassas*.
- September. *Bragg* invades *Middle Tennessee*.
- „ 4. *Lee* crosses the *Potomac* into *Maryland*.
- „ 5. *Pope* relieved of command and *McClellan* reinstated.
- „ 17. Battle of the *Antietam*.
- „ 19. *Lee* recrosses the *Potomac*.
- Oct. 3. [Battle of *Corinth*.]
- „ 8. [Battle of *Perryville*.]
- „ 26. *McClellan* crosses the *Potomac*.
- Nov. 7. *McClellan* superseded by *Burnside*.
- „ 24. *Grant's* first movement towards *Vicksburg*.

DIARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS xvii


Dec. 13.	Battle of Fredericksburg.	
„ 29.		Sherman defeated at Chickasaw Bluffs.
„ 31.		[Battle of Murfreesborough.]
1863		
Jan. 11.		McClelland captures Post of Arkansas.
„ 26.	Burnside superseded by Hooker.	
February.		Yazoo expedition.
April 30.		Grant crosses the Mississippi at Bruinsburg.
May 2-4.	Battle of Chancellorsville.	Grant occupies Port Gibson.
„ 10.	Death of <i>Stonewall Jackson</i> .	
„ 12.		Battle of Raymond.
„ 16.		Battle of Champion's Hill.
„ 17.		<i>Pemberton</i> withdraws into Vicksburg.
June 15.	<i>Lee</i> crosses into Maryland.	
„ 28.	Meade supersedes Hooker.	
July 1-3.	Battle of Gettysburg.	
„ 4.		Surrender of Vicksburg.
„ 9.		Surrender of Port Hudson.
„ 14.	<i>Lee</i> withdraws across the Potomac.	
Sept. 7-8.		<i>Bragg</i> evacuates Chattanooga.
„ 19-20.		<i>Bragg</i> defeats Rosecrans at Chickamauga.
Oct. 16.		Grant appointed to command Military Division of the Mississippi. Sherman to command Department of the Tennessee.
„ 19.	Meade advances to the Rappahannock.	
Nov. 1.		<i>Bragg</i> sends <i>Longstreet</i> against Burnside at Knoxville.
„ 24-5.		Battle of Chattanooga.
„ 26.	Meade crosses the Rapidan.	
Dec. 1.	Meade retires to north of the Rapidan.	
1864		
Feb. 14.		Sherman at Meridian.
March.		Banks's Red River expedition.
„ 9.	Grant appointed General-in-Chief.	Sherman succeeds Grant in the West.

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May.		Failure of Red River expedition.
"	4.	Grant crosses the Rapidan.
"	6.	[Butler lands at Bermuda Hundred.]
"	5-6.	Battle of the Wilderness.
"	8-12.	Battles round Spottsylvania Court House.
"	12.	Death of J. E. B. Stuart.
"	16.	[Beauregard drives Butler back to his lines.]
June	1-3.	Battle of Cold Harbour.
"	12.	Grant withdraws to cross the James River.
"	13.	Early sent to the Shenandoah Valley.
"	15.	Grant's army on south side of the James River.
"	15-18.	Attack on Petersburg.
"	27.	Battle of Kenesaw Mountain.
July	9.	[Early defeats Wallace on the Monocacy.]
"	11.	[Early before Washington.]
"	14.	[Early recrosses the Potomac.]
"	17.	Hood supersedes Johnston.
"	20.	Battle of Peach Tree Creek.
"	22.	Battle of Atlanta.
"	30.	Failure of the Petersburg mine.
Aug.	5.	Battle of Mobile Bay.
"	7.	[Sheridan appointed to command in the Shenandoah Valley.]
Sept.	2.	Hood evacuates Atlanta.
"	19.	[Battle of Winchester.]
"	22.	[Battle of Fisher's Hill.]
"	29.	Hood moves against Sherman's communications.
Oct.	19.	[Battle of Cedar Creek.]
Nov.	15.	Sherman leaves Atlanta on his march through Georgia, leaving Thomas in Tennessee.

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Nov. 20.		[<i>Beauregard</i> orders <i>Hood</i> against Thomas.]
„ 30.		[Battle of Franklin.]
Dec. 15-16.		[Battle of Nashville.]
„ 21.		Sherman enters Savannah.
	1865	
Feb. 1.		Sherman commences his march through the Carolinas.
„ 9.	<i>Lee</i> appointed Commander-in-Chief.	
„ 17.		Sherman reaches Columbia.
„ 18.		Fall of Charlestown.
„ 22.		[Fall of Wilmington.]
„ 27.	[<i>Sheridan</i> moves up the Valley.]	
Mar. 19.		Battle of Bentonville.
„ 23.		Sherman at Goldsboro.
April 1.	Battle of Five Forks.	
„ 2.	<i>Lee</i> abandons Richmond.	
„ 6.	Battle of Sailor's Creek.	
„ 9.	<i>Lee</i> surrenders at Appomattox Court House.	
„ 14.	President Lincoln assassinated.	
„ 26.		<i>Johnston</i> surrenders at Greensboro.
May 10.	<i>Jefferson Davis</i> captured.	



INTRODUCTION

THE election of Abraham Lincoln (November 6th, 1860) caused the first wave of secession in the South. The seven States of the 'Cotton South' saw in the triumph of the recently formed Republican Party, which was pledged to prevent the further expansion of slavery, an immediate menace to their prosperity and security. They therefore resolved to put in force what they claimed to be their constitutional right of secession, a right which 'the Fathers' of the Constitution had deliberately refrained from either asserting or denying, but which had been preached for a generation as the accepted doctrine of the South. Starting with South Carolina's Ordinance of Secession on December 20th, they one by one withdrew from the Union, ending with Texas on February 1st. A Provisional Congress of their delegates met on February 4th at Montgomery, Alabama, and speedily adopted a Provisional Government with *Jefferson Davis* of Mississippi as President and *Alexander Stephens* of Georgia, Vice-President. This step was hardly expected by the seceding States to provoke war. The outgoing President, Buchanan, was a Northern Democrat. In his Message to Congress of December 3rd he had expressly denied the right of secession; but he had qualified this declaration by expressing the opinion that the Constitution gave no power to the Federal Government to coerce a State into remaining in the Union. His main object during the remaining months of his Administration was to avoid responsibility himself and leave the problem unprejudiced to his successor for solution. Probably his views were those of the majority of the Northerners. The Abolitionist Party would have been only too glad to free itself from any connection whatever with the slaveholders of the South. In Congress earnest efforts were made to bring about conciliation and effect some compromise, which would enable the seceding States to return to the Union on practically their own terms. But the President Elect, though preserving a sphinx-like silence in Illinois, through his henchmen in Washington thwarted all attempts at compromise. He believed that the compromises of the past had only served to aggravate the bitterness between the two sections; 'a house divided

against itself cannot stand'; therefore it must cease to be divided; it must become all one thing or the other (slave or free). 'Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South.' So he had stated the issue in 1858; now in his Inaugural Address on March 4th, 1861, he used more conciliatory language; he declared that he had no wish, even if he had the power, which he doubted, to interfere with slavery in the States, where it was already established; but he pronounced all secession ordinances invalid and declared his intention to 'hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government.' This to the leaders of the new Confederacy, who had not hesitated to lay hands on all Federal property and places in their respective States, seemed a virtual declaration of war, and the Congress at Montgomery replied on March 6th by authorising a call for 100,000 volunteers for twelve months' service to 'repel invasion.' The case of Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbour provided the *casus belli*. The South Carolina Government were naturally anxious to get possession of this fort, built on an artificial island, which commanded the entrance of their principal harbour and, until February 12th when the Confederate Government took over the settlement of all questions between the different seceding States and the Federal Government, had been demanding the withdrawal of the small Federal garrison in occupation. An attempt to reprovision the garrison, which was on the verge of starvation, brought about a bombardment of the fort by the batteries erected round the harbour under the direction of *Beauregard*, who had been sent by the Confederate Government to Charleston on March 3rd. The first shot of the Civil War was fired at 4.30 a.m. of April 12th. Next day the commander, Major Anderson, offered to surrender and at noon on the 14th the U.S. flag was hauled down and the fort evacuated. President Lincoln on the 15th issued a call for 75,000 militia for three months' service to perform their constitutional duty of putting down an 'insurrection.'

This call brought about the second wave of secession. Of the seven Slave States still left in the Union (not counting Delaware, an appanage of Pennsylvania), all but Maryland through their Governors refused to find their appointed quotas of militia for the purpose of coercing the Confederate States. They openly defied the Federal Government. They had not been originally

in favour of secession. But their sympathies were with their Southern sisters, and if fight they must, they preferred to fight for them, not against them. They were going to fight not for the extension of slavery, but to vindicate the rights of 'Sovereign' States. Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas attached themselves to the Confederacy and its capital was now transferred from Montgomery to Richmond. The selection of Richmond was not a happy one. It was too near the frontier, less than a hundred miles from Washington, and vulnerable from the sea. Atlanta or Chattanooga would have been a wiser choice. But the Confederate Government were so much encouraged by this great accession of strength, believing too that the movement would spread into Kentucky and Missouri, that the very proximity of Richmond to the Federal capital was counted an argument in its favour. At the outset of hostilities Washington was dangerously isolated. On April 19th the secessionist mob took possession of Baltimore, and Washington was cut off from railway and telegraphic communication with the North. It was feared that *Beauregard* would move Confederate troops through Virginia to the Potomac or that the Virginia militia might make a raid on the capital. But it was not the policy of the Confederate Government to assume the offensive; they had been manœuvred by Lincoln into firing the first shot and sought to avoid any further action, which might prejudice them in the eyes of Europe as the originators of a civil war. The danger quickly passed; militia regiments from the North were brought by water from Philadelphia to Annapolis, whence a twenty-mile march put them in railway communication with Washington. The Governor of Maryland was loyal to the Union, as was the greater part of the State, and the occupation of Baltimore by General Butler on May 13th brought to an end all open resistance to the Federal Government.

Lincoln also secured to the Union the two remaining Slave States, Kentucky and Missouri, but by very different processes. Kentucky, true to its tradition of compromise between the rival sections, declared neutrality. It was a position, which the Federal Government could not permanently recognise. It was entirely to the advantage of the Confederacy, which continued to draw food supplies in great quantities from the State, whilst the territory of Kentucky stretching from the Mississippi to the Cumberland Mountains protected the seceding States from invasion. Both combatants were anxious to win the State to their side. If it attached itself to the South, the Confederate frontier would be extended northward to the Ohio, and the

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possession of the Ohio valley might well exercise a decisive influence upon the course of the war, as it would command the direct line of communication between Washington and the West. Lincoln, himself a Kentuckian by birth (as was also *Jefferson Davis*), understood his countrymen better than did the hot-headed counsellors around him, and dexterously played a waiting game, knowing that any attempt to take forcible measures with the State would throw its citizens into the arms of the South. In September Confederate patience was exhausted, and an armed force entered Kentucky and occupied Columbus on the Mississippi with the purpose of converting it into a fortress to close the river against a descent threatened by Fremont, the Federal commander in Missouri. The State Government thereupon declared for the Union.

Events took a different course in Missouri. There the extremists on both sides took control and civil war ensued. The Governor was a rabid secessionist and, backed by the Legislature, endeavoured to take the State out of the Union, although the majority of the inhabitants, like their neighbours, favoured neutrality. But the leaders of the extreme Republican faction anticipated him in the appeal to force and under the leadership of Lyon, commander of the Federal arsenal at St. Louis, took the field and quickly put the Governor and his supporters to flight. But the intrusion of Federal troops into a domestic quarrel drove a number of citizens previously neutral into the ranks of secession. It was not till the following March that the Federals gained real control of the State after the battle of Pea Ridge, and throughout the war guerilla warfare was kept up within its territory and continued efforts were made by Confederate forces to recover the State, which with Kentucky the Richmond Government claimed as a member of the Confederacy.

In addition to Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri, Lincoln also secured West Virginia to the Union. This section of Virginia was separated from the rest of the State by the Alleghanies, and geographically and economically belonged to the Ohio valley. Its inhabitants had long felt that their interests were neglected by the more largely represented eastern section, which had acquired complete control of the State Government. They promptly seized the opportunity now offered of freeing themselves from this one-sided partnership. The population of lumber-men, miners, and hunters were staunch supporters of the Union and had no sympathy with slavery, which hardly existed in their section. When they found themselves outvoted in the State Convention, which passed an Ordinance of Secession on April

17th, they seceded themselves from the disloyal State Government. Ohio, their powerful neighbour on the other side of the river, was ready enough to help them and in June McClellan crushed the feeble attempt of the Richmond Government to re-establish their authority over the seceding section. On August 20th delegates from forty counties passed an ordinance creating the new State of Kanawha, which two years later was formally admitted into the Federal Union as the State of West Virginia.

As the Confederate States were merely claiming the right to go their own way, their policy was defensive. The North, denying that right and after Fort Sumter determined to coerce the seceding States back into the Union, was forced to take the offensive. Though twenty-two States with a population of twenty-two millions were arrayed against half that number with a population of only nine millions, of whom three and a half were negroes, the task before the North was a truly formidable one. The slaves, so far from proving an embarrassment to the Confederacy, preserved their loyalty to their masters and by their work on railways and fortifications released a large number of whites for service in the field. It was not a matter of winning a few victories and then dictating terms of peace. The whole country, 'nearly four times the size of France,' would have to be conquered piecemeal. From north to south it stretched 800 miles, from east to west 1,700. The railways were few and poorly conditioned; the roads no better. The country was only sparsely inhabited. The invader would have to bring his own food-supplies with him, except in a comparatively few favoured regions, and the further he advanced into the interior, the more difficult would he find it to preserve his lines of communication. One great advantage the North had, viz. the command of the sea. The blockade of the Confederate coasts, which Lincoln had declared on April 19th, could in course of time be made effective, but at the start only a few of the U.S. warships were in commission and those were mainly on foreign stations. But the blockade, when once it became effective, would put a stranglehold upon the Confederate States, isolating them from the rest of the world and throwing them entirely on their own resources. In a protracted struggle it was likely to prove the decisive factor in the end.

Both combatants had to create an army, and in either case it was bound to be an army of volunteers. In 1860 the U.S. Regular Army numbered about 16,000; but by far the greater part was scattered in small detachments on the Indian frontier and could not be withdrawn. Both in the Northern and Southern

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States there was a great quantity of so-called militia, but the corps with few exceptions existed only for social purposes, were without discipline or training, and useless as military units in time of war. It was a great advantage to the Southerners that they were able from the first to cut loose from the red tape and bureaucratic traditions of the U.S. War Department. In the North the old practice of employing the machinery of the several States for the raising of its troops in war-time was maintained. The North organised its armed forces, as if it had been a confederacy of States; the South, like a single nation. For the 'Sovereign States' of the Confederacy under the stress of war quickly abandoned the principle of decentralisation, for which originally they had stood, and allowed *Jefferson Davis* to raise his volunteers without any State interference.

The Southern President was well qualified to deal with the material at his disposal. A graduate at West Point in the class of 1828, he had served several years in the Regular Army; later he commanded with distinction a Mississippi volunteer regiment in the Mexican War, was Secretary of War in the Pierce Administration, and after that till the outbreak of the Civil War had been chairman of the Senate Committee on military affairs. He knew the army inside out and could be depended upon to find the right men for the responsible posts. Of the Southern graduates from West Point serving in the U.S. Army in 1861 only a bare majority (168 to 162) resigned their commissions and went with their respective States; this number was increased by sixteen Northerners. Ninety-nine (all but one Southerners) graduates joined the Confederate forces from civil life; of these 283 no fewer than 182 attained the rank of general officer, and among these were three of the most distinguished officers in the old Regular Army, *R. E. Lee*, *Albert Sidney Johnston*, and *Joseph E. Johnston*. *Lee* had been the first choice of General Winfield Scott, head of the U.S. Army, for the command of the army which was to strike the first blow at the Confederacy; *A. S. Johnston* had been commander of the Utah Expedition in the Mormon War and was in *Jefferson Davis's* opinion the ablest officer in the Regular Army. *J. E. Johnston* was Quartermaster-General of the U.S. Army, and the Adjutant-General, *Samuel Cooper*, also left Washington to take a like post in the Confederate army. In that army the gradations of the military hierarchy were duly observed; generals commanded armies, lieutenant-generals army corps, and major-generals divisions. Not only did *Jefferson Davis* select (with rare exceptions) the right men, but he supported them in adversity; he did not at once remove a general, because

INTRODUCTION

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he met with a reverse. Thus the same generals, who were in command at the beginning of the war, were still in command at its end with the exception of *A. S. Johnston*, who was killed at Shiloh in April, 1862. This loyalty to the general of his selection was sometimes, however, carried too far. The earlier relief of *Bragg* and *Hood* would have saved the Confederacy from the disasters of Chattanooga and Nashville.

It was a very different story with the Federal army. There, till March, 1864, there was no rank higher than that of major-general; officers of the same rank were commanding armies, corps, and divisions with consequent confusion and jealousy. Abraham Lincoln had no military experience, knew nothing of the army, and was personally acquainted with very few of its officers. His appointments were too often made on political grounds; Fremont, Butler, and Banks were examples of the evil consequences of such preferment. When a popular outcry demanded the recall of a defeated general, Lincoln too often yielded; a general, who had failed once, rarely was allowed a second chance. Each defeat which the Army of the Potomac suffered at the hands of *Lee*, was followed by a change of commander. None of the generals commanding the main armies at the end of the war had held a high command at the beginning. A ruthless process of elimination eventually brought the best men (and they were very good) to the top; but in the process some good men had disappeared, and the army was the poorer for their loss. The War Department also failed to make the best use of the junior officers in the Regular Army. Too many of them were left with their detachments in the Far West instead of being utilised to train and lead the volunteer levies. Whereas one-half of the West Point graduates who rejoined from civil life reached the rank of general officer, only one-quarter of those still serving attained that distinction. Lincoln had met the second wave of secession with a call for 42,000 volunteers for three years' service, 22,000 infantry for the Regular Army, and 18,000 men for the Navy. The volunteers came forward in far greater numbers than had been asked for, and by July 1st 200,000 had been accepted; but the new regular regiments were never more than half-filled. Public opinion, however, demanded that some use should be made of the militia contingents before their term of service expired. *Jefferson Davis* had established himself in his new capital and summoned the Confederate Congress to meet there. 'On to Richmond' became the popular cry in the North; capture the rebel capital before the Congress can assemble there. Winfield Scott, who realised the worthlessness

of the militia and wished to postpone any offensive operations until the volunteers had had some months' training, was overruled by the Cabinet, and as he was too old and infirm to take the field in person, Major McDowell, Assistant Adjutant-General in the War Department, was selected to command the army of invasion. But before Richmond could be reached, the force which *Beauregard* was collecting at Manassas Junction had to be dealt with. The Confederates had the advantage of the 'interior lines.' *J. E. Johnston* eluded the Federal commander in the Shenandoah Valley and brought his troops by the Manassas Gap railway to *Beauregard's* aid. McDowell was defeated in the First Battle of Bull Run (July 21st) and the retreat of his undisciplined army degenerated into a rout. Washington itself was in grave peril. It is still a subject of debate, whether the victorious army ought not to have tried to consummate its victory by the capture of the capital. But *Johnston*, now in command of his own and *Beauregard's* forces, considered that the Confederates were even more disorganised by victory than the Federals by defeat, and refrained from pressing the pursuit. There is less doubt that *President Davis* was wrong, when he declined two months later to reinforce his generals for an invasion of Maryland. They realised that if *McClellan*, who had been summoned after Bull Run from West Virginia to take command of the troops in and around Washington, were allowed to reorganise the Federal army on the opposite bank of the Potomac undisturbed, he would be able within a few months to build up an army, disciplined, trained, and equipped, and in numbers greatly superior to their own. Their only chance of escaping defeat or retreat in the near future was to cross the Potomac into Maryland and by threatening the communications of Washington, whilst their own troops still had the superiority in morale and prestige, force *McClellan* to bring out against them his raw levies, before he had time to fashion them into an efficient fighting force. Estimating their own strength at 40,000 men, they asked the President to reinforce them with 20,000 'seasoned soldiers.' He refused to withdraw the required troops from the garrisons on the Atlantic coast, fearing trouble with the State Governors. The real weakness of the Confederacy is here revealed. The 'Sovereign States' composing it were not a nation, but a league of nations. Just as they had set their loyalty to their own individual States above that which they owed to the United States, so now they put their own State interests before those of the Southern cause as a whole. The President also believed that the proposed offensive was unnecessary. He thought that Southern indepen-

dence was already as good as won, that foreign recognition would be secured in the next few months, and that a cotton famine would force England and France to follow up recognition with intervention. Thus for the South Bull Run was a barren victory. Indirectly it did the South a great disservice. Believing with their President that foreign intervention was near at hand and arrogantly confident that they could best the North again in the field, if need arose, the Confederates relaxed their efforts. Recruiting fell off; the soldiers in the field began to go home with or without leave to visit their families or attend to their business; the efforts of a more far-sighted Congress to fill the ranks and increase the number of men under arms by grants of bounties and furloughs met with but a faint response. Trouble was brewing for the South, if the war lasted into 1862.

Lee, who had been acting as the President's military adviser at Richmond, was sent in August to West Virginia. He was, however, given no fresh troops; his task was to co-ordinate the operations of four small forces in that area, whose commanders were acting independently of each other. His attempt to organise an offensive failed; he could do no more than check the further advance of the Federals now under Rosecrans, *McClellan's* successor.

In Missouri the secessionist Governor and his supporters had been chased into the south-western corner of the State by Lyon, but having received reinforcements of Confederate troops from Arkansas and Texas they advanced again. Lyon, who had followed in pursuit a hundred miles beyond his railway base, was neither reinforced nor recalled by Fremont, the recently appointed commander of the Western Department, and was defeated and killed in the battle of Wilson's Creek (August 10th). But the victorious generals could not agree on any joint plan of further action and consequently failed to exploit their success.

The Confederates had won the only two pitched battles fought in 1861, but these produced no such solid results as attended *McClellan's* minor successes in West Virginia.

While the South had lapsed into apathy, in the North every effort was being made to make its immense resources in men and material available for the next campaign, which was to wipe out the disgrace of Bull Run. On the morrow of that defeat Congress had voted the enlistment of 500,000 volunteers for three years' service. *McClellan* proved a first-rate organiser, and under his direction the volunteers, who poured in, were quickly fashioned into the semblance of an army. But no one knew better than *McClellan* that it would take several months before they were

sufficiently trained to take the field. Public opinion, however, grew restive. It was universally expected, that McClellan would lead his army out against *Johnston* before the winter closed down military operations. Till at least the end of October he seems to have intended to advance on Manassas Junction before the roads became impassable. But soon after his appointment (November 1st) as General-in-Chief he appears to have begun to consider the postponement of his offensive till the following spring. The possibility of having to provide for the defence of the northern frontier against a British attack from Canada in consequence of the trouble arising out of the *Trent* affair recommended this course, and when he had once decided upon it the idea of using the command of the sea to ship his army to some point in the vicinity of Richmond appealed to him the more strongly, because it would avoid the necessity of hurling his still insufficiently trained troops against *Johnston's* army, which he believed to be strongly entrenched and whose numbers he greatly exaggerated. Whatever his plans, he kept them a close secret. In December he fell ill and was absent from his office for some weeks. On his return in the middle of January he laid before the astonished President his new plan of moving his army down Chesapeake Bay, which Lincoln after a protracted resistance finally accepted in March with the proviso that the safety of Washington should be amply secured.

In 1862 the course of military operations in Virginia and the Mississippi Valley ran on parallel lines. In both theatres the Federals took the offensive. In the West, where the campaign opened in February, they broke through the Confederate first line of defence at Fort Donelson and captured Nashville, the capital of Tennessee. But through delay in following up their success they lost their first chance of striking a really decisive blow. Resuming the offensive in April they defeated the Confederate counterstroke at Shiloh, opened the Mississippi down to Memphis and by the capture of Corinth (May 30th) broke through the enemy's second line of defence, the Memphis-Charleston railway. They now had the game in their hands; but instead of pushing on to Vicksburg, Halleck, who was now in supreme command in the West, scattered his forces and allowed the initiative to pass into the hands of the Confederate commander, *Bragg*. Consequently at the end of August *Bragg* from Chattanooga and *Kirby Smith* from East Tennessee undertook an invasion of Kentucky, which brought Buell's army back on a stern chase to the Ohio. The subordination of strategy to political aims

reduced the invasion to the dimensions of a raid, and when Buell with his army largely reinforced advanced again from Louisville, the Confederate generals retreated into East Tennessee. At the very end of the year the Federals renewed their offensive. Rosecrans, who had superseded Buell, advanced from Nashville against *Bragg* at Murfreesborough and after a hard-fought battle the Confederates fell back towards Chattanooga. For lack of anything better, this was hailed by the North as a great victory. From West Tennessee Grant undertook a combined movement, overland and down the Mississippi, against Vicksburg. Grant himself, advancing along the Mississippi Central railway to get in the rear of Vicksburg, was obliged to retire owing to the capture of his advanced supply depôt and the injury done to his lines of communication by cavalry raids; whilst Sherman in command of the river expedition, being left without support from Grant, was defeated, when he attempted to storm the line of bluffs on the north side of Vicksburg.

In Virginia McClellan, having at last gained Lincoln's consent to his overseas expedition, landed in the beginning of April at Fortress Monroe, on the end of the Yorktown Peninsula, with three corps of the Army of the Potomac. McDowell's Corps was detained temporarily by the President for the protection of Washington. McClellan's advance up the Peninsula was very slow, but at the end of May he was within five miles of Richmond, and its fall seemed inevitable, as McDowell's Corps was now under orders to advance from Fredericksburg and join McClellan on the Chickahominy. But McClellan had dallied too long and lost his opportunity. '*Stonewall*' Jackson's operations in the Shenandoah Valley caused the order to McDowell to be countermanded. Lee was assigned to the command of the Army of Northern Virginia on June 1st. Further successes won by Jackson caused McDowell's advance to be countermanded a second time. In the end it was Jackson, who reinforced Lee, instead of McDowell reinforcing McClellan. On June 26th began the 'Seven Days' Battle.' On the 27th the one Federal Corps left on the north bank of the Chickahominy to secure the junction with McDowell, if he should ever appear, was defeated and retreated across the river, and McClellan at last ordered the change of base to the James, which he had been for some time contemplating. The movement was successfully carried out. Lee's attempts to break through the Federal columns of march failed and his final attack at Malvern Hill was decisively repulsed (July 1st). McClellan established himself in an impregnable position at Harrison's Landing on the James, where his

communications by water were perfectly safe. He was many miles farther from Richmond than he had been a week earlier, but he was now in a position from which he could open a fresh campaign against Petersburg, the 'backdoor' of Richmond. The Administration had, however, lost all confidence in McClellan, and early in August the Army of the Potomac was recalled from the Peninsula. *Lee* was quick to seize the initiative. At the end of June the Washington Government had formed a new army, the short-lived Army of Virginia under Pope, to create a diversion in favour of McClellan by an advance on Gordonsville. *Lee* promptly turned upon Pope, put him in retreat from the Rapidan across the Rappahannock, defeated him in the Second Battle of Bull Run, drove him into the fortifications of Washington, and invaded Maryland (September 4th). This invasion, like *Bragg's* simultaneous invasion of Kentucky, met with slight success. *Lee* captured Harper's Ferry with its garrison; but to effect this he had to divide his army, and McClellan, who had been hastily recalled to command, forced him to fight a defensive battle on the Antietam. *Lee* held his own on September 17th against great odds, but on the night of the 18th withdrew his army across the Potomac. McClellan remained inactive for five weeks after the battle, before he followed *Lee* into Virginia, and as he was considered by the Government to be making little effort to bring on a battle, he was relieved of his command and Burnside put in his place (November 7th). The new commander at once started a vigorous offensive, but on quite different lines. He shifted his base to Aquia Creek and planned to cross the Rappahannock opposite Fredericksburg and march straight on Richmond. But *Lee* reached Fredericksburg before Burnside could effect a crossing, and entrenched himself on the heights south of the town. The Federal commander, having at last crossed the river, attempted to storm *Lee's* position (December 13th). Being repulsed with very heavy losses, he withdrew his troops to the north bank, and his brief campaign came to an ignominious end.

For the failure of McClellan's Peninsular campaign the Federal Government must be held mainly responsible. In March he had been removed from the post of General-in-Chief. This step may be defended on the ground that McClellan in the Peninsula could no longer exercise any control over military operations in the West. But the Government made the grave mistake of appointing no successor. For the next four months Federal strategy was directed by the President and the Secretary of War. They called into their counsels the heads of various

bureaux in the War Department, men who had long been divorced from active military duties and absorbed in the administration of their departments. This unofficial Council of War (the Second Aulic Council) began by detaching McDowell's Corps from McClellan's command and by this decision went far to ruin his campaign. In the absence of this corps he was held up for a month before Yorktown. Not that McClellan himself was entirely free from blame. He had left Washington for Fortress Monroe without troubling himself to explain to the President, that Banks's large force in the Shenandoah Valley was available for the protection of Washington, so Lincoln in his ignorance of strategy could only see that McClellan had evaded the strict letter of his injunctions for the complete security of the Capital. Again, if McClellan instead of sitting down to the siege of Yorktown had made a vigorous attempt to force the Confederate lines across the Peninsula, he could probably have gained his object without serious loss of life.

The same Order, which did away with a General-in-Chief, directed all general officers commanding to report to the Secretary of War, who without apparent reference to the President proceeded still further to circumscribe McClellan's command by the creation of new Military Departments in Northern Virginia under McDowell and Banks. It was not till after McClellan's movement to the James that Lincoln decided to have recourse again to a General-in-Chief and Halleck was assigned to that post; a natural selection in the circumstances, because the Government did not know that the victories in the West, for which he had got the credit, had really been won by Grant, almost in his despite. Halleck, however, proved a most unfortunate choice. He did indeed settle the question of McClellan's recall, which was agitating the Cabinet. Whether this decision was another major mistake on the part of the Government, is open to debate. But Halleck's subsequent policy of uniting the Armies of the Potomac and of Virginia on the line of the Rappahannock was strategically unsound and led to Pope's defeat at the Second Bull Run. After this Halleck consistently shirked responsibility for any important decision and sank into the position of a member of the Second Aulic Council. Instead of being the President's military adviser he was content to become the Secretary of War's chief clerk.

The appointment of Burnside in place of McClellan was a terrible mistake. There may have been sufficient reasons on military grounds for the latter's removal and politically he, as a Democrat, had become more than ever the object of Republican

distrust after the proclamation of the Edict of Emancipation. But Burnside had already declined the command, because he felt himself inadequate to it. Although the senior corps commander in the Army of the Potomac, he had only recently joined it and was generally regarded in that army as responsible for the failure to defeat *Lee* on the Antietam. His appointment seems to have been due to the hope that as one of McClellan's intimate friends he might prove acceptable to the Army of the Potomac.

In the West the Federal failure to follow up their successes was the fault of the generals rather than of the Government. At the outset the dual control set up in the Mississippi Valley by McClellan as General-in-Chief with Halleck in command west and Buell east of the Cumberland river was unfavourable to any combined operations. The generals were jealous of each other and both were seeking the sole command. The vulnerable spot in the Confederate position in Kentucky with its right wing at Bowling Green and its left at Columbus on the Mississippi was where the Memphis and Ohio railway, their lateral line of communications, crossed the Tennessee and Cumberland. To protect the railway bridges two forts had been constructed, Fort Henry on the right bank of the Tennessee and Fort Donelson on the left bank of the Cumberland, twelve miles apart. During the winter the Federals had constructed a fleet of river gunboats, and Buell proposed that two flotillas should ascend the two rivers, each accompanied by a land force of 10,000 men to be found by Halleck, while he himself marched straight on Nashville. Halleck with his hands full in Missouri declared himself unable to find more than half the number required and the plan was temporarily shelved. Buell was preparing for an invasion of East Tennessee to give aid to the loyalists in that district—a campaign on which President Lincoln had set his heart, erroneously thinking that he would find in East Tennessee a second West Virginia—when suddenly Halleck without a word of warning despatched Grant up the Tennessee. Fort Henry was easily reduced by the gunboats, and Grant on his own initiative extended the operation by marching on Fort Donelson. *A. S. Johnston* now made the fatal mistake of dividing the force left at his disposal, sending one half to Fort Donelson and concentrating the other at Nashville. Had he marched with the whole of it to the aid of Donelson, he would have saved the fort and might have recaptured Henry. As it was, he lost Donelson and its garrison of over 15,000 men and had to abandon Nashville. If now Halleck and Buell could have agreed to co-operate, Grant reinforced by the one division, which Buell had been able to

send by water to his support, could have followed in pursuit of *Johnston* and forced him to abandon Chattanooga or face the risk of being besieged there. But Halleck recalled Grant to Fort Henry and Buell was afraid to press the pursuit single-handed. *Johnston* thus was afforded a respite, of which he took advantage to organise a counter-offensive with the aid of troops brought by *Beauregard* from Columbus and *Bragg* from Pensacola.

Halleck had been appointed Commander-in-Chief in the West on March 11th and was leisurely preparing a concentration of all his forces preliminary to advancing on Corinth. The strategical importance of Corinth lay in the fact that it was at this point that the Memphis-Charleston railway was intersected by the Mobile and Ohio railway, and only a few miles to the west the same railway was intersected by the Mississippi Central railway from New Orleans. Halleck had ordered Buell to march his army from Nashville to Savannah on the Tennessee and join forces with Grant on the opposite bank. When the two armies were united, Halleck intended to go to the front and take command in person. None of the Federal leaders thought that there was any chance of a Confederate counter-offensive. But *Johnston*, having concentrated his forces at Corinth, determined to strike at Grant before Buell could reach him. Grant narrowly escaped disaster on the first day of Shiloh, but on the second, having been reinforced by Buell's main body, he took the offensive and put the Confederates in full retreat on Corinth. If the pursuit had been pressed, Corinth would have been captured with little or no resistance, so demoralised were the Confederates, to a large number of whom the two days' battle had been their first introduction to actual warfare, by the death of their leader, and by defeat, when victory had seemed all but won. But Halleck did not advance till three weeks after the battle, and then so slow was his cautious approach, that it was not till the end of May that *Beauregard*, who had succeeded *Johnston*, evacuated Corinth and withdrew to a position fifty miles south on the Mobile and Ohio railway. Halleck was then at the head of an army of 100,000 men, double the strength of *Beauregard's*. His next movement should have been against Vicksburg. The lower Mississippi was already in the hands of the Federals: on April 24th Farragut, commander of the Western Gulf Blockading Squadron, had run past the forts on either bank of the Mississippi guarding the approach to New Orleans, and the largest city and commercial capital of the Confederacy had fallen the next day. He had then continued his ascent of the river and appeared off Vicksburg on May 18th. Having only a handful of soldiers on

board, he made no attempt to reduce the place, and returned to New Orleans to reappear again on June 25th, with a larger military force. This time he ran past the Vicksburg batteries and joined hands with the river fleet, which had come down from Memphis. But during his absence the garrison had been considerably increased, and the military force which he had with him was quite inadequate to the task of capturing the city. Accordingly at the end of July he returned a second time to New Orleans. It is plain that if Halleck, in spite of the slowness of his operations against Corinth, had after its fall moved on Vicksburg, he could with the help of the navy have reduced it with but little difficulty. *Beauregard* must either have thrown himself into the place, where he would have eventually been starved into surrender, or endeavoured to prevent Halleck from reaching Vicksburg; but his army was too inferior in numbers and morale to risk another battle in the open field. With the capture of Vicksburg the Federals would have won possession of the whole length of the Mississippi, and the Confederacy would have been cut in two. But Halleck neither advanced against Vicksburg along the Mississippi Central railway nor moved out against *Beauregard* on the Mobile and Ohio railway. He was imbued with the idea that the important strategic point of the West had been gained and that all that remained was to hold it and extend the line eastward to embrace East Tennessee—at least as far as Chattanooga' (Conger). Accordingly he ordered Buell's force, about a third of his whole army, to advance eastwards along the Memphis-Charleston railway to Chattanooga. He sent one division across the Mississippi into Arkansas and with the rest of his army, still over 60,000 strong, remained at Corinth and busied himself with repairing the railways which connected that place with Memphis and Columbus, his bases on the Mississippi. He was thus employed when he was summoned to Washington to take over the post of General-in-Chief. Instead of appointing a single Commander-in-Chief to take his place in the West, he restored the dual control instituted by McClellan, assigning Grant to command the Department of West Tennessee, whilst Buell resumed his old command in Middle and East Tennessee. But he tied Grant's hands and restricted him to the defensive by requiring him to hold reinforcements in readiness to assist Buell, if needed. Buell, owing to the difficulty of keeping his line of communications open, made but a slow advance on Chattanooga, was forestalled by *Bragg*, who had superseded *Beauregard*, and brought all the way back to the Ohio. The Confederate general, when he started on his invasion of Kentucky,

had left the troops which *Sterling Price* and *Van Dorn* after their defeat at Pea Ridge in March had brought to the east of the Mississippi, too late to take part in the battle of Shiloh, but in time to aid in the defence of Corinth, to keep Grant occupied and prevent him reinforcing Buell. These two commanders attempted an ambitious offensive to recapture Corinth, but were heavily defeated in October, and Grant at last gained permission to undertake an advance against Vicksburg with all his forces. A discreditable intrigue at Washington, where McClelland, one of his lieutenants, a 'political' general, who had great influence among the Democrats of Illinois, was endeavouring to gain independent command of an expedition down the Mississippi against Vicksburg, now compelled Grant to divide his forces and send Sherman back to Memphis to carry out the river expedition before McClelland could arrive to take command of it. The consequent failure of Grant's final movement against Vicksburg has already been explained.

The Federals had made solid gains in the West, which the Confederates were never able subsequently to wrest from them. But they had not accomplished all that might have been anticipated after their initial successes, and for that failure Halleck must be held mainly responsible. West and Middle Tennessee had been secured, but Lincoln's hope of reclaiming East Tennessee had not been realised. All the Mississippi, except the 200-mile stretch from Vicksburg to Port Hudson, was in Federal hands. If Vicksburg had fallen in the summer of 1862, the whole course of the river would have been controlled by their war vessels, and the Confederacy would have been cut in two. The Federals should have gained in 1862 such a position in the Mississippi Valley as would have put the final issue of the war in the West beyond all question.

The Confederate Government found themselves at the beginning of 1862 in an almost desperate position. A large proportion of the men under arms, estimated at from one-third to even two-thirds of the whole, consisted of volunteers, who had enlisted for one year only. By the middle of May the terms of enlistment of the 148 regiments which they formed would have expired. A large majority of these men had not been tempted by the offer of bounties and furloughs to re-enlist, and of those, who had re-enlisted, a very large majority had again entered corps which could never be assembled, or if assembled could not be prepared for the field in time to meet the threatened invasion. It was imperative that these regiments should not be allowed to dissolve,

but should be retained in the army, of which they formed the backbone. This could only be effected by means of a Conscription Act, which was a violation of the theory of the independence and sovereignty of the States. In the emergency Congress rose valiantly to the occasion, and on April 16th by a vote of more than two to one passed an Act declaring every able-bodied white man between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five subject to the military service of the Confederacy. The Act came too late to save the West, where the invasion had already been in progress for two months, but it was just in time to enable Lee to save Richmond. During the summer of 1862 the Confederacy had more men under arms (about 340,000) than at any other period of the war. It was not that the numbers were swelled by conscripts: they were due to a great influx of volunteers seeking to escape the stigma of serving under compulsion. The twelve-months' volunteers proved their patriotism by submitting almost without a murmur.

Lee had been called to Richmond in March to act as the President's Chief of Staff. He realised that, if the enemy were allowed to effect a great concentration before Richmond with *McClellan's* army from the Peninsula and other troops advancing southward from the Rappahannock, the Southern capital was doomed. He sought to prevent this concentration by manœuvre; for this time must be gained. *McClellan* must be detained as long as possible in the Peninsula; therefore *Johnston's* army, which having evacuated Manassas Junction on March 9th had been brought to Richmond from the Rapidan when *McClellan* landed at Fortress Monroe, was sent to reinforce *Magruder* in the Yorktown lines. To prevent Federal troops from crossing the Rappahannock *Lee* exerted himself to strengthen the small force holding Fredericksburg, and urged on *Jackson* the necessity of driving Banks down the Valley; the Federals were not likely to advance in force, if their line of communications was threatened with a Confederate attack through the Blue Ridge gaps.

At the end of April the Shenandoah Valley seemed in danger of falling entirely into Federal hands. Fremont in the Mountain Department was organising a movement into East Tennessee and two of his brigades were approaching Staunton; Banks at Harrisonburg was preparing to advance and join Fremont there. *Jackson* himself lay on Banks's left flank in Swift Run Gap, and behind him was *Ewell's* division at Gordonsville; north-west of Staunton *Edward Johnson's* brigade faced Fremont's vanguard. *Lee*, as was his wont, left the details to be settled

by the 'man on the spot' after explaining the main outlines of his plan. *Jackson* artfully deceived *Banks* into the belief that he was leaving the Valley for Richmond, whereas he was really moving his troops to Staunton. Picking up *Johnson's* brigade, he marched against *Fremont's* troops, defeated them on May 8th, pursued them for nearly thirty miles and then turned back to deal with *Banks*, who having detached one of his two divisions to join *McDowell* for the movement on Richmond had fallen back to Strasburg. *Jackson* now joined hands with *Evell*, who had replaced him in Swift Run Gap, and getting in *Banks's* rear by an advance down the Luray Valley, for which he was quite unprepared, drove him out of Winchester and across the Potomac (May 23rd-26th). The panic, which this Confederate movement down the Valley threatening an invasion of Maryland caused at Washington, revealed to *Lee* the excessive anxiety of Lincoln for the safety of his capital. *Jackson*, having caused the diversion of *McDowell's* force to the Valley and the postponement of the advance on Richmond, retreated to Harrisonburg, turned south-east and defeated his pursuers in detail, as they had advanced up the two forks of the Shenandoah river with the Massanutten range between them (June 8th-9th). *Lee* now proceeded to play a second time upon the fears of Lincoln and sent *Jackson* considerable reinforcements. As the defeated Federals had already retreated out of his reach and the time was fast approaching when *Lee's* counter-stroke must be launched, *Jackson* drew a cavalry cordon across the Valley and on the 17th began to withdraw the rest of his forces. His latest victories and the news, that he had been heavily reinforced, again alarmed Lincoln for Washington and caused *McDowell's* Corps once more to be withheld from *McClellan*.

So far *Lee's* strategy had succeeded. He had assembled for his counter-offensive an army as large as *McClellan's*; besides the Valley troops reinforcements had been received from Savannah and Charleston. The Seven Days' battle freed Richmond from all fear of a siege, but *Lee* was disappointed in his hope of annihilating his opponent. *McClellan's* change of base from the Pamunkey to the James had not been foreseen. *Lee* expected that he would either try to recover his original base or retreat down the Peninsula to Fortress Monroe. In either case he would have to recross the Chickahominy and *Lee* wasted the whole of the 28th on the north bank of that stream; the Federal movement towards the James was not discovered before night-fall, and *McClellan* had gained a clear day's start. *Lee's* attempts on the next two days to hold fast the rear of *McClellan's* columns

and attack his right flank failed. On the 29th *Jackson* was unable to cross the Chickahominy, where the Federals had destroyed the bridges, in time to support *Magruder* in an attack upon the enemy rear at Savage Station, and on that day *McClellan* got all his trains safely over the White Oak Swamp. On the 30th *Jackson* was again held up, on the White Oak Swamp, while *Longstreet* and *A. P. Hill* were fiercely attacking the Federal rearguard at Glendale. Next morning the Army of the Potomac was standing in line of battle on Malvern Hill. *Lee's* attack on that formidable position should never have been made. *Jackson* urged a flank movement to the left, which would have secured a position, admirable for artillery and commanding the road on which the Federal trains were moving. But *Lee* let himself be over-persuaded by *Longstreet*, who believed that the Federals were 'on the run.' The Confederate attack was woefully mismanaged, and if *McClellan* had seized the opportunity to counter-attack next day, he would probably have been able to start a fresh offensive against Richmond from his new base.

It has been suggested by General *Alexander*, *Longstreet's* chief of artillery and an impartial critic, in his *Memoirs* of his own side's operations, that the Confederates in this campaign lost an opportunity of utilising their advantage of 'the interior lines'; 20,000 men of *Beauregard's* army resting on the Mobile and Ohio railway might have been detached in June to reinforce *Lee* at Richmond. The shortest route from the West to Virginia was by the East Tennessee railway from Chattanooga *via* Knoxville and Lynchburg. This line continued in Confederate possession until September 1863, so at first sight it may seem strange that no attempt was made to shift troops from one theatre of war to the other until this route had been closed by *Burnside's* occupation of Knoxville. In such a case *Beauregard's* 20,000 men would have had first to be railed *via* Mobile to Chattanooga, and the Southern railways were so poorly conditioned that the movement of large bodies of troops with their baggage was a lengthy process and dislocated all other traffic. As *Halleck* was still at Corinth, only fifty miles away, and could have quickly concentrated 70,000 men if necessary, and even recalled *Buell*, for an advance against the rest of *Beauregard's* force (30,000), the detachment could only be absent for a limited period. Further, the most accurate timing would have been required, if it was first to help *Lee* to overwhelm *McClellan* and then return in time to *Beauregard's* assistance, and it would have been impossible for *Lee* to fix in advance the exact date, when its co-operation would be needed and even more impossible to

fix the date of its return. The idea of any such co-operation seems never to have presented itself to *Lee* or *Beauregard*. It would certainly have been resented by the Governors of Mississippi and Alabama, whose territories would have been exposed by any reduction of *Beauregard's* forces, and therefore have been contrary to President *Davis's* policy.

A second opportunity for co-operation in the two main theatres of war might seem to have been missed in September, when *Bragg* was invading Kentucky and *Lee* was marching into Maryland, each with an army too small for its task. General *Alexander* definitely states that *Lee* after his defeat of Pope and the Federal retreat to Washington should have withdrawn behind the Rappahannock, and leaving one half of his army under *Jackson* to stand on the defensive have taken *Longstreet* and the other half by rail to Chattanooga to join *Bragg*. The dates show, however, that this manœuvre was impracticable. On August 30th, when *Lee* defeated Pope at Bull Run, *Kirby Smith* who was leading the invasion in the West was already in Kentucky and routing a Federal force at Richmond. The length of the railway journey *viâ* Gordonsville and the time required for organising at Chattanooga a wagon train to carry his food supplies would have prevented *Lee* from reaching *Bragg* in time to cut off Buell from Louisville, and in the meantime the Federal army at Washington, reorganised by McClellan, could have taken the offensive against *Jackson*, and Richmond would have been in danger. The Southern railway system was in too backward a state to allow the transport of troops on a large scale from one theatre to the other without dangerously weakening the army from which the detachment was made. The Civil War was indeed the first in which bodies of troops were shifted by railway in a theatre of war.

When *Lee* crossed the Rapidan in pursuit of Pope, he had a definite plan of campaign in view. He intended to throw Pope back from the Rappahannock and by manœuvre free that section of Northern Virginia from enemy occupation. He was not looking to fighting a pitched battle south of the Potomac. *Jackson's* famous flank march through Thoroughfare Gap on to Pope's rear was not designed to force battle on Pope before he could be reinforced from the Army of the Potomac, but to compel his retreat by cutting his line of supply from Washington. *Lee* knew from the capture of Pope's dispatch-book, that troops from the Peninsula were disembarking at Aquia Creek, and his object was to keep the two Federal armies as far apart as possible. But *Jackson*, who after the capture of Manassas Junction had

secured a clear line of retreat through the Bull Run Mountain passes, deliberately precipitated a battle, presumably because he had by this time learnt that Federal troops were disembarking at Alexandria and that merely to put Pope in retreat would hasten the union of his army with McClellan's. *Lee*, having followed *Jackson* to Thoroughfare Gap, was ready to play his part in the battle. Pope was driven across Bull Run (August 30th) and withdrew his army within the fortifications of Washington (September 3rd). On the next day *Lee* was moving his army across the Potomac into Maryland. He had received reinforcements from Richmond, which more than made good his losses in the recent battle. It is generally represented that his object in entering Maryland was to encourage the secessionists in the State, whose influence the Confederates greatly exaggerated just as in the parallel case of Kentucky, possibly even win over the State to the Southern side and at least secure a considerable number of recruits. The presence, too, of a Confederate army on Northern soil might impress foreign Powers with a sense of the strength of the South, and another victory, if the Federals could be brought to battle, might provide a pretext for foreign intervention.

There is, however, another version of *Lee's* purpose, supported by the high authority of Dr. D. S. Freeman, that when he crossed the Potomac, he was looking beyond Maryland to the Susquehanna. As far back as June 5th *Lee* had suggested to President *Davis* the idea of reinforcing *Jackson* in the Valley with troops from Georgia and South Carolina for an invasion of Pennsylvania. This State offered a more attractive field to an invader than Maryland. His right flank would be protected by the South Mountain range, a continuation of the Blue Ridge, as he marched up the Cumberland Valley, where his troops could find abundance of food and clothing. Pennsylvania was an enemy State and could be treated as such. But in Maryland, which the Confederates had entered in the guise of liberators, every precaution had to be taken against alienating the inhabitants. A victory could be more fully exploited in Pennsylvania, where the defeated army would have no Washington to fall back upon, as Pope had done after his defeat at Bull Run, and rich commercial and industrial cities, Harrisburg, Philadelphia, and Baltimore would lie at the victor's mercy.

After crossing the Potomac *Lee* was obliged to transfer his line of communications from the Orange and Alexandria railway to the Shenandoah Valley; Manassas would now invite a cavalry raid from Washington. He expected that the Federal garrison at Harper's Ferry would be withdrawn after his entry into

Maryland, but Halleck had refused McClellan's request for its evacuation. *Lee* therefore decided that to secure his new line of supplies this post must be captured. For this purpose he divided his army, entrusting to *Jackson* with six divisions the Harper's Ferry operation, and placing the remaining fourteen brigades under *Longstreet* at Boonsboro near the western foot of South Mountain. *Stuart's* cavalry remained on the eastern side of the mountain to observe McClellan's movements. *Lee* expected that *Jackson* would speedily overcome the resistance of the garrison, and he intended then to reunite his army at Hagerstown and march straight for Harrisburg and the Susquehanna. He overestimated the demoralisation of the Federal army and believed that three or four weeks would elapse, before McClellan would venture to bring it into the field, by which time he expected to be on the Susquehanna and in a position to dictate the course of the coming campaign. *Jackson* started on September 10th from Frederick City, crossed the Potomac at Williamsport next day, thus forcing a Federal garrison at Martinsburg to retreat to Harper's Ferry, and on the 13th appeared before Harper's Ferry, having marched sixty miles in four days. At 7.30 a.m. on the 15th the garrison surrendered, and seventy-three guns, 13,000 small arms, and 12,500 prisoners fell into Confederate hands. But the previous day McClellan after fierce fighting had forced the passes of the South Mountain, and *Lee*, with the victorious Federals interposed between the widely separated wings of his army, found himself compelled to abandon all idea of marching to the Susquehanna. McClellan had left Washington on the 7th and moving very slowly, as he was still engaged in reorganising his army during its advance, had reached Frederick City on the 13th, three days after *Lee* had left it. On that day fortune put in his way such an opportunity as has been rarely vouchsafed to any general. A Federal private discovered wrapped round a handful of cigars a copy of *Lee's* orders, giving full particulars of the intended movement against Harper's Ferry and detailing the positions which would be occupied by the different portions of the Confederate army. He now knew that the enemy army was divided and that he could concentrate an overwhelming force against either half. In one respect the 'lost dispatch' proved misleading. On the morning of the 10th, as *Lee* was crossing the South Mountain, he heard that a Federal force was gathering in Pennsylvania, and he ordered *Longstreet* with his two divisions to continue his march to Hagerstown, thirteen miles beyond Boonsboro, where *D. H. Hill's* division was to

halt and form the rear-guard. *Longstreet*, who all along had been opposed to fighting a battle north of the Potomac, was slow in coming to *Hill's* assistance on the 14th and only four of his nine brigades were seriously engaged that day. The Federal commanders, however, believing that *Longstreet* was still at Boonsboro, were unnecessarily cautious in pressing their attack and *Lee* had no difficulty in withdrawing his troops next day. It was at first his intention after his defeat to abandon the Harper's Ferry operation and retreat across the Potomac at Shepherdstown. But on hearing that Harper's Ferry had fallen and that *Jackson* was marching to rejoin him, he determined to make a stand behind the Antietam. He was reluctant that the army, which had marched in triumph from the Rapidan to the Potomac, should have to admit defeat in Maryland, and he still hoped that, if he could repulse McClellan's attack, he might be able to deliver a telling counter-stroke, which, if it did nothing more, might at least disrupt the Federal plans for a further offensive against Richmond that year. McClellan, who always magnified the force opposed to him, made his preparations with great deliberation, and when he did at last deliver battle on the 17th, three Confederate divisions had rejoined *Lee* and two more arrived that morning at a most critical moment. The last division from Harper's Ferry came up in the afternoon just in time to prevent Burnside's Corps from capturing Sharpsburg and intercepting *Lee's* line of retreat. The result was a tactical success for the Confederates, but at so heavy a price, that even if their position had offered any opportunity for a counterstroke, which it was found next day that it did not, their strength would have been inadequate to an offensive. *Lee* was compelled to retreat, thus yielding the strategic victory to McClellan. His invasion of the North had proved a failure; against his very heavy losses in battle he could only set the haul of prisoners made at Harper's Ferry; the capture of the place itself was of no importance; it was a veritable death-trap, exposed to artillery fire from the north bank of the Potomac and both banks of the Shenandoah. But *Lee* was by no means discouraged: he and *Jackson* were soon laying their plans for a more carefully prepared invasion next year. Fortune had turned against him; he could not have foreseen that his plan of campaign would fall into McClellan's hands; the unexpected promptitude with which McClellan marched out against him from Washington would have frustrated his plan of marching to the Susquehanna, but if the disposition of his forces had not been so unluckily revealed, he might have concentrated his whole force for a defensive battle on the South

Mountain, which would have been a much stronger position than that which he occupied at Sharpsburg. In that case he would have had a reasonable prospect of inflicting a heavy defeat upon McClellan, if the Federal general had ventured to attack, and a victory won on Northern soil would have been worth more than a series of victories in Virginia for its moral effect upon public opinion across the Atlantic. In undertaking an invasion of the North Lee had underestimated the tremendous strain which he had already put upon the physical endurance of his troops. He counted upon some 8,000 or 10,000 stragglers rejoining the ranks at Hagerstown, but the actual number of absentees must have been nearly double that figure. He can hardly have had more than 40,000 men on the Antietam and was outnumbered by at least two to one.

Lee made good his retreat into the Shenandoah Valley and McClellan was in no hurry to follow him across the Potomac, and when he did at last advance as far as Warrenton, *Lee* was concentrating an army, now increased to 78,000 men, at Culpeper to block any further movement against Richmond. The worst consequence of *Lee's* failure in Maryland now began to make itself felt. His prestige with his own Government was impaired. From March, when he was called to Richmond to take up the post of chief of the staff, to November, 1862, *Lee* largely dominated the strategy in the East, but in December, when Burnside, McClellan's successor, was preparing to cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, the Government began to interfere. *Lee* did not originally propose to fight at Fredericksburg; the position on the hills south of the river, though tremendously strong defensively, afforded no opportunity for a counterstroke, because the Federal heavy artillery on the heights north of the river commanded the plain on the south bank. He therefore intended to make his stand on the North Anna river, where he could take up a position not only very strong defensively, as was proved in 1864, but one from which he could follow up a victory with a good chance of annihilating the Army of the Potomac, before it could find safety on the farther side of the Rappahannock. The Government, however, intervened. President *Davis* was opposed to what he considered the unnecessary abandonment of Confederate territory, and *Lee* had to give way and fight at Fredericksburg, where he could only win a barren victory. In the judgment of the Virginian historians, Eckenrode and Conrad, 'of all the chances of victory offered the South the chance that came in December, 1862, was the best of all, and perhaps it really was the last.'

Burnside was 'the most incompetent man in the high command of the Union army, a man who did not believe in himself and who was regarded as inefficient by his associates. Lincoln made a bad blunder, and it was the part of the Confederates to make it a fatal blunder.' But all that the Confederates achieved at Fredericksburg was 'the ruin of their best friend, Burnside.'

Thus the year closed, as it had begun, with a Federal offensive all along the line. Its results in all three theatres of war had been indecisive. At Vicksburg the Grant-Sherman co-operative movement failed, and Sherman suffered a sharp repulse at Chickasaw Bluff. On the Rappahannock Burnside's assault was thrown back with very heavy loss. Only in Middle Tennessee was any Federal success gained. There Rosecrans after narrowly escaping defeat at *Bragg's* hands occupied Murfreesborough, but the Confederate army still barred the way to Chattanooga. But this second Federal offensive differed from the first in that at its close the Federals retained the initiative. Theirs would be the offensive in 1863. Grant had taken over the control of the movement down the Mississippi against Vicksburg and had established his headquarters on the right bank of the river. In spite of his terrible losses at Fredericksburg Burnside late in January attempted a fresh offensive to turn *Lee's* left, which had to be abandoned owing to the inclemency of the weather. But his successor would repeat it in greater strength next spring. Only in Middle Tennessee were the two forces so evenly matched that a deadlock seemed likely to ensue. Neither commander was capable of taking the offensive without reinforcements. At the close of the year the Confederacy was everywhere on the defensive. Its high-water mark had been reached in September, when *Lee* was invading Maryland and *Bragg* was marching through Kentucky. But neither army had been strong enough to carry its offensive through. *Lee's* sojourn on Northern soil had lasted a bare fortnight. *Bragg's* campaign had gone nearer success. If he had had command of *Kirby Smith's* forces as well as his own, he might have inflicted a severe defeat upon Buell and possibly have captured Louisville. On September 17th he stood at Munfordsville squarely across Buell's path, and if he had been empowered to call for reinforcements from his colleague, could have attacked with good hope of success. Whatever other results a Confederate victory might have had, it would at least have prevented any movement against Vicksburg that year. But 'co-operation' between two independent generals could not be as effective as 'unity of command,' and *Bragg* considering himself not strong enough to attack and finding his food supplies

running short, on the 21st drew off to join his colleague and left the Louisville road open to Buell.

Broadly speaking, the South was a year nearer the end of its resources. The loss of Tennessee as a recruiting ground had been a heavy blow, and communication with the Trans-Mississippi was becoming progressively more difficult. Finally, Lincoln's Emancipation Edict of September 22nd, proclaiming that in all States, which after January 1st, 1863 should still be in a state of insurrection, the slaves would be recognised as free by the Federal Government, had practically destroyed any chance of foreign intervention. The Confederate Government, fed with vain hopes by their agents in London and Paris, continued to cherish the fond illusion, until the dual disaster of Vicksburg and Gettysburg in July at last dispelled it. France would not move without Great Britain, and no British Government could take such a step in the face of the enthusiasm with which Lincoln's crusade for Freedom was greeted by the working classes. Lee's retreat from Maryland gave Lincoln the opportunity, for which he had been eagerly waiting since July, of issuing his proclamation; some semblance of a military success was necessary as a preliminary; otherwise it might be misinterpreted as an appeal to the negro for help. From this point of view there is some justification for the claim that the Antietam was the decisive battle of the war.

In 1863 the sands of the Confederacy were fast running out. *Joseph Johnston* was not alone in thinking that the Confederates should have asked for peace before the close of the year. But the tragedy was that for yet another twelve months the bulk of the Southern people refused to realise that their cause was hopeless. In the West the Federals completed the work, which should have been accomplished the previous year, by the capture of Vicksburg and Chattanooga. But after the fall of Vicksburg Halleck, as General-in-Chief, scattered his forces, as he had done in 1862 after the capture of Corinth. Instead of following up Grant's success with a movement on Mobile, he detached forces into Texas for political reasons. Three months after the fall of Vicksburg Grant, now a major-general in the Regular Army, had to hasten to the rescue of Rosecrans, who after skilfully manœuvring *Bragg* out of Chattanooga, had been defeated by the Confederate general, reinforced with troops from the Army of Northern Virginia under *Longstreet*, at Chickamauga and was shut up in Chattanooga with the prospect of being starved into surrender or forced to attempt a most perilous retreat. But the

jealousy and intrigue, which had long been rife at Confederate Headquarters, had reached such a height after *Bragg's* failure to follow up his victory, that *Longstreet* was sent off with 15,000 men to recapture Knoxville, the commanding general and his chief lieutenant, himself one of the leading malcontents, being no longer able to endure each other's company. *Bragg* with 33,000 men remained in his entrenchments on Missionary Ridge facing Chattanooga, until on November 25th Grant, who had concentrated 60,000 men against him, stormed his lines and put the Confederate army to flight. The end of the year found the Federals masters of East Tennessee with the road open for an invasion of Georgia next spring.

In Virginia, Hooker, who had superseded Burnside and reorganised the Army of the Potomac, now over 130,000 strong, at the end of April commenced a movement round *Lee's* left. With three corps he crossed the Rappahannock and the Rapidan and secured a position at Chancellorsville, where he was also joined by a fourth corps. *Lee's* army had been greatly weakened during the winter; three divisions and *Longstreet* himself had been detached from it and were now south of the James. To meet Hooker's seven corps *Lee* could only muster six divisions, and his total force barely exceeded 60,000 men. He was obliged to await the development of Hooker's offensive. At the same time as Hooker moved round *Lee's* left, two Federal Corps crossed the river below Fredericksburg and menaced his right. Hooker held his last corps in reserve ready to reinforce either wing, as might be required. His two to one superiority in numbers made it apparently safe to divide his army. Whilst his right wing at Chancellorsville was already on *Lee's* flank and threatened his line of communications with the Virginia Central railway, his left wing threatened to break through *Lee's* right and get possession of the Fredericksburg-Richmond railway, his alternative line of supplies. Hooker fully anticipated that *Lee* would be obliged to retreat, and he had despatched the greater part of his cavalry corps to fall upon the railways in *Lee's* rear and when he retreated to hold him up on the Pamunkey, until Hooker could overtake and crush him with his overwhelming numbers. But *Lee* and *Jackson* never thought of retreat. They determined to take advantage of Hooker's division of his forces. Early with 10,000 men was left to defend the Fredericksburg Heights and protect the railway, whilst *Lee* with the rest of his troops marched to meet Hooker in the Wilderness. As the first round of the great duel between Grant and *Lee* was fought out the following year in the Wilderness, a brief description of it will not be out

of place here. It is a forest of second-growth pine and black oak, stretching fourteen miles from east to west and ten miles from north to south. 'It was drained by many crooked brooks, with marshy borders; the soil was poor, farms were scarce, and the few clearings were not more than a rifle-shot in width. A *terrain* less suitable for the manœuvring of a large army would be hard to find. Infantry could move only with difficulty, and cavalry nowhere, except along the roads. There were few good positions for artillery, and there was no range for the guns' (Geer's *Campaigns of the Civil War*). Chancellorsville itself was merely a brick residence, standing near the eastern edge of the forest at an important road-junction. Two main roads traversed the forest from Orange Court House to Fredericksburg—on the right the Orange Plank road and the turnpike on the left. These roads came together about two miles west of Chancellorsville, which they jointly reached through a considerable clearing. At Chancellorsville they separated again to meet once more near Tabernacle Church about half-way to Fredericksburg. Between Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg a third road ran, the round-about River Road, passing near Banks's Ford on the Rappahannock. It was Hooker's obvious policy to get his right wing as quickly as possible out of the Wilderness and to uncover Banks's Ford, thereby drawing his two wings several miles nearer to each other, and give battle to *Lee* in the more open ground near Fredericksburg, where he could use his artillery to advantage. Hooker, however, who had joined his right wing at Chancellorsville on the evening of April 30th, waited for the arrival of his reserve corps, which he had called up to join the right wing, and did not commence his advance till 11 a.m. on May 1st. Before his leading troops could get clear of the Wilderness, they encountered *Jackson* advancing to meet them from the Tabernacle Church. The Federal commander, fearing that his troops would be outflanked on the narrow roads, greatly to the indignation of his corps commanders ordered them to fall back upon Chancellorsville, where he had constructed a strongly entrenched camp. He now planned to stand on the defensive behind his entrenchments and wait until the left wing should come up from Fredericksburg and fall upon *Lee's* rear. In spite of elaborate preparations it proved very difficult to maintain communications between the two wings, and Hooker believed that the whole of the Confederate army was marching against him. He was, however, still full of confidence, believing that his position was impregnable against any attack that *Lee* could make, and assured his second-in-command that he had got *Lee* just where he wanted him. *Lee*

now found himself in a very difficult position. Hooker's lines seemed unassailable and there appeared to be no course open to him except a retreat to Gordonsville. But that night *Stuart*, his cavalry commander, reported that the extreme Federal right, Howard's 11th Corps, was 'in the air.' Its entrenchments had been constructed solely with a view to an attack from the south. Two of its divisions were aligned along the turnpike west of the junction with the Plank road, and if a turning column could reach a position on its right flank the whole line of Federal defences could be taken in reverse. *Lee* now determined to take a tremendous risk. He divided his force again, sending *Jackson* with three divisions and the cavalry to make his way through the forest round Hooker's right, whilst he himself with his two remaining divisions provided employment for Hooker during the progress of *Jackson's* march. The turning column, taking a private road which had been opened through the forest for the purpose of hauling wood and ore to a local furnace, reached the Brock road, which ran from north to south intersecting the turnpike and Plank road. After a fourteen-mile march the head of the column reached the turnpike by 4 p.m., and the attack was launched about an hour and a half later. Howard's Corps was completely taken by surprise. An hour or two after its start *Jackson's* column, ten miles long, had been sighted about 8 a.m. by the Federals on the Hazel Grove ridge, as it was moving southward across a clearing on some rising ground. The movement indicated either a retreat to Gordonsville or an attack upon the Federal right flank. Hooker, remembering *Jackson's* flank march in the Second Bull Run campaign, at first apprehended a similar manoeuvre, but as the hours went by without further signs of an enemy offensive, at noon he decided that the Confederates were retreating and despatched his 3rd Corps southwards to fall upon their trains. Howard shared his commander's conviction, refused to credit various reports brought in during the afternoon by his piquets of enemy troops gathering in the woods to the west, and allowed a brigade, his sole reserve, to be detached to the support of the 3rd Corps. The 11th Corps was caught in a hopeless position; nearly all the regiments were facing south and before they could change front and form a fresh line to meet *Jackson's* attack from the west, they were overrun or outflanked by the Confederate line of battle, which came through the woods on both sides of the road. The only solid resistance was encountered in Dowdall's clearing, across which the Federals had constructed a line of rifle-pits. The attack was, however, made too late in the day to gain the full value of the surprise.

Night was fast drawing on before the last fragments of the 11th Corps were driven into the dense forest in front of Chancellorsville. The two divisions of *Jackson's* Corps, which alone so far had been seriously engaged, were in great disorder and intermingled on both sides of the turnpike after their wild charge of more than three miles through the woods. It was necessary to bring up *A. P. Hill's* division to lead a further advance, whilst the other two were withdrawn to the clearing to be sorted out and reformed. The pursuit had been halted at 7.15 p.m., and about 9 p.m., as *Jackson* was returning from a reconnaissance into the forest, he was shot down by his own men. With his fall the Confederate advance came to an end. *Hill*, who succeeded to the command, was almost immediately wounded, and his successor, knowing nothing of *Jackson's* plans, ordered the whole force to be withdrawn out of the woods. *Stuart*, the cavalry commander, was then summoned to take over the corps command, but he only arrived upon the scene shortly before midnight and decided to postpone further operations till daylight. All through the day *Lee* with his two divisions had kept up a vigorous demonstration south and east of Chancellorsville, which held *Hooker* fast within his lines. Part of his 3rd Corps had advanced from Hazel Grove as far as The Furnace, where it separated *Lee's* two wings, but two of *Anderson's* brigades, attacking its left flank, brought it to a standstill.

Jackson's flank attack had failed to achieve all that he and *Lee* had hoped. One Federal Corps, the weakest and least reliable in the Army of the Potomac, had been routed, but the two wings of the Confederate army were still separated; the Chancellorsville plateau between them was still held by the Federals; and *Hooker* had not yet lost his head, and was taking the necessary steps to strengthen his centre. The Confederate attack had been launched too late and the pursuit halted perhaps unnecessarily soon (not by *Jackson*, but by the commander of the leading division). What *Jackson's* plans were for his next movement, is not altogether clear. It is generally thought that he intended to move by the left on the Bullock road to intercept *Hooker's* line of retreat to the United States ford over the Rappahannock; it does not seem probable that this movement would have been successful. The junction of this road with that from Chancellorsville was now held by a division of the 5th Corps, from *Hooker's* extreme left, which rested on the river below the ford, and the 1st Corps from below Fredericksburg had marched up the north bank and was already crossing in *Hooker's* rear. In a night encounter the advantage would have been with the defenders, unless their

morale had been shattered by the rout of the 11th Corps, an assumption not lightly to be accepted. *Lee* must have expected that if *Jackson's* flank march proved successful, the two wings of his army would be reunited that night on the Chancellorsville plateau. But the morning of May 3rd found the two wings separated with *Hooker's* army between them and each wing was in dire peril. *Lee* had gambled on a complete success on the 2nd. The gamble had been only partially successful, and on the 3rd the game was in *Hooker's* hands, if only he had the confidence and skill to avail himself of the opportunity. He had that morning under his immediate command six of his seven corps (less one division); of these the 1st Corps had not been engaged so far and the 5th only slightly. His total force was little, if at all, less than 80,000 men. The Confederate force was not more than half that. *Stuart's* Corps was in special danger, because its left flank was exposed to the attack of the 1st and 5th Corps. *Lee's* two divisions were in less immediate danger, because they were well entrenched. But *Hooker*, on the night of the 2nd had sent orders to the 6th Corps, the largest in the army and by itself stronger by several thousands than *Lee's* wing, to come up from Fredericksburg by the Chancellorsville road and fall upon *Lee's* rear. Whenever *Sedgwick*, the commander of the 6th Corps, put in an appearance, *Lee* would be in danger of being crushed between the upper and nether millstones. *Hooker* was quite content to remain on the defensive until *Sedgwick* arrived upon the scene. He exaggerated the strength of *Lee's* army, believing that *Early's* force had accompanied *Lee*, when he marched on May 1st to meet the Federal advance from Chancellorsville, and that *Longstreet* with two divisions was on his way from Richmond to join *Lee*, as was reported by 'deserters' from the Confederate ranks. According to his own version he expected that the appearance of *Sedgwick* in the Confederate rear would cause *Lee* to retreat with his whole army to Gordonsville, leaving open the shorter and direct route to Richmond, which he would then himself take and march straight down to the Pamunkey. After the loss of *Dowdall's* clearing he was no longer confident of being able to defend the Chancellorsville plateau, and during the night of the 2nd ordered his engineers to lay out a second line of defence about three-quarters of a mile north of Chancellorsville covering his lines of retreat to the United States ford on the Rappahannock and *Ely's* ford on the Rapidan. This new position is described by General *Alexander* as 'probably the strongest field entrenchment ever built in Virginia.' It was, however, necessary to hold Chancellorsville until this new line was completed, and in order to contract

his lines on the plateau Hooker ordered on the morning of the 3rd the withdrawal of the 3rd Corps from Hazel Grove. This proved a fatal mistake, as it surrendered to the Confederates the only position from which enfilade artillery-fire could be brought to bear upon the plateau. *Alexander*, acting commander of artillery of *Stuart's* Corps, promptly crowned the ridge with his batteries, and it was the fire of these guns which proved the decisive factor in the battle of the 3rd. *Lee's* first aim on the day was to reunite his army, and his instructions to *Stuart* were 'to work by the right wing, turning the position of the enemy, so as to drive him from Chancellorsville, which will again unite us. Everything will be done on this side to accomplish the same object.' The withdrawal from Hazel Grove made a present to the Confederates of the most favourable point where the junction of the two wings could be effected. *Stuart*, however, had started his battle before he knew of the evacuation of Hazel Grove, and his efforts were mainly directed, not to flanking the enemy, but to driving straight through to Chancellorsville. His battle raged with great fury for about five hours on both sides of the turnpike with alternate advance and retreat. Throughout the struggle his left was in great danger; within a few hundred yards 30,000 men of the 1st and 5th Corps were waiting to fall upon his flank and rear. 'His enemy could not have put him in a more helpless position; far worse than that of Howard the day before, for now all *Stuart's* Corps was absolutely in Hooker's power.' (*Livermore, The Campaigns of 1863, Vol. 1.*)

But Hooker would not allow either of the corps commanders to attack. He regarded the fight for the Chancellorsville plateau as merely a preliminary and thought that the real battle would be fought on the ground occupied by these two corps. Consequently he made no attempt to reinforce or relieve the pressure upon the three corps holding the Chancellorsville position. It was about 10 a.m. when the Confederate wings effected a junction close to the smoking ruins of the Chancellor mansion. Forty minutes earlier Hooker had been disabled and had temporarily passed the command to Couch, but instead of giving Couch a free hand, he instructed him to withdraw the army to the new position, which had been prepared. He presently resumed the nominal command, but either as the effect of his injury or more probably because he had lost all confidence in himself, he remained entirely inert, exercising only a negative authority, until on the night of the 4th against the majority of a council of war he ordered the withdrawal of his army across the Rappahannock.

Lee, after the capture of Chancellorsville determined to keep up

the pressure upon Hooker. He misread his enemy's withdrawal into his second line of defences as a retreat, and to extricate himself from the difficult position, in which he was still placed, it was imperative that Hooker should be driven across the river with the least possible delay. He was not aware that the 1st Corps had joined Hooker, but imagined that it was still with Sedgwick. As long as Hooker remained on the south side of the river, the possibility of Sedgwick with, as he supposed, 40,000 men coming in on his rear constituted a grave danger. He had just completed his preparations for a renewal of the attack, when about noon news reached him that Sedgwick had captured the Fredericksburg position and was marching towards Chancellorsville.

Hooker had sent orders to Sedgwick to be in position to attack *Lee's* rear by daylight on the 3rd. But the order was received too late for his lieutenant to carry it out to the letter. Sedgwick was not on the north bank of the river as Hooker imagined, when he ordered him to cross at Fredericksburg, but on the south side from two to four miles below the town and to reach the Chancellorsville road he would have to force his way through the fortified lines of *Early*, whom Hooker supposed to be already with *Lee*. The direct road from Fredericksburg to Chancellorsville passed by Marye's Hill, where Burnside, the previous December, had been repulsed with such terrible slaughter. But now it was very weakly held. *Early* had to cover a six-mile line with only five brigades, and four of these were on his right to protect the railway to Richmond. Marye's Hill was occupied by less than 1,400 men, and it was stormed shortly after 11 a.m. Its capture cut *Early's* line in two, and the bulk of his command fell back some two miles on the Telegraph road, where it still covered the depôts on the railway. Sedgwick reorganised his column of march but did not move off towards Chancellorsville till 3 p.m. Two hours later he encountered at Salem Church, about four miles from Fredericksburg, the four brigades under *McLaws*, sent by *Lee* to hold him in check. The position was already occupied by another Confederate brigade from Banks's ford, which had moved down the river too late to succour *Early*, but had retreated before Sedgwick's advance on the Chancellorsville road and by fighting a rearguard action delayed his march. Sedgwick, who was hours behind his time schedule, attacked precipitately without any artillery preparation, and after the sharp repulse of his leading division, as there were no signs of any help from Hooker, took up a defensive position for the night, covering his line of retreat to Banks's ford. *Lee*, after the despatch of *McLaws's* detachment, entrenched a position in front of Hooker, having

Anderson's three brigades on the east side of *Hooker's* lines and *Stuart's* Corps, its numbers sadly diminished, on the west.

On the 4th, as the great army on his own front showed no signs of taking the offensive, *Lee* determined to attack the weaker force and drive *Sedgwick* into or across the river. For this purpose he moved *Anderson's* brigades to *McLaws's* help, replacing them with three brigades withdrawn from *Stuart's* Corps, and himself went to supervise the operation. On that day *Hooker* allowed himself to be contained by a force only one-quarter of his own strength. He made no attempt to help *Sedgwick*, who was now in grave danger. *Early*, finding that *Sedgwick* instead of pursuing him was marching towards Chancellorsville, had reoccupied the Fredericksburg heights and was marching against *Sedgwick's* left flank to cut him off from the ford. *Lee's* plan of operations failed. As so often happened with his method of 'progressive' attacks with his divisions assaulting not simultaneously, but in succession, the battle did not begin till 6 p.m., and *McLaws's* force did not get into action at all. *Sedgwick* held his own during the day, and withdrew his Corps across the river during the night. On the 5th *Lee*, leaving *Early* to observe *Sedgwick*, marched with *McLaws's* and *Anderson's* troops back to attack *Hooker's* lines. Of all *Lee's* plans during this campaign this was the most audacious. The Federal position was an almost impregnable fortress, and it is said that the only persons in the two armies, who believed in the possibility of success for the proposed operation were the two commanding generals. It was almost certainly fortunate for *Lee* that heavy rain prevented him moving his artillery into position and caused the postponement of the attack. On the night of the 5th *Hooker* withdrew his army across the Rappahannock. On the previous night he had sent an order to *Sedgwick* countermanding his permission to retreat to the north bank and directing him to hold his ground. But it arrived too late; *Sedgwick* was already crossing his troops at *Banks's* ford. *Hooker* subsequently claimed that his intention was to leave a sufficient force to hold his position south of the United States ford, recross the river with the balance of his command, march down to *Banks's* ford, turning the Confederate position by this movement, and joining hands with *Sedgwick* offer battle in the more open ground, where he expected to gain a decisive victory. He put the responsibility for the failure of his campaign first upon *Howard* and then upon *Sedgwick*.

Chancellorsville was another barren victory for the Confederates. As after Fredericksburg, the two armies resumed their original positions with the Rappahannock between them. The thrust at Richmond had been parried, but at very heavy cost.

The Federal losses amounted to 16,500, those of the Confederates to 13,000; in proportion to their original numbers these were the heavier of the two, and the death of 'Stonewall' Jackson was an irreparable disaster. He had indeed been Lee's right hand, his chief executive officer to carry out his daring strategy. There was no one to replace him. Longstreet, the other corps commander, never appreciated Lee's bold schemes; lacking Jackson's blind faith in his leader, his tendency was to criticise rather than execute his orders. Lee recognised his lieutenant's limitations and never called upon him to execute the great flank marches, which could be safely placed under Jackson's charge. After Jackson's death, Lee attempted no more such movements, but without them his strategy was weakened.

The chief cause of Hooker's defeat was the disposition which he made of his cavalry. On taking command of the Army of the Potomac he had organised the various mounted units into a single corps, numbering some 13,000 sabres. The greater part of this he despatched on a raid against Lee's communications, retaining only one small brigade, which proved too weak to make head against Stuart's cavalry. If he had kept an adequate force with his army, it could have secured for him information which would have encouraged him to push straight ahead from Chancellorsville on the afternoon of April 30th, and he might have got possession of Banks's ford that same evening, where he could have found a position more favourable for the deployment of his troops and used his superior artillery to advantage. Again, on the night of the 30th, Stuart could have been prevented from discovering that the right flank of his army was 'in the air,' and on May 1st Jackson's flank march would have been rendered futile. The Federal cavalry would have piqueted the Brock road and Jackson could not have reached the position from which he fell upon the Federal flank and rear. A second cause is to be found in the immense superiority of the Confederates in wood fighting. Whereas the Federal infantry could only move on the narrow roads through the forest, and consequently lost all power of manœuvre, Jackson formed a line of battle two miles long across the turnpike, and on the 3rd his troops, under Stuart, were attacking at all points on their front through the woods. Thirdly, Hooker had under his command a larger force than he was capable of handling. He 'lacked the imagination necessary to keep before his mind the changing positions of troops out of his sight. His mental vision was practically limited by his physical vision, and he had apparently no training or faculty for making war on a map.' (Bigelow, *The Campaign of Chancellorsville.*) He

called upon Sedgwick to take risks, which he himself was afraid to take, and at the critical moment left his lieutenant to shift for himself.

That *Lee's* tactics were audacious to the verge of recklessness can hardly be disputed. But in the absence of *Longstreet's* divisions, engaged in a futile siege of Suffolk 120 miles away, his position from the opening of the campaign was almost desperate. It might indeed have been a wiser policy to have fallen back at once to the North Anna, where he would have been nearer to reinforcements from Richmond. But as Colonel Henderson has said: 'The rules of war only point out the dangers which are incurred by breaking them.' *Lee* deliberately took the risk and aided in large measure by good fortune, came out victorious. But a general may take the risk once with success, but hardly twice. In the next campaign again he threw for high stakes, but this time luck turned against him. He had come to believe that his army was invincible. He failed to distinguish between bad troops and good troops badly led. He did not take sufficiently into account the reasons for his successes won over inferior generals.

After Chancellorsville the initiative passed for a while to the Confederates. Hooker was too much weakened by his heavy losses and the discharge of a number of 'time-expired' regiments to resume at once the offensive. *Lee's* losses were practically made good by the return of *Longstreet's* two divisions. *Lee* himself was eager to carry out the invasion of Pennsylvania, which he and *Jackson* had been planning during the winter. But the situation at Vicksburg was now causing the Confederate Government the gravest anxiety. Grant had succeeded in landing his army on the left bank of the Mississippi below Vicksburg and had already established himself on the high ground in rear of the city. Unless he could be dislodged from that position, the fall of Vicksburg seemed certain in the near future. *Longstreet*, on rejoining *Lee*, proposed a plan of campaign, which he had already submitted to the Secretary of War. He urged a concentration against Rosecrans in Middle Tennessee; *Bragg* should be reinforced by *Johnston's* troops, which were collecting at Jackson, by a contingent from East Tennessee and by *Longstreet's* two divisions, while *Lee* remained on the defensive behind the Rappahannock. Rosecrans defeated, the Confederate army should march to the Ohio and, by threatening Louisville and Cincinnati, compel Grant to abandon his campaign against Vicksburg.

The proposed plan of campaign, though based upon the strategic principle of the use of 'interior lines,' nevertheless seems unsound. Its success depended upon making *Bragg's* army

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strong enough to win a decisive victory over Rosecrans. At this date the Federal general had 87,000 men in his Department, and *Bragg's* army only numbered 50,000. The proposed concentration would barely offset the original difference in numbers. Moreover, if *Johnston's* troops were withdrawn to strengthen *Bragg*, what was to prevent reinforcements being sent to Rosecrans's aid from Grant's and Burnside's Departments? The former had in addition to his army before Vicksburg 36,000 men in West Tennessee and Northern Mississippi, and Burnside had in his Department of the Ohio 38,000 men, and was able to send a little later over 7,000 men to assist Grant in the siege of Vicksburg. Again, who was to command against Rosecrans? Neither *Johnston* nor *Bragg* inspired any confidence as leader of an offensive. *Davis* asked *Lee* if he would be prepared to take command, but he declined. *Lee* would not leave Virginia for the West, nor would he willingly allow troops to be detached from his army for service in Tennessee. To a council of war held at Richmond he put the question squarely: 'Which did they prefer to risk losing? Mississippi or Virginia?' When the issue was thus baldly stated, there could only be one answer. On May 26th it was decided that the invasion of Pennsylvania should be undertaken.

Though the resultant campaign proved disastrous to the Confederacy, a strong case can be made out for *Lee's* decision. For practically the last word was his; so high had his prestige risen after his last victory. President *Davis*, who alone could have resisted him, was not greatly concerned at the time with the question of an offensive policy; for he was sanguine of foreign intervention, and Napoleon III had already given permission to a French firm to build ironclads for the Confederate navy; his chief anxiety was for the safety of the Richmond railways, which the movements of Federal troops on both banks of the James seemed to be threatening. An invasion of Northern territory was more likely to hasten the date of European intervention than a campaign in Tennessee.

The Army of Northern Virginia had suffered great privations in its winter quarters, and *Lee* had come to envisage the possibility of his troops, invincible in the field, succumbing in the end to economic attrition; he doubted whether they would be able to live through another winter. He could not risk another battle on the Rappahannock, because he could not be sure of keeping them supplied with food; local resources had been drained dry and the railway services were unable at the same time to move troops and transport supplies. If he waited for Hooker to start a fresh

offensive, he would be obliged to fall back to the North Anna, and the process would be repeated until he found himself cooped up in Richmond, and then the end would be in sight. If he was still to keep the enemy at a distance from Richmond, Hooker must be forced back across the Potomac. For this purpose he proposed to make a flank march round Hooker's right and enter Maryland through the Shenandoah Valley. By this means he would rid the northern section of his State, including the lower Valley, of the presence of the enemy and find in Pennsylvania the supplies of food and clothing, of which his troops stood so sorely in need. An invasion of the North would disrupt Federal plans for the next campaign and the summer would be at an end before a fresh movement against Richmond could be made. The threat to the great commercial cities of the North might force the recall of Grant's army from Vicksburg and would almost certainly bring about the weakening of the Federal forces threatening Richmond from the Atlantic coast. Furthermore, if he penetrated far into Pennsylvania, he might get a chance of defeating the Army of the Potomac at such a distance from Washington or Baltimore as would make its annihilation possible, and by the third year of the war *Lee* had become convinced that the cause of Southern independence could only be won by the annihilation of that army.

The death of 'Stonewall' *Jackson* rendered a reorganisation of the Confederate army necessary. As organised in the previous autumn, it had consisted of two corps, one under *Longstreet*, of five divisions, and the other of four under *Jackson*. *Lee* all along felt that corps of such size were too cumbrous to be handled easily, but in 1862 he had no third lieutenant whom he regarded as sufficiently equipped for the post of corps commander. Now in 1863 he found himself obliged to appoint two new corps commanders, because he did not consider any of his lieutenants, except *Longstreet*, capable of handling so large a unit as *Jackson's* old corps. He therefore re-formed his army on a three-corps basis, each corps consisting of three divisions, and appointed *Ewell* and *A. P. Hill* his new corps commanders. The work of reorganisation was by no means as simple a matter as it sounds. It involved a reshuffling of divisions and brigades, as State sentiment had to be respected and as far as possible divisions formed of brigades of the same State. Losses at Chancellorsville necessitated the appointment of a number of new brigade commanders. At the same time a thorough reorganisation of the artillery was carried out, which remained in force till the end of the war. The old Army reserve of artillery was abolished. Battalions of artillery (four 4-gun batteries to a battalion) were formed; five of these battalions

were allotted to each corps, a battalion to each division and two battalions as corps reserve. There can be no doubt that this reorganisation impaired the efficiency of the army in the Gettysburg campaign, because time was lacking to enable the various units to settle down in their new formations ; infantry and artillery had not learnt to work together, and worst of all, staffs for the new commanders could only be hastily extemporised. Staff work was the weak point in the armies on both sides in the Civil War. Staff training in the modern sense was practically unknown. There was no such institution in America as a Staff College. In too many cases a staff officer was appointed, not because he had special qualifications but on personal grounds. *Lee*, when first appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Northern Virginia, had tried to improve the staff work. But in no campaign fought under his command did the staff work of the Confederate army prove so hopelessly inefficient as at Gettysburg. Dr. Freeman holds the view, that in this reorganisation of the Confederate army is to be found the cause of *Lee's* defeat. His army was not nearly so efficient a fighting machine as it had been in the Second Bull Run and Chancellorsville campaigns. There were two reasons why *Lee* could not afford the time to assure his new machinery running smoothly ; the fate of Vicksburg was hanging in the balance, and if anything was to be done to save the fortress, it must be done swiftly ; and if *Lee* did not promptly take the offensive, the indications were that Hooker would snatch the initiative from his hands.

Lee started his movement on June 3rd, and by the 8th had concentrated *Longstreet's* and *Ewell's* Corps at Culpeper. *A. P. Hill* was left to hold the Fredericksburg lines and prevent Hooker from discovering that the Confederates were on the move. On the 9th the most considerable cavalry engagement of the war was fought at Brandy Station. Hooker sent his cavalry under Pleasanton to beat up *Stuart's* quarters, which he believed to be at Culpeper, and find out whether any concentration of infantry was taking place there. The importance of this encounter lies in the fact that it really 'made' the Federal cavalry. Hitherto the Confederate cavalry had held a marked superiority over their opponents. But after Brandy Station the Federal mounted arm felt itself fully a match for the enemy's and no longer feared to meet it on equal terms. In itself the cavalry battle was indecisive. *Stuart* was partially taken by surprise, but by skilful handling of his troops retrieved the situation, and on the appearance of Confederate infantry from Culpeper the Federals retired behind the Rappahannock. The only information which Hooker gained,

was that there were Confederate infantry at Culpeper, but in what strength he did not know. Next day *Ewell's* Corps, covered by *Longstreet's*, which remained at Culpeper, set out for the Valley; marching seventy miles in three days, it cleared the Federal garrisons out of Winchester and Martinsburg, capturing 4,000 prisoners and twenty-eight guns, and on the 15th was crossing the Potomac at Williamsport. On the 19th two of *Ewell's* divisions were at Hagerstown and Sharpsburg, whilst his cavalry brigade had pushed forward as far as Chambersburg to collect supplies in Pennsylvania. As early as June 5th Hooker had suggested to President Lincoln that if, as he anticipated, *Lee* should march for the Potomac, he should 'pitch into his rear' at Fredericksburg; but Lincoln discouraged any idea of crossing the Rappahannock southwards, when *Lee* was marching northwards. Again on the 10th, after the fight at Brandy Station, Hooker urged upon the President that he should be allowed to march straight on Richmond. But Lincoln repeated his warning against going south of the Rappahannock and pointed out that not Richmond, but *Lee's* army was Hooker's 'sure objective point.' Accordingly on the 13th Hooker started to move northward from the Rappahannock towards Manassas Junction. As soon as Hooker left the Rappahannock, *Hill* on the 14th began to move up to Culpeper and marching in rear of *Longstreet*, still at Culpeper, followed *Ewell's* route to the Valley. *Longstreet* on the 15th began his march along the east side of the Blue Ridge, with *Stuart's* cavalry screening his front and right flank, passed through the Blue Ridge at Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps and joined *Hill* in the Valley, on the west bank of the Shenandoah. *Lee* has been criticised for taking too great a risk in this flank march round Hooker. His apparent audacity has been attributed either to an overweening contempt for Hooker after the failure of his Chancellorsville campaign or to his conviction that anxiety for Washington would prevent the Federal Government from taking any steps to interfere with his movements. But it seems more likely that *Lee* had planned every move in advance and took all possible precautions to protect his widely separated Corps from defeat in detail. It is not to be presumed that any single Corps would have stood its ground and risked battle against overwhelming numbers. Even when the head of *Ewell's* column was at Martinsburg and *Hill's* Corps was still at Fredericksburg seventy-five miles away, so that 'the animal must be very slim somewhere' in Lincoln's pithy phrase, as he exhorted Hooker to 'break him,' the danger was more apparent than real, because Hooker was in process of changing his base from Aquia to Alexandria. *Lee* would have welcomed an attempt on Hooker's

part to force the Blue Ridge gaps. He would just as soon destroy the Army of the Potomac in the Shenandoah Valley as in Pennsylvania, and it is not improbable that he sent *Longstreet's* corps along the east side of the Blue Ridge in the hope of luring Hooker into the Valley. *Ewell's* Corps was kept for a week in its encampment about Hagerstown, ready to recross the Potomac if its presence should be required south of the river.

There was hard cavalry fighting from the 17th to the 20th, as *Stuart* and Pleasanton contested the possession of the 'gaps' in the Bull Run Mountains. *Stuart's* efforts to prevent the Federal cavalry from reaching the Blue Ridge and discovering the Confederate march to the Potomac were vain, and *Longstreet* had to move up infantry to enable him to hold on to the Blue Ridge gaps. On the 22nd *Lee* gave orders to *Ewell* to advance from Hagerstown into Pennsylvania and if Harrisburg 'came within his means' to capture it. On the 23rd *Ewell* occupied Chambersburg and one of his divisional commanders, *Early*, was on his way to York, hoping to capture the railway bridge over the Susquehanna at Wrightsville. On the 24th *Longstreet's* and *Hill's* Corps were crossing the Potomac at Williamsport and Shepherdstown; next day they were reunited at Hagerstown and moved forward to Chambersburg, which they reached on the 27th. On the same day *Ewell* reached Carlisle and the next day his outposts were within four miles of Harrisburg. If *Early* could capture the railway bridge at Wrightsville, he was to destroy the railway communications on the further side of the river and then march up the left bank and take Harrisburg in the rear. But some Federal militia destroyed the bridge before he could reach it.

Before *Lee* finally committed himself to an invasion of Pennsylvania, he endeavoured to create a diversion on the south side of the Potomac in order to cause some portion of Hooker's army to be detailed for the protection of Washington. For this purpose he pressed President *Davis* to order the formation of a skeleton army at Culpeper under the command of *Beauregard*; his reputation would magnify the presence of a force, however small, into a serious menace to Washington. *Davis* was quite unprepared for *Lee's* request, and as he was at the moment greatly concerned for the safety of his own capital owing to the demonstrations of a considerable Federal force from Fortress Monroe, he declined to send *Beauregard* or any troops from the Atlantic coast defences to Culpeper.

Lee's plan for the invasion of Pennsylvania was an advance up the Cumberland Valley to the Susquehanna. His right flank would be protected by the South Mountain range, a continuation

of the Blue Ridge, nearly as far as Carlisle. He had agreed with *Longstreet* that the campaign should be offensive in strategy, defensive in tactics, and so long as he kept on the west side of the mountain range, he could adhere to this policy, but by sending *Ewell* forward to Carlisle he was taking a risk. He was, however, adopting the principle of dispersing his army for the purpose of subsistence with the intention of concentrating it for battle. He only intended to accept battle on his own terms and on ground of his own choice. The dwindling man-power of the Confederacy demanded, that he should jealously conserve his own army and not waste its strength in any reckless offensive. 'It was a grave risk to send *Ewell* so far east as Carlisle while the position of the Union army was entirely unknown' (*Eckenrode* and *Conrad*). His ignorance of *Hooker's* movements was due to a grave error of judgment; which was to have disastrous consequences. *Stuart*, who was smarting under the defeat inflicted by *Pleasanton*, approached *Lee* with a proposal to pass through some one of the gaps in the Bull Run Mountains with the larger part of his cavalry, attain the enemy's rear, and passing between his main body and Washington cross into Maryland and rejoin *Lee* north of the Potomac. *Lee's* original intention had been that the cavalry should follow *Hill's* Corps across the river at Shepherdstown and then take position on the right of the main army. But his confidence in his cavalry commander had grown so great, that he now left it to his lieutenant's discretion whether he should cross on the east or west side of the Blue Ridge. *Lee* almost certainly and *Stuart* probably expected that the crossing could be effected near Leesburg. Captain *Thomason*, *Stuart's* latest biographer, comments as follows: '*Lee's* instructions to *Stuart* fall outside, even, of that latitude which a general may with propriety extend to a trusted subordinate. Questions affecting vitally the operations of an army are the affair of the Commander-in-Chief. Whatever *Stuart's* error in judgment, the responsibility lay with *Lee*.' *Stuart* started on his adventurous ride at 1 a.m. of the 25th, with three of his brigades, leaving the other two to hold the Blue Ridge gaps, until *Hooker* should have definitely committed himself to a movement into Maryland. *Hooker* had been for some days encamped on the eastern side of the Bull Run Mountains, and *Stuart* expected to be able to ride through his camp area. But on the very day, on which *Stuart* started on his raid, *Hooker* set his army in motion for the Potomac, and the Confederate cavalry found their way blocked by the 2nd Federal Corps. Dr. *Freeman*, who puts the main responsibility on *Stuart*, considers that at this point *Stuart*, finding his way

obstructed, should have turned back and followed the main army across at Shepherdstown. *Stuart's* instructions were 'to feel the right of *Ewell's* troops' and York had been indicated as the place where they would be found; accordingly he decided to take the more direct route, move round Hooker's rear and cross the river between him and Washington. This involved a wide detour and he only crossed the Potomac on the night of the 27th at a point within twenty miles of Washington. Owing to a variety of mischances he did not rejoin *Lee* until the afternoon of July 2nd, his men and horses completely exhausted. Thus for the most critical week of the campaign *Lee* had been deprived of the 'eyes' of his army, and just as Hooker's campaign had been ruined by the absence of his cavalry on a raid, so *Lee's* campaign was brought to naught for the same reason.

Hooker crossed the Potomac on the 25th and 26th; and established his headquarters near Frederick. Here he covered Washington and at the same time threatened *Lee's* line of communications. He proposed to move the 12th Corps, to be reinforced by the garrison of Harper's Ferry (11,000), up the river in order to destroy any bridges which *Lee* might have built over the Potomac, and to stop the flow of supplies which *Ewell* was sending into Virginia. When Halleck refused to allow the garrison to be removed from Harper's Ferry for this purpose, Hooker offered his resignation, which was promptly accepted, and Meade, commander of the 5th Corps, appointed in his place. To change the commander of the Army of the Potomac, when the enemy was in the heart of Pennsylvania and a battle, which might very possibly decide the issue of the war, was imminent, seems so grave a step that some explanation is required. After Chancellorsville, Stanton, Secretary of War, and Halleck, General-in-Chief, were emphatic that Hooker must not be entrusted with the command of the army in another battle. Lincoln, however, had not entirely lost faith in Hooker and was willing to give him another chance. But when Hooker allowed *Lee* to cross the Potomac unopposed, he came over to the view of Halleck and Stanton. Probably Halleck's refusal to allow the Harper's Ferry garrison to be moved was designed to provoke Hooker into resignation.

It was only very late on the night of the 28th that *Lee* received the news that the Federal army had been for four days on the north bank of the Potomac and that Hooker had been superseded in favour of Meade. The information was brought by one of *Longstreet's* 'scouts' (or spies), who had made his way from Washington through Frederick, where he reported the presence of three Corps. Hitherto *Lee* had believed, in the absence of any

news from *Stuart*, that Hooker was still south of the Potomac. This did not suit *Lee's* plans at all ; he had hoped that his advance up the Cumberland Valley would bring Hooker rushing up into Pennsylvania to prevent him crossing the Susquehanna and that he would have a good chance of defeating his Corps in detail, as they came up scattered and exhausted by forced marches. To compel Hooker to move northward he had already earlier on the 28th ordered *Ewell* to move next day on Harrisburg and *Hill* and *Longstreet* to follow him to the Susquehanna. Now on receiving the scout's report, he countermanded these orders and directed a concentration on Cashtown, close to the eastern foot of the South Mountain. His reason for coming east of the mountain range was to cover the movement of *Ewell's* Corps, which he had ordered to march south from Carlisle on the east of the mountain in order to threaten Baltimore and draw the Federal army eastwards away from his line of communications. All that he knew so far was that the enemy was threatening a movement westward through the lower 'gaps' against his crossing-places over the Potomac. The news of Hooker's removal from command was somewhat disquieting ; *Lee* believed that he had taken his measure, and expected that in Meade he would find a more formidable adversary ; but on the other hand the transference of command was likely to cause some delay and confusion. Consequently he conducted his concentration in leisurely fashion ; the weather was inclement and ' the march was conducted with a view to the comfort of the troops.' He little guessed that the time-factor had become all important and that Meade's army was moving northward by forced marches. Not only had *Stuart* failed him, but the two brigades of cavalry left to guard the Blue Ridge gaps, instead of rejoining the army after Hooker crossed the Potomac, had remained where they were in Virginia. On the 29th *Lee* sent an order to the cavalry commander on the Blue Ridge to hasten to the front, but these brigades did not arrive in time to take any part in the battle. *Lee's* plan of a concentration at Cashtown was judicious, and in keeping with his policy of pursuing defensive tactics. He would be quite safe against an attack from the east, with a good road behind him through the mountains to Chambersburg, by which he could withdraw his troops through the pass, if he preferred to give battle on the west side of the range. If the enemy tried to move into the Cumberland Valley by the lower passes, *Longstreet's* Corps moving slowly up from Chambersburg would still be in a position to deal with any such attempt. It has been repeatedly stated and perhaps generally believed that *Lee* intended to fight at Gettysburg. But the only mention of Gettys-

burg in his orders for the 29th is to be found in his instructions to *Ewell*, telling his lieutenant that from Heidlersburg he can follow the direct road to Cashtown or take the longer but better road through Gettysburg. Neither *Lee* nor Meade originally planned to fight at Gettysburg. Both desired a defensive battle, *Lee* at Cashtown, eight miles west of Gettysburg, and Meade on Pipe Creek, ten or twelve miles east.

Meade, who had been dragged out of bed in the small hours of the 28th to ride to Hooker's headquarters and formally relieve him of the command—so afraid had the Government become, lest the Army of the Potomac should find itself committed to battle, with Hooker still in command—promptly decided that he must set his army at once in motion for the Susquehanna in order to prevent *Lee* from crossing that river—for he would then have Harrisburg and Philadelphia at his mercy—and at the same time keep Washington and Baltimore covered. To protect the latter city he was pushing the 6th Corps on his right somewhat to the north-east and fixed his base at Westminster, thirty miles north of Baltimore, with which it was connected by a branch line of railway. Some ten miles beyond Westminster runs Pipe Creek, a tributary of the Monocacy. Behind this stream Meade proposed to make his stand, if, as he was inclined to anticipate, *Lee* came south from the Susquehanna to attack Baltimore. Close in his rear he would have Parr's Ridge, which would secure his retreat in case of defeat in the same way as South Mountain secured *Lee's*. He was not, however, any more than *Lee* irrevocably committed to the defensive. He was prepared to take the offensive, if a favourable opportunity offered. Two forced marches had brought the Federal left wing near to *Lee's* main body on the evening of the 30th, and chance made Gettysburg the battlefield.

Heth's division of *Hill's* Corps had reached Cashtown on the 29th, and next day *Pettigrew's* brigade was sent forward to Gettysburg to see if they could find any shoes in the town. On their approach they found it already occupied by Federal cavalry, who had just entered it, and *Pettigrew*, who had no orders to precipitate an engagement, retired to Cashtown. As *Hill* was at Cashtown for the express purpose of covering *Ewell's* march and *Ewell* was very likely to take the Gettysburg road, on July 1st *Hill* sent *Heth's* division forward to make a reconnaissance in force. About a mile or so west of Gettysburg *Heth* encountered Buford's cavalry division (*Meade's* two other cavalry divisions had been detached in pursuit of *Stuart*) occupying a strong position and evidently resolved to check his further progress. Buford seems to have been the first man in either army to appreciate the

strategical importance of Gettysburg, the meeting-place of some dozen roads from all points of the compass, and he sent back word to Reynolds, commanding Meade's left wing, to hurry up troops to his support. Part of the 1st Corps came up in time to reinforce the dismounted cavalry, and *Heth's* leading brigades were roughly handled. He in turn called upon *Pender's* division, which with *Hill* had reached Cashtown the previous evening. Presently the 11th Corps came up to the help of the 1st. Reynolds was killed very early in the day and Howard succeeded to the command of the two Corps. Next, *Ewell's* two divisions (his third division had marched from Carlisle west of the mountains with the trains) appeared upon the scene and dashed into the fray. Howard attempted to hold Seminary Ridge against the twofold attack; but as at Chancellorsville, his right was 'in the air,' and *Early*, coming in from the north-east fell upon his flank. The Federals were driven from the ridge and after a vain attempt to make a stand in Gettysburg, retreated to Cemetery Hill on the opposite side of the valley, where a Federal division had been left to entrench itself. Two Federal Corps had been severely defeated by four Confederate divisions on the first day of the battle. But *Lee* failed to crown his victory with the capture of Cemetery Hill. If this position had fallen into the hands of the Confederates that evening, the battle of Gettysburg would have begun and ended on July 1st and Meade would have fallen back to his selected position on Pipe Creek. *Ewell*, the senior of the two Corps commanders on the field, was directed to storm the hill, 'if practicable.' Exercising the discretion thus given him, he decided that it was not practicable. *Lee* would have done better to leave his lieutenant, who had had so brief an experience of a Corps command, no discretion in the matter. He himself was on the field and should have taken the responsibility of issuing a direct order. *Hill* is generally held responsible for precipitating a general engagement against the wish of his Commander-in-Chief and on ground several miles beyond that which had been selected for battle. But Dr. Freeman accepting *Heth's* evidence lays the responsibility directly upon *Lee*. According to *Heth's* version, the battle had been broken off after the initial repulse of his division's attack, but *Lee* himself ordered it to be renewed. *Lee* is represented as seeing that with *Hill* pushing forward from the west and *Ewell* coming in from the north, the Federal force in his front could be overwhelmed. *Lee* may well have thought that this was the opportunity for which he had been hoping, and that here he might begin the work of crushing Meade's Corps in detail.

Meade on receiving the news of Reynolds's death sent Hancock, the recently appointed commander of the 2nd Corps, to take command of the troops at Gettysburg and report whether a good position for fighting a battle could be found there. On receiving his report, which was not, however, particularly encouraging, he ordered a general advance of all his Corps to Gettysburg. It now became a race between the two commanders, which could concentrate his forces there first. The odds were rather in favour of *Lee*. On the evening of the 1st two of his three Corps were on the ground, but the march of *Longstreet's* Corps was delayed by the trains of the other two Corps moving on the same road. *Meade's* Corps were more scattered, but most of them had a road of their own on which they could move unobstructed. His largest Corps, the 6th Corps under Sedgwick, was, however, thirty-four miles from the battlefield. *Lee* on the 2nd was bound to take the offensive, because he had advanced so far from the South Mountain, that he could no longer be sure of being able to subsist his army if he remained on the defensive, especially in the absence of his cavalry. He proposed to attack the enemy's left flank with *Longstreet's* Corps; as the Confederate advance progressed northward, the attack would be taken up by *Hill's* divisions in succession, and at the same time *Ewell* was to attack the northern end of *Meade's* line. Undoubtedly the attack was intended to be made at an early hour, and if it had been delivered before 7 a.m., it would have had a fair chance of success. Unfortunately *Longstreet* did not see eye to eye with his chief. He was, as usual, opposed to an offensive and urged that the army should be moved round *Meade's* left, and a position taken up between him and Washington, which would, he thought, compel the Federals to become the assailants. But such a movement with no cavalry to screen it would have been slow and risky and would not have prevented *Meade* from retiring to Pipe Creek. It is not easy to see how any move of the kind suggested by *Longstreet* could have compelled *Meade* to give battle against his will, unless indeed he received direct orders from his Government to do so; besides, the Confederates could not have long maintained any position, which they might take up, for lack of supplies. *Longstreet*, however, was a very stubborn, self-willed man, who secretly believed himself a better general than *Lee*, and instead of carrying out his chief's wishes he argued for hours in support of his own plan. It is generally admitted that *Lee* gave him no direct order to attack till 11 a.m., but it had been *Lee's* usual practice to outline his plan of action and leave it to his lieutenants to carry it out with the least possible delay. This method had worked well

enough with *Jackson* ; it entirely failed with *Longstreet*. Even after the direct order was finally given, *Longstreet* still dallied and his attack was not delivered until the middle of the afternoon. By that time even Sedgwick's Corps had reached the field, and *Longstreet* was still short of *Pickett's* division. Meade's position was a strong one, occupying Cemetery Ridge, which started at Cemetery Hill about half a mile south of Gettysburg and continued for nearly two miles, rising at the southern end into two rocky hills called the "Round Tops." The Federal line, which at Cemetery Hill was bent back south-east for half a mile to Culp's Hill, was about three miles long, convex, so reinforcements could be rapidly moved from any one point to any other. *Lee's* line on the opposite Seminary Ridge was five miles long and concave, and 'to move from point to point required long round-about marches, often exposed to the enemy's view.' (*Alexander*.) * An unlooked-for piece of good luck made amends for *Longstreet's* delay. The commander of the Federal 3rd Corps, thinking that his position, where the ridge was at its lowest, was commanded by an intermediate ridge, along which ran the Emmitsburg road, had on his own initiative advanced his line to the latter ridge, where it presented a salient to the enemy's attack and left the Round Tops uncovered. This Corps in its exposed position suffered terrible punishment at the hands of *Longstreet*, and the Round Tops narrowly escaped capture. They were only saved by the initiative of Warren, Meade's chief engineer, who took the responsibility of diverting troops sent to aid the 3rd Corps to Little Round Top, the more northerly of the two hills. If that had fallen into the hands of the Confederates, Meade would have been forced to withdraw his line from Cemetery Ridge. As it was, he was hard put to it to hold the ridge, but he brought up reserves from all parts of the field. Eventually the 3rd Corps was driven back to its old position, which it had left, and there held fast. But the Confederates established themselves at the base of the two Round Tops. On *Longstreet's* left the attack was taken up by three brigades of *Anderson's* division of *Hill's* Corps, and two of these reached the crest of the ridge and for a moment got in among the Federal batteries. But their attacks were not co-ordinated ; the brigades attacked in succession and independently ; in no case was any support afforded, and each in turn was repulsed by the reinforcements rushed up by Meade. *Anderson's* two other brigades and *Heth's* and *Pender's* divisions of *Hill's* Corps took no part in the second day's battle. *Ewell's* Corps attacked the northern end of the ridge very late in the day, long after *Longstreet's* battle had begun. *Johnson's* division assailed Culp's Hill and secured a

footing there, occupying about 9 p.m. some trenches, from which the defenders had been withdrawn to reinforce the left wing. *Early* attacked Cemetery Hill about sunset with two brigades. They stormed the hill and laid hands upon the Federal guns, but again no support was forthcoming. *Rodes's* division, which should have supported *Early's* attack, had been kept by *Ewell* in the position, which it had occupied on the first day, on the north-west edge of the town, and was unable to get up in time to prevent *Early's* men from being dislodged from the ground, which they had so gallantly won. All through this day's fighting there was on the Confederate side a marked lack of co-ordination. *Alexander* sums up the situation as follows: '*Longstreet*, with eleven brigades, in seven piecemeal attacks, drives back six Federal brigades, which, being gradually reinforced by eighteen fresh brigades, check the Confederate advance and recover part of the lost ground, before night ends the conflict. Co-operative attacks by *Ewell* and *Hill*, ordered by *Lee*, fail to be effective, because both *Ewell* and *Hill* had failed to have their divisions in proper positions for the charge long before the moment arrived, although each had had ample time.' But *Lee* must share with his lieutenants the responsibility for the comparative failure of the Confederate offensive on the 2nd. He never seemed to be in the right place on that day; otherwise he might have corrected the mistakes made by his subordinates and seen that they executed the orders as they had been given. His conception, that the Commander-in-Chief's functions ceased, when he had brought his troops on to the battlefield and that the handling of the troops in action must be left to his lieutenants, was carried too far; as Dr. Freeman has written, it is hardly too much to say that on this day the Army of Northern Virginia had no commander-in-chief. If *Jackson* had been in command of either wing, the result would have been very different; either the Round Tops or Cemetery Hill would have been captured; but the new Corps commanders entirely failed to measure up to their responsibilities, and *Longstreet's* stubborn ill-humour caused him to miss the last chance of turning the Federal left flank. The reconnaissance work of the Confederate staff had been deplorable; neither *Lee* nor *Longstreet* seems to have had any clear idea where the Federal left rested. From the original orders given by *Lee* to *Longstreet* and passed on by the latter to his divisional commanders, it would almost seem that they imagined the Federal line on Cemetery Ridge to run, not north and south, but east and west.

On July 3rd *Lee* was obliged to renew his attack, if only to

secure his retreat across the South Mountain. But he had not yet abandoned hope of defeating Meade. He had gained ground on both flanks in the battle of the 2nd, although the effect of these gains was exaggerated. He believed that *Longstreet* had gained a position on the Emmitsburg road, from which the artillery could bring to bear enfilade fire on Cemetery Ridge, and *Ewell*, who from the first had held that Culp's Hill was the key to the northern end of the Federal line and that its capture would compel the evacuation of Cemetery Hill, was confident of improving the success, which he had already gained. *Pickett's* division of *Longstreet's* Corps had come upon the field and *Stuart's* cavalry had rejoined the army at last. *Lee* had one entirely fresh division at his disposal and neither *Heth's* and *Pender's* divisions had been engaged on the second day nor two brigades of *Anderson's* division on either day, whereas all of Meade's Corps had been thrown into the fight on July 2nd. But on the other hand *Longstreet's* other divisions had suffered such heavy losses, that they were no longer able to take the offensive, while Meade's 6th Corps was still practically intact. *Lee* therefore abandoned his original idea of renewing the attack on the Round Tops with the whole of *Longstreet's* Corps and decided to launch his final onslaught against the enemy left centre at the point, where on the previous day one of *Anderson's* brigades had broken through the Federal line. For that purpose he placed at *Longstreet's* disposal *Pickett's* and *Heth's* divisions (the latter now under the command of *Pettigrew*); two of *Pender's* brigades were to support *Pettigrew* and one of *Anderson's* to cover *Pickett's* right flank. The attacking column would consist of about 15,000 men. *Lee* intended that this attack should be made in conjunction with *Ewell's* assault of the Federal right, and that if *Pickett* and *Pettigrew* won the ridge the rest of his army should advance against Meade's line of battle. He believed that 'with proper concert of action and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed.' But 'concert of action' was as far to seek on the 3rd as it had been the day before. *Ewell* during the night had reinforced *Johnson* with three brigades from his other two divisions, and ordered his attack to commence at daybreak under the impression that this was the hour fixed for *Longstreet's* attack. But no such order had been given to *Longstreet*, who on the morning of the 3rd was still urging a movement round Meade's left, 'though such an operation was now absurd in view of the losses the army had sustained and the small amount of ammunition left' (*Eckenrode* and *Conrad*). It was the Federals who took the

initiative on Culp's Hill. Seeking to regain their lost trenches, they opened their attack in 'the grey of the dawn' and after several hours' hard fighting *Johnson* was driven off the hill. Before noon the battle on *Ewell's* front had come to an end and no further movement was attempted by his Corps on that day. His other two divisions, weakened by the withdrawal of the three brigades, which were not returned to them after *Johnson's* defeat, were reduced to the defensive. '*Pickett's* charge' was to be preceded by a tremendous bombardment of Cemetery Ridge, which was expected to silence the Federal artillery. One hundred and thirty-eight guns had been massed on or near the Emmitsburg road and on the Seminary Ridge, and opened fire at 1 p.m. These batteries were badly handled; little or no attempt was made to bring an enfilade fire to bear on selected points of the Federal line; most of the guns blazed away straight in front of them and their fire passed over the crest of the ridge and did little damage to the Federal infantry, who were well sheltered. The Federals owing to the convexity of their line could only reply with eighty guns, but Hunt, the commander of the artillery and the ablest artillerist of his day in America, handled his guns with great skill, replacing disabled batteries from his reserves and husbanding his ammunition for the infantry attack, which he knew must follow. *Longstreet*, who despaired of success, could not bring himself to give the signal, which would send *Pickett's* men to their death, and delegated the responsibility to *Alexander*, his chief of artillery. After the artillery duel had lasted about half an hour, the Federal fire began deliberately to slacken. By this time the Confederate ammunition was beginning to run short and *Alexander* sent a message to *Pickett*: 'Come quick or my ammunition will not let me support you properly.' It took some time to lead the infantry out of the thick woods behind the Seminary Ridge, where they had been sheltering during the cannonade, and it was not till 2.30 p.m. that they advanced in line of battle. At this critical moment the Confederate ammunition gave out and most of the guns became silent. The batteries had been directed 'to be pushed forward as the infantry progressed, protect their flanks and support their attacks closely.' The ground was not unfavourable for the movement of artillery, being nearly level though slightly undulating with a gentle slope to the crests of the two ridges. But *Alexander* could only find some fifteen guns, which still possessed ammunition. These he advanced behind *Pickett's* division and opened fire from the west side of the Emmitsburg road. As soon as the infantry crossed this road, the Federal batteries opened upon them, enfilading them both

from Little Round Top and Cemetery Hill. The distance between the ridges was 1,400 yards, and the Federal infantry reserved their fire until the enemy were within 200 yards. The left of *Pettigrew's* division, enfiladed from Cemetery Hill, soon began to crumble, but the right brigade and *Pender's* two supporting brigades linked up with *Pickett's* division and reached the Federal lines. The stone wall, behind which the first line of *Gibbon's* division of the 2nd Corps was posted, was carried at several points and for several minutes a desperate hand-to-hand fight was waged at and beyond the wall. *Pickett's* charge had broken the Federal line, but no supports were at hand to make good the breach; the brigade, which should have covered his right flank, received its orders too late, and the attack had been repulsed before it began its advance towards the ridge. Noting the absence of any protective force *Hancock* advanced a brigade, which poured a heavy fire into *Pickett's* exposed right flank and rear, and the small bodies of Confederates who had crossed the wall were practically swallowed up by the Northern reinforcements, which were rushed up to repair the breach. *Lee* had made his last throw and lost. *McCade* has been much criticised for not following up *Pickett's* repulse by a counterstroke with *Sedgwick's* Corps; but General *Hunt* justifies him: 'An advance of 20,000 men from Cemetery Ridge in the face of the 140 guns then in position would have been stark madness.' The Federal commander could not know, that the Confederate artillery ammunition was almost exhausted, and two of *Longstreet's* divisions and half of *Hill's* Corps still stood in line of battle. The inefficiency of the Confederate staff work is shown by the fact that the really vulnerable point in the Federal position was never discovered. This was the salient at Cemetery Hill. Here and here alone an effective cross-fire could have been brought to bear upon the Federal defences. *Rodes's* division on the right of the 2nd had occupied a sheltered position within 500 yards of its west face. 'From nowhere else was there so short and unobstructed an approach to the Federal line, and one so free from flank fire. On the north-east, at but little greater distance, was the position whence *Early's* two brigades the evening before had successfully carried the east face of the same salient. Within the edge of the town between these two positions was abundant opportunity to accumulate troops and to establish guns at close range' (*Alexander*). That the position might possibly have been carried if *Pickett's* charge had been made at dawn, carrying with it some element of surprise, and through the town, is also the opinion of *Eckenrode* and *Conrad*.

It had been *Lee's* intention on the evening of July 1st to make his main attack next morning against this salient with *Ewell's* and *Hill's* Corps, both of which had all their divisions on the ground; but the two commanders were reluctant to face the responsibility, and persuaded *Lee* to attack the Federal left, thus transferring the conduct of the main attack to *Longstreet*, who was absent from the conference. *Lee* then proposed in that case to move *Ewell's* Corps more to the right in order to bring it into closer contact with *Hill's* Corps on the Seminary Ridge and shorten his line. But *Ewell* was so anxious to attack *Culp's* Hill, that *Lee* deferred to his judgment and allowed his Corps to remain where it was. Next morning, when he encountered *Longstreet's* opposition to the proposed attack on Meade's left flank, *Lee* again visited his two junior Corps commanders and urged that they should make the main attack on Meade's right. But they were still unwilling to take the risk, and *Longstreet* received his orders. The chief weakness in *Lee's* character as a commander was his excessive amiability. He was too anxious to avoid giving offence—a fault from which his great rival Grant never suffered—and refrained from forcing his views upon unwilling recipients. In this case his judgment was sound. Cemetery Hill was the vulnerable spot in Meade's position; if, however, *Lee* forbore to take advantage of it and decided to attack at the other end of Meade's line, then he must contract his own lines and *Johnson's* division should not have been left in front of *Culp's* Hill. If *Lee* had not deferred his judgment to that of his subordinates, the second day's battle might have run a very different course. At Gettysburg *Lee* was at his worst; not only was his reluctance to discipline his lieutenants most marked, but his nerves were 'on edge' owing to the inexplicable failure of *Stuart* to report. *Scheibert*, a Prussian officer with the Confederate army during this campaign, bears witness to *Lee's* obvious nervousness, which communicated itself to his subordinates. He had believed his army invincible, a belief shared by the army itself, and he now found that he had tried it beyond its strength.

As after the Antietam, *Lee* did not immediately retreat, but stood his ground for another day, hoping that Meade might be tempted to attack in his turn; the Confederates had found that they had after all enough ammunition for one more day's fight. He began his retreat on the night of the 4th. On the 6th his army reached Hagerstown and his trains were at Williamsport. But he found the Potomac in flood, and his pontoon bridge at Falling Waters had been partially destroyed by a raiding party from Frederick. It was a week before the bridge was repaired and the

ford at Williamsport became passable. During those days *Lee* entrenched a very strong position nearly ten miles long from the heights above Hagerstown to the river, covering both the bridge and the ford, and during the interval a fresh supply of ammunition reached him from the Valley. Meade's pursuit was slow; instead of directly following *Lee's* retreat through the South Mountain, he took the longer route through Frederick and only arrived before the Hagerstown lines on the 12th. He would have attacked on the 14th, but *Lee* had already got his army across the previous night.

Estimates of the strength and the losses of the two armies at Gettysburg vary widely, but Colonel T. L. Livermore, who is the recognised authority on this subject, gives Meade 88,000 and *Lee* 75,000 men and estimates the Federal losses at 23,000 and those of the Confederates at 28,000.

Meade followed *Lee* across the Potomac, keeping on the east side of the Blue Ridge. Eventually *Lee* fell back behind the Rapidan and Meade advanced to Culpeper. In September both armies were called upon to send troops to Tennessee. Two divisions under *Longstreet* were despatched to reinforce *Bragg*, who was on the point of being driven from Chattanooga, and after Rosecrans's defeat at Chickamauga a composite Corps under Hooker was detached from the Army of the Potomac to raise the siege of Chattanooga. In October *Lee* took the offensive, hoping to serve Meade as he had served Pope, but the Federals retreated across the Rappahannock. *Lee* failed to prevent them falling back across Bull Run and retired first behind the Rappahannock and finally behind the Rapidan. At the end of November Meade attempted an elaborate manoeuvre, in some way an anticipation of Grant's next spring. Meade planned to cross the Rapidan in three columns below *Lee's* right and establish them on the turnpike and the Plank road. They were then to follow these roads westwards and fall upon *Lee's* right flank, before it could be reinforced by the other Corps from the upper fords. The operation required very accurate timing across very difficult country. It may be doubted whether it ever had much chance of success. But it convinced Meade, that he had not in his army five lieutenants competent to command army Corps, and he therefore decided to reorganise his army into three Corps under Hancock, Warren, and Sedgwick; the 1st and 3rd Corps were abolished and their divisions distributed among the other three.

In the East the close of 1863 found the two rival armies, each with a victory to its credit, very nearly in the same positions as at the beginning of the year, but in the West the Federals had

gained two decisive successes at Vicksburg and Chattanooga, the two places of the greatest strategical importance (after Richmond) in the Confederacy. The capture of Vicksburg, closely followed by that of Port Hudson, secured to the Federals control of the Mississippi throughout its entire course and cut off the Trans-Mississippi from the rest of the South. The occupation of Chattanooga secured Middle and East Tennessee, and opened the road into the heart of Georgia. The campaign of Vicksburg is justly accounted Grant's greatest achievement, and it cannot be too highly praised, though not for some of the reasons generally given. The problem, which Grant had to solve, was how to get his troops on to the high land in rear of Vicksburg. During February and March, when land operations were impossible owing to the floods, he made four attempts more or less simultaneous to move his troops by water to the left bank of the river either above or below the city. Two of these aimed at crossing the Yazoo basin and effecting a landing above Haynes's Bluff, where Sherman had suffered his reverse in December. Of the other two one was the construction of a canal across the peninsula opposite Vicksburg, by which troops might be moved on transports below the city out of reach of the Confederate batteries; the other was the opening of a passage from Lake Providence sixty miles above Vicksburg through two bayous into the tributaries of the Red River, thence into the Red River itself and finally into the Mississippi. It would have been a long and roundabout route covering several hundred miles, but might have been useful for sending reinforcements to Banks in his operation against Port Hudson. From Grant's own account it does not appear that he ever had much confidence in any of these plans, but he pursued them for the purpose of distracting the enemy, finding work to keep his soldiers in health, and deceiving the politicians at Washington into the belief that he was really making progress. From the first he seems to have had in his mind the plan, which he ultimately put into execution, viz., to wait till the water subsided and then move his troops overland down the west bank and land them in transports below Vicksburg. To accomplish this, the fleet must escort the transports past the Vicksburg batteries. This took place on the night of April 16th, when seven armoured gunboats and two transports effected the passage one transport was lost. Six nights later five out of six transport unescorted ran past the batteries. The transports were all laden with stores for the troops. After an unsuccessful attempt to silence the Grand Gulf batteries, thirty miles below Vicksburg, Grant on April 30th got his troops across the river at Bruinsburg, si

miles lower down. The landing was unopposed and McClernand's Corps at once pushed forward towards Port Gibson, which was connected by a short line of rail with Grand Gulf. The Confederate commander, *Pemberton*, had been completely deceived by Grant's many feints. As commander of the Department of Mississippi and Louisiana, he was responsible for the safety of Port Hudson as well as of Vicksburg. He had none too many troops, about 50,000 in all, for the dual task. His own headquarters were at Jackson and he was trying to hold the whole Vicksburg line from Haynes's Bluff to Grand Gulf. He was, moreover, devoid of cavalry; by *Johnston's* orders he had sent all his mounted troops to *Bragg*. Early in April he had come to the conclusion that Grant was preparing to withdraw from before Vicksburg and reinforce Rosecrans, and sent three brigades of infantry to *Bragg's* aid. Part of these were now hastily recalled, but part had already reached Chattanooga. At the moment of Grant's landing, his attention was still further distracted by a demonstration against Haynes's Bluff undertaken by Sherman with one division up the Yazoo in company with the rest of the Federal fleet, and by Grierson's cavalry raid. Three cavalry regiments started on April 17th from La Grange and rode right through the State of Mississippi, reaching Baton Rouge on May 2nd after doing considerable damage to the railways connecting Jackson with Meridian and New Orleans—perhaps the most successful cavalry raid of the war. Consequently *Pemberton* could only muster four brigades to meet McClernand's advance. Two of McPherson's divisions followed McClernand across the river. The Confederates were defeated on May 1st, and abandoned Port Gibson and Grand Gulf on the 2nd. Next day Grant occupied Grand Gulf and established his base there. He had now secured a safe position with 28,000 men on the uplands, his left flank protected by the Big Black river, while at Grand Gulf he was in touch with Porter's gunboats. Now that he was in possession of the bluffs, he could reasonably expect to hold his own, until the rest of his troops joined him, viz. McPherson's third division and Sherman's Corps. This would give him a force of between 40,000 and 50,000 men, and 10,000 more could in case of emergency be forwarded from Memphis. By this time it was plain, that *Pemberton* had not under his immediate command sufficient troops to drive him from his position. (Writing twenty years later Grant credited *Pemberton* with nearly 60,000 men, nearly double his actual force.) The only risk was that large reinforcements might reach him *via* Jackson.

In this position, had *Lee* or *Jackson* been in Grant's place, they

would perhaps have made a dash for the railway in order to cut off the flow of possible reinforcements. But Grant was taking no unnecessary risks. He remained where he was till the 7th, when Sherman arrived escorting a wagon train of supplies, which had been brought down the right bank of the Mississippi and ferried across to Grand Gulf. It had been his original intention to detach one Corps to Banks to ensure the speedy reduction of Port Hudson, and upon the return of that Corps with a reinforcement of 15,000 men from Banks to commence operations against Vicksburg, making New Orleans his base instead of Memphis. But on hearing from Banks that he could not commence operations against Port Hudson till May 10th and that his whole field force would only number 15,000, he decided to wait no longer. The reinforcements, which in the meantime would reach *Pemberton*, would probably outnumber those which he might get from Banks. Time was on the Confederate side. Accordingly he commenced a cautious movement towards the railway to intervene between Vicksburg and Jackson, and defeat in detail the Confederate forces concentrating at those two places. With his left wing he hugged the Big Black river, whose ferries he kept closely guarded, and thus forced *Pemberton* to envisage the possibility of his crossing that river and striking straight for Vicksburg. McPherson's Corps on the right advanced towards Jackson. Sherman was held in reserve to support either wing, if required. Till the 12th Grant moved with deliberate caution, his chief object being to keep his army well together. Twelve days after the landing at Bruinsburg his most advanced troops had only covered sixty miles. But on the 12th McPherson on his way to Jackson encountered near Raymond a Confederate brigade coming up from Port Hudson. He put this in retreat for Jackson and from prisoners learnt that troops were concentrating there and that *Johnston* was on his way to take command in person.

Johnston at the end of 1862 had been placed in general control of the three Western Departments of Tennessee (*Bragg*), Mississippi (*Pemberton*), and the Trans-Mississippi (*Kirby Smith*). But he was in bad health, having barely recovered from the wounds received at the battle of Seven Pines, and his control was so ill-defined as to be little more than nominal. From the outset both Vicksburg and Chattanooga were objects of much anxiety. He vainly represented to the President that 'the great distance between the Armies of Tennessee and Mississippi, and the fact that they had different objects and adversaries made it impossible to combine their action.' To strengthen Vicksburg against an attack he would have brought reinforcements across

from Arkansas, where, as he maintained, General *Holmes* had under his command 50,000 men with no enemy force near him. The President would give no orders to this effect. Undoubtedly *Holmes's* numbers were exaggerated, but the probable reason for the President's refusal is that he knew how unpopular service on the eastern side of the Mississippi was with the Trans-Mississippi soldiers, and feared that the Governors of those States would make trouble. Consequently the President expected *Johnston* to reinforce Vicksburg from *Bragg's* army. This he was most reluctant to do; he held that, if *Holmes's* troops were not to be brought across the river, the Government must make their choice between Mississippi and Tennessee; he could not guarantee to keep both safe and he was more concerned to secure Chattanooga, since the importance of Vicksburg seemed to him greatly reduced by the power of the Federal ironclads to run the Vicksburg batteries. However, on May 9th he received orders from Richmond to go immediately to Mississippi, take chief command of the forces there and arrange for the prompt despatch of '3,000 good troops' from *Bragg's* army. He reached Jackson on the night of the 13th and found two brigades there and two more expected next day. But he also found that railway communication with Vicksburg had been broken that day by the enemy occupation of Clinton, and telegraphed the despondent message to Richmond: 'I am too late.'

As soon as Grant received McPherson's news from Raymond, he determined to 'turn the whole column towards Jackson and capture that place without delay. All the enemy's supplies of men and stores would come by that point. As I hoped in the end to besiege Vicksburg, I must first destroy all possibility of aid. I therefore determined to move swiftly towards Jackson, destroy or drive any force in that direction, and then turn on Pemberton. But by moving on Jackson, I cut my own communications. So I decided to have none. To cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole force eastward. I then had no fears of my communications, and if I moved quickly enough, could turn upon Pemberton before he could attack me in the rear' (Grant's *Personal Memoirs*). The risk which Grant took in cutting loose from his base was but slight. He had already proved that his troops could live on the country. The only supplies which his trains need carry were ammunition, biscuit, coffee, and salt. A second wagon-train had come up on the 11th and 200 more wagons were near at hand under the escort of Blair's division of Sherman's Corps. If Grant abandoned his base at Grand Gulf, he could cross the Big Black river and march to Haynes's Bluff,

which was not fortified by nature against any attack from the rear. There, with the assistance of the Federal war vessels in the Yazoo, he could establish a fresh base. He was already between *Pemberton* and *Johnston*, and the chances of their forces being able to effect a concentration against him were but small. Having come to this resolution, Grant moved with great rapidity. On the 13th McPherson marched to Clinton on the railway, whence next day he was to continue his advance on Jackson. Sherman was moved up to advance on McPherson's right to Jackson, and McClernand covered the rear against any attack from *Pemberton* and awaited the arrival of Blair's train. On the morning of the 14th Sherman and McPherson were converging on Jackson. *Johnston* with only two brigades under his hand could only fight a rear-guard action to cover the removal of stores by train and then retreated up the Canton road. Grant left Sherman in Jackson to destroy the railways. McClernand and McPherson were ordered to move west against *Pemberton*, whom Grant from an intercepted despatch expected to be advancing along the railway to Clinton to cut his way through to Jackson. That unlucky general having concentrated three divisions behind the Big Black river, was marching southward against Grant's non-existent line of communications, in disregard of *Johnston's* orders issued on the night of the 13th; a second order issued two nights later, calling upon him still to march to Clinton in order to effect a concentration with *Johnston*, who hoped to bring 6,000 men from Calhoun, caused him this time to try to carry out his superior's instructions and on the 16th he was moving eastward only to find the Federals marching in force against him. He tried to fall back to Edwards Station, hoping to reach *Johnston* by a more northern road. But the two armies had approached too close to each other, and he was forced to stand and offer battle at Champion's Hill. He was heavily defeated and having lost the road by which he hoped to join *Johnston*, he attempted to make a stand next day at the railway bridge over the Big Black. The Confederates made but a brief resistance and were quickly in full retreat for Vicksburg, but they succeeded in destroying the bridge. The loss of the Big Black line rendered Haynes's Bluff untenable and on the 18th Sherman having crossed the river higher up by a pontoon bridge was in possession of the heights overlooking the Yazoo. On the 19th Grant attacked Vicksburg, but was repulsed by troops who had recovered their morale as soon as they found themselves behind entrenchments. He repeated the attack with less justification on the 22nd and met with a second repulse. He now sat down to a regular siege of the city. Large reinforcements reached

him and before the end his army had risen from 43,000 to 72,000. He threw up a line of circumvallation to shut the garrison in and a line of countervallation to shut *Johnston* out and formed a covering force of seven divisions under Sherman. 'The only hope for Vicksburg lay in the possibility of *Johnston's* gathering a sufficiently large force to break through Grant's lines. But the thorough wreck which Sherman had made of Jackson as a railway centre delayed his concentration at Canton, twenty-five miles north of Jackson, and the utmost force which he could laboriously collect never reached 30,000 men. Without further reinforcements he hesitated to attack Grant's entrenchments. Vicksburg was starved into surrender and *Pemberton* capitulated on July 4th. Five days later Port Hudson, which Banks had invested on May 24th, surrendered, its garrison reduced to an even worse plight than the defenders of Vicksburg. The capture of Vicksburg was hailed at the North as a greater feat than the victory of Gettysburg, because *Lee* though defeated had effected his escape, and it was upon Grant, not Meade, that Lincoln bestowed the highest reward then in his power, promotion to the rank of major-general in the Regular Army. Meade, Sherman and McPherson became brigadier-generals.

It will be seen that Grant's Vicksburg campaign was no desperate adventure in defiance of the 'principles of war,' but that the risks had been carefully weighed and each movement duly considered. At the outset the two biggest risks had to be faced; first, his landing might be opposed, but even if *Pemberton* had managed to concentrate a considerable force to meet him, he would not have come to any serious harm with Porter's gunboats to cover the movement. Second, granted that he had made good his landing, *Pemberton* might mass sufficient force to prevent him reaching the uplands before further Confederate reinforcements arrived. But on May 3rd he had two Corps established on the bluffs, which below Grand Gulf turn away from the river bank and run inland. For defensive purposes he was now quite safe and could await with equanimity the arrival of his third Corps. He made no further advance till the 7th. Here he was taking a risk; reinforcements during the interval might have been pouring in to *Pemberton's* aid from Jackson. But where were these reinforcements to come from? *Bragg* would not wish to weaken himself while Rosecrans lay in his front with a much larger army, and *Pemberton* could not afford to draw too freely upon the resources of Port Hudson, which was itself threatened by Banks. Troops might be withdrawn from Mobile or the Atlantic ports. But it would be a lengthy journey

from Charleston or Savannah, and the garrison at Mobile was a small one, chiefly artillery. It was only on the 13th that Grant 'cut loose from his base' and on the 19th the Federal fleet in the Yazoo provided him with a fresh line of supply. The most daring act on Grant's part was his refusal, when once he had made up his mind that his plan of campaign was practicable, to let himself be diverted from his purpose by the objections raised by his most trusted subordinates, none of whom believed that the movement could prove successful. Colonel W. R. Livermore's criticism seems sound: 'The campaign was all the more praiseworthy from a military standpoint from the fact that the risk was a minimum. Anyone may take great chances; Grant and his generals took no great risk in the expedition around Vicksburg, and are entitled to great credit for their success.'

In Middle Tennessee, Rosecrans, as soon as he saw that the success of the Vicksburg campaign was assured, moved against *Bragg* and in a nine days' campaign manœuvred him out of his lines at Tullahoma. In September he advanced against Chattanooga and crossing the bulk of his army below that place forced *Bragg*, who was expecting his antagonist to cross above the town, to evacuate it. *Bragg*, however, had no intention of permanently relinquishing Chattanooga to the enemy; he only fell back twenty-five miles to Lafayette, covering the railway to Atlanta. Here he awaited the reinforcements which he had been promised, and prepared to take advantage of any opportunity which might be offered by Rosecrans, who in the belief that *Bragg* was in full retreat for Rome had widely scattered his own forces in a headlong pursuit. After the conclusion of the Gettysburg campaign the question had again been raised at Richmond of reinforcing *Bragg* from *Lee's* army. Now that the invasion of Pennsylvania had failed and Vicksburg had fallen, the Government felt that they could not afford a third defeat in Tennessee. *Lee*, as in the earlier part of the year, was opposed to making any detachment from his own army for service in the West. But, as had happened after the Antietam, he had lost some of his prestige after Gettysburg and found himself unable to resist the pressure now put upon him. *Longstreet*, who aspired to replace *Bragg* in command of the Western army, strongly supported the proposal, and eventually it was decided that he should go with two of his divisions to *Bragg's* aid. But precious time was lost in the discussion and just before *Longstreet* was ready to start, Burnside's capture of Knoxville closed the direct route through East Tennessee. Instead of a railway journey of 540 miles which was reckoned to take only four days, the roundabout

route by way of Petersburg, Wilmington, Augusta and Atlanta, 925 miles long, 'with imperfect connections through some cities and some changes of gauge,' had to be followed with the result, that four out of nine brigades and a whole battalion of artillery were too late for the battle. *Bragg* had already received reinforcements from East Tennessee and Mississippi and on the day of battle had 66,000 men against Rosecrans's 58,000. The Federal commander, who had got possession of Chattanooga on September 9th did not discover the trap, which had been laid for him, till the 12th. *Bragg* signally failed to close the trap; he saw his opportunities of overwhelming the three Federal Corps in detail, but he had so lost the confidence of his subordinates that he could not get his orders executed. Rosecrans was allowed to reconcentrate his army in Chickamauga Valley on the night of the 18th and then stood to fight to hold the road to Chattanooga. On the 19th after a hard day's battle he had fairly held his own and strengthened his grip on the road. But on the 20th a gap opened in his line owing to a misunderstanding of an order. *Longstreet* commanding the Confederate left wing burst through the breach and swept away the Federal right. Rosecrans himself and two of his Corps commanders fled to Chattanooga, but Thomas, the 'Rock of Chickamauga,' to whose wing the bulk of the Federal army had gradually been drawn, offered a staunch resistance and saved the army from annihilation, securing the retreat of his own force to Chattanooga.

Chickamauga was the one great Confederate victory in the West; perhaps, indeed, the greatest Confederate victory in the war, if judged by the opportunities which it offered to the victors. But it proved to be only one more Pyrrhic victory for the South and in its after-effects more costly than any other. *Longstreet* proposed that the army should cross the Tennessee above the town and by threatening Rosecrans's line of retreat force the evacuation of Chattanooga. The Confederates would then have the choice of either pursuing Rosecrans or falling upon Burnside in East Tennessee. *Bragg* at first accepted the proposal, but having had words with *Longstreet* on the morning after the battle cancelled the order and decided to lay siege to Chattanooga, expecting to starve Rosecrans into surrender or force him to attempt a retreat. Rosecrans seemed 'to go all to pieces' after his unexpected defeat and took no steps to ward off the impending disaster. Having abandoned his railway line of supply by withdrawing from Look-out Mountain and making no effort to open an alternative route by water, he was reduced to hauling his supplies a distance of sixty or seventy miles over the mountainous region

north of the river. His troops came near to starvation point and the transport animals died in such numbers that in case of a retreat he could not have brought off his trains. The news of Rosecrans's defeat caused the despatch of three divisions from the Army of the Potomac under Hooker's command. These reached Bridgeport, the Federal advanced base on the Tennessee, on October 2nd. But it was useless to bring them to Chattanooga, as Rosecrans could not feed the troops already there. As the news from the besieged town grew more and more ominous the Federal Government decided to place Grant in command of all the troops between the Mississippi and the Alleghanies and constituted the Military Division of the Mississippi, embracing the Departments of the Ohio, Cumberland and Tennessee. Grant received his new appointment on the 17th and reached Chattanooga on the 23rd. He had already appointed Sherman to succeed him in command of the Army and Department of the Tennessee and superseded Rosecrans in favour of Thomas. On his arrival at Chattanooga he found that W. F. Smith, the chief engineer of the army, had devised a plan for establishing a workable line of supply up the river. Thomas was on the point of putting it into execution and Grant after studying the situation gave his approval. The key to the problem of feeding the Army of the Cumberland lay in securing possession of Look-out Valley and this was done by Hooker's Corps advancing up the south bank of the river on the 28th. That night *Longstreet* attempted to dislodge Hooker from his position, but the attack was bungled and the Confederates made no further attempt to regain the valley. The opening of the 'Cracker line' relieved Chattanooga of all fear of starvation. While Grant was bringing up Sherman from Memphis, *Bragg* was detaching *Longstreet's* Corps against Burnside. Whether this move was President *Davis's* solution of the problem, which had arisen from the strained relations between *Bragg* and his chief lieutenant, or whether *Bragg* believed that his position before Chattanooga was so strong that he could hold it against Grant until *Longstreet's* return, remains a doubtful point; but it proved the ruin of *Bragg*: for *Longstreet*, having once got away from him, had no intention of returning. The Confederate advance on Knoxville threw the Federal Government, however, into an agony of fear for Burnside's safety, and Grant was importuned with appeals to send help to him. Accordingly on November 7th Grant without waiting for Sherman's arrival ordered Thomas with his Army of the Cumberland to attack at the north end of Missionary Ridge and then to threaten and if possible attack the enemy's line of communication between

Dalton and Cleveland and thus compel *Longstreet's* recall. A reconnaissance made by Smith from the north bank of the river showed, however, that Thomas had not troops sufficient at once to outflank *Bragg's* right and cover Chattanooga. The order was therefore cancelled. It appears that not only had Thomas not adequate strength to carry out the proposed offensive, but also he could not move his artillery for lack of teams. The impatience manifested by Grant on this occasion, which led him to order an impracticable attack without proper examination of the ground, is in marked contrast to the caution displayed at Vicksburg, when he waited several days for the arrival of Sherman. It may perhaps be conjectured that he was over-eager to justify his new appointment by helping Burnside, whose Department was now part of the Military Division of the Mississippi, or that he relied upon Thomas, an army commander, to make the necessary reconnaissances. The order given to Thomas, however, was unconditional in form, and the whole incident is suggestive of difficulties, which Grant might make for himself in dealing with army commanders placed under his control. Sherman himself reached Chattanooga on the 15th, and the four divisions, which he was bringing with him, were at Bridgeport on that day. Grant now employed the same sort of feint against *Bragg*, which he had used with effect against *Pemberton*. A division of Sherman's army was marched in the direction of one of the passes in Look-out Mountain, as if it intended to cross the mountain and threaten *Bragg's* rear. The other three divisions crossed the river at Brown's Ferry and moved behind the hills on the north bank to the North Chickamauga river, where 116 pontoons had been collected, some seven miles above the town. These troops were, of course, plainly seen from Look-out Mountain, as they crossed at Brown's Ferry, but Howard's two divisions, which had previously been brought from Look-out Valley to the north bank, were now ordered to recross to Chattanooga, and these troops were mistaken by the Confederates for Sherman's. Thus *Bragg* remained unsuspecting of any danger to his right flank. Grant had hoped that Sherman would commence his turning movement on the 22nd. But very heavy rain on the two previous days necessitated its postponement, and on the 23rd Grant learning that *Bragg* was starting off another division for Knoxville ordered somewhat injudiciously a reconnaissance in force by Thomas's army. The troops engaged in this captured Orchard Knob, an advanced Confederate position in the plain between the Federal lines and the foot of Missionary Ridge; its capture, though improving Thomas's position for the coming battle, alarmed *Bragg*

for his right, and he moved one division from Look-out Mountain to Missionary Ridge and recalled the division, which was starting after *Longstreet*. The actual battle was fought on the 24th and 25th. On the first day Sherman crossed his force over to the south bank on pontoon rafts, but failed to reach Missionary Ridge itself, occupying a detached hill north of it. Hitherto it has been supposed that the Ridge was continuous, and Grant had expected Sherman to capture that day Tunnel Hill, through which ran the main line to Atlanta. On the right Hooker advancing from Look-out Valley carried the western slopes of the mountain (the 'Battle above the clouds'), which was evacuated during the night by the Confederate garrison.

The course, which the battle took next day, has been the subject of much controversy, embittered by the rivalry between the Armies of the Cumberland and the Tennessee. Grant's admirers maintain that the battle was fought strictly according to plan. It has been termed 'Grant's perfect battle,' and Grant's *Memoirs* seek to convey the same impression. But his memory was not infallible where plans which he formed twenty years earlier were concerned. According to his friends, he planned a double envelopment, of the Confederate right by Sherman and of the left by Hooker. He expected a greater success from Sherman's manœuvre than from Hooker's and counted upon *Bragg* weakening his centre to hold his ground against Sherman's attack. At the favourable moment Thomas in the centre was to be thrown in and storm the ridge. But when Sherman failed to make the progress expected, Grant turned his attention to *Bragg's* left and threw in Thomas, as soon as he judged that Hooker had gained the southern end of the ridge. 'In place of winning the battle with his left, as originally planned, Grant won it with his right. That he should have done so after his mistaken move of Thomas on the 23rd, does not reflect adversely on his generalship; instead, it shows that his plan and distribution were flexible, that is, that they could be adapted to circumstances as they arose. This, after all, is one of the greatest tests of generalship' (Fuller). The partisans of the Army of the Cumberland tell a very different story; they assert that Grant was obsessed with the idea of scouring for his own old Army of the Tennessee, as represented by Sherman's divisions, the chief credit for the victory which he anticipated: that Hooker's role was intended to be a very minor one, nothing more than a diversion, and that Thomas's attack was ordered in order to 'do something for Sherman' either by way of taking the pressure off him or to enable him to capture the Tunnel Hill, in front of which he had been 'hung up' the whole

day: and that Hooker's advance from Rossville Gap on to the southern end of the ridge was made so late that the Confederate centre had already been broken, before the Federal right wing could exercise any decisive influence upon the issue of the day. Professor Fiske sums up this point of view: 'Now if anything in this world can be said to be clear, it is that the battle of Chattanooga was not fought as Grant had planned it.' The outstanding fact is that Thomas's troops were ordered by Grant in the first instance only to seize the enemy's line of rifle-pits at the foot of the ridge but having captured this, without waiting for further orders, they continued their charge to the crest.

After this victory, which secured Chattanooga and threw the Confederates on the defensive, Grant, as after Vicksburg, urged an advance on Mobile from New Orleans. With Mobile in his hands, he proposed a twofold movement, from Chattanooga on Atlanta and from Mobile on Montgomery: such a campaign would, he thought, 'secure the entire States of Alabama and Mississippi and a part of Georgia, or force Lee to abandon Virginia and North Carolina. Without his force the enemy have not got army enough to resist the army I can take.' President Lincoln thought favourably of this plan and agreed to it on condition that *Longstreet* should first be driven out of East Tennessee. As the severity of the winter made operations against *Longstreet* impracticable, Grant had to postpone his plan of campaign and put his troops into winter quarters. At the time he did not foresee that another would carry out the plan of campaign which he had conceived, and that he himself would be summoned to take up a still higher post and have to undertake still more exacting duties. But his work in the West had been well and truly done. As he foresaw, Lee should not continue to defend Richmond when a Federal army was invading Georgia and threatening a movement against his rear through North Carolina. It is true that it would be fifteen months before the indomitable Lee abandoned Richmond, but Grant had already outlined in his own mind the plan of campaign, which would render the end inevitable, although as yet he could not foresee the obstinacy, with which Lee would cling to Richmond for months after all hope had departed.

Already at the end of 1863 the case of the South was well nigh hopeless. The twin disasters of Gettysburg and Vicksburg had been a staggering blow, and now the loss of Chattanooga and the rout of *Bragg's* army, the more disheartening because it extinguished the bright hopes kindled for a moment by victory at Chickamauga, might well seem the climax. Even worse than the

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loss of territory was the loss of men. It was no longer possible to replace the 30,000, who had surrendered at Vicksburg, and the 7,000, who had formed the garrison at Port Hudson, or the thousands who had fallen at Gettysburg and Chickamauga. The Government had already made it plain to *Lee*, that he could never again have at his disposal an army strong enough to carry the war across the Potomac. All hope of foreign intervention had gone. After Gettysburg Napoleon III had withdrawn his permission for Confederate war vessels to be built by French firms. The only chance left was that the enemy in the coming year might make some grave mistake; the Federal generals, who had made their mark in 1863, were not likely to make such mistakes in the field; but the Northern public might from sheer war-weariness throw away the victory all but won. The coming year 1864 would be a Presidential year, and if Lincoln failed to win re-election and a Democrat replaced him, there was a chance that the South might still secure independence as the price of peace. With that hope *Davis* and *Lee* braced themselves for the coming struggle, and if they no longer had the majority of their people behind them, at least they could count on the soldiers in the field to give them loyal support.

CHAPTER I

WINTER OPERATIONS AND PLANS

The Confederate position in the West—Sherman marches on Meridian—The Red River expedition—Banks retires before Taylor—The Federals abandon Alexandria—Longstreet in East Tennessee—Grant appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Federal armies—Grant before the war—Further changes in the Federal armies—Grant's plan of campaign—Sherman's previous history—Subsidiary operations projected—Divided counsels in the Confederate camp—Longstreet's suggested plan of campaign—Bragg's proposed plan of campaign.

IN the western theatre of war the Confederate cause at the end of 1863 seemed in a desperate plight. The army, with which *Bragg* had hoped to win a great victory and even compel the surrender of the Army of the Cumberland, was divided and disheartened. A considerable part of it, under *Longstreet*, was in East Tennessee,¹ having retired from before Knoxville to the Upper Holston Valley, and was cut off from direct communication with the rest of the army, which, after the crushing defeat at Chattanooga, had rallied at Dalton. In the winter quarters at Dalton demoralisation grew apace. Discontent was rife among both the officers and men: the bonds of discipline were loosened, and there was a danger lest the army should degenerate into a mere rabble. If discipline was to be restored and the army ever become again an organised weapon of warfare, it was essential that *Bragg* should be relieved of the command. *Bragg* offered his resignation on November 28th, which was accepted by the Government on the 30th. *Hardee* for the time being succeeded to the command of the army at Dalton, but after a short while, being unwilling to assume the responsibility of supreme command, he was relieved by *Joseph E. Johnston*.

While the Confederate forces in the West were thus broken up and disorganised, Grant was endeavouring to improve the opportunity. Thomas and the Army of the Cumberland remained at Chattanooga keeping an eye upon the Confederate army at Dalton. Schofield succeeded Foster, who had relieved Burnside, in command of the Army of the Ohio, and was at Knoxville preparing to

¹ See Map II.

operate against *Longstreet* and, if possible, drive him out of East Tennessee. Sherman, with the Army of the Tennessee, was directed to march from Vicksburg against Meridian¹ and destroy the railroads in its vicinity. At Meridian, which is near the eastern border of Mississippi, the railroads from Vicksburg to Selma and from Mobile to the Ohio intersect. A thorough destruction of the railway system at that point would close to the Confederates Northern Mississippi as a possible theatre of war for some considerable period. Experience had shown that a large force, if engaged in protracted operations, could not subsist far from a railway or some line of water communication. Sherman's expedition, if successful, would free the Federal authorities from any fear during the next campaign of a movement in force from Northern Mississippi towards either the Mississippi or Nashville, and thus allow a larger force to be concentrated for the offensive movement into Georgia, which Grant and Sherman were planning.

Sherman proposed to march with about 20,000 men from Vicksburg to Meridian, whilst General Sooy Smith was to move with a strong cavalry force simultaneously from Memphis and break up the Mobile and Ohio railroad southward from Corinth, and then join Sherman at Meridian. There was a Confederate force in Mississippi under the command of *Polk*, but it was not strong enough to cope single-handed with Sherman's army, and the Confederate commander at Dalton was prevented from marching to *Polk's* aid by the consideration that Thomas at Chattanooga would then have a clear course to Atlanta. Consequently Sherman himself encountered no opposition: he reached Meridian on February 14th, and completely destroyed the railroads in the neighbourhood. Smith, however, was not so fortunate. Before he could carry out his share of the work, he had to reckon with *Forrest*, the ablest cavalry commander in the West. He was badly beaten and driven back into Memphis.²

In March three of Sherman's divisions were detached for service under Banks in the Red River expedition. This expedition calls for notice as being the last directed by Halleck in his capacity as General-in-Chief of the Federal armies. After the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, Grant, Banks, and Admiral Farragut were all in favour of a combined movement of the land

¹ See Map I.

² Sooy Smith's defeat seems to have been thoroughly discreditable. He had a force of at least 7,000 cavalry, and allowed himself to be driven back by *Forrest* with a force of not more than 2,500 men (4 B. & L., 416-17).

and naval forces against Mobile, as an effective diversion which might aid Rosecrans in his campaign against *Bragg*. Halleck, however, on political grounds, insisted on an attempt being made to raise the Federal flag in Texas. Napoleon III had just established an Austrian Archduke as Emperor of Mexico under French protection; and it was feared by both the Federal and Confederate Governments that the French might try to establish an independent Republic in Texas.¹ To prevent such an attempt it was desirable that the Federals should gain some foothold in Texas. To Banks, as commander of the Department of the Gulf, the work was entrusted. Halleck favoured an expedition up the Red River into Northern Texas, but the Red River was only navigable in spring. Banks accordingly attempted to gain possession of the coastline of Texas by sudden descents from the sea. In September, 1863, an expedition was sent to seize the Sabine Pass, but it was easily beaten off and two gunboats forced to surrender. At the end of October Banks made a second attempt. This time he struck the mouth of the Rio Grande (on the frontier, not shown on map), and hoped to work his way eastward along the coast. But the Confederate fortifications at Galveston and the mouth of the Brazos River proved too strong to be taken except by a movement into the interior and an attack upon their rear; and to carry this out Banks needed reinforcements, which Halleck refused to give him.² He therefore found himself obliged to adopt Halleck's plan of a movement up the Red River. He was to be supported by 10,000 troops from Sherman's army and by Porter's Mississippi fleet. Sherman's contingent was to be convoyed up the river by the fleet, and Banks's army was to march by land up the Teche to Alexandria, where the two forces were to unite on March 17th. From Alexandria an advance was to be made upon Shreveport, the most important Confederate depôt in the Trans-Mississippi Department, in conjunction with Steele's army, which was to advance from the Arkansas River. Halleck hoped by this combined movement to establish the Federal forces on the Red River, and from Shreveport as a base to push forward into Texas.

¹ On June 10th, 1863, Marshal Bazaine entered the city of Mexico, and a packed assembly at once offered the throne to Maximilian, 'or, in case of his refusal, to such other Catholic prince as Napoleon might please to indicate.' Maximilian refused to accept the crown, unless his choice was ratified by a vote of the Mexican people. On April 10th, 1864, he was formally crowned (Schouler, vi. 428-9). For the French designs upon Texas, see Mahan, 185-6.

² An earlier attempt upon Galveston had been made on January 1st, 1863, with signal ill-success.

The expedition was late in starting. The navy and Sherman's contingent duly kept their appointment, but Banks was delayed in New Orleans by official duties. He was nearing Shreveport when on April 18th *Taylor*, commanding in West Louisiana, advanced against him and catching his column strung out for twenty miles on a single road defeated him at Sabine Cross Roads (fifty miles south of Shreveport), and following up his retreat attacked him next day at Pleasant Hill. Here the Confederates after an initial success met with a heavy reverse. Banks, who might have claimed a victory, continued his retreat to Alexandria, leaving that portion of the fleet which had ascended the Red River above Alexandria in great danger. The river was falling fast and the gunboats only got down over the falls above Alexandria thanks to the ingenious construction of a dam by Colonel Bailey. After Pleasant Hill *Kirby Smith*, the commander of the Department, took away the bulk of *Taylor's* troops to march against Steele, who had reached Camden, ninety miles from Shreveport. Steele effected his retreat to Little Rock, and *Kirby Smith* was too late on his return to intercept the gunboats and *Taylor* too weak to interfere seriously with their movements. On May 13th, on which day the last of the gunboats passed the falls, Banks evacuated Alexandria.

The Red River expedition, having proved a failure, was fatal to Banks's military reputation, and he was relieved¹ by General Canby in the command of the Department of the Gulf: while the troops which took part in the expedition were prevented from having any share in the extensive and glorious campaign planned by Grant for the ensuing summer.

During the winter the one Confederate force which held a position of strategic importance was *Longstreet's* Corps in East Tennessee. After *Bragg's* defeat and retreat to Dalton, *Longstreet* found himself cut off from the main army. Having received from President *Davis* discretionary authority over all the Confederate troops in that Department, he attempted to resume the offensive. But the difficulty of getting provisions and the severity of the winter caused the operations on both sides in this theatre of war

¹ Banks still remained for a time in command of the Department of the Gulf, but he was placed under the orders of Canby, the commander of the newly made Trans-Mississippi Division (4 B. & L., 360). General *Taylor*, who severely criticises *Kirby Smith's* military methods, claims that the Confederates lost a chance of striking a blow which would have been decisive of the war. He maintains that the capture of Porter's fleet ought to have been achieved, and that with that fleet the Confederates could have regained possession of the Mississippi and undone all the work of the Federals since the winter of 1861 (*Taylor*, 189).

to be ineffective. Still *Longstreet* in East Tennessee was inconveniently near to Kentucky and the Ohio, and Halleck at Washington was urging Grant to drive him out of the Department. For a time Grant shared this view, and seems to have anticipated that the final campaign of the war might be fought out in East Tennessee ; but the arguments of General Foster, who was for a short time in command of the Department, convinced him that for the time being there was nothing to fear from *Longstreet*, owing to the lack of supplies, and in April that commander was recalled to Virginia, and East Tennessee ceased to be of strategic importance.

During the winter of 1863-4 the Federal Government determined to take the very important step of appointing a single Commander-in-Chief of all the armies in the field. Halleck had been acting as General-in-Chief at Washington ever since the middle of 1862, but he had not succeeded in establishing any real co-operation between the different armies in the field, and it was gradually brought home to the Government that the Commander-in-Chief ought not to be a bureau officer, but one who could take the actual command in the field. It was, in fact, a return to the policy of the beginning of the war, when on November 1st, 1861, McClellan had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the Federal forces in the field. The events of 1863 had shown conclusively that Grant was the one man who could be safely entrusted with so great a responsibility.

The campaign of Vicksburg had resulted in the most notable success achieved as yet in the war. The promptitude with which Grant had marched to the relief of Chattanooga, and the crushing reverse which he had then inflicted upon *Bragg*, marked him out as the general for whom Lincoln had for so long and with such ill-success been looking. It was determined to revive the grade of Lieutenant-General in the Federal army. Washington alone had held that rank.¹ Scott had only been a Lieutenant-General by brevet. On February 26th an Act was passed by Congress for that purpose, and on March 1st the President sent the name of Grant to the Senate as the officer whom he proposed to promote to that rank. The Senate confirmed the appointment the following day, and on the 9th Grant received his commission from the hands of the President.

Hiram Ulysses Grant was born in Ohio in 1822.² He graduated

¹ In Washington's case the rank was really honorary ; as it was known that, if the anticipated war with France broke out, he could not take the field in person.

² By a strange mistake Grant was entered at West Point as Ulysses Simpson, the latter having been his mother's maiden name.

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at West Point in 1843, twenty-first in a class of thirty-nine. As a cadet he did not display any marked intellectual ability, but was chiefly distinguished for his skill and daring as a horseman. He was assigned to an infantry regiment, and with it served through the Mexican War, displaying conspicuous gallantry and gaining two brevets.

After the Mexican War promotion in the United States Army became very slow. A great many officers left the service in despair of gaining further advancement and entered various walks of civil life. Grant resigned in 1854. He left the army under a cloud. He was accused of intemperate habits, and this charge, which had but a slender foundation of truth, proved prejudicial to him in later days, when he re-entered the army on the outbreak of the Civil War. After leaving the army he fell upon evil days. He tried various forms of employment, but was successful in none.

At the beginning of the war he was a clerk in his father's leather-store at Galena, Illinois. As an ex-captain of the Regular Army he promptly offered his services to the Government. But the War Department took no notice of his application. He served for a short while in the Adjutant-General's office under Governor Yates. An application for a post on McClellan's staff met, fortunately for Grant as it turned out, with no success. Yates appointed him colonel of one of the Illinois volunteer regiments: and his name was the first on a list of seven citizens of the State sent in by the Illinois members of Congress for appointment as Brigadier-Generals of volunteers. He served first under Fremont and next under Halleck in Missouri. His successful campaign against Forts Henry and Donelson at the beginning of 1862 established his military fame. Yet in spite of this brilliant success, Halleck was strongly prejudiced against him. After Donelson and again after Shiloh he was temporarily under a cloud. But his twofold triumph in 1863 entirely resuscitated his reputation and left him beyond dispute the first soldier in the Federal service.

His appointment to the supreme command of the Federal armies necessitated further changes. Halleck was, of course, relieved from duty as General-in-Chief and 'assigned to duty in Washington as Chief of the Staff of the Army under the direction of the Secretary of War and the Lieutenant-General commanding.' Sherman succeeded Grant in command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, and McPherson succeeded Sherman in command of the Department and Army of the Tennessee. It was Grant's original intention to remain with the Army of the West, with which his whole military career in the war had been associated, and he was urged to adopt that course by Sherman. But a visit to

Washington convinced him that he must keep near to the Army of the Potomac to prevent the movements of that army being interfered with by the Washington authorities.

The new Commander-in-Chief quickly evolved a comprehensive plan of operations for the ensuing spring. The armies in East and West were now to act in concert with each other. A general combined movement was to be made against the Confederate armies still remaining in the field, and a campaign commenced which was to end by uniting nearly all the Federal armies against the doomed capital of the South. Grant himself, with the Army of the Potomac, of which Meade was retained in command, was to take the field against the Army of Northern Virginia under *Lee*. Wherever *Lee* went, Grant meant to follow : and even if he failed to destroy *Lee's* army in the field, he felt certain of being able to force it to take shelter within the lines of Richmond. The only other large Confederate army was concentrated at Dalton, under the command of *Joseph E. Johnston*. To deal with this army was the special task assigned to Sherman and the Grand Army of the West. Just as Grant would stick close to *Lee* until he forced him into the fortifications of Richmond, so Sherman was to stick close to *Johnston* and capture Atlanta.

William Tecumseh Sherman, to whom was allotted a task second only in importance to that which Grant had taken for himself, had, like his Commander-in-Chief, made his reputation in the West. Born in Ohio in 1820, he graduated at West Point in 1840 sixth in his class, and received a commission in the artillery. He had not the good fortune to see service in the Mexican War, but served for some years on the Staff in California. In 1853 he retired from the United States Army and took up banking in San Francisco. In 1859 he was appointed President of the Louisiana Military Academy, and held that post until the secession of the State. He commanded a brigade in the battle of Bull Run and shortly after was promoted brigadier-general of volunteers. He succeeded General Anderson, of Fort Sumter fame, in the command of the Federal forces in Kentucky, but at his own request was relieved of so responsible a post and assigned to a subordinate command under Halleck in Missouri. Because he was one of the few persons who openly expressed his opinion of the vastness of the task laid upon the Federal Government, and maintained that 200,000 men would be required to conquer the Valley of the Mississippi, he was attacked by various newspapers and declared insane. Like his great chief, with whose fortunes his own were linked from the commencement of the campaign of 1862, he laboured for a time under a heavy load of prejudice. But throughout 1863 he was

Grant's right-hand man, and became his natural successor in the command of the Army of the West.

Subsidiary operations were also to take place both in East and West. In the West, Banks was to organise an army of 25,000 men, for that purpose drawing off all the troops in Texas except a small force left to hold the line of the Rio Grande, and combining with the fleet under Farragut in an attempt upon Mobile.¹ After the fall of that city Banks's army would become a part of the Grand Army, with which Sherman was to move eastwards through Georgia. In the East, Sigel, commanding the Department of West Virginia, was to move up the Shenandoah Valley to Staunton, and if practicable to Lynchburg, and then join the Army of the Potomac *via* Gordonsville, after destroying the railroads in that region, which served as lines of supply to *Lee's* army. Another column, under General Crook, was to move through West Virginia against the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, and after breaking that up to join Sigel. General Gillmore was to be transferred with 10,000 men from South Carolina to General Butler, commanding at Fortress Monroe. The latter general was to organise a force of about 23,000 men, under the immediate command of W. F. Smith, with which and Gillmore's contingent he was to seize City Point and operate against Richmond from the south side of the James in co-operation with the advance of the Army of the Potomac.

At this critical time, when the Federal Government was making strenuous efforts to insure unity of action and co-operation in the forthcoming campaign, the Confederate camp was distracted by divided counsels and personal jealousies. The appointment of General *Bragg* (February 24th, 1864) to the post of Commander-in-Chief near the President was not likely to commend itself to the other general officers serving either in the East or West.² Furthermore, *Davis* was known to be prejudiced against both *Joseph Johnston* and *Beauregard*, who had both been among the five Confederate officers appointed full generals at the beginning of the war. The President in all probability acted wisely when he refused to accede to General *Lee's* request, that he might be relieved of the command of the Army of Northern Virginia after the termination of the Gettysburg campaign; but his refusal was

¹ After the failure of Banks's Red River expedition the execution of this movement passed into Canby's hands.

² 'Commander-in-Chief' seems to have been a courtesy title and not official. *Bragg's* new post was that which *Lee* had held from March, 1862, up to his appointment to the command of the Army of Northern Virginia. During the interval it had not been filled, but the President seems to have regarded *Lee* as his chief military adviser.

attributed not so much to a just appreciation of *Lee's* great military abilities as to his dislike of the other two generals, one or other of whom would have been *Lee's* natural successor.

The war policy of the *President* also was very far from finding favour in the eyes of the best Confederate officers. From the first he had adhered to the policy of standing on the strict defensive, dissipating his forces in a vain effort to cover every threatened position. It was in vain that *Lee* and other officers had urged the advisability of concentrating all available forces for a vigorous offensive at some carefully selected point. The failure of the Gettysburg campaign had been largely due to the fact that *Lee's* means were inadequate to the end proposed. The *President* had refused to allow any considerable body of troops to be drawn from the garrisons in the Carolinas and along the Atlantic coast, in order to form an army 'in effigy' under *Beauregard*, as he had requested. Yet the dearly bought experience of the recent campaign was powerless to convince the *President* of the danger of scattering his forces over a great area of country instead of concentrating them by a judicious use of the interior lines.

Lee was called upon to submit schemes for a campaign, which might break up the enemy's plans and force him to make fresh combinations. Accompanied by *Longstreet*, who had come from East Tennessee for a consultation, he visited Richmond to lay the plan on which they had agreed before the *President* and his military advisers. Their plan was that 20,000 men should be drawn from the forts in South Carolina and placed under *Beauregard's* command : that this force, in conjunction with *Longstreet's* army in East Tennessee, should invade Kentucky, and by striking at the railroad to Louisville, the sole line of communications for the Grand Army under Sherman, force the Federal general to fall back from his position in front of *Johnston's* army. The latter was then to hasten with all speed, with his own army and all other troops which he could collect from Alabama and Mississippi, after *Beauregard* and *Longstreet*, and a junction would be made of all the columns at or near the Ohio, thus putting the Federal forces in the West on the defensive.¹

This comprehensive plan of campaign, conceived by *Longstreet* and approved by *Lee*, was rejected by the Council of War in favour of a scheme proposed by *Bragg*, according to which

¹ The plan was *Longstreet's*. *Lee* went to Richmond to urge its adoption. But the fact that it originated with *Longstreet* was sufficient to cause its rejection ; the *President* with *Bragg* as his confidential adviser was loath to accept any plan of campaign for the execution of which *Longstreet* would be responsible.

Johnston and *Longstreet* were to unite their forces in East Tennessee, enter Middle Tennessee, and strike at the Federal line of communications near Nashville. This plan of campaign, which was approved by the *President*, was ultimately abandoned in consequence of *Johnston's* objection that he could not adequately supply his army in the mountainous country through which he would have to march before turning west for the invasion of Middle Tennessee.¹

The net result of the Council of War was that no plan for an offensive campaign was definitely adopted, and *Lee* and *Johnston*, in command of the two principal armies of the Confederacy, were left to do the best that either could independently of the other against the superior numbers which the Federal Government was threatening to bring against the isolated forces of the South.

¹ *Johnston* was strongly opposed to *Bragg's* plan because, as the interior positions were held by the enemy, his own and *Longstreet's* armies were liable to be defeated in detail before they could unite (*Johnston*, 295-8).

CHAPTER II

GRANT AND LEE IN VIRGINIA FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOUR¹

The Army of the Potomac under Grant—Alternative courses open to Grant—The Army of the Potomac crosses the Rapidan—Movements of the Army of Northern Virginia—Collision with the Confederate forces in the Wilderness—The battle on the turnpike—The battle on the Plank road—Results of the day's fighting—The Federals assume the offensive—Hill driven back on the Plank road—Arrival of Longstreet—Federal attack checked—Hancock renews the attack on the Plank road—Longstreet turns Hancock's left—Longstreet wounded by his own troops—Confederate attack on Hancock's entrenchments repulsed—Ewell's flank attack against the Federal right—Results of the two days' fighting—Grant continues his movement by the left flank—Lee's counter-move—The Confederates win the race to Spottsylvania Court House—Concentration of both armies—Operations on the banks of the Potomac—Battles round Spottsylvania Court House—Warren's attack repulsed—Hancock's attack repulsed—Partial success of Wright's attack—Grant's plan for renewing the attack—Hancock's attack on May 12th—The Confederate lines broken—Desperate struggle for the salient—Failure of Warren's attack—Failure of Burnside's attack—Losses of both sides—Grant endeavours to crush the Confederate right—The Federals renew the attack on the salient—Grant decides to make a fresh movement by the left flank—Operations of the Federal cavalry—Death of Stuart—Sheridan threatens Richmond—Grant moves round Lee's right—Lee falls back to the North Anna—Grant reaches the North Anna—Dangerous position of the Federal army—Grant withdraws his army—Federal movement to the Pamunkey—Lee follows and covers Richmond—Fighting on the 30th—The Federals occupy Cold Harbour—Grant continues the movement to the left—Battle of Cold Harbour—Lee's movements on the 2nd—The Federal assault—Federals repulsed with heavy loss—Grant's change of plan.

BY the end of April the Army of the Potomac encamped on the north bank of the Rapidan numbered over 99,000 men with 274 guns. It had been recently reorganised by Meade into three Corps; but it is very doubtful whether this step was a wise one. In the densely wooded country, which was to be

¹ See Map III. The most valuable authority for Grant's campaign against *Lee*, which continued from May 4th, 1864, to April 9th, 1865,

the scene of the next campaign, the Corps, as enlarged under the new arrangement, was too unwieldy an organisation to be easily handled, and in consequence a degree of responsibility devolved upon the divisional commanders which their actual rank hardly qualified them to undertake. North of the Rappahannock was the fourth Corps under Burnside, over 19,000 strong with 42 guns.¹

This Corps, though taking part in the campaign, was not formally placed under Meade's command till May 24th. The Army of the Potomac was also handicapped by the anomalous position of General Meade. He was still commander of the army which he had led to victory at Gettysburg, and through him all orders passed. But the presence of the Commander-in-Chief led to a division of authority, which did not invariably work for good.

When Grant was appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the Federal armies, Meade had at once offered to resign his position, thinking that Grant would probably wish Sherman to take his place. But Sherman could not be spared from the West, and Meade's straightforward conduct gained him Grant's warm approval and caused him to be retained in the command.

It was open to Grant either to advance against *Lee's* army by land, or else to transport the Army of the Potomac by sea to the vicinity of Richmond. The latter had been the course adopted by McClellan in 1862. But there were weighty reasons which rendered it unsuitable in 1864. In the first place, *Lee*, both in 1862 and 1863, had invaded the North and threatened Washington. If the Army of the Potomac were removed from his front, it was probable that he would again march upon the Federal capital. In the second place, the events of the last two years had convinced Grant that his true objective was not so much Richmond as the Army of Northern Virginia. The fall of Richmond would not involve the overthrow of the Southern Confederacy. The true bulwark of the South was the Army of Northern Virginia and its

is Humphreys's *Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65* (Scribner's). General Humphreys was appointed chief of the staff by Meade immediately after Gettysburg, where he had commanded a division of the 3rd Corps, and served in that capacity for sixteen months, until in November, 1864, he succeeded Hancock in command of the 2nd Corps. His narrative has been generally accepted as 'a monument of faithful and accurate research.' The Confederate case has been stated by General *Alexander*, chief of artillery of the 1st Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, with singular impartiality; he is more concerned to point out the mistakes of his own side than those of the other.

¹ Return of the 9th Corps for April. The Morning Report for May 10th gave for its strength over 22,000.

great commander. 'Therefore Grant, in the orders which he issued to Mcade, directed him to keep close to *Lee's* army. 'Wherever *Lee* goes, there you will go too.' An advance by land was a course dictated by sound military principles. It specially commended itself to President Lincoln, who had never succeeded in reconciling himself to the movement by water.

Grant had still to decide between two plans of campaign. He might move so as to turn either *Lee's* right or left flank. A movement against the Confederate left would threaten Gordonsville and the line of communications between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley, still one of the most fruitful sources of supplies on which the Confederates could count. It had this further advantage, that it would be made in more favourable country for offensive operations. But there were two reasons which caused Grant to reject it. It would be necessary to detach considerable bodies of troops, increasing in number as the Federals advanced, in order to protect the Orange and Alexandria railway, which would be the main line of supplies for the advancing army. Even if the railway were abandoned, a strong force would be required to protect the wagon-trains moving to and from the navigable rivers, which might serve as an alternative line of supplies. Further, a movement by the right would necessitate a march of more than forty miles being made in full view of the Confederate signal posts on South-west Mountain, and *Lee* would have ample time to entrench a formidable position on the mountain, covering all the lines of approach to Gordonsville.

On the other hand, if the Federals moved by their left, they would have, it is true, to pass through the terribly intricate country of the Wilderness, but all their supplies could be brought up from the navigable rivers by which connection was maintained with Washington, and the wagon-trains would be moving on the left, in this case, the protected flank of the Army of the Potomac. There was, moreover, the chance, judging from the experience of the Mine Run campaign, that the advancing army might get safely through the Wilderness before *Lee* was in a position to strike it.

Accordingly on May 2nd Grant issued orders for an advance by the left flank. The movement commenced at midnight of the 3rd. Five bridges were laid down across the Rapidan, two at the Germanna Ford, two at Ely's Ford, and one at the Culpeper Mine Ford. The 5th Corps crossed at Germanna Ford and marched on May 4th as far as the Wilderness Tavern, the point of intersection between the Germanna Plank road and the turnpike from Orange Court House to Fredericksburg. The 6th Corps followed the 5th, and bivouacked on the night of the 4th on the south bank of

the river, waiting for Burnside's Corps to come up and take its place. The 2nd Corps crossed at Ely's Ford and moved to Chancellorsville, whilst the trains crossed at Ely's and the Culpeper Mine Fords. The troops might have marched several miles further, and even have cleared the Wilderness, if their advance had not necessarily been regulated by the much slower rate of progression of the trains.¹

The Army of Northern Virginia numbered over 60,000 men with 224 guns. Two Corps, *Ewell's* and *A. P. Hill's*, were near the Orange Court House.² The 1st Corps, under *Longstreet*, recently returned from East Tennessee, was held back about and south of Gordonsville, in case the Federal movement should be by the right. But *Lee* fully expected that Grant would prefer to advance through the Wilderness, and his signallers on Clark's Mountain were ready to convey to him the earliest news of Grant's advance. The passage of the Rapidan was reported on the morning of the 4th, and the 2nd Corps, under *Ewell*, moved out along the turnpike road and went into camp that night about five miles from the Wilderness Tavern, where Warren was encamped.³ *A. P. Hill*, with two divisions of his Corps, marched on the Plank road and halted about seven miles from Parker's Store. His third division, under *R. H. Anderson*, was left on the Rapidan. Orders were sent to *Longstreet* to advance, and at 4 p.m. the two divisions, which made up the 1st Corps (*Pickett's* division, which had not accompanied *Longstreet* to Tennessee, was still south of the James), were in motion. Early on the 5th the Confederate columns were again moving towards the enemy. *Lee* did not want to bring on a general battle until *Longstreet's* Corps had arrived, and both *Ewell* and *Hill* were warned to that effect. *Ewell* on the turnpike being some miles nearer the Federal army than was *Hill* on the Plank road, halted his column, when he was within two miles of the Wilderness Tavern.⁴

¹ The 2nd Corps was assembled at Chancellorsville about 1 p.m., and the 5th Corps was up to its position by 2 p.m. But the trains only completed the passage of the river during the afternoon of the 5th.

² '*Ewell's* Corps was on and near the Rapidan above Mine Run and *Hill's* on his left higher up the stream.' *Lee's* headquarters were two miles north-east of Orange Court House.

³ *Ewell's* Corps was less two brigades.

⁴ Both *Alexander* and *Longstreet's* biographers regard it as a grave mistake on *Lee's* part to leave *Longstreet* south of Gordonsville, after he had decided on May 2nd that Grant would cross the Rapidan by the Germanna and Ely's Fords. *Ewell* had eighteen miles and *Hill* twenty-eight to march to reach their positions for *Lee's* attack on Grant's flank; *Longstreet*, by the route, which he actually took, had forty-two miles to

The Federals had moved at 5 a.m. Warren was directed to reach Parker's Store on the Plank road, Sedgwick was to take Warren's place at the Wilderness Tavern, whilst Hancock, from Chancellorsville, was directed to advance to Shady Grove Church, on the Catharpin road, and extend his right towards the 5th Corps at Parker's Store. The Cavalry Corps was under the command of Sheridan, who had been brought for the purpose from the West. He had organised his force into three divisions under Gregg, Wilson, and Torbert. Information was received to the effect that the larger part of the Confederate cavalry was still on the lower Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, whither they had been sent for the sake of forage, and Sheridan, with Gregg's and Torbert's divisions, was sent on a reconnaissance in the direction of Fredericksburg to find the whereabouts of this body of cavalry, whilst Wilson's division was ordered to precede the march of the 2nd Corps and keep parties out on the principal roads running west and south-west.

In the 5th Corps Griffin's division lay across the turnpike about a mile in front of its junction with the Germanna road, whilst Crawford's division, followed by Wadsworth's and Robinson's, moved towards Parker's Store. It was shortly after 7 a.m. that Meade was informed by a despatch from Warren that Confederate infantry were in his front on the turnpike. He at once sent orders to Warren to halt his column and attack with his whole force, in order to develop the strength of the force confronting him, and orders were sent to Hancock, directing him to halt at Todd's Tavern until Warren's movement had cleared up the situation. At the time of receiving this order, 9 a.m., the head of Hancock's column was already two miles beyond Todd's Tavern.¹ The

cover, and he was a slow marcher. 'In this disposition of his forces Lee made the mistake that possibly prevented his winning the greatest victory of the war' (Eckenrode and Conrad). He should have ordered *Longstreet* to start his march on the 3rd to Orange Court House. Lee's order received by 10.30 a.m. directed *Longstreet* to march eastward on the Plank road behind *Hill*. *Longstreet* by the time he had reached that road would have found it clear of *Hill*'s trains. But it was not *Longstreet*'s habit to obey orders without demanding changes, and he sought and obtained permission to move not to the Court House, but across country to the Catharpin road and by it to the Brock road, where he hoped, according to his own account, 'to intercept the enemy's march and cause him to develop plans before he could get out of the Wilderness.' He was thus moving on an arc and on the night of the 5th was still several miles from the battle-field.

¹ At the junction of the Brock and Catharpin roads. The Brock road starts from the Orange turnpike about a mile east of the Old Wilderness Tavern, and runs south-east to Spottsylvania Court House, intersecting

6th Corps was on its way from Germanna Ford. Wright's division of that Corps was directed to leave the Germanna road and take a cross-road, by which it might gain a position on Warren's right, and thus prolong the Federal line of battle. Crawford's division of the 5th Corps received the order to halt, when it was within a mile of Parker's Store. A detachment of cavalry left by Wilson to observe the Plank road was skirmishing with what was supposed to be a cavalry force. On throwing out a skirmish line to support the cavalry, it was found that infantry were also moving on the Plank road. Between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. Getty's division of the 6th Corps, which had already reached the Wilderness Tavern, was ordered to move down the Brock road to its intersection with the Plank road and to advance along the latter road and endeavour to drive the enemy back beyond Parker's Store. At the same time orders were sent to Hancock to move up the Brock road into the Plank road and be prepared to advance toward Parker's Store.

About noon Griffin's division moved forward to the attack on the turnpike, and at first gained some success, driving back two of *Ewell's* brigades in confusion. But as the strength of *Ewell's* Corps developed itself and Wright's division failed to get up in time on the right, Griffin finding himself in danger of being out-flanked, fell back, leaving two guns behind him. It was after 2 p.m. that Wright's division reached the scene of battle and formed on Warren's right, where it was immediately attacked by two brigades, which were repulsed with some loss. On the left of the turnpike Wadsworth's division and one brigade of Robinson's had been endeavouring to connect with Griffin's left. But so thick and tangled was the wood through which they had to march that they lost their direction, and exposing their left flank to an attack from *Ewell's* right, were forced to retire in some confusion. On the extreme left of the 5th Corps Crawford, after receiving the order to halt, had taken up a strong position in open ground at Chewning's Farm. Further orders were received, directing him to send one brigade to the right to connect with the rest of the Corps. But this brigade also lost its line of direction in the forest, and being enveloped by *Gordon's* brigade on *Ewell's* right, was driven back with loss. Crawford's division being thus isolated, was withdrawn from its advanced position.

Ewell and Warren now confronted each other with a distance of the Plank and Catharpin roads. The Catharpin road connects Chancellorsville with Orange Court House, starting from the Piney Branch church and running south-west to Shady Grove church, where it intersects the Pamunkey road from Orange Court House to Spottsylvania Court House.

about 300 yards dividing them at the nearest point, and both sides hastened to entrench their positions.

On the Plank road Getty's division was moving forward soon after 11 a.m., and found the cavalry outposts engaged with the skirmishers of *Heth's* division, which was leading *Hill's* advance. Neither side, however, was anxious for a stand-up fight. Getty, on learning from some prisoners that *Hill's* Corps was in his front, decided to wait for the arrival of Hancock's Corps before assuming the offensive, and in the meantime threw up some slight entrenchments. *Hill* had been directed by *Lee* not to bring on a battle before *Longstreet's* arrival, and made no attempt whatever to precipitate matters, letting *Heth* halt in front of Getty and sending *Wilcox's* division to the left to assist *Ewell*, who was plainly engaged on the turnpike.

At 2 p.m. Hancock's leading division arrived to support Getty. The 2nd Corps was drawn up along the Brock road on Getty's left with one division, Barlow's, on the extreme left advanced somewhat forward beyond the Brock road, occupying some open and elevated ground which commanded a good deal of country both to right and left, and also covered a possible line of approach from the left along the bed of an unfinished railway. Nearly all the artillery of the 2nd Corps was posted at this point. As the afternoon wore on Grant and Meade learnt that *Longstreet's* Corps was not yet up, and determined to attack all along the line in the hope of dealing the Confederate army a crushing blow before the 1st Corps could arrive to the rescue. At 4.15 p.m. Getty's division moved forward to the attack, supported by Hancock with two divisions, Birney's and Mott's, and later by two brigades of Gibbon's division. *Wilcox* was brought over from the left to reinforce *Heth*, and two of his brigades having taken post on the Confederate right beyond the Plank road, struck Mott's division on the left flank and drove it back some distance, but were themselves driven back by a flank attack made by two of Barlow's brigades. Fighting continued till about 8 p.m., when the approaching darkness put an end to the combat. *Hill's* two divisions had suffered heavy losses, and but for the opportune arrival of night would scarcely have resisted the superior strength of Hancock's assault much longer. To the right of this fiercely contested battle on the Plank road Wadsworth's division had been ordered to fall upon *Hill's* left flank. But the difficulty of making a way through the dense forest for a large body of men was so great that Wadsworth only succeeded in reaching the skirmish line of the enemy, which he was vigorously pushing back, when night ended the battle.

On the extreme right the fighting was confined to an assault by two brigades, and part of a third, of the 6th Corps upon *Ewell's* entrenched position, which was found to be too strong to be carried by a frontal attack.¹

Night found the two armies confronting each other very much in the positions occupied when they had first come into collision. On the Federal right Warren had been forced to fall back a short distance, and *Ewell's* line in his front was strongly entrenched. On the left Hancock's men had raised a triple line of fortifications, which played an important part in the battle of the following day, whilst, on the other hand, *Hill's* divisions, facing them, had only thrown up very slight entrenchments. Late at night *Lee* had sent orders to *Longstreet* to come up with all speed to Parker's Store. The 1st Corps did not reach this point till after sunrise. *Anderson's* division of the 3rd Corps, which had bivouacked at Verdierville, was also called up, and reached the battlefield soon after *Longstreet*.²

¹ On the 5th two distinct battles were fought on the turnpike and the Plank road. On the former *Ewell's* Corps held its own against Warren and Sedgwick, but on the latter *Hill's* two divisions were hard pressed by Hancock with the 2nd Corps and Getty's division, but held their position till night ended the combat. The fighting started about 7 a.m. on the turnpike, when *Jones's* brigade drove in the Federal outposts. Having encountered no resistance on the Rapidan, Grant and Meade supposed that *Lee* was retreating to the North Anna and that the Confederate force on the turnpike was only a rear-guard endeavouring to cover the retreat. It was not until Confederate infantry were found advancing on the Plank road that the Federal commanders realised they had to deal with the greater part of *Lee's* army. Warren's Corps delayed for over four hours before attacking *Ewell*. Grant intended in the event of *Lee* standing on the defensive to turn his right flank (facing east) by the Catharpin and Pamunkey roads, and by interposing between him and Richmond force him to fight in the more open ground south-west of the Wilderness. *Lee*, realising that owing to the superiority of the Federal artillery he could not prevent Grant from crossing the Rapidan, sought to entangle him in the depths of the Wilderness and serve him as he had served Hooker. He aimed at nothing less than the annihilation of the Army of the Potomac, and therefore held back *Ewell* and *Hill* till *Longstreet* should be up. The success of *Lee's* manœuvre is shown by the fact that on the 5th with less than five divisions he forced Grant to stop and give battle, when it was Grant's interest to get out of the Wilderness into open country.

² *Longstreet*, after a thirty-six miles' march, halted at 5 p.m. on the 5th, ordering the march to be resumed at 1 a.m. for Todd's Tavern. During the night orders were received from *Lee* directing him to move across to Parker's Store on the Plank road and reach the battlefield at dawn. But no emergency could change *Longstreet's* deliberate methods. He did not move till 1 a.m. There was apparently a difficulty about

Orders were sent from the Federal headquarters to Hancock, Sedgwick, and Warren to attack at 5 a.m. Burnside was ordered to march at 2 a.m. with three of his divisions. With two of these he was to fill the gap between Hancock's and Warren's Corps in time to take part in the general assault, when he was expected to push forward into the gap, which also existed between *Hill's* and *Ewell's* Corps, and cut the Confederate line in two. At 5 a.m. on the 6th the Federals moved to the attack. On the right neither Warren nor Sedgwick could make any impression upon *Ewell's* entrenched line, which had been strengthened during the night and armed with artillery. Repeated assaults were made during the morning, but without success. On the left Hancock attacked *Hill's* two divisions with Birney's, Mott's, and Getty's divisions and Gibbon's two brigades, whilst Wadsworth's division on the north of the Plank road assailed *Hill's* left. *Hill's* troops had apparently been told on the previous night that they would be relieved the following morning by *Longstreet's* Corps.¹ In consequence they had made no attempt to strengthen their entrenchments nor any preparations for renewing the battle. Taken more or less by surprise, they made a stout resistance for some time, but were driven back along the Plank road in ever-increasing confusion.

The Confederate right wing was on the point of giving way when *Longstreet's* Corps at last reached the field, and, with *Kershaw's* division on the right of the road and *Field's* on the left, rushed into the battle to retrieve the day. Hancock's line was considerably disordered by the hard fighting and by pressing a pursuit of a mile or more over very difficult ground, and, attacked by this new foe, was first brought to a standstill and then forced some little way back. Hancock recognised the necessity of readjusting his line in the presence of *Longstreet's* reinforcements, and the first stage in the fighting on that wing came to an end about 6.30 a.m.

Whilst Hancock was engaged in re-forming his line, *Heth's* and *Wilcox's* divisions were rallied and again brought up into line on *Field's* left. *Anderson's* division of *Hill's* Corps had also arrived

finding guides, and Parker's Store was only reached after a six-mile march after sunrise, and the Corps was still three miles from the battlefield.

¹ *Lee* had learned in the night that *Longstreet* would not be up at dawn, but he sent no warning to *Hill's* troops. 'Probably *Lee* was solicitous for the comfort of the weary soldiers, who had fought for long hours against heavy odds. He took the chance that the Unionists would not renew their attack at daylight. In doing so, he ran a risk that brought him perilously close to decisive defeat' (Eckenrode and Conrad).

on the battlefield : part had joined *Field* in the attack on Hancock, and part was formed in support. The Federal leaders did not, however, know that *Anderson's* division had come up, and also supposed that *Longstreet* had with him *Pickett's* division as well as *Kershaw's* and *Field's*. There seemed a danger, therefore, lest a strong Confederate force as yet unaccounted for might be marching against the Federal left flank, and Gibbon, commanding on Hancock's left, was ordered to keep a sharp look out along the Brock road. At 7 a.m. Hancock directed Gibbon to attack the enemy's right with Barlow's division and fight his way to the Plank road. But this order was only executed (presumably, owing to the fear that *Longstreet* was approaching on the Brock road) by one brigade, which, after some hard fighting, succeeded in connecting with Mott's left. Had Hancock's order been carried out by the whole division, *Longstreet's* subsequent flank attack by the unfinished railroad would have been rendered impossible.

Grant had hoped that he might have the good luck to get through the Wilderness without a pitched battle, but from the first he had seen that there was a possibility that he might be forced to fight, and now that he found himself confronted by the Army of Northern Virginia, his true objective, he was prepared to fight to a finish. Orders were sent to Hancock formally placing Wadsworth's division under his command. Stevenson's division of the 9th Corps, which had been held in reserve at the Wilderness Tavern, also reported to him for duty : and he was informed that Burnside's other two divisions would attack on his right between the Plank and turnpike roads.

This information proved inaccurate, as Burnside, whose movements were very dilatory on this day, did not come into collision with the enemy till 2 p.m. Acting on the information received, Hancock shortly before 9 a.m. renewed the attack. Getty's division had been withdrawn to the Brock road, but the last of Gibbon's brigades had been brought over from the left to take its place. With Birney's, Wadsworth's, Mott's, Gibbon's, and part of Stevenson's divisions, Hancock made his second attack. Fierce fighting ensued, and lasted till nearly 11 a.m., but without any material advantage being gained by either side. Barlow's division on the extreme left was engaged with the enemy's dismounted cavalry, and took no part in the main attack along the Plank road. About 10.30 a.m. orders were received by Warren and Sedgwick to make no further attack upon *Ewell's* lines, but to entrench their own positions more strongly, so that a part of their forces might be drawn off to support Hancock.

But it was now the turn of the Confederates to assume the

offensive. *Longstreet* had discovered that the unfinished railroad on his right afforded a safe and covered line of advance against the left flank of Hancock's main force on the Plank road. Four brigades were moved along this railroad, and then facing north fell furiously upon the unprotected Federal flank shortly after 11 a.m. The exposed flank was rolled up 'like a wet blanket,'¹ and the confusion spread to the other divisions. Hancock vainly endeavoured to draw the troops which had been struck in flank back to the Plank road, and at the same time with his right held his ground against the enemy in his front. The difficulty of forming troops partially demoralised into a fresh line under heavy fire in a thick wood was too great: and he found himself obliged to withdraw his whole force into the entrenchments which had been thrown up the previous day on the Brock road.

It was *Longstreet's* intention to follow up this success by an immediate attack, with his Corps and *Anderson's* division, upon Hancock's entrenched position, but as he was riding with his Staff along the Plank road at the head of the attacking column, a volley was fired across the road by some part of the four brigades which had taken part in the flanking movement, and were now in the line of battle on the south side of the road, about sixty yards from it. *Longstreet* himself was dangerously wounded, and forced to leave the field, whilst *Jenkins*, one of the ablest of his brigadiers, was killed on the spot. The fall of *Longstreet* robbed the Confederates of any chance which they had of crushing the Federal left. *Lee* on arriving on the scene determined to have the line straightened out before the attack was made. Not till 4.15 p.m. did the Confederates assail Hancock's entrenchments. The attack was gallantly made.² At one point the Federals gave way, and

¹ Hancock's own phrase, according to *Longstreet*.

² The flanking brigades under *Mahone's* command were in line on the south side of the Plank road facing north, and some troops had already crossed the road. On the road the Confederates were advancing in column, *Jenkins's* brigade of *Field's* division leading with three brigades of *Kershaw's* division following. The column on the road and the line of battle south of it were at right angles to each other. According to *Alexander*, General *M. L. Smith*, Chief Engineer of the Army, who had discovered the unfinished railway, had then made a further reconnaissance and found a way across the Brock road, which would turn Hancock's extreme left. *Longstreet* had handed over the command to *Field*, his senior divisional general, and instructed him to press the pursuit; the column to make the direct attack on the road, and *Mahone's* brigades to turn the Federal left on the Brock road. Before *Field* could take formal control, *Anderson*, his senior, came up, followed by *Lee*, who had been informed of *Longstreet's* fall. *Longstreet* says in his book that 'the plans, orders and opportunity were explained. But *Lee* did

the Confederate colours were planted upon the first line of work. But the success was only momentary : an advance from the second line promptly drove the Confederates back, and recovered the lost works ; and at 5 p.m. the Confederates fell back baffled.

The repulse of this charge brought to an end the fighting on the Federal left. Grant, indeed, intent on 'hammering' the enemy had ordered another attack to be made by Hancock and Burnside at 6 a.m. But Hancock's troops had almost exhausted their stock of ammunition, and there was no time to organise a fresh attack by the hour named. On Hancock's right Burnside's two divisions had been engaged with *Perry's* brigade of *Anderson's* division and *Lane's* brigade of *Field's* division. Fighting commenced in this portion of the field about 2 p.m. ; and about 5.30 p.m., in order to relieve the pressure upon Hancock, Burnside made a vigorous attack with both his divisions and drove back the two brigades in his front in confusion. But reinforcements were brought up by *Heth*, and Burnside was forced to fall back to the position which he had held earlier in the day. Beyond preventing some of *Hill's* troops from taking part in the attack on Hancock's position Burnside's immediate command played a very insignificant part in the day's fighting.

Against the extreme right of the Federal line shortly before sunset a vigorous flank attack was delivered by *Gordon* with two brigades. The two Federal brigades on that flank were taken by surprise and rolled up in great confusion. Amongst the prisoners both the brigadier-generals fell into the hands of the Confederates. So complete was the surprise that one of the brigades was assailed whilst still engaged in the work of building entrenchment. *Gordon* did not succeed in pushing his success far. His troops were thrown into great disorder whilst pursuing the enemy through the dense wood. The rest of *Wright's* division stood firm in their entrenchments against an attack delivered by the rest of *Early's* division, and night put an end to a contest in which both opponents were in considerable confusion and heartily welcome a cessation of hostilities. During the night *Early* formed a new line somewhat in advance of his old one : on the Federal side the 6th Corps was withdrawn and posted in an entirely new

not care to handle the troops in broken lines and ordered formation in general line for parallel battle.' *Lee* had to arrange the two perpendicular lines so as to make them parallel. In the dense woods this took a long time and Hancock was given several hours in which to prepare to meet the attack and strengthen his lines on the Brock road. *Field* himself says that it was necessary to reform the Confederate lines, but *Lee*, in *Alexander's* opinion, was unwise to make the attack after so long a delay.

position some distance to the rear, and the right of the 5th Corps also fell back so as to conform to this new disposition.

The net result of the day's fighting had been that the Confederates had gained a little ground on their left, and on their right had forced Hancock back into his entrenchments, but their attempt to storm those entrenchments had been a costly failure.¹ It was a drawn battle, proving the powerlessness of either army to overwhelm the other in its present position. But if the fighting had no decisive results, still the losses on both sides were very heavy. Grant's loss amounted to 17,666.¹ It is impossible to state the Confederate casualties with any confidence of accuracy. They have been variously estimated from 8,000 to 11,400, but may have been considerably more. They were undoubtedly a good deal less than those of the Federals, as the latter were in the main the attacking force. During the fighting on the 6th the woods caught fire in some places, and some of the helpless wounded perished miserably in the flames.

On May 7th Grant determined to continue the movement by his left flank, to get clear of the Wilderness, and renew his attempt to get on to *Lee's* right rear. The trains were ordered to start in the middle of the afternoon, so that they might not impede the movement of that part of the army which followed on the same road. At 8.30 p.m. the 5th Corps started along the Brock road for Spottsylvania Court House, fifteen miles to the south-east. The 2nd Corps was ordered to follow the 5th to Todd's Tavern at the junction of the Brock and Catharpin roads. The 6th Corps was ordered to march to Chancellorsville and advance to a position on the left of the 5th Corps by the road from Piney Branch Church, whilst the 9th Corps followed Sedgwick, but was ordered to halt at the junction of the Orange Plank road with the Piney Branch Church road to guard the trains. The fighting on that day was confined to a cavalry encounter. Sheridan assumed the offensive with his whole force and drove *Fitzhugh Lee's* and *Wade*

¹ *Ewell's* Corps might have gained a substantial success if *Gordon's* attack had been delivered earlier in the day. *Gordon* had discovered by a personal reconnaissance in the early morning that the Federal right was 'in the air' and urged an immediate attack. But *Early* who dominated his Corps commander, insisted that *Burnside's* Corps must be within supporting distance of *Sedgwick's* right rear. It was not till *Lee* about 5 p.m. reached *Ewell's* headquarters to inquire if anything could be done on the left flank to ease the pressure on the right (where the Confederate attempt to storm the Brock road entrenchments had just been repulsed with heavy loss) and was informed by *Gordon* of the actual position on his front, that the attack was ordered to be made.

Hampton's divisions from *Todd's Tavern*, pursuing the former along the *Brock road* and the latter along the *Catharpin road*.

Lee quickly learnt that the Army of the Potomac was on the move. It was probable that *Grant* was doing one of two things. He was moving either east to reach the *Fredericksburg road* to *Richmond*, or south-east to outflank the Army of Northern Virginia. In either case *Spottsylvania Court House* would be his next objective. *Lee* did not believe that *Grant* was retreating. The fact that on the night of the 6th he had abandoned his line of communications *via* *Germanna Ford* indicated his intention. *Anderson*, now commanding *Longstreet's Corps*, started at 11 p.m. to march for *Spottsylvania Court House* by the *Shady Grove Church road*, and at daybreak of the 8th was across the river *Po*.¹ After a brief rest the Corps moved to the left on discovering that the enemy was advancing on the *Brock road*, and took position on a ridge about a mile and a half north of the *Court House*, at the intersection of the *Brock* and *Block House roads* (the latter ran from the *Old Court House*, intersecting the *Shady Grove Church road* a mile east of the crossing of the *Po*).

The advance of *Warren's Corps* along the *Brock road* had been considerably delayed by the presence in his front of *Fitzhugh Lee's* cavalry division. Trees had been felled across the road, and the dismounted cavalry offered so obstinate a resistance, that by the time the 5th Corps reached open ground, in the vicinity of *Alsop's Farm*, the men were thoroughly exhausted, and the 1st Corps of the Confederate army was found roughly entrenched in their front. Some sharp fighting ensued, with the result that the Federal Corps took up a position from 200 to 400 yards distant from the enemy's entrenched line and commenced to throw up entrenchments themselves.

On the arrival of the 6th Corps in the course of the afternoon the fight was renewed, but without any decided advantage being gained on either side, as the 2nd Confederate Corps reached the battlefield shortly after *Sedgwick's* arrival, and the advance of *Rodes's* division prevented the right flank of *Anderson's* position.

¹ The 1st Corps marched by a road which *Lee* had ordered to be cut through the woods from the *Plank road* into the *Catharpin road* between *Todd's Tavern* and *Corbin's Bridge*. After crossing the river at *Corbin's Bridge* the Corps took the *Shady Grove Church road* to *Spottsylvania Court House* and crossed the *Po* a second time a mile west of the *Block House*. Two brigades of *Kershaw's* division marched thence to *Spottsylvania Court House* and hastened the retreat of *Wilson's* cavalry division, which had been in possession of the *Court House* for two hours and had just received orders to withdraw from *General Sheridan* (*Humphreys*, 62-3).

being turned. *Ewell* had had the longest march of any of the Confederate Corps to make, having been ordered to go round by Parker's Store, and by that route reach the Shady Grove Church road. The 3rd Corps, temporarily commanded by *Early* (whose division in the 2nd Corps was for the time commanded by *Gordon*), was the last to move, and apparently followed *Anderson's* route to the Catharpin road, on which it was advancing towards 'Todd's Tavern to get into the Brock road, when *Early* found *Wade Hampton's* cavalry division in his front engaged with the Federal cavalry, and on pressing forward discovered that Hancock's Corps held Todd's Tavern, and that the route by the Brock road was closed to him. Throughout the 8th these two Corps remained confronting each other, and some skirmishing took place between their advanced guards. Very early in the morning of the 9th *Early* marched by the Shady Grove Church road to Spottsylvania Court House, and took position on the right of the Confederate line facing Burnside's Corps, which was advancing along the Fredericksburg road. Hancock marched by the Brock road, and took position on the extreme right of the Federal line with his right resting on the Po.

Spottsylvania Court House was of considerable strategic importance, being in the angle between the two railways entering Richmond from the north and affording an excellent approach to Hanover Junction. The Confederate position rested on a ridge which ran across the peninsula formed by the Po and Ny Rivers, but, though fairly strong in itself, it might be turned on either flank. During the 9th, Hancock was ordered to cross the Po with three of his divisions, move down the right bank, and endeavour to locate the position of the Confederate left. The other division (*Mott's*) of the 2nd Corps was ordered to the left of the 6th Corps. Hancock's movement threatened the Louisa Court House road, by which the Confederate trains were moving, and had it been persisted in, would have turned the left. Anxious for the safety of his trains, *Lee* directed *Early* on his right to move two divisions to the left. At an early hour on the 10th, *Mahone's* division entrenched a position covering the bridge, by which the Shady Grove Church road crossed the Po, a mile west of the Block House and two and a half miles west of Spottsylvania Court House, whilst *Heth's* division crossed the river lower down and moved out against Hancock's turning column. But the Federal Commander-in-Chief, on the morning of the 10th, had determined to assault the Confederate lines in front, and Hancock was directed to withdraw two of his divisions to the left bank and join in an attack by the 5th Corps upon *Anderson's* position.

Grant, having got the enemy in position in front of him, was resolved to repeat the experiment, which had already proved so costly in the Wilderness, of assaulting all along the line. Barlow's division of Hancock's command was ordered to remain on the right bank to threaten the Confederate left. But *Heith's* advance against this isolated division necessitated its withdrawal across the Po.¹ The retrograde movement was not effected without some heavy fighting, in which the Federals lost a gun.

At 3.45 p.m. Warren advanced to the attack with Crawford's and Cutler's divisions (Cutler had succeeded to the command of Wadsworth's division after the latter's death on the 6th) and two brigades of Gibbon's division, which had recrossed the river. The assault was gallantly made. But the Confederate position was too strong to be carried by a frontal attack, and though at certain points the entrenchments were reached, the Federals were repulsed with heavy loss. When Hancock, after seeing Barlow's division safely withdrawn, reached the scene of the recent attack, he was directed to renew it at 7 p.m. He attacked with Birney's and Gibbon's divisions, part of the 5th Corps co-operating, but met with no better success. The really vulnerable point in the Confederate lines was further east, where, near the intersection of the Brock and Block House roads, the general line of the entrenchments turned sharply to the south; from the angle thus formed a salient, roughly in the shape of an inverted letter U, a mile long and half a mile across, projected northwards. The western half of the curved portion was, however, so flat as to be almost a straight line; it was held by *Dole's* brigade of *Rodes's* division of the 2nd Corps, and the eastern half occupied by *Johnson's* division of the same Corps.² Upton's brigade, with four regiments of another brigade, was ordered by General Wright

¹ Barlow's division had already received orders to recross the Po.

² In Humphreys, 73-4, it is pointed out that what is usually called the salient was an east and west line about 400 yards long, and should properly be termed its apex, but the Confederate plan, made by Captain *Hotchkiss* and reproduced in the atlas of the *Official Records* of the war (83. 3), shows the salient as described in the text. General Humphreys probably means the flattened western shoulder of the inverted U, which runs about east by north and west by south. The original line at the junction of the 2nd and 3rd Corps, writes Dr. Freeman, had been extended on the 9th to the north, at *Ewell's* instance, so as to include some high ground, from which it was thought that the Federal artillery could have dominated the Confederate position. The inclusion of this elevation made that sector a great irregular angle with its apex to the north. It might prove untenable, and *Lee* contemplated the construction of a second line across the base of the angle. Whether this line had been completed by the 9th seems uncertain.

(who had succeeded to the command of the 6th Corps upon the death of Sedgwick, killed by a sniper on the 9th) to assault the west shoulder, whilst Mott's division was to attack on Wright's left. Upton was able to form his regiments for the attack under cover of a wood, which reached within 200 yards of the Confederate lines. The assault at this point, delivered at 6.10 p.m., proved at first entirely successful. The first line of the Confederate defences was carried as also was a second line of entrenchments 100 yards to the rear, but the failure of Mott to co-operate enabled the Confederates to concentrate a superior force against Upton, who was driven back to the first line of entrenchments, from which the Federal troops were withdrawn under cover of the darkness. Mott was obliged to form his line of attack in full view of the enemy, and was repulsed by the heavy fire of artillery and musketry without reaching the Confederate entrenchments. The nature of the ground prevented his attack from partaking of the nature of a surprise: and only a surprise attack had any chance of success against *Lee's* lines.

On this day Burnside (9th Corps) on the Federal left pushed a reconnaissance close up to the enemy's lines on the Fredericksburg road and took up and entrenched a position there.

In spite of his heavy losses on the 10th, which probably amounted to over 4,000, Grant was determined to make another attempt to break *Lee's* lines. He was encouraged in this determination by the partial success which had attended Upton's attack, and he attributed the failure to follow up that success to the want of energy displayed by Mott and Burnside. Accordingly he issued orders to Hancock to march on the night of the 11th in rear of the 5th and 6th Corps, and under cover of the darkness take up a position in the open ground of Brown's Farm, from which point Mott had made his unsuccessful attack on the 10th. Having connected the rest of his Corps with Mott's division, Hancock was ordered to attack the apex of the salient at 4 a.m. on the 12th, and Burnside on Hancock's left was to attack at the same hour. Warren and Wright were to keep their troops in readiness either to attack the enemy's lines in their respective fronts or to move to some other point, according to the orders which they might receive. The entrenchments left empty by the withdrawal of the 2nd Corps were filled by part of the 5th, whilst Wright kept one division in the trenches and held the other two in reserve. *Lee* was deceived by certain movements of the Federal troops on the 11th into the idea that they intended to turn his left, and ordered the withdrawal of the artillery of *Johnson's* division holding the apex of the salient. The order was counter-

manded in the course of the night owing to information received from *Johnson* that the enemy were massing in his front. But Hancock's assault was made before these guns had got back into position. Only two of them fired at all, and they only two rounds and the whole of this artillery force fell into the hands of the victorious Federals.

During the night of the 11th the 2nd Corps occupied the position assigned to it. The morning was very foggy, and in consequence the assault ordered for 4 a.m. did not take place till half an hour later. Birney's division was on the right and Barlow's on the left; the former in two deployed lines, the latter in two lines of masses, each regiment formed in close column of attack. Mott's division was in rear of Birney's in a single line, and Gibbon's was held in reserve. In advancing to the attack over the open ground, which at this point lay in front of the Confederate lines, the two lines of Barlow's division combined into one dense mass, and edging off somewhat to the left, struck the east shoulder of the salient and the entrenchments running south from it for about 600 yards. Two of Gibbon's brigades rushed forward and entered the Confederate lines at the same time as Barlow's division, continuing the storming line to the left. The Confederates were swept away by the assault. Without artillery musketry was powerless to check an advance over so short a distance of open ground. *Johnson's* division was almost annihilated. He himself and one of his brigadiers, *G. H. Stuart* were taken prisoners, as were also a great part of his troops variously estimated from 2,000 to 4,000; all the artillery of the division, twenty guns, were captured, and a very heavy loss of killed and wounded inflicted, as the entrenchments were carried at the point of the bayonet. Birney's and Mott's divisions struck the Confederate lines just west of the east angle extending from that point to the west angle and for some 400 yards along the west face of the salient.

Great as had been the success achieved, the confusion into which the assailants had fallen prevented them following up their victory. *Gordon* with two brigades forced back Barlow's and Gibbon's troops to the outer face of the salient, whilst on the other wing two brigades of *Rodes's* division drove back Birney's and Mott's divisions. Within an hour after the entrenchments were carried the Federals had been forced back to the further side of the line which they had assailed. Both sides hurried up reinforcements. Wright's two divisions were ordered to attack on Hancock's right soon after 6 a.m., and throughout the day and far into the night a desperate encounter raged in the vicinity of the west shoulder

since known as the Bloody Angle.¹ *Lee* did not dare at once to draw any troops from his left; for if that part of the line were broken, then the troops in the salient would be exposed to attack in rear and flank. The lines which *Anderson's* Corps held formed in fact the hinge upon which *Lee* might swing back from the salient, and it was vitally important that they should be held intact.

Between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. Warren attacked the entrenchments held by *Anderson's* Corps, but as they were fully manned, the attack of the 12th met with the same fate as that of the 10th, and the assault was promptly ordered to cease. Still *Lee* did not venture to withdraw any troops from *Anderson's* Corps to help his sorely pressed centre till late in the afternoon. In the meantime, as soon as Warren's attack was seen to be a failure, Cutler's division was withdrawn and sent to support the 6th Corps, and preparations were made to follow with the rest of the 5th Corps.² But by the time that Warren reached the point from which the attack was to be made, the Federal commanders had decided that it was useless to make any fresh assault.

The chief burden of the day's fighting consequently fell upon the 6th and 2nd Corps, and it extended all along their line from the right of the one Corps to the left of the other. *Lee* was only able to send up to the support of his centre under *Ewell* three brigades from the right wing.³ But with their support *Rodes's* and *Gordon's* divisions obstinately held their own throughout the day. Never probably in the annals of warfare has a stranger combat taken place than that which was carried on hour after hour by two large bodies of troops separated only by a line of log works.

Prisoners were taken on both sides by being simply pulled over the top of these works. The Federals advanced artillery quite close up to the breastworks, and brought enfilade fire to bear upon the Confederates, but they held fast to their posts, and the Federals were unable to regain a footing on the southern side of the entrenchments which they had stormed so many hours ago. In the early hours of the 13th the Confederate troops were withdrawn to a retrenchment which had been constructed across the base of the salient. The loss at the Bloody Angle at Spottsylvania Court House far surpassed that at the Bloody Lane at the Antietam. So pitiless was the storm of bullets that an oak tree

¹ The fighting at this point continued till 3 a.m.

² Except Crawford's division, which occupied the entrenchments of the Corps.

³ Two of *Mahone's* brigades and later two of *Anderson's* were also sent to *Ewell's* support. Grant massed 45,000 men in all at the salient.

within the Confederate lines with a diameter of twenty-two inches was actually cut in half.

On the left of the Federal line Burnside moved to the attack at the hour appointed. Potter's division carried the line of works held by *Lane's* brigade on *Early's* left at 5 a.m., but *Lane*, reinforced by two other brigades, renewed the battle and recaptured his entrenchments. Burnside made repeated attacks with his three divisions, but failed to drive the enemy from their lines.¹

The losses on both sides for this day's fighting were very heavy. The total Federal loss was over 6,800: the Confederate loss in killed and wounded must have been between 4,000 and 5,000, and the prisoners may have amounted to nearly as many more. In spite of his tremendous losses, *Lee* had nevertheless held his own. Both on the right and left the Federal attacks had been decisively repulsed, and though the salient had been carried by Hancock, yet the retrenchment constructed across its base was of so formidable a nature that any fresh attempt to break *Lee's* lines by a frontal attack was likely to lead only to increased slaughter.

Grant, instead of pressing the attack at the centre, determined to transfer a considerable part of the army to the left flank, in the hope that they might break the Confederate lines at that point before *Lee* could bring up reinforcements. An advance by the right flank would have probably caused *Lee* to abandon his lines in front of Spottsylvania Court House and withdraw towards Richmond, with which his communications would be threatened. But an advance by the left flank was not so likely to frighten *Lee* into a hasty retreat, and at the same time would secure the Federal communications with their depôts at Washington and the despatch of their wounded to Fredericksburg for Washington.²

Warren was directed to move his Corps on the night of the 13th towards the left to the Fredericksburg road, to form on the left of

¹ Dr. Freeman represents the later fighting on Burnside's front in quite a new light. On the eastern flank south of the 'Mule Shoe' (the Confederate name for the salient) was a lesser salient with an oak wood in front, 'Heth's salient.' *Lee* hoped to deliver a counter-stroke by moving *Heth's* and *Wilcox's* divisions through this wood. As two brigades were advancing, Burnside's Corps attacked the left face of the small salient. The attack was repulsed, but when later *Lee* sought to loosen the Federal grip on the 'Mule Shoe' by an advance from *Heth's* salient, the Federals were found entrenched and the attempt had to be abandoned.

² After the battle of the Wilderness Grant shifted his base of supply to Fredericksburg. The Federal command of the sea enabled him to change his base with each sideslip to the left: Port Royal on the lower Rappahannock, White House on the Pamunkey, and City Point on the James became in succession his bases.

the 9th Corps and assault the Confederate right at 4 a.m. of the 14th. The 6th Corps was to follow the 5th and attack on its left along the Massaponax Church road. The commanders of the 2nd and 9th Corps were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to attack the lines in their front at 4 a.m., but to wait for actual orders to do so. Warren's night march was made in circumstances of extreme difficulty. Rain fell throughout the night, turning the road into a slough: the darkness was intense. Not till two hours after the hour fixed for the assault did the 5th Corps reach its destination: and then the troops were so worn out with exhaustion and so reduced by straggling, that it was vain to think of making an attack on that day. The 6th Corps on the 14th took position on the left of the 5th, and some high ground on the Massaponax Church road, about half a mile south of the Ny, which commanded the surrounding country as well as the Fredericksburg road, was seized and held by the Federals.

This summed up the fighting of the 14th. On the same day the one brigade of *Mahone's* division, which had been left to guard the bridge near the Block House, was brought over to *Early's* right. But it was not till night that *Field's* division of *Anderson's* Corps was brought from its entrenchments to the Confederate right, and *Kershaw's* division of the same Corps did not follow till midnight of the 15th. Could Warren's Corps have been up to time, there would have been a good chance of breaking the Confederate lines before any reinforcement arrived from the left. But the unavoidable delay gave the Confederates time to extend their lines further south as far as Snell's Bridge over the Po, and to bring over to the threatened point troops from the other flank, which was no longer menaced. Early on the morning of the 15th Hancock moved two of his divisions to the left to the Fredericksburg road, leaving Birney's division to cover Burnside's right flank. The 15th, 16th and 17th were spent by the 5th and 6th Corps in advancing and entrenching their lines, putting batteries in position, and examining roads which led southwards.

As the strength of the Confederate right did not hold out any prospect of a successful attack at that point, Grant determined to move the 2nd and 6th Corps back on the night of the 17th, in order that at daylight of the 18th they might assault the retrenchment which had been constructed across the base of the salient after the successful attack of the 2nd Corps on the 12th. It was hoped that the Confederates at that point might be caught off their guard, and a permanent lodgment effected in their lines. Burnside was to attack in conjunction with Wright and Hancock,

and Warren was to open fire with all his artillery, and be prepared on receiving orders to that effect to assume the offensive.

The attack proved, however, a complete failure. The enemy were fully prepared to meet it. The entrenchments attacked proved to be of a most formidable character, and as soon as Meade realised that failure was inevitable, he ordered the troops to be recalled. The 6th Corps at once returned to its position on the left of the 5th, and the same night the 2nd Corps was moved to the left and took position on the east bank of the Ny below the left of the 6th Corps. The 9th Corps was also moved to the left of the 6th Corps and posted on the west bank of the Ny. Both the 6th and 9th Corps pressed up as close as they could to the Confederate lines and there entrenched.

After the failure of the attack on the 18th Grant decided that nothing was to be gained by further assaults upon *Lee's* entrenched position. He therefore determined to continue his movement by the left flank. He hoped that by throwing the 2nd Corps several miles out in advance of the rest of his army, *Lee* might be induced to attack it, and that thus a chance might be given of forcing him to fight, before he had time to entrench. The movement was to be commenced by Hancock on the night of the 19th; but on that day *Ewell's* Corps moved out of its entrenchments round the right of the Federal line to see whether the enemy were withdrawing from their lines or not. *Ewell* encountered *Tyler's* division, which had recently joined Grant from Washington, on the Fredericksburg road near the Harris House, and a sharp engagement ensued. Hancock and Warren were ordered to send reinforcements to *Tyler*. *Ewell* was repulsed with considerable loss, but Hancock's march was postponed till the night of the 20th.

On May 8th Grant had ordered Sheridan to concentrate all his available cavalry and make a raid against the railways in *Lee's* rear, and after threatening Richmond to connect with *Butler's* army on the James, and thence rejoin the Army of the Potomac by way of the White House on the Pamunkey.¹ Such a movement

¹ Grant has been criticised for sending away his cavalry on a raid, 'when he wanted every single man he could lay hands upon to fight *Lee* at Spottsylvania.' He certainly failed to realise the value of his cavalry, armed with the Spencer carbine, a breech-loading repeater, as mounted infantry. The raid accomplished little; the damage done to the railways was quickly repaired. Major-General Fuller, however, points out that Sheridan's raid was closely connected with *Butler's* movements south of the James and largely depended upon their success. 'Had *Butler* occupied Petersburg, as he should have done, then damage to the railways in rear of *Lee* would almost certainly have compelled *Lee* to fall back or risk starvation.' Sheridan destroyed *Lee's* reserve food supplies.

was certain to bring the Confederate cavalry in hot pursuit of Sheridan, and a cavalry encounter might be expected to ensue, in which the Federal superiority of numbers was likely to give them the advantage. On the 9th Sheridan moved round *Lee's* right flank by the Telegraph road, crossed the North Anna on the same day with his leading division, and on the 10th struck the Virginia Central railway at Beaver Dam Station, where ten miles of the track were torn up, and engines, cars, and a quantity of army supplies destroyed. At daylight on the 11th the Fredericksburg railway was reached at Ashland Station, and a similar scene of destruction inaugurated. *Stuart* with three cavalry brigades promptly started in pursuit, and whilst one brigade hung on Sheridan's rear, the other two by a roundabout route got in front of him, and on the 11th confronted him at Yellow Tavern about six miles from Richmond. A fierce engagement took place, in which the Confederates were ultimately forced to retire with the loss of their commander mortally wounded.

Stuart died the following day at Richmond. His loss was a heavy blow to *Lee* and the Army of Northern Virginia. He was the *beau ideal* of Southern chivalry, a dashing cavalry commander, who won a well-deserved fame for his daring raids. But there is nothing to show that he was growing as a strategist, or that he would ever have displayed the same ability in independent command as did *Forrest* in the West. He was succeeded in the command of the cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia by General *Wade Hampton*.¹

Having disposed of the Confederate cavalry, Sheridan pushed on towards Richmond. He entered the most advanced line of the Confederate entrenchments, but the second line of works was so strongly held that he was forced to cross to the north bank of the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge (Map VI). He recrossed to the south bank on the 13th at Bottom's Bridge, and reached Haxall's Landing on the James on the 14th, where he remained till the 17th. He rejoined the Army of the Potomac a week later.

The Federal losses about Spottsylvania Court House from the 8th to the 19th amounted to 18,399.² It is difficult to form any approximate estimate of what the Confederate losses were during the same period. Except on the 12th, they must have been considerably less than those of their opponents, as they were fighting on the defensive behind entrenchments with entanglements in front, new to warfare even in America.

¹ *Wade Hampton* was not appointed formally to the command of the Cavalry Corps till August 11th.

² 4 B. & L., 182.

Grant commenced to withdraw his forces from *Lee's* front on the night of the 20th. Hancock's Corps marched during the night to Guinea Station on the Fredericksburg railway, a distance of about eight miles. The march was continued through Bowling Green, and by noon on the 21st the leading division had crossed the Mattapony and entrenched a position after driving off a small force of Confederate infantry from the north bank of the river. The original plan was that Warren's Corps should march by the Telegraph road, to be followed by Burnside's Corps, whilst Wright's Corps followed Hancock's line of march. But apparently Grant grew apprehensive for the safety of Hancock's advanced column, and directed Warren to take a route which would bring him nearer to Hancock's exposed flank. Under his fresh orders Warren was directed to march to Guinea Station and then take a road running south-west, which would ultimately bring him into the Telegraph road.

Lee had had timely information of the Federal movements. As soon as news reached him that a Federal force had appeared upon the Fredericksburg railway, he brought *Ewell's* Corps round to the extreme right and directed him to extend along the south bank of the Po until he covered the crossing of the Telegraph road at Stannard's Mills. When he found that Warren's Corps was withdrawing on the morning of the 21st, he started *Ewell's* Corps, followed by *Anderson's* Corps, along the Telegraph road. His first impression was that Grant was moving to the left, in order to put the Mattapony between himself and his foe, and to open up communications with Port Royal, and he did not anticipate meeting Grant again in the field until he should have crossed the Pamunkey on his way to Richmond. He did not attempt, as Grant had hoped that he would, to fall upon Hancock's isolated Corps, but determined to withdraw behind the North Anna, keeping between Grant and Richmond and covering the Virginia Central railway. This railway intersects the Fredericksburg line at Hanover Junction, about two miles south of the North Anna, and from that point runs to Richmond at a distance of about six miles to the east of the other railway. The junction is twenty-five miles north of Richmond, and by the Telegraph road twenty-eight miles south of the right of *Lee's* position at Snell's Bridge.

Ewell's Corps reached Hanover Junction in the morning of the 22nd, and *Anderson's* Corps in the course of the afternoon took up a position on the south bank of the North Anna. *Hill's* Corps marched on the night of the 21st, after a brisk skirmish with the 6th Corps, by a road west of the Telegraph road, and was in

position near Hanover Junction along the Virginia Central railway on the morning of the 23rd. *Hill* had resumed command of the 3rd Corps just before it marched from Spottsylvania, and *Early* returned to the command of his own division in the 2nd Corps, whilst *Gordon* was assigned to the command of *Johnson's* division, which had suffered so heavily on the 12th. At Hanover Junction *Lee* received his first reinforcements since the campaign opened. He was joined by two infantry brigades brought by *Breckinridge* from the Shenandoah Valley after *Sigel's* defeat on the 15th, by *Pickett's* division of the 1st Corps, and *Hoke's* brigade of *Early's* division, both from Petersburg. Altogether *Lee's* reinforcements amounted to about 9,000 men. Grant also had received considerable reinforcements since the beginning of the campaign. On the 17th Tyler had joined him with a division of 8,000 men, and other troops had reached him as well. But the army was being so much reduced by the continual mustering out of time-expired regiments, that it may be doubted whether the reinforcements did more than make good the deficiencies thus caused.¹

The 5th Corps of the Army of the Potomac started on its march for Guinea Station on the morning of the 21st, and was followed by the 9th Corps, as soon as Burnside had convinced himself by a reconnaissance that the Telegraph road crossing was too strongly held to be easily forced. Wright's Corps withdrew at nightfall. These three Corps, after reaching the Fredericksburg railway, moved on the 22nd by parallel roads between the railway and the Telegraph road, whilst Hancock stood fast waiting for the other Corps to come into line with him. But on that night *Lee* had two Corps, with the third near at hand, on the south bank of the North Anna, fifteen miles in front of the nearest Federal Corps.²

The whole Army of the Potomac moved forward at 5 a.m. on the 23rd. Warren having reached Jericho Mills, four miles above the Telegraph road bridge, which was about half a mile above the Fredericksburg railway bridge,³ crossed the river, which at that point was unguarded, and though attacked towards evening by *Hill's* Corps advancing from the Virginia Central railway, beat it

¹ Between May 2nd and July 4th thirty-six regiments were discharged from the service.

² The distance from *Lee's* right to Hanover Junction by the Telegraph road was twenty-eight miles. To reach the same point Hancock had to march thirty-four miles and the other Corps thirty. Had Hancock been able to take the direct route by the Telegraph road, the distance for his Corps would have been only twenty-five miles.

³ In Map III the Telegraph road is placed too far to the west and Jericho Mills, Quarles's Mill, and Ox Ford too far to the east. They are all above the Telegraph road bridge.

off with considerable loss and entrenched a position.¹ Hancock moved forward with his right across the Telegraph road and his left across the railway, and about 6 p.m. captured some entrenchments covering the Telegraph road bridge on the north bank of the river, and gained possession of that bridge. He did not, however, cross the river, as the Confederates held entrenchments on the south bank covering both bridges.

Burnside on Hancock's right endeavoured to cross by the Ox Ford, about a mile above the Telegraph road bridge, but found it too strongly held by the enemy.

On the 24th Hancock, finding that the enemy had abandoned their entrenchments close to the bridges, crossed the river, whilst Burnside moved a mile and a half up the river above Ox Ford and crossed one division over at Quarles's Mill. This force joined hands with Crawford's division of the 5th Corps and moved down to uncover Ox Ford, where Willcox's division of the 9th Corps was waiting (Burnside's third division had already taken position on Hancock's right on the south bank), but the Confederate lines were too strongly held, and an attempt to force them was repulsed. The 6th Corps had followed Warren's line of march and crossed on the morning of the 24th.

On the 25th the Federal army found itself in a far from enviable position. One division was still north of the river. The rest of the army was in two distinct bodies, separated from each other by *Lee's* whole army, holding a central position and strongly entrenched. For one wing of the Federal army to reinforce the other it would be necessary to cross the river twice. *Lee* had redrawn his lines with great skill. The left rested on the Little River, and ran for about a mile and a half to Ox Ford on the North Anna. This flank was held by *Hill's* and *Pickett's* troops. From Ox Ford the Confederate lines extended down the river for three-quarters of a mile, and then ran in a south-east direction until the extreme right crossed the Fredericksburg railway and covered Hanover Junction.² This part of the line covered a distance of three miles, and was held by *Ewell's* and *Anderson's* Corps.

¹ *Lee* was much incensed with *Hill* for allowing Warren to cross the river.

² Colonel Henderson writes with high praise of *Lee's* manoeuvre: 'He shut up his line like one closes an umbrella, the line had been originally almost straight. His whole force was now massed in a space not more than two and a half miles broad, and his enemy was not only widely separated, but would have to cross the river (twice) to reinforce one wing from the other. He could reinforce a point attacked in one-third of the time that Grant could reinforce at the same point' (*Science of War*, p. 328).

Grant saw that there was no prospect of attacking either flank of *Lee's* army with any hope of success, and ordered his army to withdraw on the night of the 26th to the north bank and continue the movement by the left flank to the Pamunkey.¹

It has been sometimes stated that *Lee's* ill-health alone prevented the Army of Northern Virginia from striking a crushing blow at one or other wing of the Federal army in its uncomfortable position on the south bank of the North Anna. But when it is remembered that both wings of the Army of the Potomac were entrenched, it must be admitted that Grant had little to fear from any frontal attack. His own reluctance to attack his enemy's entrenched lines is the best proof that a Confederate assault on the Federal lines would have had but little chance of success.

On the afternoon of the 26th Sheridan, with two divisions of cavalry, started for Hanover Town on the Pamunkey, some thirty-two miles south-east of the Federal position on the North Anna. During the night the Army of the Potomac was withdrawn across the North Anna, and on the 28th was in position on the south bank of the Pamunkey. The 5th and 9th Corps crossed at Hanover Town, the latter not till midnight. The 6th and 2nd Corps crossed four miles higher up.² On the same day Sheridan, after a hard fight, drove the Confederate cavalry from Hawes's Shop, four miles out from Hanover Town, on the road to Richmond.

On the morning of the 27th *Lee* discovered that his foe had withdrawn across the river, and was informed that some of the Federal cavalry and infantry had crossed the Pamunkey at Hanover Town. The 2nd Corps, under the command of *Early*, *Ewell* being ill, was at once started on the march. It crossed the South Anna by the Virginia Central railway bridge, and moved through Atlee's Station on that line to Huntley's Corner, where it covered the direct road from Hanover Town to Richmond and also a road from White House to Richmond. There, on the afternoon of the 28th, *Early* took up his position with his right close to Beaver Dam Creek and his left resting on the Totopotomoy, near Pole Green Church. The 1st Corps crossed the South

¹ Dr. Freeman writes : The operation on the North Anna ' strategically accomplished far more than *Lee* could then foresee. It forced the Federal commander to abandon a direct movement on Richmond from the north, and that was to leave *Lee* in command of communications with the valley of the Shenandoah. No achievement in the entire campaign from the Rapidan to the James meant more in prolonging the struggle.'

² But Russell's division of the 6th Corps, which led the advance, crossed at Hanover Town.

Anna by the Fredericksburg railroad bridge, and moving by Ashland and Atlee's Stations, took up its position on the same afternoon on *Early's* right from Huntley's Corner to Walnut Grove Church, covering another road from White House to Richmond. The 3rd Corps and *Breckinridge's* command formed on *Early's* left along the Totopotomoy, with its left across the Virginia Central railway, a mile north of Atlee's Station. *Lee's* new position covered the approaches to Richmond from the Pamunkey.

On the 29th Grant ordered reconnaissances to be made in full force by the 2nd, 5th, and 6th Corps, whilst the 9th Corps was held in reserve near Hawes's Shop. The 6th Corps marched north-west along the river-road in the direction of Hanover Court House, but finding no infantry force in its front, was ordered to march at daylight on the 30th, and take position on Hancock's right, and try to place itself across the Confederate left flank. But the line of march lay across the swampy ground at the head of Crump's Creek,¹ and in consequence it arrived too late to take any part in the fighting on that day. On the Federal left the 5th Corps crossed the Totopotomoy, and on the 30th moved out along the Shady Grove Church road. Burnside's Corps on the 30th was brought up between the 2nd and 5th Corps, and crossed the Totopotomoy. On the right the 2nd Corps found the enemy entrenched on the south bank of the stream holding the crossing of the Richmond road. On the afternoon of the 30th *Early* moved his right across Beaver Dam Creek on to the Mechanicsville and Old Church turnpike, where it was on the left flank of Warren advancing along the Shady Grove Church road. *Early's* position at Huntley's Corner was taken by *Anderson's* Corps.² A fierce attack was made by *Rodes's* division of the 2nd Corps against Warren's left by the cross-road

¹ A stream running parallel to and north-west of the Totopotomoy and entering the Pamunkey above Hanover Town.

² This statement made on Humphreys' authority seems difficult to reconcile with the position assigned to the 1st Corps on the 28th by the same authority. *Anderson* must have already been at Huntley's Corner but how then could he have been on *Early's* right? The 1st Corps diary states that it went into bivouac on the 28th between Huntley's Corner and Walnut Grove Church, but makes no reference to the Corps forming the right of the army. Dr. Freeman says that on May 28th *Early's* Corps was on the south bank of the Totopotomoy with its head near Pole Green Church; *Anderson* in rear of *Early* and *Hill* west of *Anderson* near Shady Grove Church, and that the Confederates held a fine defensive position between the Totopotomoy and Beaver Dam Creek. It would seem that *Anderson* was behind *Early*, but that his right at Walnut Grove Church was farther south than *Early's* right.

from Bethesda Church into the Shady Grove Church road, but was repulsed with considerable loss. To lighten the pressure upon Warren, Hancock was directed to attack in his front, which he did with Barlow's division just before dark, and carried the enemy's advanced line of rifle-pits.

W. F. Smith's Corps, the 18th, had been sent from Butler's army on the south bank of the James by water to White House, where it began to arrive on the 30th. On the afternoon of the 31st Smith was marching with 10,000 men of his command and the Corps artillery towards New Castle Ferry, on the Pamunkey, according to his original instructions. A mistake in the orders, which he received next morning, caused him to continue his march up the Pamunkey, when Grant's real intention was to send him to Cold Harbour.

On the 31st Sheridan, moving on the left of the Federal army, drove *Fitzhugh Lee's* cavalry division out of Cold Harbour and received orders to hold it at all costs. Cold Harbour was an important point, because it lay on the direct line of the Federal advance to the left, and was the meeting-point of various roads from the different bridges over the Chickahominy. Grant had by this time come to the conclusion that an attack on the Confederate position, where it lay behind the Totopotomoy covering the approaches to Richmond by the Shady Grove Church road and the Mechanicsville turnpike, held out no reasonable prospect of success. He determined therefore to continue the movement by the left towards the Chickahominy, in the hope that he might have a chance of attacking the Confederate right before it had time to entrench itself strongly. Anticipating that an attack would be made upon Sheridan at Cold Harbour, he ordered the 6th Corps to make a night march, and, if possible, reach Cold Harbour by daylight of June 1st. Wright, however, had to march his troops over difficult country a distance of fifteen miles, and did not reach Cold Harbour till after 9 a.m. and the Corps was only up by 2 p.m.

The capture of Cold Harbour warned *Lee* of danger to his right flank. On the 31st *Anderson's* Corps was moved to the right of *Early's*, and the extreme right was held by *Hoke's* division, which had reached *Lee* from the south side of the James on the 28th. The intention was to make a strong movement on the 1st towards Cold Harbour.¹ Sheridan, however, had no difficulty in holding

¹ *Lee* had built great hopes on the attack to be delivered on June 1st by *Anderson* with his own Corps and *Hoke's* strong division which had come up from Drewry's Bluff. He was not aware of Smith's arrival at White House, and expecting *Anderson* to drive Sheridan from Cold Harbour planned to roll up Grant's left and looked forward to decisive

his ground against the attack, which was confined to two weak attempts by a part of *Kershaw's* division, until the arrival of the 6th Corps set him free to continue the movement towards the Chickahominy covering the left flank of the army. In the afternoon Smith's Corps arrived from New Castle Ferry and was posted on Wright's right. Some 1,400 yards separated the hostile lines. The intervening space was mainly open ground, but a good part of the Confederate skirmish line was in a narrow strip of pine wood. At 6 p.m. Smith and Wright attacked. Ricketts's division of the 6th Corps penetrated an interval between *Hoke's* and *Kershaw's* divisions and carried the main line of entrenchments at that point, capturing 500 prisoners. The 18th Corps drove the enemy out of the pine wood and captured their advanced line of rifle-pits. The loss suffered by the two Corps amounted to about 2,200. They entrenched themselves along the new line which they had gained, whilst the Confederates threw up a fresh line of works in rear of that portion of their lines which had been carried by Ricketts's division.

This partial success encouraged Grant to continue his plan for breaking the enemy's right, and Hancock's Corps was ordered to move that night, and by a forced march reinforce Wright's left extending the Federal line still nearer to the Chickahominy. It was hoped that he would be in position early on the 2nd. The difficulties of a night march over unknown roads in very sultry weather were great : nevertheless Hancock reached his destination at 6.30 a.m. But his Corps was so exhausted with its hard march that the attack was postponed till 5 p.m.

It had been Grant's original plan that the whole Army of the Potomac should attack as early as possible on the morning of the 2nd. But Smith's Corps was nearly out of ammunition, and this in conjunction with the tired state of Hancock's Corps, led to the postponement of the attack. Meanwhile the 5th Corps had extended its left towards Smith's right, and the 9th Corps had been placed in rear of Warren's right. The assault was still further postponed until 4.30 a.m. on the 3rd. This decision was come to in consequence of the heat of the day and to give longer time for preparation.

When *Lee* discovered that Hancock's Corps had been withdraw

victory. *Lee* was too unwell to take personal control of the operation. *Anderson* and *Hoke* were both new in their respective commands and *Hoke* had not been formally placed under *Anderson*. If *Anderson* had cleared *Sheridan's* cavalry out of the way, he would have encountered the 6th Corps 'scattered along the road for many miles and in an exhausted condition' (*Alexander*).

from its position in front of his left, he ordered *Hill*, with two divisions of his Corps and *Breckinridge's* division, to move to the right and extend the line on the right of *Hoke's* division. *Hill* formed on the extreme right, and *Fitzhugh Lee's* cavalry crossed the Chickahominy and piqueted the roads leading to the James. Three brigades of *Field's* division were moved from the left to the right of the 1st Corps and posted in support of *Kershaw*.¹ This movement was rendered possible by the fact that the ground in *Field's* front was so swampy that no attack at that point need be apprehended. *Heth's* division of the 3rd Corps remained on *Early's* left. Furthermore, *Lee* directed *Early* with the left wing to place himself across the right flank of the Federal army and drive down along the front of the Confederate lines. The attempted movement led to some sharp fighting with *Burnside's* and *Warren's* Corps, which lasted till nightfall, but failed to produce the desired effect.

At 4.30 a.m. on the 3rd, the 2nd, 6th, and 18th Corps advanced to the attack. But besides the heavy artillery and musketry fire which blazed forth in their faces, a murderous cross-fire of artillery swept the flanks of each of the attacking Corps. They were, in fact, advancing on divergent lines, and consequently *Hancock's* right, *Smith's* left, and both of *Wright's* flanks were exposed to a deadly enfilade fire.² Against such odds the assault was doomed to failure. The advanced rifle-pits were captured, and on the extreme left *Barlow's* division carried an advanced line of works along the road from Despatch Station, but was speedily driven out again. The fate of the assault was settled in less than an hour.³ Unable, under the tremendous fire which they encountered, to carry the main line of entrenchments, the attacking force quickly took cover and succeeded in holding the advanced positions which they gained, at some points within thirty yards of the enemy's works.

The loss of the Federals in this short but desperate attack was very heavy. In the three Corps which took the chief part in the attack over 4,000 were killed and wounded, and probably this estimate falls considerably short of the truth.⁴ *Burnside's* and *Warren's* Corps on the Federal right were not heavily engaged. Before any regular assault by these troops could be delivered, *Meade's* order suspending further offensive operations was received. The

¹ *Pickett's* division was on *Kershaw's* left.

² *Smith's* right was also exposed to an enfilade fire, owing to a considerable gap existing between his right and *Warren's* left.

³ *Humphreys*, 182.

⁴ The total Federal loss on June 3rd was between 6,000 and 7,000.

Confederate losses were in comparison very slight, probably not more than 1,700 in all.

At 1.30 p.m. an order was issued directing the suspension of the attack, and that further advances should be made by regular approaches after due reconnaissance. In his despatch to Meade, which contained this order, Grant stated that his object now was to hold *Lee's* army fast until Hunter's army in the Shenandoah Valley was well on its way to Lynchburg, and that that purpose would be more easily effected by keeping *Lee* out of the Richmond entrenchments than by forcing him back into them. The two armies remained confronting each other till the night of the 12th. Though the Federal lines were being pushed forward by regular approaches, there seemed no chance of making a successful assault, and on that night the Army of the Potomac withdrew from its lines and marched to cross the James.

The Federal losses from the crossing of the Rapidan to the night of June 12th exceeded 50,000. *Lee's* losses must have been at least half that figure, and may have reached 30,000.

If Grant's movements from May 4th to June 12th are regarded as constituting in themselves a campaign, then it must be admitted that the campaign was a failure. *Lee's* army had not been destroyed or forced to abandon the defence of Richmond. At the end of every movement *Lee* had been found barring the Federal advance and Grant had entirely failed to force him to fight outside his entrenchments. At Cold Harbour he was still nine miles from Richmond, further away than McClellan had been in May, 1862, and to reach that point Grant had lost nearly half his original numbers. 'That the campaign was strategically a failure is proved by the facts that at its close *Lee* was able to detach *Early's* Corps to threaten Washington and the Confederate line of supply was still intact.'

It has, however, been very fairly argued that these operations should be regarded as only the first stage in a campaign, which ended with *Lee's* surrender. From the first Grant had envisaged the possibility that, if he failed to crush *Lee*, he would have to cross the James to unite with Butler. Grant's official report says 'It was still understood by both Generals Butler and Meade before starting on the campaign, that it was my intention to push both their armies south of the James River in case of failure to destroy *Lee* without it.' His methods of attrition, though they failed to destroy *Lee*, yet inflicted upon him losses in proportion to his numbers, little, if at all, short of his own. As a result of Grant's 'hammering' tactics *Lee* had lost the initiative and was thrown upon the strategic defensive. *Early's* raid across the

Potomac was merely a gesture and did *Lee* more harm than it did Grant. When *Lee* was forced back on to Richmond by Grant's passage of the James, he already saw the end in sight. From this point of view the first stage of Grant's campaign was successful, though he had paid a high price for success.

But from a political standpoint Grant's operations had done nothing to further Lincoln's chance of re-election, but had rendered it more than ever uncertain. The huge casualty lists spread dismay throughout the North, and the 'stop the war' cry grew more insistent among a people who failed to realise what Grant had really achieved. It was Sherman's capture of Atlanta on September 2nd which turned the tide of public opinion in Lincoln's favour.

NOTE

GRANT AND LEE ON THE JAMES

It has been so often asserted that Grant in crossing the James completely outgeneralled *Lee*, that special attention must be drawn to Dr. Freeman's vindication of *Lee's* policy. He regards three facts as definitely established: (1) *Lee* expected Grant to cross the James, (2) *Lee* knew Grant's approximate position by the early afternoon of June 14th, and (3) *Lee* had ordered *Hoke's* division to the pontoon bridge at Drewry's Bluff eight hours before the completion of Grant's bridge at Wilcox's Landing. As soon as his skirmishers brought news in the early morning of the 13th of the Federal evacuation of their Cold Harbour lines, *Lee* crossed the Chickahominy in pursuit. That night his right flank was within ten miles of the Drewry's Bluff bridge. He had intended on the 14th to attack the Federals on the Long Bridge road with *Hill's* Corps, but at dawn of that day Grant had again disappeared. 'There were few country roads in that part of Charles City County, whither Grant had moved, and those few ran in rough quadrilaterals. By maintaining strong guards at the cross-roads, Grant could screen his army as effectively as if he had taken ship and vanished down the James,' and he could always steal a night's march upon *Lee*. When later it was reported that part of Grant's forces was at Wilcox's Landing, *Hoke's* division was moved to the north end of the pontoon bridge, and next morning was ordered to cross the river and report to *Beauregard* at Petersburg. This left *Lee* only six divisions on the north bank. Early on the 16th *Pickett's* division was ordered to the Bermuda Hundred lines, which *Beauregard* had announced his intention of evacuating. *Lee* himself crossed the James before 9.40 a.m. on the 16th and established his headquarters at Drewry's Bluff. That

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afternoon *Field's* division was ordered to cross the river and *Kershaw's* to march to the north end of the bridge and await orders there. The first definite information received by *Lee* of Grant's movements was through a telegram received from *Beauregard*, dated 7 p.m. 16th, stating that Hancock's and W. F. Smith's Corps were in his front, but this telegram included the words 'no satisfactory information yet received of Grant's crossing James river.' Before noon of the 17th *Lee* received another telegram from *Beauregard*, written at 9 a.m., confirming the information, given in the first, but ending 'nothing positive yet known of Grant's movements.' *Lee*, who on the morning of the 17th had moved his headquarters to the Bermuda Hundred lines, in consequence of two alarmist telegrams from *Beauregard* ordered in the evening *Kershaw* to move from Chaffin's Bluff to Bermuda Hundred, and *Hill*, if he had no contrary news of the enemy, to bring his Corps to Chaffin's Bluff. On receipt of another telegram threatening the evacuation of Petersburg, *Lee* at 10 p.m. ordered *Kershaw* to march to Petersburg early next morning and *Hill* to cross the James, march to the Petersburg road and await orders there. Some time that night *Lee* heard that his cavalry had reached the vicinity of Wilcox's Landing during the afternoon and ascertained that the last of Grant's army had crossed the James at that point. During the night staff officers arrived from *Beauregard* to report on the fighting at Petersburg, and *Lee* ordered *Field* to follow *Kershaw* to Petersburg. At 3.30 a.m. on the 18th *Hill* was ordered to Petersburg; he was instructed to leave one division on the north side of the Appomattox, in case it might be required for the defence of Richmond. Of the two cavalry brigades with *Lee's* army one was sent to Petersburg. *Lee* himself started for Petersburg, where he arrived by 11 a.m., having been preceded by *Kershaw's* division (7.30 a.m.) and *Field's* (9.30 a.m.). *Beauregard* was so elated by the arrival of these two divisions, that he proposed an immediate attack against the Federal left flank. This *Lee* declined. Dr. Freeman sums up: 'The operations of June 14th-18th constitute a most informative example of how a limited force may be defensively employed to defend two widely separated positions, when a stronger adversary is so placed that he can move unobserved.'

When Grant evacuated the Cold Harbour position, it might merely indicate a change of base to Harrison's Landing, a reproduction of McClellan's movement two years earlier. Even when it was found that Grant had gone down as far as Wilcox's Landing, his object might be only to gain a more convenient base on deep water. Richmond was *Lee's* special charge, just as Petersburg was *Beauregard's*, and he could not uncover Richmond until he knew for certain that all Grant's army had crossed the James. But he could not get from *Beauregard* the information which he required about the movements of the Army of the Potomac, as distinct from those of the Army of the James. In fact it was from his own cavalry on the north side of the river that he at last received information. It seems, too, that *Lee* was not inclined

to give full credence to the information which *Beauregard* sent; it was largely based upon the evidence of prisoners and *Lee* instinctively distrusted such. If it should come to making a choice between saving Petersburg and risking the safety of Richmond, *Lee* would not have hesitated to sacrifice Petersburg; in that case he would have held the north bank of the Appomattox and endeavoured to keep open the railway from Danville to Richmond.

CHAPTER III

THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG

Movements of the Army of the James—Butler's feeble offensive—Confederate forces in Petersburg and Richmond—Butler's procrastination—Federal advance towards Drewry's Bluff—Beauregard assumes the offensive—Battle of Drewry's Bluff—Early sent to the Shenandoah Valley—Butler's unsuccessful attempt on Petersburg—The Army of the Potomac crosses the James—Defences of Richmond and Petersburg—Partial success of Smith's Corps against Petersburg—The 2nd Corps reinforces Smith—Preparations of the Confederates—The fighting on June 16th—The 9th Corps on the 17th—Heavy losses of the Federals on the 18th—Grant resolves to attack the Confederate railways—Grant fails to secure the Weldon railway—Wilson's raid against the railways—Sheridan's expedition to Charlottesville—The Burnside mine—Movement of the 2nd Corps to the north bank of the James—Hancock withdraws to the south bank—The mine fiasco—Hancock's second movement to the north bank of the James—Warren's movement to the Weldon railway—Federals secure possession of the Weldon railway—Hill drives Hancock from Reams' Station—Grant's third movement to the north bank of the James—Ord captures Fort Harrison—Warren moves towards the Boydton Plank road—Federal success at Peebles Farm—Grant makes a final effort to secure the Southside railway—Failure of the Federal movement.

IT was part of Grant's general plan of campaign that a co-operative movement should be made by the Army of the James, under General Butler, up the south bank of that river against Richmond. This army had been organised into two Corps, the 10th and the 18th, under the command of Generals Gillmore and W. F. Smith, and numbered about 36,000 men. One division was composed of coloured troops. The army had been concentrated on the York River with the view of deluding the Confederate Government into the idea that the line of advance would be that followed by McClellan in 1862. On the night of May 4th the troops were conveyed by water from the York to the James, and disembarked on the south bank at Bermuda Hundred Neck,¹ where the Appomattox falls into the James. Butler was directed to march on Richmond, keeping close to the river and

¹ See Map IV.

securing a footing as far up as he could, and, if able to invest the city, establishing his left flank on the river above Richmond, where it was hoped that the Army of the Potomac might be able to effect a junction.¹ But unfortunately for the success of the Federal plans, Butler was perhaps the most incapable officer still retained in a high command. His appointment as a major-general of volunteers had been made at the very beginning of the war on purely political grounds. He had had no military training or experience: his only claim was that he had commanded the Massachusetts militia, which had marched to the relief of Washington in 1861.

Disembarking on May 6th, the Army of the James moved forward from the landing-place about six miles and occupied and entrenched a position across the Neck, where it is only three miles wide, with the right resting on the James and the left on the Appomattox. Two and a half miles away were the Richmond and Petersburg railroad and turnpike. One brigade was sent the same afternoon to secure these, but withdrew on finding a small Confederate force holding the railway at Port Walthall Junction. Next day Butler despatched another force to the railway, which after some fighting retired. On the 9th Butler moved out of his entrenchments with a still stronger force and succeeded in breaking up the railway for a distance of about six miles from Chester Station to Swift Creek. At this latter point he was within three miles of Petersburg, but the Creek was held by the Confederates in force, and the following day Butler withdrew to his lines at Bermuda Hundred.

At this time the Confederate forces holding Richmond and Petersburg, twenty-two miles apart, were very weak indeed. They probably did not number on May 1st more than 6,000 infantry in addition to the artillery, who worked the heavy naval guns, which commanded the James at Chaffin's and Drewry's Bluffs, and the field-guns, with which the entrenchments were armed. General *Beauregard* was in command, having been transferred from the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida to that of North Carolina and South Virginia, where he relieved General *Pickett*. He had been ordered to bring as many troops as possible from these two Departments for the protection of Richmond against an advance along the line of the James. He had succeeded in getting together about 19,000 infantry. But at the moment when Butler commenced his

¹ The orders given to Butler were not sufficiently explicit. Petersburg was not mentioned, and throughout the operations his action was to depend on Grant's movements.

movement none of these troops had even arrived at Petersburg.¹ To reach that city they had to be brought from Weldon (fifty-five miles south of Petersburg) by rail. But on May 5th Butler had sent a cavalry division under General Kautz from Suffolk to break up the Petersburg and Weldon railroad at various points: and the destruction of two railway bridges proved a considerable hindrance to *Beauregard* in his task of forwarding troops from the south to the threatened cities.

It would have been Butler's wisest course to turn his back for the moment upon Richmond, march upon Petersburg, which he could have easily captured, garrisoned as it was by little more than a brigade,² and by securing the Petersburg and Weldon railroad cut off *Beauregard's* troops from their most direct route to Richmond. The fall of Petersburg would have necessitated the immediate recall of *Lee's* army, or else the abandonment of the Confederate capital itself. For Butler, even if he failed to capture Richmond single-handed, could at least have closely invested it on the south side of the James, and materially assisted in forwarding Grant's plan of campaign. Possibly, if Butler had been in position in front of Richmond at the time of Sheridan's cavalry raid, the city would have fallen. Both his Corps commanders joined on the night of May 9th in urging Butler to bridge the Appomattox at the Point of Rocks (seven miles below Petersburg) and operate on the south bank of that stream against Petersburg from the east.

With such great possibilities before him Butler adopted a policy of procrastination, which gave *Beauregard* time to get all his reinforcements into Richmond and Petersburg, and actually assume the offensive with a force of equal strength to that which Butler was able to put into the field. Turning a deaf ear to the sound advice of his lieutenants, the Federal commander on the 12th moved out along the turnpike towards Richmond, and advanced against the fortifications at Drewry's Bluff. From the Bluff the Confederate entrenchments ran westward for two and a half miles, crossing both the Petersburg and Richmond railroad and turnpike, and then turned north. Near the Bluff an outer line of works branched off from the main entrenchments and reached across the railway about a mile in front of the inner line,

¹ The leading troops only began to arrive at Petersburg on the 5th. Part of one brigade had already been called in by *Pickett* from the Blackwater, where it was watching the approaches from Norfolk and Suffolk.

² The original garrison of Petersburg consisted of one infantry regiment and part of a brigade on the Blackwater. Part of another brigade reached Petersburg on the 5th.

with its right resting on a hill to the west of the railway. On the 13th Gillmore, whose Corps formed the left of Butler's army turned this outer line and secured possession of the aforesaid hill: and on the 14th the whole of the outer line of works was in the hands of the Federals. Butler ordered an assault against the main line of the enemy's works to be made on the morning of the 15th, but the attack had to be abandoned owing to the lack of available troops to form the assaulting column.

By this time *Beauregard* had concentrated three infantry divisions, 17,000 strong, with an artillery battalion and a cavalry regiment to each division, within the fortifications at Drewry's Bluff. Two infantry and one cavalry brigade held Petersburg. Butler by his delay had lost the initiative, and on the 16th *Beauregard* attacked. The weak point of the Federal line was the right, which was 'in the air' a mile away from the river. *Beauregard* hoped by turning Butler's right to cut the Federal army off from its entrenchments at Bermuda Hundred and destroy it, or force its surrender in its present position before his lines. *Whiting*, who had been left in command at Petersburg, was ordered to make a co-operative movement and fall upon the enemy's flank or rear. *Whiting*, however, found his line of advance barred at Walthall Junction by a division which Butler had posted there to cover his rear, and failed to render *Beauregard* any assistance.

There was some hard fighting between the two main armies on the morning of the 16th. *Beauregard* succeeded in turning the Federal right, but his attacks on the rest of Butler's line were firmly met and repulsed. A dense fog, which just before daybreak came up from the river, prevented *Beauregard* from following up the turning movement, and his left division, after its first success, was withdrawn, in order that its line might be reorganised. Butler, finding himself in danger of being cut off from his base, ordered his whole line to fall back some distance to the right rear. The Confederates recovered their first line of entrenchments, and at nightfall Butler withdrew from his second position to Bermuda Hundred.¹ *Beauregard* followed in pursuit on the following day and entrenched a position in front of Butler. The Army of the James was as it were confined in a bottle, of which *Beauregard* held the cork.

When Grant learnt of the failure of Butler's co-operative

¹ The Federal loss on the 16th was about 3,500, the Confederate over 2,000. In this engagement Smith utilised telegraph-wire for the defence of part of his line, stretching it among the stumps in his front. The fog lifted about 9 a.m.

movement, he ordered him to send all the forces not required for holding his entrenchments to White House on the Pamunkey, in order to take part in the movement of the Army of the Potomac against *Lee* between the Pamunkey and the Chickahominy.

Beauregard, knowing that he held *Butler* fast, had already despatched one division and one brigade to *Lee's* aid, and a little later sent a second division to join the Army of Northern Virginia. *Butler*, in obedience to *Grant's* orders, sent *Smith* with a force of about 16,000 infantry to White House.¹

On June 7th *Sheridan* was despatched with two cavalry divisions on an expedition to Charlottesville (in the Upper James river valley).² There he was expected to find *Hunter* who, after defeating a small Confederate force on the 5th at Piedmont, about ten miles north-east of Staunton, was moving up the Shenandoah Valley against Lynchburg. The two forces were to destroy thoroughly the Virginia Central railroad back from Charlottesville to Hanover Junction and then join the Army of the Potomac.

After the repulse of the Federal attack at Cold Harbour, *Lee* felt himself strong enough to send back *Breckinridge's* division to the Valley, whence it had come,³ and being seriously alarmed for the safety of Lynchburg, he despatched the 2nd Corps under *Early* on the 13th after *Breckinridge*. *Early* was directed, after defeating *Hunter*, to march down the Valley and crossing the Potomac to threaten Washington. *Lee* hoped by this move to cause *Grant* to detach a considerable force for the relief of Washington, and at the same time protect Lynchburg and the upper part of the Valley. When he learnt on the 8th that *Sheridan* was moving in the direction of Charlottesville, he ordered *Wade Hampton* to follow with two divisions of cavalry.

On June 9th *Butler* sent across to the south bank of the Appomattox⁴ a small force under *Gillmore*, consisting of 3,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry, to attempt the capture of Petersburg. The cavalry carried the entrenchments to the south of the town and penetrated some way beyond them, but the commander of the expedition judged that the works in his immediate front were

¹ *Smith's* force is generally spoken of in the subsequent operations at Cold Harbour as the 18th Corps, because *Smith* commanded that Corps in the Army of the James. It was really composed of one division of his own Corps and two of the 10th Corps.

² See Map V.

³ *Breckinridge's* division had been brought from the Valley after *Sigel's* defeat at Newmarket, May 15th.

⁴ See Map IV.

too strong to be successfully attacked, and withdrew the same day.

On the night of the 12th Grant commenced to remove his army from Cold Harbour. He had decided to cross the James at Wilcox's Landing rather than higher up, in order to withdraw his troops as far as possible from the observation of *Lee*. The 5th and 2nd Corps crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, fifteen miles below Cold Harbour, whilst the 6th and 9th Corps crossed at Jones's Bridge, five miles farther down, and the trains crossed still lower. Wilson's two cavalry brigades were stationed on either flank. By midnight of the 16th the whole of the Army of the Potomac was safely established on the south bank of the James.¹ The 18th Corps had received orders to march with all speed to White House, re-embark on the transports, which had brought it from the James, and rejoin Butler's command at Bermuda Hundred.

Lee was led to believe from the movements of the 5th Corps, which formed the right wing of the Army of the Potomac and covered the movement from the Chickahominy to the James, that Grant intended either to march by the north bank of the James against Richmond or else to cross the river at Malvern Hill. He accordingly posted *Anderson's* and *Hill's* Corps so as to cover the approaches to Richmond from White Oak Swamp to Malvern Hill. He remained uncertain of the movements of his opponent until the afternoon of the 17th.²

The defences of Richmond comprised, first, a series of field redoubts, which encircled the city at a distance of from a mile to a mile and a half. Outside these, on the north bank of the James, a connected line of artillery redans and infantry parapets enveloped the city at a distance of from one to two miles in front of the redoubts. This line of entrenchments crossed the James two and a half miles below Richmond and continued westwards till within a mile and a half of the river above the city. On the north bank there was further a disconnected line of entrenchments at a distance varying from half a mile to three miles in front of the connected line and resting on the James at Chaffin's Bluff. Almost opposite that Bluff on the other side of the river was Drewry's Bluff, and at both these points heavy batteries of coast defence guns had been established to prevent the further advance of the

¹ The construction of the bridge was a triumph of engineering. After roads had been formed through the swamps at both ends of the bridge, the actual throwing of it began at 4 p.m. and was completed by midnight. The river was 700 yards wide, 90 feet deep, and had a rise and fall of 4 feet.

² But see Note to Chapter II.

Federal gunboats up the river. A number of mines had also been placed in the river, and one hostile gunboat had already been blown up. The shallowness of the bar at Trent's Reach, which was nine miles by water from Drewry's Bluff, prevented the Federal monitors going further up the river. The defences on the south bank starting from Drewry's Bluff have already been described in connection with Butler's advance from Bermuda Hundred.

The defences of Petersburg consisted of a circle of strong redans connected by infantry parapets drawn about two miles outside the city.

On the night of the 14th General Smith with his Corps reported to General Butler at Bermuda Hundred, and was ordered to move against Petersburg along the south bank of the Appomattox at daylight.

Smith was not aware how weak was the force garrisoning Petersburg. It consisted only of one infantry brigade, numbering about 2,400 men, one cavalry brigade, and some local militia. Smith had about 14,000 infantry and artillery, and Kautz's division of cavalry. But he spent a considerable part of the day in pushing forward reconnaissances to test the strength of the enemy's lines. About 7 p.m. he advanced to the attack with a heavy skirmish line, and captured, without much difficulty, a mile and a half of the entrenchments (seven redans with their connecting infantry parapets) and sixteen guns. He did not, however, make any attempt to push his success further, although the weakness of the resistance encountered should have shown him that only a small infantry force was at the moment defending Petersburg.

The 2nd Corps was across the James at an early hour on the 15th. It was ordered to march towards Petersburg as soon as it had been provided with rations to be sent from City Point. The rations did not, however, arrive, and at 10.30 a.m. the Corps marched without them. The instructions which Hancock had received for his march proved extremely inaccurate, and further delay was thereby caused. Consequently it was not till late in the evening that Hancock joined Smith, and the latter general, believing that considerable reinforcements were reaching *Beauregard*, urged the postponement of further operations till daylight.¹

¹ The failure to capture Petersburg on the 15th affords a striking instance of the evil consequences of a divided command. Grant intended the capture of Petersburg to be the affair of the Army of the James. He expected Smith to take the place by surprise, i.e. before *Beauregard* could call up sufficient troops to man the works. For surprise, secrecy was essential, and Grant did not inform either Meade or Hancock that

The reinforcements, which actually arrived in Petersburg on the evening of the 15th, only consisted of *Hoke's* division. It can hardly be doubted that if Smith, after Hancock's arrival with two fresh divisions, had renewed the attack, Petersburg must have fallen.

During the night *Beauregard* withdrew the greater part of *B. R. Johnson's* division from its lines at Bermuda Hundred, leaving *Gracie's* brigade to do its best to hold those entrenchments. The Confederate general was in the awkward predicament of being obliged to abandon either his Petersburg lines or the works which he had constructed in front of Butler. He wisely determined to abandon the latter, hoping, as proved the case, that General *Lee* would shortly arrive and retake them. He occupied the night in throwing up a fresh line of entrenchments in rear of that portion of his lines which had been captured by Smith's attack. With the addition of *Hoke's* and *B. R. Johnson's* divisions, *Beauregard* had in his lines on the morning of the 16th about 14,000 infantry. But his extreme right did not reach the Jerusalem Plank road by half a mile, and for four and a half miles westwards to the Appomattox the Confederate entrenchments were unoccupied except by a few cavalry piquets.

Early on the 16th the Federals at Bermuda Hundred, finding that the forces in their front had been greatly reduced, advanced, and after a short struggle carried the Confederate lines. But next day they were recaptured by *Pickett's* division, which *Lee* had brought early on that morning to Drewry's Bluff. *Field's* division followed *Pickett's*, but *Kershaw's* division and *Hill's* entire Corps still remained on the north bank of the James.

On the morning of the 16th the 9th Corps arrived before Petersburg. Meade had ordered Hancock to wait for its arrival before renewing the attack upon *Beauregard's* lines. At 6 p.m. the 2nd Corps, supported by two brigades of the 18th on the right and by two brigades of the 9th on the left, went forward to the assault and carried one redan on the right and two on the left of the breach, which Smith had already made in the Confederate works, together with their connecting lines.

During the night the Confederates constructed a new entrenched line reaching from Redan No. 3, near the Appomattox, to the

the 2nd Corps was to take any part in the attack; he expected that its co-operation would only be required to hold the town, when captured. Hancock's Corps was in no need of rations and had enough in hand to last three days. He informed the Assistant-Adjutant-General of the Army of the Potomac to this effect, but the information does not appear to have reached Meade.

works on the Norfolk railway. On the 17th the 5th Corps reached the scene of action. At the earliest dawn of day Potter's division of the 9th Corps carried in gallant style a mile of Confederate entrenchments on the Shand House ridge, but on pushing forward found itself confronted by the new line of works. The fighting on that day was mainly confined to the 9th Corps, though portions of the 2nd and 5th took part in the operations. Late in the afternoon Ledlie's division of the 9th Corps carried part of the Confederate lines, but a spirited charge of *Gracie's* brigade, which had just reached Petersburg, recovered the captured works.

During the night of the 17th *Beauregard* decided to fall back to yet a fresh line of entrenchments. These were constructed in rear of a ravine from 500 to 1,000 yards behind his last line, intersecting the original line of entrenchments near the Jerusalem Plank road. As these works had only been thrown up in the night, Meade ordered a general assault to be made by the 2nd, 5th, and 9th Corps at noon of the 18th.¹ The 18th Corps, with the exception of one division, had been sent back on the previous day to Bermuda Hundred, and this one division with one division of the 6th Corps held the extreme right of the Federal line. At the appointed hour the 2nd Corps made two assaults, but was repulsed with heavy loss. Another attack was made by the same Corps late in the afternoon with the same result. The 5th and 9th Corps found much greater difficulty in approaching the enemy's lines, as they had first to carry the Norfolk railroad cut, which was strongly held. This cut was eventually captured, but a further assault upon the main line of entrenchments was repulsed with heavy loss. *Beauregard* on this day was reinforced by *Kershaw's* and *Field's* divisions (*Pickett's* having been left to hold the Bermuda Hundred entrenchments), and *Hill's* Corps also arrived later, in time to assist in repelling the assaults made in the afternoon. The positions, which had been gained by the Federal Corps close to the enemy's line, were entrenched, and these two opposing lines were held by the respective armies till the close of the siege.

After the failure of the assault of the 18th, Grant, recognising that, now that *Lee* with the greater part of his forces was confronting him, there was no longer any chance of success for a frontal attack, directed that his men should be put under cover and a

¹ On the night of the 17th Meade ordered the attack to be made at 4 a.m. next morning. When this movement was being carried out, it was found that the enemy had fallen back to *Beauregard's* new line, and Meade fixed the attack for noon.

much-needed rest given them. Since crossing the James, from the 15th to the 18th, his casualties fell little, if at all, short of 10,000 men. The losses of the Confederates must have been considerably smaller, as they were standing on the defensive.

Grant's plan of campaign after crossing the James was to reduce Richmond by destroying its lines of supply. These were, from the north, the Virginia Central and Fredericksburg railroads, both of which had already been considerably damaged, and it was hoped that Sheridan's expedition to Charlottesville would permanently destroy the former. From the south three railways entered Petersburg and Richmond. Into Petersburg ran the Weldon, and Lynchburg or Southside lines, whilst the railroad from Danville went to Richmond. It was Grant's purpose by a gradual extension of his left to gain possession of these different railroads in turn, and thus compel the evacuation of Richmond. Had he succeeded in capturing Petersburg, as he had every right to expect to do, his task would have been immensely lightened. But when he found that Petersburg was impregnable against direct assault, undismayed he entered upon his more arduous undertaking. The occupation of the Weldon and Lynchburg railways would compel the evacuation of Petersburg; the next step would then be to turn the Confederate entrenchments at Bermuda Hundred, and then to operate against the last remaining line, the Richmond and Danville railway. When that fell into his hands, starvation would oblige the Southern capital to surrender.

Accordingly he set himself to construct a line of entrenchments, steadily stretching westwards, of even greater strength than those which the Confederates held, in order that he might be able to leave a small force to hold them, and employ the greater part of his army in extensive movements to turn Lee's right flank. The costly plan of attacking all along the line was thus abandoned, but not until it had produced a more or less demoralising effect upon the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac. It was noticeable that in the operations which ensued after the crossing of the James, for some considerable period the Federal troops fought with much less determination and fire than they had displayed in the earlier part of the campaign.¹ This was due in part to the discouragement produced among the troops by the useless sacrifice of life in assaults which the soldiers themselves knew to be doomed to failure; partly to the deterioration in the quality of the recruits, who were steadily pouring in. These being either substitutes, or obtained through the 'draft,'

¹ Ropes, however, holds a different view: 'the blame of the failure to take Petersburg must rest with our generals, not with our army.'

were very inferior to the volunteers of the earlier years of the war, and tended to impair the efficiency of the organisations to which they were assigned. The Government continued the mistaken policy of forming entire regiments of the new recruits, instead of distributing them to fill up the vacancies created in the veteran regiments.

On June 21st Grant commenced a turning movement, which was confidently expected to secure the Weldon railroad, whilst it was hoped that it might also get possession of the Southside line. The operation was not, however, carried out in sufficient force to ensure success. The 2nd and 6th Corps were ordered to move to the left of the 5th, across the Jerusalem Plank road, and advance against the Weldon railway, which was only three miles beyond the road. At the same time Wilson, with 5,500 cavalry, was ordered to make a raid against the Southside and Danville railroads, and, if possible, break them up so completely as to render them useless for the rest of the campaign.

On the 22nd the two Infantry Corps moved forward from the Jerusalem Plank road. The 2nd Corps on the right was ordered to swing its left forward and entrench a position, whilst the 6th Corps was directed to push straight for the railway. It had originally been intended that the movements of these two Corps should be made in close connection with each other, but the difficulty of moving through the dense thickets proved so great that Meade ordered the Corps commanders to operate independently, whilst impressing upon them the necessity of guarding carefully their exposed flanks.

As soon as the movement began to develop, *Lee* sent *Hill* with *Wilcox's* and *Mahone's* divisions, supported by *B. R. Johnson's*, out of the Confederate lines down the railway. As the Federals advanced, the gap between the two Corps increased: and *Hill*, seizing the opportunity, detached *Wilcox* to hold the railway against the 6th Corps, and moved forward with *Mahone's* division to fall upon the exposed left flank of the 2nd Corps. That Corps was temporarily commanded by *Birney*, and he had neglected to carry out Meade's instructions to protect his left flank against just such a movement as the Confederates were now making.

Hill's attack was entirely successful. The 2nd Corps, struck on the flank and rolled up from left to right, was driven from the entrenchments, which it had thrown up, to the position which it had quitted in the morning, with a loss of four guns and 1,700 prisoners. The loss in killed and wounded was comparatively slight and points conclusively to the impaired morale of a Corps which had been both the best and strongest in the Army of the

Potomac. *Hill*, after driving the enemy, returned at dusk to his own lines, and the next morning the 2nd Corps advanced and reoccupied the line of works lost on the previous day. *Wright*, on the left, had been unable to gain ground in the face of *Wilcox's* opposition, and entrenched a position which was a mile and a half short of the Weldon railway. The Federal infantry had completely failed to secure even the nearer of the two railways.¹

Very early on the morning of the 22nd *Wilson* started on his expedition. Crossing the Weldon railway at Reams' Station, he struck straight for the Southside railway. Reaching it at a point about fourteen miles from Petersburg, he destroyed it for a distance of thirty miles as far as *Burkesville*, where it intersects the Richmond and Danville line. Having completely destroyed the station and all railway appliances at the Junction, the work of destruction was continued for thirty miles south along the Danville railway. But on reaching the bridge over the Staunton River, further progress was barred by a strong force of militia entrenched with artillery.² *W. H. F. Lee's* cavalry division had followed closely after *Wilson* throughout these operations, but had not been able to interfere seriously with the work of breaking up the railways, though sharp skirmishing continued all the time. Finding himself unable to advance further south and being already nearly a hundred miles from Petersburg, *Wilson* determined to retire.

But his return journey proved to be one of extreme difficulty, and was only effected with heavy loss. *Lee* had made arrangements for intercepting his retreat. On approaching the Weldon railroad on the 28th *Wilson* found himself confronted by *Wade Hampton's* cavalry division at Stony Creek depôt, whilst *Fitzhugh Lee's* division and two infantry brigades had been posted at Reams' Station, ten miles to the north. Unable to fight his way through *Hampton's* division, he moved westwards, hoping to cross the railway nearer Petersburg, but on the 29th encountered *Fitzhugh Lee's* cavalry at Reams' Station. As the Federals tried to retreat, *Fitzhugh Lee* and *Mahone*, who commanded the infantry, attacked, and under their united pressure *Wilson's* force was broken. *Kautz's* division managed to get round the Confederate left, and

¹ From Dr. Freeman's account it appears that the success of June 22nd was not due to *Hill*. *Lee* was himself on the spot and approved *Mahone's* suggestion that he should thrust three brigades into the gap between the two Federal Corps. More might have been accomplished if *Wilcox* had co-operated with *Mahone*, but *Hill's* instructions to *Wilcox* were contrary to *Mahone's* plan.

² Dr. Freeman calls this force 'a handful of reserves.'

crossing the railway a short distance south of Reams' Station, reached the Army of the Potomac in the course of the same night. But the larger part was forced to make a wide detour, and did not rejoin the rest of the army till July 2nd. Wilson lost twelve guns, his wagon-train, and 1,500 killed, wounded, or missing.¹ He had done considerable damage to the railways, but the Confederates found no difficulty in repairing them.

The rest of the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac had started with Sheridan on June 7th on the expedition to Charlottesville.² On the evening of the 10th the North Anna was crossed, and the Federals bivouacked about ten miles north-east of Trevilian Station. On the same night *Wade Hampton's* cavalry division encamped about three miles north-west of the station, and *Fitzhugh Lee's* division near Louisa Court House, six miles east. At daylight on the 11th the two Confederate divisions moved from their respective camps, hoping to encounter Sheridan before he could reach the railway. It was, however, very difficult to carry out a combined movement between two bodies of troops separated by several miles of wooded country. *Wade Hampton*, before he could effect a junction with *Fitzhugh Lee*, encountered Sheridan, who had also broken up his camp early in the morning, about three miles north of the station. According to Sheridan's account Torbert's division carried the entrenchments, which *Wade Hampton's* men had hastily thrown up, and drove the Confederates pell-mell into Custer, who had moved between the two Confederate divisions and reached Trevilian Station. Gregg meantime had attacked *Fitzhugh Lee* on the Louisa Court House road, and driven him back some distance, pursuing till nightfall.³ During the night the two Confederate leaders reunited their commands in the direction of Gordonsville, whilst Sheridan with his whole force occupied the station. On the strength of his subsequent movements the Confederates claimed the victory, but it seems quite clear that they were driven west of the Virginia Central railway. During the night Sheridan learnt from his prisoners that General Hunter was not moving on Charlottesville, as he supposed, but was threatening Lynchburg. It was useless

¹ The break on the Danville railway was not repaired until July 25th (Freeman). Meanwhile *Lee* hauled his supplies round the breaks. General *St. John*, in charge at the time of the military railways of the Confederacy, after the war spoke of Wilson's cavalry raid as 'the heaviest blow the Confederacy ever received, until it was destroyed at the battle of Five Forks' (Fuller).

² See Map III.

³ Gregg commanded one of Sheridan's two divisions, and Custer a brigade in Torbert's division.

in the presence of *Wade Hampton's* united force to attempt the systematic destruction of the railroad, and accordingly he retired on the night of the 12th and reached White House on the 21st. Grant had determined to break up his base there, and on the 22nd Sheridan started to escort a train of 900 wagons to the James. The train safely crossed on the 25th, but Gregg's division, which was covering the movement, had a hard fight on the 24th with *Wade Hampton's* and *Fitzhugh Lee's* divisions, and was driven back some distance. On the 27th Sheridan was ordered to move by the left to Reams' Station¹ to aid Wilson's return. But he did not arrive in time to take part in the fighting; for the enemy's infantry had already withdrawn within their own lines, and the cavalry, after pursuing Wilson's main body as far as the Black-water, returned by circuitous routes to their camp on July 1st.²

Since the beginning of June the heat had been intense, and no rain fell for forty-seven days. All the surface water disappeared, and the Federals had to rely upon wells for their supply. The dust lay thick upon the ground, and marching caused great suffering to the troops. In the circumstances Grant decided to postpone, till a more convenient season, his flank movement to turn *Lee's* right and gain possession of the Petersburg railroads: and orders were issued that the operations against the Confederate lines were to be conducted by regular approaches on the front opposed to the 5th and 9th Corps. In July the 6th Corps had been sent north to defend Washington against *Early's* raid, and after its departure the left flank of the Federal army was drawn in to the Jerusalem Plank road, on which two strong redoubts were constructed about half a mile apart. The Federal left was thus refused. A formidable siege-train, including forty rifled siege-guns and forty heavy, as well as lighter, mortars had by this time reached Grant.

Towards the end of June Lieutenant-Colonel Pleasants, of the 48th Pennsylvania Regiment, which was largely composed of coal miners, whilst he himself had been a mining engineer, suggested to his divisional commander, Potter, the practicability of running

¹ See Map VI.

² The Confederates claimed that on the 11th Custer's brigade was routed by *Rosser's* brigade, which not only recovered all that Custer had captured, but also 'got possession of Custer's headquarters ambulances.' But the same writer, General *Butler*, C.S.A., admits that the day 'ended disastrously.' There was also some hard fighting on the 12th. *Torbert's* division was trying to secure a ford over the North Anna, but being opposed by both *Hampton* and *Fitzhugh Lee*, was repulsed. The Federals were therefore obliged to return by the road by which they had come (Sheridan, I, 424-5).

a mine under one of the Confederate redans. The scheme was reported to Burnside, the Corps commander, and Meade gave his consent, though with some hesitation. For though the ground on the Federal side was favourable for carrying on the work unobserved, yet the space, which would have to be crossed by the columns advancing to the attack after the explosion of the mine, was exposed to a cross-fire on both flanks. The mine was commenced on June 25th, and was ready to receive the powder-charge by July 23rd. The main gallery was 511 feet long, with two lateral galleries 37 and 38 feet long, and 8,000 pounds of powder were placed in them.¹ The mining operations of the Federals failed to escape *Beauregard's* notice. He threw up entrenchments across the gorge of the salient threatened, and established batteries of heavy mortars to give a front and cross-fire on it.

On July 25th Grant ordered the 2nd Corps, again under the command of Hancock, with three cavalry divisions under Sheridan (including Kautz's cavalry division of the Army of the James), to cross to the north bank of the James with as much secrecy as possible. The principal object of this expedition was to destroy the Virginia Central and Fredericksburg railways from the neighbourhood of Richmond back to the North and South Anna Rivers. If a favourable opportunity presented itself, the cavalry might make a dash at Richmond. The infantry was to support the cavalry if it got into Richmond, and also to prevent troops being sent to interfere with the cavalry's operations against the railways. At the same time Grant hoped that this movement across the James would cause *Lee* to withdraw some of his forces from the Petersburg lines and thus weaken the opposition to be encountered, when a general assault followed the explosion of Burnside's mine.

Two pontoon bridges had been laid across the James at Deep Bottom,² one just above and the other below the mouth of Bailey's Creek. They were guarded by General Foster of the 10th Corps. Opposite the upper bridge the Confederates held an entrenched line, which did not, however, apparently extend far from the river. Before daylight on the 27th Hancock crossed by the lower bridge. The defences of Richmond on the north side of the river were under the charge of *Ewell*, who had under his command two militia brigades and a force of Government employes. Hancock's plan was that Foster, moving forward from the upper

¹ Colonel Pleasants had to work under great disadvantages, as Meade and his chief engineer did not believe the undertaking was possible. 'With proper tools and instruments it could have been done in one-third or one-quarter of the time.'

² See Map IV.

bridge, should threaten the enemy's entrenched line in front, whilst he himself turned its left.

But *Lee* had already, in anticipation of the attack, brought two infantry divisions from the south bank, and on the 27th a third division arrived. Two cavalry divisions and another infantry division were subsequently withdrawn from the Petersburg lines.¹ In the face of so strong a force the Federal movement made no progress. Hancock had been ordered not to attack entrenchments, and a turning movement was rendered impossible by the superior numbers of the enemy. On the night of the 29th Hancock withdrew his forces to the south bank of the river, preparatory to taking part in the general assault upon Petersburg. The knowledge that *Lee*, by withdrawing so large a force from Petersburg, had left only three infantry divisions and one cavalry division for its defence, and the discovery that what had hitherto been supposed to be a connected line of entrenchments along a ridge 500 yards in rear of the main Confederate line was not a connected line at all, but only consisted of detached redans, caused Grant to have great hopes of the success of the assault, which he had determined to make with all his available forces on the 30th.

The mine was to be exploded at 3.30 a.m. Burnside's Corps was to make the main assault, supported on the right by the 18th Corps, and on the left by the 5th, whilst the 2nd Corps was also expected to co-operate. Burnside had originally proposed that his fourth division, consisting of coloured troops under General Ferrero, should lead the assault, because his three white divisions had suffered considerably from the heavy fire kept up day and night from the Confederate lines, only 100 yards away. But both Grant and Meade refused to entrust so important a task to inexperienced troops. The other three divisional commanders drew lots for the post of honour, and the lot fell upon Ledlie. Burnside had been specially directed by Meade to prepare his parapets and abatis for the passage of the assaulting columns, to equip his pioneers for the purpose of opening passages for the artillery and destroying the Confederate abatis, and to distribute the entrenching tools of the Corps. But these precautions were totally neglected by the commander of the 9th Corps. At a personal interview on the 29th Meade had endeavoured to impress upon Burnside and the commanders of his three white divisions

¹ *Lee* maintained a garrison of two veteran brigades in the fortifications of Chaffin's Bluff. At this date *Wilcox's* division was providing the garrison. The three divisions sent from the south side were *Heth's*, *Kershaw's* and *Field's*, with *Anderson* in command (Freeman).

the importance of pushing forward at once to the ridge in the enemy's rear, and the uselessness of trying to hold the crater which the explosion would make.

Owing to some defect in the fuse the explosion did not take place till 4.40 a.m. The redan, against which the mine was directed, was held by *Elliott's* brigade of *B. R. Johnson's* division. One regiment and part of another and a battery were overwhelmed, and the Confederates in terror abandoned their lines for some 200 or 300 yards on either side of the crater. A few minutes after the explosion *Ledlie's* division filed slowly out of their entrenchments. The movement was necessarily slow, as no proper passages for the assaulting columns had been prepared. The division, on reaching the crater, which was about 150 feet long, 60 wide, and 25 deep,¹ poured into it. The divisional commander, who had been particularly cautioned not to let his troops halt in the crater but to push straight on for the ridge beyond, had not considered it part of his duty to accompany his troops, but remained behind sheltered in a bomb-proof fifty yards within his own lines, whence he could see nothing of the movements of the troops under his command. The troops, having once entered the crater, could not without much difficulty be induced to go forward, and time was thus given to the Confederates to recover from their surprise and prepare for defence. *Elliott* rallied the remnant of his brigade in a ravine behind the salient, and on his left *Ransom's* brigade and an artillery battery opened fire on such of the Federals as tried to advance beyond the crater.

Eighty-one heavy siege-guns and mortars had been carefully placed in position to beat down the fire of the Confederate batteries, and, as soon as the mine was exploded, opened fire, and about the same number of field-guns came into action. But a four-gun battery on the Confederate left and a two-gun battery on the right were so skilfully concealed, that the Federal artillery failed to silence them, and they brought a cross-fire to bear upon the troops advancing from *Burnside's* entrenchments. *Ledlie's* division was followed by *Potter's*, which, keeping to the right of the crater, captured, after a sharp fight, that part of the entrenchments which had been partially abandoned. A corresponding move on the left was made by *Willcox's* division. His first brigade entered the crater, but the second, keeping to the left, captured some portion of the enemy's entrenchments. Though on both sides of the crater part of the Confederate lines had been captured, no further progress towards the ridge was made. At 8 a.m. the

¹ Dr. Freeman's figures are 135, 97, and 30. According to his account the men in *Elliott's* salient quickly rallied.

coloured division advanced from the Federal entrenchments, but its commander, General Ferrero, remained behind with Ledlie in the bomb-proof. A considerable part of it, in spite of the efforts of the brigadiers, hurried into the crater; the rest entered the entrenchments to the right.

Ord, commanding the 18th Corps, had been ordered on the 29th to withdraw his troops from their entrenchments and post them in rear of Burnside's Corps to follow up its attack. When ordered by Meade to advance, Ord experienced great difficulty in getting his troops through Burnside's entrenchments, owing to the lack of proper preparation. At last he got one division into open ground, and carried a part of the Confederate lines to the right of the point which the coloured troops had occupied, and was preparing to sweep along the enemy's line to the right, when he saw the troops on his left streaming back to their own entrenchments, and his own troops promptly followed suit.¹

Lee, on hearing of the attack, had ordered up two brigades of *Mahone's* division, which held the right of the Petersburg defences. *Mahone* arrived shortly before 9 a.m., and seeing how large a force had occupied the Confederate entrenchments, sent back for a third brigade. One of Ferrero's brigadiers, followed by a very small fraction of his men, was attempting to push forward to the ridge, when one of *Mahone's* brigades charged and drove them back. Thereupon the whole of the coloured troops, who had gained a footing in the entrenchments, took to their heels, carrying away with them many of Potter's men and Ord's one division. By this precipitate flight the Confederates were enabled to recover the entrenchments which they had lost on their left of the crater. Meade, recognising that all chance of success was gone, ordered offensive operations to cease.² Warren was just advancing to attack with his right division when the order reached him, and he abandoned the movement. A large number of men were in the crater suffering great distress under the burning rays of the sun, and one brigade was holding a part of the Confederate entrenchments on the left. *Mahone* attacked these troops, but was driven back. Having been reinforced by his third brigade, he renewed the attack along with part of *Johnson's* division between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m. Two of the brigadiers in the crater gave the order to retire, and the greater part of the troops in the crater and

¹ Ord, who had relieved W. F. Smith in the command of the 18th Corps, had at his disposal one division of his own Corps and one of the 10th. It was the latter which took part in the attack.

² At 9.45 a.m.

entrenchments fell back to their own lines, suffering heavy loss, whilst a large number of prisoners were taken in the crater.

Thus the great assault, by which Grant had hoped to gain possession of Petersburg and to cross to the north bank of the Appomattox, turned out a costly fiasco. The Federal loss nearly reached 4,000, whilst that of the Confederates was probably at least 1,200.

Meade requested that a Court of Enquiry should be held to examine into the causes of the disaster. The finding of the Court fully exonerated him, and laid the blame, where it justly belonged, upon Burnside and his divisional commanders, with the exception of Potter. The Court also expressed its opinion that a single general on the spot should have been given command of all the troops which were to take part in the assault, in order to secure greater unity of action. Warren's Corps, through no fault of that commander, was kept out of the fighting; only one division of Ord's Corps was engaged, and the list of casualties shows that the 9th Corps had practically all the fighting to itself. Ledlie was allowed to resign, and Burnside was succeeded in the command of the 9th Corps by General Parke.¹

In August Sheridan was sent to command the Federal forces in the Shenandoah Valley, and two cavalry divisions from the Army of the Potomac were sent with him. Lee, in turn, reinforced Early in the Valley with *Kershaw's* infantry division and *Fitzhugh Lee's* cavalry division.² Grant's information led him to believe that the whole of *Anderson's* Corps, and not a single division only, had been sent to Early.³ He therefore directed Hancock to take his own Corps and the 10th, now under the command of Birney, along with the remaining cavalry division under Gregg, and make another movement along the north bank of the James on Richmond.

The object of the movement was to prevent Lee from sending more troops to the Shenandoah Valley, and, if possible, cause him to recall some of those which Grant erroneously supposed to have been sent. It was expected that Hancock would be able to break

¹ The Congressional Investigating Committee found that the chief cause of the disaster was due to the fact that the attack was led by white and not black troops. Ferrero's coloured division had been specially drilled in view of the contemplated movement. This view was not, however, taken by the military Court of Enquiry.

² *Kershaw* and *Fitzhugh Lee* were sent in the first instance to Culpeper to menace the flank and rear of the Federals, if they advanced up the Valley against Early. *Wade Hampton's* cavalry division was to follow, but had to be recalled before it reached Culpeper (Freeman).

³ Grant was deceived by the fact that *R. H. Anderson*, the Corps commander, accompanied *Kershaw's* division.

through the left of the Confederate entrenchments on Bailey's Creek, and this success, if vigorously followed up, might lead to the capture of Chaffin's Bluff, the strongest work on the north bank guarding the river approach to Richmond. The cavalry might get a chance of making a dash upon Richmond: failing that, they were to fall upon the railways coming into Richmond from the north.

Every effort was made to keep the movement a secret. The 2nd Corps was marched to City Point to give the impression that it was about to be sent by water to Washington. But in the night it was conveyed in steamers up the river to the lower pontoon bridge at Deep Bottom, and disembarked on the morning of August 14th.

The northern defences of Richmond were not so weakly held as Grant imagined. The Bailey's Creek line was defended by *Field's* division: *Wilcox's* two brigades occupied Chaffin's Bluff, and at once moved out to join *Field*. From the south bank *Lee* sent across *Mahone's* infantry division and two cavalry divisions; only a single brigade of cavalry was left with *Beauregard* in the Petersburg lines. Against such a force as *Lee* had thus concentrated Hancock had no chance of achieving success. On the 16th the left of the Confederate entrenchments on Bailey's Creek was carried by Terry's division of the 10th Corps, but was quickly recaptured. Though Grant now saw that the information on which he had acted was inaccurate, he still retained Hancock in front of the Bailey's Creek entrenchments until the night of the 20th, in order to prevent *Lee* from withdrawing troops to resist a movement which was meanwhile being carried out against the Confederate defences on the south of Petersburg.¹

On the 18th Warren, with the 5th Corps, marched to the Weldon railroad at the Globe Tavern.² A single cavalry brigade was easily driven off, and Griffin's division commenced the destruction of the railway, whilst two other divisions moved up the line towards its intersection with the Vaughan road. On learning of the appearance of Federal troops on the railway *Beauregard* despatched *Heth* with two brigades to the threatened point. A surprise attack on the left flank of Ayres' division, which

¹ Grant's orders were that the 5th Corps should destroy as much of the railway as it could without attacking fortifications. The movement was intended to be a reconnaissance in force 'during which Warren might take advantage of any weakness of the enemy he discovered.' Grant's object was to force *Lee* by this demonstration to withdraw part of his troops from the Valley, so that Sheridan might fall upon the remainder (Humphreys).

² The Globe Tavern was about four miles south of the outskirts of Petersburg.

was advancing on both sides of the railroad, caused the Federals to fall back a short distance, but their line was quickly restored and *Heth* driven off with considerable loss.

On the 19th *Mahone's* infantry division and *W. H. F. Lee's* cavalry division arrived from Richmond, and on the Federal side the 9th Corps was gradually withdrawn from its entrenchments and sent to Warren's assistance. On that day *Hill*, with five brigades, attempted, whilst pressing Ayres' division in front with *Heth's* two brigades, to turn Crawford's right with *Mahone's* three. Warren had sought to establish connection by means of a skirmish line between Crawford's right and the left of the 9th Corps, which held the entrenchments just quitted by the 5th Corps. But the intervening country was very thickly wooded, and *Mahone* had no difficulty in breaking through the skirmish line and falling upon Crawford's right flank. Crawford was forced to fall back, and Ayres' right brigade shared in the retrograde movement, but on two divisions of the 9th Corps coming up Warren assumed the offensive and drove *Mahone* back into his entrenchments in confusion.

As it was now plain that the enemy would not abandon the possession of the railroad without a serious struggle, Warren selected on the 20th a position about a mile in rear of his earlier one, mainly in open ground and favourable for the use of artillery. On the 21st *Hill*, who had been reinforced by *Wilcox's* division of his own Corps and part of *Hoke's* division, attacked Warren's new position, but was repulsed.¹ After this failure the Confederates made no further attempt to interfere with Warren, and the Federal entrenchments were extended from the Jerusalem plank road to Warren's position on the Weldon railway.

But, though the occupation of that railroad at the Globe Tavern prevented the Confederates from running trains any longer right through into Petersburg, they could still use the railway as far as a point which was within a distance of a day's hauling by wagon to Petersburg. Grant therefore determined to destroy the railroad as far as Rowanty Creek.² If that work were successfully accomplished, the Confederate wagon-trains would have to follow a roundabout route from Stony Creek Depôt to Dinwiddie Court House on the Boydton plank road, a distance of fully thirty miles from Petersburg.

¹ Dr. Freeman speaks only of a gallant but futile attack by *Mahone*. A misunderstanding between *Hill* and *Mahone* caused disaster to one of the latter's brigades.

² See Map VI. Rowanty Creek was about thirteen miles beyond Warren's left.

On the 22nd Hancock was despatched with two of his divisions and Gregg's cavalry division to destroy the railroad to the desired point. By the night of the 24th the line had been destroyed to within five miles of Rowanty Creek, and the troops bivouacked for the night at Reams' Station.¹ The Confederates, realising the importance of preventing the further destruction of the railway, concentrated eight infantry brigades² and *Hampton's* two cavalry divisions, under the command of *Hill*, against Hancock, and attacking him on the afternoon of the 25th, after two unsuccessful attempts, drove him from the slight entrenchments, which had been thrown up earlier in the year at Reams' Station.³ It was only the gallant bearing of Hancock himself and of Miles commanding the first division, who succeeded in rallying a part of his division, which prevented a great disaster overtaking the Federals. Miles held the road leading to the station from the Jerusalem plank road until dusk, and the whole force was then withdrawn. *Hill*, having driven the 2nd Corps from the railroad, returned with his infantry to their entrenchments, leaving *Hampton's* cavalry at Reams' Station. If a Federal force had been sent to Hancock's assistance along the railway, it would have had a fair chance of taking the Confederates in flank and converting the defeat into a victory. Meade, however, was afraid lest the railroad should be closed to the relieving force, and preferred the safer and longer route by the Jerusalem plank road. Consequently neither of the two divisions, sent by Meade to reinforce Hancock, arrived in time to be of any assistance.⁴

¹ The destruction of the railway had been continued three miles south of Reams' Station.

² According to Dr. Freeman's account, only seven infantry brigades were employed by *Hill*; early in the afternoon an attack by two of *Wilcox's* brigades was repulsed; after a brief delay part of his division and some of *Heth's* troops attacked farther to the left and stormed the Federal right; *Hampton* worked round the Federal left and attacked dismounted.

³ The unsuccessful attacks were made by *Wilcox* with four brigades at about 2 p.m. *Hill* made his successful attack about three hours later. The entrenchments at Reams' Station had been hurriedly thrown up on the occasion of *Wilson's* fight in that vicinity at the end of June. Being very indifferently sited they now proved a death-trap to the men of the 2nd Corps, who found themselves completely enfiladed by artillery-fire on both flanks.

⁴ *Willcox's* division and a detachment, about 1,800 strong, from *Mott's*. *Willcox* had to march twelve miles (and *Mott's* troops about the same distance) instead of five. The Federal loss was 2,742 and nine guns; the Confederate was returned by *Hill* as 720. This inglorious defeat of the 2nd Corps, hitherto regarded as the finest in the Army of the Potomac, under the personal command of Hancock 'the superb,'

A month later Grant tried another co-operative movement against *Lee's* lines. On September 28th Ord and Birney were ordered to take part of their respective Corps, the 18th and 10th, and with Kautz's cavalry division cross to the north bank of the James.¹ Ord was directed to cross by a pontoon bridge, to be laid down during the night, two miles below Dutch Gap.² He would thus turn the enemy's line of entrenchments at Bailey's Creek, and be able to march straight up the river by the Varina road. Birney and Kautz were to cross by the upper pontoon bridge at Deep Bottom and march by the Newmarket and Darbytown roads.

By 7.30 a.m. on the 29th Ord found himself in front of the main line of Confederate entrenchments, and promptly attacked and carried Fort Harrison, the strongest work in that line. An attack upon Fort Gilmer, which was about three-quarters of a mile north of Fort Harrison, was, however, repulsed. The capture of Fort Gilmer would have given the Federals possession of the Chaffin's Bluff defences. Accordingly when Birney arrived on the ground, he renewed the attack upon Fort Gilmer, but with like ill-success. As soon as the attack developed, *Lee* summoned reinforcements from the Petersburg lines. Six brigades of infantry were brought across the river, and also some regiments of *Pickett's* command at Bermuda Hundred.

On the 30th *Anderson*, with five brigades, made a determined attempt to recapture Fort Harrison, but the Federals had strengthened the fort, and the attack, though twice repeated, was repulsed with heavy loss. On the previous day Ord had attempted unsuccessfully to sweep down the Confederate lines to the river and capture their pontoon bridge. But a line of entrenchments was constructed by the Federals connecting Fort Harrison with the river at Dutch Gap.³

may be partially explained by the excessive physical exertions which the men had been called upon to make during the long marches to Deep Bottom and back again to Petersburg. On August 14th two small regiments had lost 104 men by sunstroke. But the failure of the Corps was also due to the presence in its ranks of new regiments of recruits and substitutes. In one regiment some of the officers could not speak English.

¹ Ord took with him 2,000 men from each of his first and second divisions. Birney had under his command two divisions of his own Corps and one coloured brigade as well as Ord's third division (coloured), numbering in all about 10,000 men.

² See Map IV.

³ The Federal loss during the two days' fighting was 2,272; the Confederate, perhaps, 2,000.

On the south side of the river the co-operative movement was commenced on the 30th. Warren, with two of his divisions, followed by two divisions of the 9th Corps, moved out of the Federal lines and advanced towards the Boydton plank road, whilst Gregg's cavalry division covered their left flank. About two miles west of the Weldon railroad a redoubt and line of entrenchments at the Peebles Farm were captured by Warren,¹ and Parke, with his two divisions, pushed forward on Warren's left towards the Boydton plank road. Hill sent Wilcox's and Heth's divisions to drive back Parke, and Potter's division, which was leading on the right, was taken in flank and forced to fall back. Parke established a new line with Wilcox's division and checked the Confederate advance. Having been reinforced the next day by Mott's division of the 2nd Corps, he again advanced and succeeded in establishing a line of entrenchments about a mile from the enemy's lines. This new line was quickly connected with the Federal entrenchments on the Weldon railroad.

Grant was very anxious, before the approach of winter put an end to the operations of the year, to make one more attempt to seize the Southside railroad. For this purpose a force of about 32,000 infantry with Gregg's cavalry division and a proper complement of artillery was detailed. The infantry were drawn from the 2nd, 5th, and 9th Corps. Hancock was to move on the left across Hatcher's Run by the Vaughan road, advance by Dabney's Mill to the Boydton plank road, and then to push for the Southside railway by the White Oak and Claiborne roads.² At this time the Confederate lines almost reached to Hatcher's Run, about two miles above the Vaughan road crossing; but farther up the stream there was no connected line of entrenchments, but only some infantry parapets and emplacements for artillery at the Boydton road crossing of the Run.³ Parke was to endeavour to surprise the entrenchments near Hatcher's Run, but in case of failure to continue to demonstrate in front of them, whilst the 5th Corps was to advance in support on Parke's left. It was only to cross the Run if Parke failed to carry the entrenchments on his front. In that case it was to keep on Hancock's right and

¹ The importance of the Peebles Farm was that it lay at the junction of two roads coming from the south-west. The entrenchments captured by Warren were not part of the Confederate main line, but an advanced work.

² The White Oak road intersects the Claiborne road, and by this latter Hancock's column would strike the Southside railway east of Sutherland Station.

³ The Federal commanders erroneously believed that the Confederate entrenchments on Hatcher's Run were incomplete.

endeavour to turn the enemy's right by recrossing the Run above the Boydton road bridge.

Hancock crossed Hatcher's Run at daylight of the 27th October and reached the Boydton road, but at 1 p.m. was directed not to advance further, as the forward movement of the other two Corps had been obstructed. *Hill* concentrated on the Boydton road *Heth's* and *Mahone's* divisions and *Hampton's* whole cavalry force. Later in the afternoon Grant made a reconnaissance in person of the enemy's position on the Boydton road north of the Run, and decided in view of the fact that Parke was blocked and Warren's one division on the south side of the Run had not yet put in an appearance, to suspend the whole movement. Hancock was ordered to hold his position during the night and then retire by the same road by which he had come. He already held the southern end of the Boydton road bridge, and to secure his position for the night determined to cross the Run and occupy some rising ground on the north side, on which the Confederates had mounted some artillery.

Hancock had just advanced one of his two divisions against the Boydton road bridge, when three brigades under *Heth* rushed from the woods on the south side of the Run, and falling upon the exposed flank of an isolated brigade on the east side of the road drove it across the road and captured a couple of guns. As *Heth* formed across the road, and facing south was opening fire upon the two Federal brigades, which were holding the intersection of the Dabney's Mill road with the Boydton road, he was himself taken in flank by Egan's division counter-marching from the bridge, and was driven in great confusion into the woods with the loss of the two guns just captured.

On the Federal left a fierce contest was maintained between *Hampton* and Gregg, whose cavalry division was covering Hancock's left flank, till dark, but though hard pressed, Gregg held his own. During the night Hancock withdrew his forces, as no reinforcements had reached him and his supply of ammunition was running short. Had he remained till the following morning a battle against superior forces could not have been avoided, as *Hill*, leaving only one division to hold the Hatcher's Run entrenchments, was concentrating all his available troops on the Boydton road.

Early in the afternoon of the 27th it had become plain to Grant and Meade that their attempt to seize the Southside railway was doomed to failure. On the Boydton road Hancock was still six miles distant from the desired goal, and all chance of taking the enemy by surprise had vanished.

Parke had found the Hatcher's Run entrenchments too strong to be carried by assault. After some delay Warren was ordered to move one division across the Run lower down, and advancing up the right bank, to flank the enemy out of their lines. But Crawford's division, which crossed the Run at Armstrong's Mill, made very slow progress in the dense wood and intricate country. It took four hours to cover a mile and a half, and even when the division was in position opposite to the Confederate right, it was found impracticable to cross the Run.¹ Nor was Crawford able, owing to the thickness of the intervening thicket forest, to form a junction with Hancock on his left. On the 28th the whole Federal force returned to its entrenchments.

At the same time that this unsuccessful movement against the Southside railway was being made, Butler was directed to make a co-operative movement on the north bank of the James. Whilst part of the 10th Corps under Terry moved up the Charles City and Darbytown roads and made a demonstration against the Confederate lines in their front, Weitzel,² with part of the 18th Corps, was ordered to push through the White Oak Swamp and endeavour to carry the works reaching from the Williamsburg road across the York River railroad. It was expected that these works, if occupied at all, would only be held by a very weak force. But Longstreet, who had returned to duty and on October 19th had taken command of the forces on the north bank of the James and the Bermuda Hundred front, quickly divined the significance of Terry's demonstration, and hurried Field's and Hoke's divisions and Gary's cavalry brigade to his left along his lines to cover the Williamsburg and Nine Mile roads.

Field was just in time to repulse Weitzel's attack, and though the Federals captured part of the entrenchments beyond the railroad, they were promptly driven out again by Gary. An attack made by Terry against the entrenchments in his front was also repulsed. Butler's demonstration proved rather a costly failure, as he lost 1,100 men and inflicted practically no loss on his enemy.

With this double failure Grant's operations against Richmond and Petersburg came to an end for 1864.

¹ Crawford arrived opposite the Hatcher's Run lines about 4 p.m., at which hour *Heth* was advancing against Hancock's right. Crawford was accompanied by one brigade of Ayres' division.

² Weitzel had succeeded Ord, wounded on September 29th, in the command of the 18th Corps.

CHAPTER IV

THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN¹

The Grand Army of the West—The Confederate position—Sherman's general plan of campaign—The campaign opens—McPherson's flanking movement—Johnston abandons Dalton—Johnston's position at Resaca—Johnston abandons Resaca—Johnston falls back behind the Etowah—Davis captures Rome—Johnston's position at Allatoona—Sherman moves on Dallas—Johnston advances from the railway to meet him—Sherman unsuccessfully attacks Johnston's right—Confederate attack on Federal right repulsed—Johnston falls back towards Marietta—Johnston's new position—Death of General Polk—Confederate left outflanked—Johnston falls back to Kennesaw Mountain—The Federals continue to gain ground on the right—Hood's attack on the Federal right repulsed—Federals attack Kennesaw Mountain—The attack repulsed with loss—Schofield turns the Confederate left—Johnston falls back to the Chattahoochee—Johnston retreats behind the Chattahoochee—Sherman decides to move by his left flank—Hood supersedes Johnston—Thomas crosses Peachtree Creek—Hood attacks Thomas's left flank—The Confederates defeated—Hood attacks McPherson's left flank—Death of McPherson—The Confederates repulsed with heavy loss—Changes in the Federal army—The Atlanta railways—Sherman's movement by the right flank against the Macon railway—Hood attacks Howard's right flank—The Confederates again defeated—Unsuccessful attempts of the Federal cavalry to break up the railways—Sherman gains ground on the right—Sherman moves with nearly all his army against the Macon railway—Hood outwitted—Hood vainly attacks Howard—The Federals secure the Macon railway—Unsuccessful attempt to capture Hardee's Corps at Jonesboro—Hood evacuates Atlanta.

FOR his campaign against General *Joseph E. Johnston*, Sherman had under his command, when he took over from Grant, the three Armies of the Tennessee, Cumberland, and Ohio. The Army of the Cumberland, under the command of Thomas, was composed of the 4th Corps, under Howard, the 14th, under Palmer, and the 20th, under Hooker. It numbered about 60,000 men with 130 guns. The Army of the Ohio, commanded

¹ See Map VII. The text is based mainly upon Cox's *Atlanta* (Scribner's). General Cox commanded a division of the 23rd Corps during the campaign. He commanded the same division in Thomas's Nashville campaign against Hood, and the Corps itself in Sherman's final campaign in the Carolinas. The fourth volume of *Battles and*

by Schofield, who had relieved Foster, only consisted of one Corps, the 23rd, and numbered 14,000 men with 28 guns. The Army of the Tennessee, under McPherson, who had succeeded Sherman upon the latter's appointment to the Military Division of the Mississippi, at the commencement of the campaign consisted of two Corps: the 15th under Logan and the 16th under Dodge, and numbered 25,000 men with 96 guns. The 17th Corps joined it later on. Sherman reported his infantry and artillery present for duty on May 1st as numbering 98,797 men. The cavalry force, not included in this estimate, was more than 10,000 strong, consisting of four divisions under Stoneman, Garrard, McCook, and Kilpatrick. The Confederate army at the time when Sherman advanced against Dalton, and before the arrival of *Polk's* Corps, probably numbered about 60,000 men.

Johnston held a strongly entrenched position at Dalton, thirty-eight miles south-east of Chattanooga on the Chattanooga-Atlanta railroad. Before reaching Dalton the railroad passes through Rocky Face Ridge, the eastern barrier of the basin drained by the Chickamauga River. The ridge extends some three miles north of Mill Creek Gap, through which pass the railroad runs, and continues south for several miles, completely covering Dalton on the west. From Dalton a branch line runs to Cleveland, where it joins the East Tennessee railway. Both armies were tied for their supplies to the railway. Sherman had the choice of operating against *Johnston* from either Chattanooga or Cleveland as a base. But to have adopted Cleveland for that purpose would have been to lay open to *Johnston* a road by which he might invade Middle Tennessee and strike at the Federal lines of communication with the Ohio. Such a movement would have at once cut Sherman off from his line of supplies in the Lower Tennessee valley; and the experience of Burnside at Knoxville showed that East Tennessee would be unable to provide sufficient supplies for so large an army invading Georgia.¹

Johnston saw clearly that the Federal advance must proceed

Leaders of the Civil War (the Century Company), quoted in the footnotes as 4 B. & L., contains valuable articles by Sherman, *Johnston*, Howard, and Hood. A good deal of material derived from Captain Liddell Hart's *Sherman* (Benn) has been included in the footnotes.

¹ Grant's original plan of campaign would have provided Sherman with a second line of supply. He had ordered Banks to move from New Orleans against Mobile in conjunction with a naval force; from Mobile he intended that Banks should march towards Montgomery and threaten *Johnston's* rear. Banks would thus stand in the same relation to Sherman's army as Butler was to do in relation to the Army of the Potomac. The Red River expedition frustrated any hope of Banks's co-operation.

along the main railroad to Atlanta, and devoted himself to strengthening his position across that line. Mill Creek was dammed so as to flood part of the country in his front, and entrenchments were thrown up in the Gap, and extended along both the northern and southern crests of Rocky Face Ridge. About four miles north of Dalton, near the northern extremity of the ridge, a line of entrenchments was constructed, running eastward to the high ground commanding the Cleveland railway, and thence continued south, covering Dalton against any attack from the east. *Johnston's* position was almost impregnable to any attack from the front or either flank. He regarded Sherman as impulsive and reckless, and hoped that, in spite of the strength of the position, his adversary would attempt to storm it, and thus give him an opportunity of delivering a crushing counter-blow.¹

Sherman, however, had no intention of wasting his troops in frontal attacks upon *Johnston's* entrenchments. His whole plan of campaign aimed at flanking him out of successive positions and forcing him either to stand and fight on open ground, where effective use could be made of the Federal numerical superiority, or to continue his retreat, until at length he abandoned Atlanta, or submitted to be besieged within its walls.

To carry into execution this plan the Army of the Cumberland, which was about the strength of *Johnston's* whole force, formed the centre of the Federal line of advance, with the two smaller armies on the wings ready to operate against either flank, as opportunity offered.

On May 4th the campaign opened. The Federal armies were concentrated along a line about sixteen miles long with the centre at Ringgold, the Army of the Cumberland being somewhat advanced in front of the wings.² On the 7th Thomas and Schofield moved forward to hold *Johnston* fast in his entrenched position,

¹ Cox's *Atlanta*. But *Johnston* (*Narrative*) disliked the position because Rocky Face Ridge covered any direct approach from Chattanooga to Resaca or Calhoun. Had he been left to himself he would have preferred to withdraw his troops to the vicinity of Calhoun, so as to free his left rear from exposure.

² Sherman had originally intended to move McPherson's Army of the Tennessee, straight from its winter quarters near Decatur on the Tennessee, behind the mountain belt between that river and the Atlanta railway to Rome and Kingston. A march of little more than a hundred miles would have placed it far behind *Johnston's* rear and would have turned the line of the Oostanaula. But owing to the absence of two divisions lent to Banks and of two more, which had not yet returned from 'veteran furlough,' McPherson's strength had shrunk from nine to four divisions. Sherman therefore decided upon a less ambitious manœuvre and to move McPherson upon Resaca, north of the Oostanaula (Liddell Hart).

whilst the Army of the Tennessee made a sweep to the right through Ship's Gap to Villanow. From Villanow McPherson advanced through Snake Creek Gap early on the 9th, and at 2 p.m. was close to Resaca, a station on the railway some twelve or fourteen miles south of Dalton.

Sherman's superiority of numbers made it quite safe to detach McPherson's army on this flanking movement. *Johnston*, considering the length of the lines which he had to hold, was not strong enough to divide his forces and detach a large enough part of his army to hold McPherson in check for any length of time, as reinforcements could follow to the flanking column. Either he must hold on to Dalton with his whole army, or if he wished to attack McPherson he must abandon his present position and move against him with all his forces. In case *Johnston* adopted the latter course, Sherman knew that he could depend upon McPherson, who was a soldier of great ability and sound judgment, to hold his own until he was able to bring up the bulk of his army to his support. If *Johnston* held on to his position round Dalton, Sherman hoped that McPherson would be able to seize Resaca, and thus compel the Confederate army in its retreat to abandon the railway and move to the east: in which case its destruction would be a comparatively easy task.

Johnston apparently considered that the road through Snake Creek Gap was impracticable for the movements of large bodies of troops, and had made no attempt to secure it. At Resaca he had thrown up some entrenchment and detailed two brigades to hold them.¹ McPherson, greatly to Sherman's disappointment, did not deem it prudent to attack this position, not knowing how large a part of *Johnston's* army he might have to encounter, and withdrew his forces to the mouth of Snake Creek Gap.² In

¹ *Johnston* seems to have considered that this entrenched position at Resaca would delay any force advancing through Snake Creek Gap long enough to enable him to make good his retreat from Dalton (4 B. & L., 262; *Johnston's Narrative*, 316-17).

² Sherman has been criticised for not accepting Thomas's original plan and entrusting the flanking movement to the Army of the Cumberland. Captain Liddell Hart justifies Sherman's selection of McPherson's army on the grounds that the sudden disappearance of Thomas's army from the centre of the Federal line would have put the enemy on their guard: that 'to swing Thomas out to the right and pull McPherson in' would cause a crossing of routes and might entangle the lines of supply, and that 'the turning movement had to be made by an uncertainly known route and with a still greater uncertainty as to whether Snake Creek Gap would be blocked'; Sherman therefore could not take the risk of detaching two-thirds of his force on such a doubtful errand and leaving the remainder exposed to a Confederate attack, which might place his base at Chattanooga in danger.

the meantime the other two Federal armies had been demonstrating against various points of *Johnston's* lines. The Confederate skirmishers had been driven into Mill Creek Gap, and attempts had been made to gain a footing on Rocky Face both above and below the Gap. But at both points, where the attempt was made, the Confederate lines were found to be too strong to admit of any chance of success. Sherman therefore determined to leave Howard's Corps and a cavalry division to watch the Gap and follow up *Johnston*, as soon as he commenced his retreat, and to swing the rest of his army round to the right and join McPherson at Snake Creek Gap.

On the night of the 9th *Johnston* sent *Hood* with three divisions from his right towards Resaca, expecting that an attack would be made upon the entrenchments at that place. But on finding that McPherson had withdrawn to Snake Creek Gap, he ordered one division to return to his right wing in front of Dalton, whilst the other two were posted at Tilton, a station between Dalton and Resaca. On the 11th *Polk*, with the advance division of his Corps, arrived at Resaca and reported for duty to *Johnston*. On the same day the general movement of the Federal army to the right commenced, and on the 12th the whole of Sherman's force was concentrated at the mouth of Snake Creek Gap, with the exception of Howard's Corps and Stoneman's cavalry, which latter force took up the position in front of *Johnston's* lines recently held by Schofield's Corps. On that night *Johnston*, finding that his position at Dalton was no longer tenable with the enemy in force threatening his rear, abandoned his lines and withdrew to Resaca. His retreat was covered by his cavalry, and *Polk's* division held back the advance of McPherson's column. On the morning of the 13th Howard entered Dalton.

Thus Sherman had won the first move in the great game of war to be played out between *Johnston* and himself. The Confederate general was disappointed of his hope of dealing his opponent a severe counter-blow at the commencement of the campaign, and the Federal soldiers were proportionately elated at the ease with which so strong a position had been turned.

At Resaca *Johnston* took up a strong position with his left resting on the Oostanaula, whilst his right was bent back across the railway until it rested on the Connasauga. Strong as the position was, it had one fatal defect. There was a river in its rear, and if Sherman continued his flanking movement and threatened to cross the river below, *Johnston* would be obliged to continue his retreat. The left and centre of the Confederate line were covered by Camp Creek, and *Polk* on the left had put part of his forces

across the Creek in order to secure some high ground from which, if it fell into Federal hands, the railway and wagon bridges over the river could be commanded.

During the 14th there was some sharp fighting, as *Hood*, commanding the Confederate right, attempted to fall upon the left flank of Howard's Corps, which on the extreme left of the Federal line, was 'in the air.' But Sherman, seeing the weakness of Howard's position, promptly moved Hooker's Corps to his support, and *Hood's* attack was repulsed. On the Federal right McPherson drove *Polk's* troops from their advanced position on the west bank of Camp Creek, and a footing on the east bank was secured by part of Osterhaus's division of the 15th Corps.

On the 15th Sherman moved Schofield's Corps from the centre to the extreme left, and one division of McPherson's army crossed the Oostanaula and threatened Calhoun some seven miles south of Resaca on the railway. It was Sherman's plan to advance by the left flank, and having strengthened and contracted his lines to detail a considerable part of his army for a flanking movement by the right against Calhoun.¹ For that purpose he had two bridges laid across the river below Resaca.

Johnston had already found his position gravely compromised by McPherson's capture of the high ground on the west bank of Camp Creek, and had been obliged to throw a pontoon bridge across the river about a mile above the railway bridge, out of range of the Federal batteries. Seeing that Sherman intended to continue his flanking movement, on the night of the 15th he retired across the Oostanaula, burning the bridges behind him.

The railroad from Chattanooga to Atlanta is crossed by three rivers flowing in a general direction from the north-east to the south-west. These rivers are the Oostanaula, the Etowah, and the Chattahoochee. After crossing the railway close to Allatoona, the Etowah flows west till it joins the Oostanaula at Rome, where the united streams form the Coosa. From Resaca to the point where the Etowah crosses the railway is a distance of about thirty miles, and in the triangle formed by the two rivers and this section of the railway the next stage in the duel between *Johnston* and Sherman was about to be fought out. In this district the country is more open and less broken than on the northern bank of the

¹ Such a flanking movement would be completely protected by the Oostanaula (4 B. & L., 267). *Johnston* (4 B. & L., 265) claims that on the 14th *Hood* drove the Federal left from its position; but Howard (4 B. & L., 302) maintains that though his left was very hard pressed, yet it held its ground by the aid of reinforcements from Hooker.

Oostanaula, and altogether more favourable for military operations on an extensive scale.¹

Sherman was in great hopes that he could force *Johnston* to fight a battle before crossing the Etowah, and he had every confidence that the battle, if fought, would be decisive of the campaign. *Johnston* also felt that his retreat had gone quite far enough. To continue it farther would only tend to discourage and demoralise his troops. He had now under his command three full Corps, and the numerical disproportion between the two armies was at this moment less than at any other part of the campaign.² Immediately after crossing the Oostanaula he began to look about for some favourable position, where he might offer battle to Sherman's army. On the 16th he was hoping to stand and fight a mile or two south of Calhoun. But on examination the position was found to be unsuitable: and he accordingly fell back to a position about a mile north of Adairsville, where his engineer officers had reported that the ground was favourable for the defensive. This position also was finally judged unsuitable, as the breadth of the valley to be held was too great, and the retreat was continued, *Hardee* retiring in the direction of Kingston, and *Hood* and *Polk* towards Cassville.

Sherman, who had pressed on in pursuit as fast as he could get his various Corps across the rivers,³ judged that *Johnston* intended to give battle at Adairsville, and directed a concentration of his troops with a view to a general engagement on the 18th. So anxious was he to finish the campaign by one decisive blow, that he directed his lieutenants to bring on a battle without waiting for supports, reckoning that such veteran troops as his, and under such able commanders, would be able to hold their own until he had time to concentrate the bulk of his army against the Confederate position. Greatly disappointed to find on the 18th that *Johnston* had abandoned his position at Adairsville, he continued to make vigorous pursuit. Under the impression that *Johnston's* main line of retreat was on Kingston, he ordered Thomas with the 4th and 14th Corps to follow that road, having the Army of the Tennessee on his right, whilst the 20th and 23rd Corps were sent along the road to Cassville.

¹ Rugged mountain ridges gave way to open and slightly rolling country, with broad and fertile fields (Liddell Hart).

² Whilst at Resaca, *Johnston* had been joined by two divisions of *Polk's* Corps, and the third division and a cavalry division joined him at Adairsville. These reinforcements amounted to nearly 20,000 men (4 B. & L., 281), making up the Confederate strength to 75,000.

³ Hooker and Schofield crossed the Connasauga and Coosawattee, two tributaries of the Oostanaula.

At Adairsville the road forked, one branch going south-south-east to Cassville, the other alongside the railway south-south-west to Kingston. These two roads are at the widest interval about seven miles apart, and between them is a gravelly plateau, somewhat broken towards the south. On the right McPherson, in order not to crowd Thomas, was marching towards Kingston by parallel roads.¹ Thus on the 18th Sherman's army was strung out upon a broader front than at any time since the campaign commenced, and *Johnston* had such an opportunity as was never again presented to him of striking his foe in detail. His best chance of dealing a heavy blow would have been to order *Hardee* to march with all possible speed from Kingston to Cassville, and thus to concentrate the whole of his army against the exposed left of the Federal forces. Could he have massed his whole strength against Schofield's solitary Corps, or even against Schofield and Hooker combined, he might have inflicted considerable damage upon them before Sherman could have got Thomas's two Corps across the difficult ground between the two roads to their assistance. But *Johnston* did not give any such orders to *Hardee*, who consequently fell back slowly, skirmishing with Thomas's advanced guard, and did not reach Cassville until the afternoon of the 19th. *Johnston* claims, indeed, to have given orders to *Hood* and *Polk* to make a combined attack upon Schofield on the 18th, but *Hood* denies that any such movement was ordered for that day.

On the 19th Thomas occupied Kingston in the morning, and pressed close on *Hardee's* rearguard, until in the evening it was driven into Cassville, and the Armies of the Cumberland and the Ohio held a connected line close up to the Confederate entrenchments. The Army of the Tennessee on that day halted at Kingston.

Johnston, who was equally anxious to fight a battle, if he could find a strong defensive position, was intending to stand and fight at Cassville on the following day. But *Polk* and *Hood* protested that their position was untenable, as part of both their lines was enfiladed by the batteries on the Federal left, and *Johnston*, very reluctantly throwing the responsibility upon his two Corps commanders, ordered the lines to be evacuated on the night of the

¹ Captain Liddell Hart represents McPherson's movement 'on a line about six or eight miles to the west (of Thomas), heading towards Kingston' as an essential part of Sherman's strategic plan of 'moving in a wide loose grouping or net, which could be quickly drawn in round the point of contact with the enemy.' He sums up the result of this manœuvre: 'Instead of (Johnston) catching a part of Sherman's army between his pincers, these narrow pincers were likely to be caught in a wide net.'

19th, and on the 20th retreated across the Etowah, burning the railway bridge behind him. *Hood*, however, has a very different version, saying that he vainly pressed *Johnston* to assume the offensive-defensive on the 18th, and that what he complained of was *Johnston's* purely defensive policy. Whatever the actual fact, it is quite clear that the difference of opinion between the Confederate generals by preventing an engagement on the north bank of the Etowah, prolonged the campaign. Sherman was justly confident of gaining a decisive victory if he could force his adversary to give battle.

Davis's division of the 14th Corps had been detached down the west bank of the Oostanaula to support Garrard's cavalry division, which was moving towards Rome, with a view to crossing the river and operating on *Johnston's* flank. The cavalry did not go far down the river for fear of separating itself too much from the main column. But Davis continued to march down the river, and on the 18th, after some sharp fighting, captured Rome. This town, which was connected with Kingston by a branch line, was a dépôt for military stores of some size, and its occupation by Davis's division gave Sherman's advance a broad front, which tended to impose upon the enemy.

Sherman had secured two bridges near to Kingston, and, as he could therefore count with certainty on being able to move his army across the river, he gave his troops a three days' rest, while the railway behind him was being repaired and a store of supplies accumulated for the next move.

Johnston, after crossing the Etowah, had taken up a strong position along the railroad. His temporary base was at Marietta, about half-way between the Etowah and the Chattahoochee. After crossing the river the railway runs through the Allatoona Pass, a deep gorge which traverses a spur of high, rugged hills.¹ This pass was held by *Johnston*. It was not likely that Sherman, having the means of crossing the Etowah at Kingston, would attempt to force a crossing in front of Allatoona. Accordingly *Johnston* kept the main part of his army along the railroad, waiting until he should have definite information of Sherman's next movement. If, as he expected, Sherman continued his flanking movement by the right, *Johnston* intended to move his troops to meet him and to hold the roads leading from that direction to the railway.

Sherman's plan was, after providing his army with twenty days'

¹ South of the Etowah the country again becomes hilly and wooded, intersected by numerous streams and less numerous dirt roads (Liddell Hart).

rations, to cut loose from the railway and make straight for Dallas, a village twenty-five miles south of Kingston and about seventeen miles west of Marietta. From Dallas he would then march east and endeavour to strike the railroad near Marietta: if that line of advance proved very strongly held by the enemy, he would swing his left wing on to a road leading to Ackworth and regain the railway above Marietta. On May 22nd he gave orders for the movement to commence on the following day. He had no fear of *Johnston* attempting to meet him near the river in front of Kingston, as the Confederate commander could not afford to divide his army, and if he massed his troops to resist an advance at that point, Sherman could throw his left wing across the river at Allatoona and retain his hold on the railway.

On the 24th *Wheeler's* cavalry, which had crossed the river on the 22nd, made a reconnaissance to Cassville to find out whether the whole of Sherman's army was crossing at Kingston. *Jackson's* cavalry, on the left of the Confederate army, had already come into contact with the Federal advance at Stilesboro', and it was soon plain that Sherman, with his whole force, was pushing for Dallas. *Johnston* accordingly ordered his troops to move forward from the railroad, and on the 25th his line of defence was formed. *Hardee*, on the left, lay across the road from Dallas to Atlanta, and *Hood*, on the right, with his centre at New Hope Church, covered the road from Dallas to Ackworth. *Polk's* Corps formed the centre closed up on *Hood*, with a thinner line connecting with *Hardee*. The Confederate position was a strong one, occupying a succession of ridges with wooded summits, and approached by open valleys, which an attacking force would have to cross without shelter. It covered all the roads from Dallas to Ackworth, Marietta, and Atlanta, as well as those running in the same direction by New Hope Church.

In the Federal army McPherson was on the right, Thomas in the centre, and Schofield on the left. In the centre the 20th Corps leading the advance attacked *Hood's* centre at New Hope Church on the 25th, but the position was too strong to be carried by frontal attack, and the assault was repulsed with considerable loss.¹ The 4th Corps was sent from Thomas's right to the support of the 20th, and took position on its left, extending the Federal line in that direction.

¹ According to Captain Liddell Hart, the Federal attack on the 25th was an accident, caused by one of Hooker's divisions 'taking the wrong road and running into *Hood* at New Hope Church.' Hoping to overwhelm *Hood* before *Johnston* could reinforce him, Sherman ordered Hooker to attack with his whole Corps, and called up reinforcements.

On the 26th Schofield, with two divisions of the Army of the Ohio, came into position on Howard's left, and with his left reached across the Dallas-Allatoona road. On the next day Sherman made an unsuccessful attempt to turn the Confederate right. Howard was directed to take two divisions, Wood's of his own Corps and R. W. Johnson's of the 14th, which as yet had been held in reserve, to move up the Allatoona road, face eastward, and when he overlapped the Confederate lines to fall upon their exposed flank. But what the Federal leaders took to be the extremity of the Confederate lines was only an angle of the works, which at this point made a sharply refused flank, and Hood had been reinforced by *Cleburne's* division from *Hardee's* Corps. The consequence was that Wood and Johnson found themselves taken in flank, and were repulsed with a loss of about 1,500 men.

Sherman now determined to extend his whole army towards the left, hoping that by crowding troops in that direction he might be able to gain the road to Ackworth.¹ Howard's movement on the 27th, though failing to achieve the desired object, had nevertheless gained valuable ground, which helped to cover Sherman's movement to the left. But on the 28th *Hardee*, anticipating the movement, sent *Bate's* division forward to feel McPherson's lines and find out whether the whole Army of the Tennessee was still confronting him. *Bate* made a fierce attack on Logan's Corps, which formed McPherson's right, and after about half an hour's hard fighting was repulsed with very heavy loss. In order to withdraw *Bate's* troops *Hardee* made a demonstration against the 16th Corps on the left of Logan: and a sharp engagement took place all along McPherson's line. Logan reported a loss of 379 in all, and no special return was made of the casualties in the 16th Corps, which must consequently have been few. The Confederate loss probably reached 2,000.

On the same night Hood moved with his Corps to the extreme right of the Confederate position, intending to fall upon Sherman's extreme left, but, finding that the Federals had not advanced as far as he expected, withdrew his troops to his own lines.² On the evening of the 29th an artillery demonstration was made by *Johnston* all along the line, the probable object of which was to

¹ Cox's *Atlanta*.

² *Ibid.* But, according to *Johnston's Narrative*, 333-4, Hood refrained from attack, because he found a Federal division thrown back almost at right angles to the general line and entrenching. *Polk's* Corps had been moved to the right of Hood, apparently after the engagement of the 27th, though *Johnston* says that this movement took place on the 26th, and that it was *Polk's* Corps and not Hood's which, with *Cleburne's* assistance, repulsed Howard's attack (Cox's *Atlanta*).

find out whether McPherson still held the lines in *Hardee's* front in full force.

On June 1st Stoneman's cavalry occupied Allatoona, and on the 2nd Sherman's whole army was steadily gaining ground to the left, moving three miles in that direction. It was now plain to *Johnston* that the continued extension of the Federals towards the railway rendered his position untenable, and on the night of June 4th he evacuated his lines about New Hope Church and withdrew to a fresh line of entrenchments already laid out by his engineers nearer Marietta.

As soon as he discovered *Johnston's* withdrawal Sherman commenced to move his army to the railway, where fresh depôts could be established, and the work of rebuilding the bridge over the Etowah was pushed on with all possible speed. The Army of the Ohio was ordered to hold its ground, whilst the other two armies moved to the left, and thus became the right of the new Federal line. Thomas's army held the centre, and McPherson's formed the left wing. The work of transferring the army to its new line continued from the 5th to the 9th. The change of base was most opportune; for rain had been falling steadily, and the roads from Kingston had been rendered by the constant passage of the wagon-trains mere seas of mud, in which all traces of the original track were lost.

The first month of the campaign was over. In that period the Federal army had advanced nearly eighty miles, had forced *Johnston* across the Oostanaula and Etowah, and after cutting loose from the railway at Kingston had regained it at Ackworth, thus turning the Allatoona Pass. The total loss during the month of May is returned by Sherman as 9,299. *Johnston* stated his own loss for the same period as 5,393, but in his estimate he did not include prisoners or cavalry losses. During the Atlanta campaign 12,983 prisoners were taken by the Federals, and on the assumption that the proportion of prisoners was about the same for each month, Sherman estimated the Confederate loss for May as quite 8,600. The Federal leader had manœuvred his opponent out of a succession of strong positions, and inflicted upon him a loss relatively, and perhaps even actually, greater than that which he himself had suffered.¹

Johnston's new line of entrenchments rested on the mountains to the north and west of Marietta. His right held Brush Mountain, and the line then extended over Pine to Lost Mountain on the extreme left. Pine Mountain in the centre stands out somewhat in isolation from the other mountains, forming a salient, and in

¹ Cox's *Atlanta*.

order to protect it on the west an advanced line to the south-west was held, crossing the road from Burnt Hickory to Marietta, about a mile north of the Gilgal Church. The left wing was held by *Hardee's* Corps, its left at Gilgal Church and its right on Pine Mountain. In the centre, *Polk's* Corps reached from Pine Mountain across the railway to the Ackworth and Marietta road : and on the right *Hood's* Corps lay along the foot of Brush Mountain behind Noonday Creek. This creek also partially covered *Polk's* front. The entrenchments from Gilgal Church to Lost Mountain were held by *Jackson's* cavalry. Formidable as the line appeared, it was really too long, covering as it did ten miles, to be held by an army of about 65,000 men, and the isolated position of Pine Mountain in the centre was a source of weakness, as the Confederate general quickly realised.

It was open to Sherman to operate against *Johnston's* new line either on the east or on the west of the railway. Probably the ground east of Marietta was more favourable for offensive movements. But to have adopted that line of advance would have exposed to *Johnston's* attack the railroad back to Kingston. Accordingly Sherman resolved to ensure the safety of his lines of communication by advancing by the right flank, though the ground in that direction was less favourable for his operations. Rain had been falling continually since the 4th, and the discomfort of the troops was increased by a cold east wind. But advantage was taken of a partial cessation of the rain on the 14th to press close up to the Confederate entrenched lines. In the centre Thomas pushed forward into the re-entrant angle between Pine Mountain and the works to the east, and advanced so far as to threaten to cut off the troops posted on that mountain from communication with the rest of the Confederate lines. A consultation was being held on the top of the mountain by *Johnston*, *Hardee*, and *Polk* as to the advisability of withdrawing the troops—*Bate's* division—holding it. A chance cannon shot killed *Polk*.

The fallen general had been Bishop of Louisiana, and a cousin of J. K. Polk, who was President of the United States during the Mexican War. Having had a military education at West Point, on the outbreak of the Civil War he had been pressed by President *Davis* to take command of the Mississippi Valley. Exercising very considerable influence from his position both in Church and State, he had been advanced to a higher command in the Confederate army—at the time of his death he was a lieutenant-general—than perhaps his purely military qualifications justified.¹ He was succeeded for the time being in the command of his Corps

¹ Conger, *The Rise of U. S. Grant*, 35-6.

by *Loring*, the senior divisional commander. During the night the troops on Pine Mountain were withdrawn.

Johnston's weak spot now was on the extreme left, where he had not enough troops to hold in force the lines between Gilgal Church and Lost Mountain; these lines and Lost Mountain had been committed to the charge of *Jackson's* cavalry, for lack of infantry to hold them. Schofield, on the Federal right, pressed *Hardee* vigorously, and forced him on the night of the 16th to abandon Gilgal Church and fall back about three miles to a new line of entrenchments behind Mud Creek. With Hooker's Corps on his left, Schofield continued to press *Hardee*; and on the 17th, whilst Hooker 'contained' *Hardee's* left, Schofield moved his Corps across Mud Creek and secured a position overlapping the Confederate left flank. In the centre Thomas was pushing close up to the enemy's lines, and his batteries were getting into position to enfilade the salient angle, which *Hardee's* new line formed with the original line of Confederate entrenchments. On the Federal left the Army of the Tennessee, reinforced by the arrival, on June 8th, of the 17th Corps, under Blair, about 9,000 strong, was overlapping the Confederate right. On the night of the 18th *Johnston* withdrew the whole of his army to a fresh line.

The key to the new position of the Confederates was Kenesaw Mountain. It was held by *Loring's* Corps. Hood, on the right, held the high ground beyond the railway, which, bending back north-east, runs between Kenesaw and Brush Mountains, and faced the latter mountain. On the left *Hardee's* Corps was drawn up behind Noses Creek. These lines formed a semicircle round Marietta facing west, but were considerably nearer the town on the north side. *Hardee's* Corps had fallen back some six or eight miles, whilst Hood had not retired more than two miles.

The change of position did not bring *Hardee* much relief. Hooker and Schofield were promptly pressing in pursuit, and whilst Hooker crossed Noses Creek in *Hardee's* front, Schofield was moving round his left towards the valley of Olley's Creek and threatening to gain possession of the road from Powder Springs village to Marietta. At the same time a general extension of the Federal troops was being made towards their right.

Johnston, in order to prevent his left being turned, on the night of the 21st moved Hood's Corps from the right to the left. Having reached his new position, Hood made an impetuous assault upon Hooker's right and Hascall's division of the 23rd Corps. But the Federal lines were too strongly held to be carried by direct assault, and Hood's attack was repulsed with a loss of about 1,000 in killed and wounded.

It would seem that *Hood*, after his night's march from McPherson's front, had expected to be able to outflank the Federal right.¹ But on the morning of the 22nd, before the Confederate attack was made, that wing of Sherman's army had been extending eastwards and thus upset *Hood's* calculations. For Schofield had pushed Cox's division down the Sandtown road towards the point where it crossed the road from Powder Springs village to Marietta. Hascall's division was on the road from Powder Springs Church, which is about four miles north of the village of the same name, to Marietta, covering the road which Cox was following. At the same time Hooker had swung his Corps to the right so as to connect with Hascall, and *Hood* found stretching all along his front a continuous line of entrenchments. The attack on Hascall's division was so persistent that Schofield ordered Cox to send back three of his brigades to his support, though these did not reach the battlefield until the fighting was over. Cox's fourth brigade had already passed the junction of the two roads and held some high ground overlooking Olley's Creek. The loss of the Federals in this engagement, known as the battle of Culp's Farm, was but slight, being mainly confined to two brigades, and probably did not exceed 300.² *Hood's* attack had, however, necessitated the recall of Cox's division from a movement down the Sandtown road, which had seemed likely to produce great results.

It was plain, that if further progress was to be made in that direction, it would be necessary to extend the whole Federal army to the right. But such an extension would carry the troops further away from their depôts, and in the shocking condition of the roads, owing to the continuous rain, it was impracticable to lengthen the lines of supply, especially as the Confederate cavalry were threatening the long line of railway in the Federal rear. Sherman was therefore obliged either to wait until the weather improved and the roads grew harder, and then accumulate supplies preparatory to a movement of a considerable part of his army by the right flank to some point on the railway well to the south of Marietta, or else to make an attempt to break *Johnston's* lines at some point or other. He was loath to remain inactive until such time as the weather might improve, because his adversary might seize the opportunity to detach some of his troops to *Lee's* aid in Virginia, and Grant in mapping out the campaign had specially impressed upon his chief lieutenant the necessity of keeping so tight a grip upon *Johnston*, that he could not afford to weaken himself by sending reinforcements to the Army of Northern Virginia. Besides, *Hood's* movement from right to left must have left that

¹ Cox's *Atlanta*.² *Ibid*.

part of the Confederate lines, from which he had come, very weakly defended at some point, and Sherman hoped by a direct assault to find out that weak point, and if he could break *Johnston's* lines there, he expected to make the battle decisive of the campaign.¹

It seemed probable to him that Kenesaw Mountain, as the naturally strongest part of the Confederate lines, would be the most weakly guarded. Accordingly he ordered McPherson to attack the south-western face of the mountain, whilst Thomas was directed to assail the lines in his front at whatever point he judged most suitable. The attack was fixed for June 27th. Schofield also, partly by way of creating a diversion, partly in the hope that he might gain some solid advantage, was instructed to push forward along the Sandtown road.

McPherson made the assault with one division of Logan's Corps, whilst Thomas, further to the right, launched two columns against the Confederate lines, consisting of Newton's division of the 4th Corps and Davis' division of the 14th. The rest of the Armies of the Cumberland and the Tennessee held themselves in readiness to follow up any advantage which the attacking columns might gain, whilst all along the front of the two armies the skirmish-line kept up a brisk demonstration. But the superiority of a strongly entrenched position over a frontal attack was again demonstrated, and the Federal columns were beaten off with a loss of about 2,500.²

Seeing that the sole chance of success lay in a surprise, the Federal Corps and divisional commanders did not repeat the attack after the first repulse, and troops which had formed the columns of attack quickly entrenched themselves close to the lines which they had failed to storm. This they were enabled to do without severe loss, owing to the thickness of the forest, which reached close up to the abatis in front of the Confederate trenches.

On the extreme right, however, Schofield made good progress. He had already, on the 26th, pushed one brigade across Olley's Creek, whilst a mile below a second brigade was threatening to

¹ A further motive influenced Sherman's decision. He perceived that the enemy and his own officers had become convinced that he would not assault fortified lines but would always try to outflank. He did not think that an army should settle down to a single mode of offence. He reckoned that he would upset *Johnston's* calculations and make it more difficult for him to anticipate his moves in the future (Liddell Hart).

² Cox's *Atlanta. Johnston (Narrative, 343)* stated his loss at 808. General Howard (4 B. & L., 310) says that the whole Confederate line was 'stronger in artificial contrivances and natural features than the cemetery at Gettysburg.'

cross. On the 27th the movement was continued. Cox's division reached a position beyond Olley's Creek on a ridge which separated that valley from the valley of Nickajack Creek. The Confederate left was completely turned, and a road was now opened, by which an advance might be made to Smyrna, a station some five miles south of Marietta.¹

Sherman, after his failure at Kenesaw Mountain, determined to wait until he had accumulated the necessary supplies, and then move McPherson's army over to the extreme right, and carry out in force the flank movement so successfully initiated by Schofield. He had heard from Grant on the 28th that the possibility of *Johnston* trying to reinforce *Lee* might now be dismissed from consideration, and consequently the chief motive for assaulting the Confederate entrenchments was removed. The weather was improving: the heat of the summer sun was drying up the roads, and in a few days he expected to be able to make a big flank movement, which would force *Johnston* to abandon his lines and fall back behind the Chattahoochee.

Johnston, however, fully realised that Schofield's advance along the Sandtown road had rendered his position at Marietta untenable. The lie of the country beyond Olley's Creek was such that it was impossible to extend a really continuous line of entrenchments into the Nickajack valley, and on the 28th his engineers were busily occupied in laying out two fresh lines of works. The work was speedily done with the assistance of negroes and the Georgia militia.² The first line crossed the railway at Smyrna,³ continued in a south-west direction for some three miles to the left of the railway, and then ran south behind Nickajack Creek. The second line was nearer the river, and only covered about two miles of the railway, and its left flank also reached Nickajack Creek, which, before entering the Chattahoochee, runs for some miles parallel to it at a distance of about a mile.

Sherman having accumulated the supplies necessary for his fresh movement, on July 2nd began to move the Army of the Tennessee from the left to the extreme right. On that night *Johnston* fell back from the Kenesaw entrenchments and occupied the new lines in front of Smyrna. But the continued advance of the Federal right along the Sandtown road towards the Chattahoochee showed *Johnston* that his position at Smyrna was too far in

¹ Cox's *Atlanta*.

² Two brigades of the Georgia militia had been brought across the Chattahoochee under the command of General G. W. Smith, who had been second in command at the battle of Seven Pines in 1862.

³ See Map VIII.

advance of the river, and that if he wished to make any stand on its northern bank he must fall back to a position where he would be able to guard the crossings over it. Accordingly, on the night of the 4th, he retreated to his second line of entrenchments.

Sherman followed in pursuit, and from Vining's Station, where he established his headquarters, could see his goal, the city of Atlanta, nine miles south of the Chattahoochee.

Writing to Halleck, Sherman had said that, if *Johnston* decided to hold the line of the Chattahoochee, he should have to study the situation a little. It is likely that *Johnston* would have been able to make a more obstinate defence, if instead of entrenching a position on the north side of the river he had only fortified a *tête de pont* on that bank and had withdrawn the bulk of his army to the other bank.¹ As it turned out, the situation did not require any prolonged study. *Johnston's* lines were about five or six miles long, and covered the railway bridge and principal wagon roads from Marietta to Atlanta. His cavalry were stationed along the southern bank, and all the crossings for a dozen miles were defended by separate fortifications on that bank. Some twenty miles above the railway bridge there was a bridge at Roswell, which the Confederate cavalry burnt. Sherman invested *Johnston's* position with the Armies of the Cumberland and the Tennessee. McPherson held the extreme right at Turner's Ferry, whilst Howard's Corps formed the left at Pace's Ferry. Schofield's Corps was held in reserve near Smyrna, ready for a movement in any direction which seemed to promise success. Stoneman's cavalry was sent down the river to see if any crossing could be found, and on the other flank Garrard's cavalry moved up the river to Roswell, only, however, to find the bridge already burnt.

On the 8th Schofield crossed the river without the loss of a man at the mouth of Soap Creek, some six or seven miles above Pace's Ferry.² The Confederates were completely taken by surprise, as the opposite bank was only held by a handful of cavalry with a single gun. A hasty reconnaissance convinced *Johnston* of the futility of trying to drive back the Federal troops across the river, and on the night of the 9th he withdrew to the south

¹ 'No general such as he [*Johnston*] would invite battle with the Chattahoochee behind him' (Sherman, quoted by Liddell Hart).

² The same day Garrard's cavalry crossed at Roswell and formed another bridgehead, which was shortly afterwards occupied by an infantry division, and next day Sherman started the 16th Corps on a thirty-mile march from Sandtown Ferry to Roswell, where it crossed the river on the 10th (Liddell Hart).

bank, destroying the bridges behind him, and marched towards Atlanta.

The second month of the campaign was ended, and Sherman's victorious progress still continued. The railroad from the Etowah to the Chattahoochee had passed into the hands of the Federals. Their total losses for June are given by Sherman as amounting to 7,530, whilst the Confederate losses are probably not over-estimated at 7,000. Relatively to the respective strength of the two armies the Confederate loss for June, as for May, was decidedly the heavier. Of the Federal losses just one-third were accounted for by the fighting of the 27th. The remaining 5,000 show how fierce had been the fighting on the skirmish-lines. The average daily loss was about 200, and the skirmish-lines were so strongly entrenched as to be little less formidable than the main line of works, and any attack upon them rapidly assumed the dimensions and the dignity of a regular battle. A month of such fighting was worth years of ordinary experience, and Sherman's veterans might well feel confident that with the coveted prize in sight nothing could prevent them from shortly crowning their hopes with its capture.

When he had driven *Johnston* across the Chattahoochee, Sherman had next to decide whether he would operate against Atlanta by his right or left flank. If he chose the former course, the ground on the south side of the railway was the more favourable for offensive movements. The streams, which run into the Chattahoochee below the railway bridge, enter it at right angles, and the ravines, which their courses form, would prevent *Johnston* taking up a position very far from Atlanta, as they would make it difficult to move supports from one point to another with any speed. Furthermore, as soon as the Federal army was across the river on the south side of the railway, it would be already in rear of Atlanta, and the railways running south from that city to Macon and Montgomery would lie at its mercy.

If, on the other hand, Sherman advanced by his left flank, the ground would favour the defensive. On that side, the streams, instead of running perpendicular to the river, follow a course more or less parallel to it, and empty into Peach-tree Creek, which itself, after running parallel for some distance to the Chattahoochee, falls into it close to the railway bridge. The succession of parallel ridges would ensure *Johnston* a choice of strong positions. The road on the north side of the railway was both longer and more difficult; but it had this advantage, that it would enable Sherman to strike the Atlanta-Decatur Railway. There was a danger, so Grant warned his lieutenant, that troops from Richmond might

be sent to Georgia, and in such a contingency it was all-important to seize this line of railroad in time to prevent their arrival.¹ A movement by the left flank was also calculated to give more protection to the Federal lines of supply. For to have adopted the southern route would have allowed *Johnston* to cross his cavalry over the river at points which would be at once in the Federal rear, and to break up the railway right back to the Allatoona Pass, whereas a movement by the left flank practically covered the railway communication. It was Sherman's intention as soon as he got near to Atlanta to swing his right wing across the railway, and, when that was secured, to order the reconstruction of the bridge over the Chattahoochee with all speed.

Having decided for the above reasons to advance by the left, Sherman gave orders for the general movement to commence on the 16th. Thomas's army was to form the right, and crossing the river at Pace's and Phillips's Ferries to march direct on Atlanta.² Schofield, in the centre, was to move towards Decatur, whilst McPherson, on the left, was to strike in upon the railroad between Decatur and Stone Mountain, and after destroying the track move on Decatur. *Johnston*, for his part, was prepared to give battle behind the line of Peach-tree Creek. He might easily have selected a strong position nearer the river, but he was afraid lest in that case his untiring foe might strike in between him and the railway.

But another was destined to command on the field which *Johnston* had selected. On the night of the 17th he received a telegram from Richmond, relieving him of the command of the army and ordering him to turn it over to *Hood*. The Confederate President and the Southern Press had grown tired of *Johnston's* continued retreats, and the appointment of *Hood* signified that a new policy was about to be adopted. As such, it was hailed with delight by the whole of the Federal army. *Hood* had gained a well-deserved reputation in the East as a hard fighter, especially when a divisional commander under *Longstreet*, but it was a dangerous experiment at this critical stage of the Confederate fortunes to put in supreme command a man whose methods savoured so much of recklessness, and it promptly proved a fatal mistake.³

¹ At this date Grant had failed to capture Petersburg; his attempt to secure the Weldon railway had been defeated and he had abandoned his move to turn *Lee's* right. When Grant on an earlier occasion had informed Sherman that there was no longer any likelihood of *Johnston* detaching troops to Richmond, he based his conclusion upon *Lee's* inability to feed them.

² Phillips's Ferry was where Schofield had crossed.

³ *Hood* had graduated at West Point in 1853. McPherson, Schofield, and Sheridan had belonged to the same class, McPherson graduating 1st, Schofield 7th, Sheridan 34th, and *Hood* 44th.

The new commander adopted the general outlines of the policy which his predecessor had fixed upon. He determined, first, to attack the Federal right, as soon as it had crossed Peach-tree Creek, hoping to take it in flank, whilst it was in motion and separated from the rest of Sherman's army; and, secondly, to move troops to the south and east and fall upon the exposed flank and rear of the left wing. The Confederate lines started on the railway two miles south of the river, ran six miles eastwards to the junction of Pea Vine Creek with Peach-tree Creek, and then turned southwards along the former creek, till they reached the railway between Atlanta and Decatur.

In carrying out Sherman's plan of advance by the left flank McPherson's army had nearly four times as far to go as Thomas's, and it was plain that the latter would have to stand fast whilst the rest of the Federal forces were coming into line. Sherman fully realised that he was giving *Hood* an opportunity of striking at his exposed right wing, but he had every confidence in the ability of Thomas and his army of veterans to hold their own, and was most desirous that *Hood* should strike a blow, which, considering the well-known rashness of that commander, was likely to inflict a heavier loss upon the Confederates than their opponents. The result fully justified his expectations.

On the 19th Thomas crossed Peach-tree Creek with the heads of his three columns, and the following day the whole of the Army of the Cumberland was on the south side of the creek. Sherman had directed his lieutenant, whilst holding fast with his right, to try and connect on his left with Schofield. But the maps in the hands of the Federal commander proved faulty, and Thomas found it impossible to connect with Schofield by anything like a continuous line. Eventually he ordered Howard with two divisions of his Corps to make a detour to the left rear and press forward, until he arrived within supporting distance of Schofield.¹ In consequence the right wing of the Federal army, consisting of the 14th and 20th Corps and one division of the 4th, was, on the morning of the 20th, on the south side of Peach-tree Creek, showing a front of only a mile, whilst the left wing of four Corps and the other two divisions of the 4th was strung out as far as Decatur along a front of quite eight miles, and between the two

¹ It was by Sherman's orders that Thomas detached Howard. 'Thomas was tending to hug the Chattahoochee and crowd in on his own right' and Sherman several times earlier in the day urged upon him to stretch out to his left and link up with Schofield. Finally at 1.15 a.m. Sherman gave definite orders for the movement of Howard's divisions (Liddell Hart).

wings there was a gap of two miles. It seemed as though *Hood* was to have a perfect opportunity of striking *Thomas* a heavy blow on his exposed flank.

The Confederate commander ordered *Hardee's* and *A. P. Stewart's* Corps to fall upon *Thomas's* left flank, assaulting it by divisions in echelon, whilst the lines fronting the Federal left wing were to be held by *G. W. Smith's* Georgia militia and *Cheatham's* Corps.¹ The attack was ordered to commence at 1 p.m. But the Federal left was pressing forward with a speed not anticipated by *Hood*, and threatening to turn the Confederate right. Accordingly *Hood* ordered *Cheatham's* Corps to take ground to the right, and the attack was thereby delayed until 3 p.m.

The assault fell first upon *Newton's* division of the 4th Corps, and then, as the successive divisions came into battle, spread along *Hooker's* front, but the 14th Corps on the extreme right was barely engaged. The attack was repulsed at every point, but, in obedience to *Hood's* instructions for a decisive engagement, it was renewed again and again, though, as in the Federal attack on *Kenesaw Mountain*, its only chance of success lay in its taking the enemy by surprise. The combat was brought to an end by an urgent summons from *Hood* to *Hardee*, who was just about to renew the attack on *Newton's* exposed flank, to send a division to the assistance of *Cheatham*. The Federal loss for the four divisions actively engaged was 1,707. The loss in the two Confederate Corps can have been but little short of 6,000. Whilst this combat was raging on his left *Hood* was being very hard pressed on his right. *Wheeler's* cavalry, which had been skirmishing in advance of the Confederate lines on the extreme right, was pushed back with great rapidity by *McPherson's* advance, *Cheatham's* line was already stretched as far as it could possibly reach, and it was only the opportune arrival of *Cleburne's* division, sent by *Hardee* in answer to *Hood's* summons, which prevented *Wheeler* being driven into the city and the Federals following him in.²

As a result of the fighting of the 20th *Hood* found that both his flanks were in danger of being turned. He therefore determined

¹ *Hood*, after taking over the command of the army, had assigned *Stewart* to the command of what had been *Polk's* Corps and after the latter's death had been temporarily commanded by *Loring*, whilst *Cheatham* had succeeded to the command of *Hood's* own Corps.

² *Hood* (4 B. & L., 337) puts the blame for his failure on to *Hardee*, whom he charges first with being the cause of the delay in commencing the attack, secondly with contenting himself with skirmishing instead of pressing the attack home. *Sherman* (4 B. & L., 253) estimates the Confederate loss at 4,796, but *Cox* gives the higher figure adopted in the text.

to abandon the Peach-tree Creek line and withdraw his troops to fresh entrenchments nearer Atlanta, and at the same time to carry out the second part of his programme of offensive action by assailing the left flank and rear of McPherson's army. This very important task he entrusted to his most capable and experienced Corps commander, *Hardee*.¹ On the night of the 21st *Hardee's* Corps was withdrawn from its position north of Atlanta, marched through the city, and struck south and then north-east in order to fall upon McPherson's flank somewhere near the railway between Atlanta and Decatur. The advance of the Federal left on the 21st obliged the turning column to make a considerable detour. A march of fifteen miles brought it shortly after daybreak within two or three miles of Decatur. There the troops left the road and plunged into the thick wood beyond, in order to find a jumping-off position on the flank of the Federals. The greater part of the Federal cavalry was away engaged in raiding expeditions against the various railways. No information reached McPherson of *Hardee's* approach, and the Army of the Tennessee was taken by surprise. It was *Hood's* intention, as soon as *Hardee's* Corps gained any success, to move the rest of his troops in succession out of their entrenchments, and, falling upon the Federal line as it was being rolled up from left to right, to drive it down and, if possible, into Peach-tree Creek.

Hardee with wonderful accuracy considering the difficulties with which he had to contend, arranged his troops on the Federal flank so that his left slightly overlapped the Federal left, consisting of the 17th Corps under Blair. The Confederates moved to the attack about noon. But to their surprise the two right divisions ran up against the 16th Corps under General Dodge, which was halted in rear of Blair preparatory to advancing to take a position on his left.² On that part of the field the Confederate attack was repulsed. But the two divisions on the left, taking Blair's Corps in the rear, gained considerable ground.

Early in the fight McPherson, riding from the 16th to the 17th Corps, encountered the skirmish-line of *Cleburne's* division and fell mortally wounded. Sherman, when informed of McPherson's death, sent orders to Logan, commanding the 15th Corps, to

¹ *Hood* says that he selected *Hardee's* Corps because it was the largest, and was comparatively fresh, as it had taken but little part in the battle of the 20th. Apparently he did not select *Cheatham's* Corps, because that commander had been so short a time in command of the Corps (4 B. & L., 338).

² 4 B. & L., 326. The 16th Corps had been in reserve behind the 15th Corps, north of the railway, until the 21st.

take the temporary command of the Army of the Tennessee. Gaining ground steadily on his left, *Hardee* drove the Federals back upon a high bald hill south of the railway, which had formed the southern extremity of *Cleburne's* position on the 20th, and had been captured by *Blair* on the 21st. Here a desperate struggle ensued, as the Federals, being attacked from the rear, were forced to leap over their entrenchments and fight from the opposite side. A brigade was sent by *Logan*¹ to fill the gap between *Blair* and *Dodge*, and with its aid the Confederate attack on the hill was repulsed.

Hood, who was watching *Hardee's* battle from a salient of the Atlanta fortifications, now directed *Cheatham* to assail the hill and the lines of the 15th Corps running to the north of it, whilst *Smith's* Georgia militia attacked *Schofield's* line, which was now only held by one division and one brigade.² *Smith's* attack was repulsed without much difficulty. But *Cheatham* made a vigorous onslaught, and that part of the 17th Corps which was holding the hill leapt back over their entrenchments and again faced towards their proper front. *Cheatham* failed to carry the hill, but north of it he met with more success, and a great gap was made in the line of the 15th Corps. *Schofield's* artillery was, however, now brought into play, and massed so as to bear upon the flank of the Confederates as they pushed towards the east.³ As *Cheatham* and *Hardee* were personally several miles apart, their attacks lacked combination, and were defeated in detail. Night put an end to the conflict. The Confederate leaders, following the mistaken policy of the 20th, again and again renewed the attack after all chance of success had vanished, only swelling their own list of killed and wounded. The Federal loss was 3,521, and ten pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the Confederates: but the total loss of the assailants numbered not less than 10,000. *Wheeler's* cavalry had accompanied *Hardee's* Corps on its flank march, and had swooped down

¹ Commanding the 15th Corps on *McPherson's* right.

² Three brigades had been detached from *Schofield's* Corps, one to Decatur and two to cover *Dodge's* left flank on the railway.

³ This was the only assistance given to the Army of the Tennessee from the other armies. In his memoirs *Sherman* gave as a reason that the Army of the Tennessee would have been jealous if either of the other armies had intervened. Feeling had run high between the Army of the Tennessee and the Cumberland ever since *Grant* had assumed command at Chattanooga. The latter army complained that the chances of winning distinction were always given to the other. Captain *Liddell Hart* suggests that the appointment of *Howard* as *McPherson's* successor was intended as a sop to the Army of the Cumberland. *Howard* was very young for an army commander—only thirty-three.

on Decatur, where a part of the Federal trains was under the protection of a single brigade. A brigade sent from Schofield's Corps assisted the garrison of Decatur to drive off the Confederate cavalry.

Thus far the policy conceived by *Johnston* and executed by *Hood* had proved a disastrous failure. Both wings of Sherman's army had been attacked in turn, and both attacks had been repulsed with a loss which the Confederacy at that crisis of the struggle could ill afford. It would seem that *Hood*, when he relieved *Johnston* of the command, felt some misgivings, realising that the condition of assuming the offensive was virtually imposed on him; but in spite of the two reverses which he had suffered in such quick succession he was still resolved to carry out at any cost what he believed to be the wishes of the Richmond Government, and was ready to seize the earliest opportunity of striking another blow at Sherman's flanks.

The death of McPherson led to various changes in the higher commands of the Federal army. Logan, who had temporarily succeeded to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, had not been a member of the regular army before the outbreak of the Civil War. Like Blair, the commander of the 17th Corps, he had been a politician before he became a soldier. It was doubtful whether the other Corps commanders of that army would give him an ungrudging obedience: and for these reasons Sherman, after consultation, recommended Howard for the vacant command, and the President approved his selection. Hooker, however, ex-commander of the Army of the Potomac, and senior major-general in Sherman's army, had regarded the appointment as his own by right. Sherman had deliberately passed him over, feeling sure that he would not find in him the sympathetic co-operation which he had a right to look for in his chief subordinates. Hooker throughout the campaign had displayed a distinct tendency to fight for his own hand: he had more than once disregarded orders in order to secure a better position for himself and his Corps. His own glorification, rather than the ultimate success of the Commander-in-Chief's plans, had been his consistent aim. The appointment of Howard, whom he had sought to make the scapegoat for his defeat at Chancellorsville, seemed to Hooker a double insult, and he promptly applied to be relieved of his command. His request was acceded to, and Slocum was summoned from Vicksburg to take command of the 20th Corps. Stanley succeeded Howard in command of the 4th Corps.

Four railways run into Atlanta. The Chattanooga line was in the hands of the Federals. The Georgia line had been destroyed

by the Federal cavalry for some distance beyond Decatur, and the left wing of Sherman's army already lay astride of it. On the other side of Atlanta two railways ran south and south-west to Macon and Montgomery. For the first five miles these railways ran over the same line, but at East Point they diverged. The Montgomery railway had already been raided by a cavalry force under Rousseau, and in its course west passed within easy striking distance of a force advancing from the Chattahoochee. It was obviously out of the question for any force operating from Atlanta to attempt to defend that line. The safety of Atlanta consequently depended upon *Hood's* ability to keep open and preserve intact the Macon railway : and this railway naturally became the objective of Sherman's next movement. It was open to him to advance against it from either flank : he decided to move by the right because it would be easier in that case to keep his army supplied.

By July 25th the railway bridge over the Chattahoochee had been rebuilt,¹ and the railroad completed up to the camps of Thomas's army. On the 27th the movement to the right commenced. The Army of the Tennessee was to be transferred from the extreme left to the extreme right and commence an advance on that flank, whilst Schofield was to hold the Federal lines on the left. Dodge's Corps led the advance of the Army of the Tennessee, followed closely by Blair's Corps.

On the morning of the 28th the two Corps held a position facing due east along a road running south to Mount Ezra Church, where a road from Atlanta to Lickskillet, a village near the Chattahoochee, was crossed. Blair's right was within a mile and a half of the railway from Atlanta to East Point.

Hood's engineers were already constructing a line of entrenchments running south-west, which should guard the junction of the two railway lines at East Point ; and in the meantime *S. D. Lee*, who had been summoned from Alabama and placed in command of the Corps recently assigned to *Cheatham*, was ordered to fall upon the right flank of Howard's army, and *Stewart*, with two divisions of his Corps, was directed to support the assault. *Hardee* and *Smith*, with their respective commands, were to occupy the lines facing the Armies of the Cumberland and Ohio. Sherman, expecting this attack, had directed Davis's division of the 14th Corps to move round the rear of the Army of the Tennessee and get into position to fall upon the flank of any

¹ The bridge was 760 feet long and 90 feet high, and was completed in four and a half days (*Liddell Hart*).

force coming out of Atlanta to attack Howard.¹ But Davis was not in time to take any part in the fight of the 28th, else the repulse of the Confederates might perhaps have been converted into a rout. In this engagement the brunt of the fighting was borne by Logan's Corps, which was placed on the right of Blair's Corps, bent back so as to form almost a right angle with it. But on this day the Confederates showed by no means the same determination and desperate courage as had marked their assaults on the 20th or 22nd, and were beaten off with comparative ease. Howard's loss was under 600, whilst that of the Confederates probable exceeded 5,000.² After this third repulse the Confederate Government took alarm, and *Hood*, on August 5th, was directed by President *Davis* to avoid, if practicable, attacking Sherman in his entrenchments.

At the same time as the Army of the Tennessee was moved to the extreme right, the Federal cavalry had been sent in two divisions from the right and left flanks respectively to break up the Macon railroad. Neither expedition proved very successful. McCook, who moved by the right, reached the railway at Lovejoy Station, about thirty miles south of Atlanta, and did some temporary damage to the track. But returning by the road by which he had come, he was surrounded by the enemy's cavalry, and only succeeded in cutting his way through with considerable loss. Stoneman, on the left, was even more unsuccessful. Working eastwards, he raided the railway and then shelled Macon, but in his turn was surrounded by the Confederate cavalry and forced to surrender in person with about a quarter of his force.

After this failure on the part of his cavalry, Sherman determined to strike at the railway with a strong force of infantry. The 23rd Corps moved on August 2nd round to the right of Howard's position, and the 14th Corps was also posted on the right along the Lickskillet road. Schofield was directed with his own Corps and the 14th to push ahead and reach the railway if possible above East Point. But the commander of the 14th Corps, Palmer, refused to recognise Schofield's authority, and the misunderstanding between the two generals caused the movement to hang fire, until after a couple of wasted days Palmer was relieved of his

¹ Cox's *Atlanta*, 184. But Howard says (4 B. & L., 319) that on the morning of the 28th Sherman, with whom he was riding, expressed the belief that *Hood* would not venture to renew the attack.

² Cox's *Atlanta*, 185. Sherman (4 B. & L., 254) estimated the Confederate loss at 4,632 to the Federal 700. Sherman's estimate of the Confederate losses during this campaign is generally less than Cox's, e.g. he states *Hood's* loss on the 22nd as only 8,499.

command and Davis appointed in his place. Schofield failed to reach the railway, as the Confederates when driven from their first line of entrenchments took position behind a second strongly fortified line, which reached the Montgomery railway about a mile below East Point.

Sherman now considered that he had stretched his lines as far as was safe, and determined to try the effect of a bombardment with his heavy guns. This was maintained for several days without apparently producing much effect on the enemy's lines. As the cannonade produced but little result, Sherman determined to make a last attempt with his cavalry to break up the Macon railroad. Kilpatrick made a dashing raid, starting from the right flank and riding right round Atlanta. But as had been the case with the previous cavalry raids, the damage done to the railway was speedily repaired. Sherman now found himself obliged to cut loose from his line of supplies and strike the railroad with almost his whole force. The 20th Corps was ordered back to the railway bridge over the Chattahoochee, where it entrenched itself, whilst the rest of the Federal army were directed to take rations for ten days, to be made to last fifteen, preparatory to a march to the Macon railroad.¹

The movement commenced on August 25th. The Army of the Tennessee led the way on the right, followed by the two remaining Corps of the Army of the Cumberland. Schofield remained in his lines in front of East Point with the 23rd Corps, and kept up a series of demonstrations. This final move of Sherman, which was destined to bring about the fall of Atlanta, completely baffled *Hood*. At that critical moment the Confederate general had stripped himself of the greater part of his cavalry.

Wheeler, on August 10th, had started on a raid against the Federal lines of communication, and after being beaten off at Dalton had made his way into East Tennessee. His subsequent operations in that region had no effect upon the fortunes of the two armies battling round Atlanta. *Hood*, deprived of the eyes of his army, found himself in the dark as to the real object of Sherman's movements. On the evening of the 27th he jumped hastily to the conclusion that *Wheeler's* raid had been successful

¹ From Captain Liddell Hart's account it seems that Sherman by his bombardment of Atlanta aimed merely at 'straining the enemy's morale' before delivering his final stroke, and that it was the absence of *Wheeler's* cavalry which decided him to send Kilpatrick not on a raid but to make a deliberate attack on the railway, which might force the enemy to evacuate Atlanta. Kilpatrick reported that he had disabled the railway for at least ten days, but it was repaired in two.

and that Sherman's army was retiring from lack of supplies to the other side of the Chattahoochee. For forty-eight hours he adhered to this strange delusion, and by that time the Federals had gained a position, from which it was impossible to dislodge them, commanding the Macon railway.¹

From the commencement of the last stage of the campaign on the south bank of the Chattahoochee, when the Federal army was beginning to close in upon Atlanta, Sherman's policy had been not to assault the city or invest it by regular approaches, but by destroying its lines of supply to compel its evacuation. It was for that purpose that he had employed his cavalry on their somewhat futile raids against the railways, in order that he might keep the bulk of his army in hand to fall upon *Hood*, as soon as he evacuated the city. For *Sherman* never forgot that his objective was not merely Atlanta, but also the Confederate army in his front. It was with reluctance that he acknowledged the failure of cavalry raids to destroy the railroad, and moved with almost his whole army to complete that task, knowing that, though the success of his movement would render the surrender of Atlanta inevitable, yet *Hood's* army would probably escape destruction and be left free to fight another campaign.

Thanks to *Hood's* illusion, the Federal movement encountered no opposition at first. On the 28th the Army of the Cumberland reached the Montgomery railway at Red Oak, seven miles below East Point, and the Army of the Tennessee at Fairburn, five miles farther down the line. On the 29th Schofield's Corps came into line with the rest of the army, which devoted that day to a systematic destruction of the railway. On the 30th the march was resumed. Schofield moved up the railroad a mile and a half towards East Point, in order to cover the trains whilst the rest of the army was moving between the two railroads.

Hood at last awoke from his dream of fancied security, but he still failed to grasp the full meaning of his opponent's movement. He directed *Hardee* to take his own and *Lee's* Corps to Jonesboro and fall upon the flank of the Federal advance the following morning.

On the 30th Howard had reached the Flint River to the west of

¹In spite of *Wheeler's* absence with more than half the cavalry, *Hood* still had a sufficient force of that arm to enable him to get fairly accurate information of *Sherman's* movements. The information which his cavalry reconnaissances gave him, viz. that the bulk of the Federal forces were echeloned along the Atlanta-Sandtown road, was correct enough in itself, but *Hood* entirely misinterpreted its significance. Had he retained *Wheeler's* force, he might perhaps have discovered his error sooner.

the Macon railway, and put Logan's Corps across the river with the other two Corps in close support but still on the west bank of the river.¹ On the 31st *Hardee* attacked Logan's lines, but the Confederate movement lacked combination. The fighting was almost entirely confined to *Lee's* Corps, and the assault was repulsed with ease.²

On the same day Schofield reached the Macon railway close to Rough-and-Ready Station, and the 4th Corps struck it a little farther south. Both Corps set to work to destroy the line from Rough-and-Ready Station southwards. When *Hood* learnt from those on board a railway train, which had returned to Atlanta on finding its way south blocked by Schofield's Corps, that the Federals were astride his line of communications, he inferred that a general assault upon Atlanta was about to take place, and that it was not the whole of the Federal army, but only an extension of the right flank, which was across the railway. He therefore sent peremptory orders to *Hardee* to send back *Lee's* Corps that night for the defence of Atlanta. *Hardee* with his single Corps was directed to cover the railroad and guard the ammunition and provision trains which had accompanied the two Corps as best he could.

At 2 a.m. on September 1st *Lee* marched away towards Atlanta. *Hardee* stretched his troops along the lines, which had been occupied the previous day, hoping by a bold front to impose upon his opponents. In this he succeeded to a certain extent. It was impossible that the Federal commanders could foresee that *Hood* would take such an extraordinary step as withdrawing *Lee's* Corps out of supporting distance of *Hardee*.

Sherman, who knew that by the possession of the railway line at Rough-and-Ready the fate of Atlanta was sealed, at first directed Schofield and Thomas to move their respective forces down the railroad, destroying the track as they advanced, and to connect with Howard's left. But upon finding in the course of the afternoon that *Lee's* Corps had been withdrawn and only *Hardee's*

¹ On the morning of the 31st bridges were built across the river so that the three Corps were in mutual support. Between East Point and Jonesboro the railway made a sharp bend to the east, following the line of the watershed between the confluent of the Flint and the Ocmulgee Rivers. Sherman's immediate aim was to get his forces onto the railway edge and into the triangle thus formed, so that he would have the advantage of a central position, with the Confederates forced to move round the outside if they gave up Atlanta and sought either to retreat or strike at him (Liddell Hart).

² *Hardee's* own Corps, under *Cleburne's* command, crossed the river on Howard's right in pursuit of Kilpatrick's cavalry.

remained in his front, he determined to try and capture this force. The knowledge that he could not hope to destroy *Hood's* entire army made him all the more eager to capture this, its strongest Corps. The 14th Corps was ordered to swing its left forward and endeavour to envelop *Hardee's* right, and the 4th Corps was directed to march with all speed towards Jonesboro. Davis with the 14th Corps assailed *Hardee's* right on September 1st with much determination, and after one repulse succeeded in carrying the salient angle, where the Confederate line of entrenchments was bent back across the railway, and captured nearly a whole brigade and two batteries of artillery. But the 4th Corps did not get up in time to co-operate in the assault, and *Hardee's* right wing took up a new position, where they showed a bold front, whilst the centre and left held their original lines confronting Howard.

By this time *Hood* had learnt his fatal mistake. *Lee's* Corps, which was about half-way to Atlanta, received orders countermanding its advance, and directing it to cover the withdrawal of *Stewart's* and *Smith's* troops. It was too late to attempt to save anything which had not already been removed from Atlanta, and during the night the explosions in the city, where the military stores and railway stock were being destroyed by a cavalry rear-guard, made known both to Sherman and to Slocum the welcome fact that Atlanta was being evacuated.¹ Slocum had been directed on the 1st to make a reconnaissance towards Atlanta to see if *Hood* had abandoned it, and on the 2nd entered the city without encountering any resistance. Under cover of the darkness *Hood*, marching south, rejoined *Hardee*, who also evacuated his lines during the night, at Lovejoy Station.² But Atlanta, 'the gate city of the South,' was in Sherman's hands.

This campaign, which commencing on May 4th terminated on September 2nd with the capture of Atlanta, may be fairly regarded as the most brilliant feat accomplished by any Federal general throughout the war. One hundred and thirty miles of mountainous and difficult country had been covered.³ Three rivers had been crossed.⁴ No offensive battle had been fought except the assault

¹ According to Captain Liddell Hart, Sherman was in doubt whether these sounds portended the evacuation of Atlanta or a battle being fought by Slocum.

² *Hood* had made a wide circuit to the south-east through McDonough before turning west.

³ *Johnston*, however, considers that the difficulties of the country between Dalton and Atlanta were greatly exaggerated. 'That country is intersected by numerous practicable roads and is not more rugged than that near Baltimore and Washington' (4 B. & L., 267).

⁴ The Oostanaula, Etowah, and Chattahoochee.

on Kenesaw Mountain, which was stopped immediately after the first repulse. In all other instances the Confederates had been forced to assume the offensive and had been repulsed with heavy loss. The conditions of the country were favourable to the defensive, and it was a triumph of skilful manœuvring to have forced an army strategically acting on the defensive to assume so often the temporarily offensive and with such disastrous results. *Johnston's* force after it had been reinforced by *Polk's* Corps was probably in the proportion of seven to ten, when compared with *Sherman's* army of invasion.¹ The advantages of the defensive are commonly reckoned at five to two. It cannot therefore be said that the two armies were unequally matched.

It must, however, be admitted that the substitution of *Hood* for *Johnston* greatly facilitated *Sherman's* task. Probably this was one of the greatest mistakes made by *Jefferson Davis* throughout the four troubled years of his Presidency. He had been prejudiced against *Johnston* from the very beginning of the war, because he considered that that commander had endeavoured to put off on to his shoulders the responsibility for not following up the victory of Bull Run.² In *Johnston* *Sherman* had found a foe worthy to be matched against him. The Confederate general had a real genius for defensive warfare. In spite of *Sherman's* brilliant manœuvres *Johnston* again and again withdrew his troops in safety from one position to another as strong. In the series of retrograde movements, which carried him from Dalton across the Chattahoochee, he was never caught at a disadvantage, never gave *Sherman* a chance of striking a decisive blow, and succeeded in keeping his troops in good spirits and good health.³ His removal from command was a great mistake; the appointment of *Hood* in his place was a still greater error.

Since *Lee's* defeat at Gettysburg and the fall of Vicksburg, it was plain that the only chance which the Southern Confederacy still had of maintaining its independence was by playing a waiting game, by striving to tire out their opponents, and to gain time in

¹ Cox's *Atlanta*. But Major Dawes, who has made a special study of the numbers engaged in this campaign, estimates the odds from the end of May as less than five to four (4 B. & L., 282).

² This prejudice was greatly increased by *Johnston's* failure to relieve Vicksburg.

³ *Hood*, however, states (4 B. & L., 336) that 'the troops of the Army of Tennessee had for such length of time been subjected to the ruinous policy pursued from Dalton to Atlanta that they were unfitted for united action in pitched battle.' The evidence is, however, all in favour of *Johnston's* contention that under his command the morale of the army had greatly improved.

the hope that the mass of the people of the North would weary of the expense and bloodshed of war and insist upon a compromise. This last chance was flung away when *Hood*, a fighting general of no proved strategical ability,¹ was appointed to supersede *Johnston*, who throughout this campaign had shown himself a master of Fabian tactics. It would not be safe to assert that, had *Johnston* been continued in the command, the fall of Atlanta might have been averted, but at any rate it would have been postponed. And time was just what the Confederacy needed. With *Johnston* in command the Confederate losses on July 20th and 22nd would very probably have been much smaller, and it is most unlikely that *Johnston* would have committed *Hood's* extraordinary blunder of supposing that Sherman, at the moment when he was cutting loose from his base for the purpose of seizing and holding the Macon railway, was in retreat across the Chattahoochee. A strong line of entrenchments would have confronted Sherman on his approach to the Montgomery railway at Red Oak and Fairburn, and another long flanking movement, probably by the left round Atlanta, would have been imposed upon the Federals.

The Federal losses during the month of August, including the fighting at Jonesboro on September 1st, were given by Sherman as amounting to 5,139, whilst the Confederate losses for the same period were estimated at 7,443. The aggregate loss for the whole campaign on the Federal side was 31,687, whilst that of the Southern army was stated as 34,979, and this estimate given by Sherman has been generally accepted as tolerably correct.²

The conquest of Atlanta, besides being a brilliant feat of arms, was of great political significance. It exercised a great influence over the inhabitants of the North, who were on the eve of a Presidential election. Grant's operations before Petersburg, slow and costly as they were, might easily be misunderstood by the 'man in the street.' Lincoln might express his conviction that 'Grant was in a position whence he would never be dislodged until Richmond was taken,'³ but it is doubtful whether the President's conviction was shared by the majority of his supporters. But the capture of Atlanta, like that of Vicksburg in the previous year, was a definite solid fact, which no reasoning, however ingenious,

¹ Another argument against *Hood's* appointment is the fact that his physical activity had been impaired by wounds. At Gettysburg he was crippled in one arm: at Chickamauga he lost a leg.

² Major Dawes estimates the losses of the two armies as about equal—40,000 each.

³ Speech of June 16th, 1864, at Philadelphia

could get rid of. It gave the lie to the Democratic Party, who were running General McClellan as a candidate for the Presidency on a programme which denounced the war as a failure. To Sherman's victory at Atlanta Abraham Lincoln was greatly indebted for the overwhelming majority by which he defeated McClellan at the polls.

CHAPTER V

THE MARCH TO THE SEA¹

The military position after the fall of Atlanta—Farragut enters Mobile Bay—Importance of Georgia as the Confederate granary—The Confederate cavalry raids against Sherman's lines of communication—Hood crosses the Chattahoochee—Confederate attack on Allatoona repulsed—Hood's game of 'hide-and-seek'—Sherman follows Hood to Alabama—Beauregard assigned to the chief command in the West—Hood moves west to Tusculumbia—Sherman prepares for his march through Georgia—Hood crosses the Tennessee—Sherman's army—Sherman destroys the railway in his rear—And dismantles Atlanta—Sherman's plans—The march begins—Slocum occupies Milledgeville—Movements of the Federal right wing—Howard occupies Millen—Savannah in sight—Destruction of the Georgia railways—Sherman subsists his army off the country—Hardee's plans—Hatch's failure to cut Hardee's line of retreat—Capture of Fort McAllister—Hardee abandons Savannah.

AFTER the fall of Atlanta the Federal army enjoyed a well-earned rest. But whilst the soldiers rested, the general was considering how the success already gained might be yet further improved. It was plain enough that the campaign was not ended by the capture of Atlanta. The Confederate army in the West still had to be dealt with. If Sherman's army was to play the part assigned to it in the general plan of campaign as devised by Grant, it could not rest upon its laurels, but must push on to deal fresh blows, which might lighten Grant's arduous task before Richmond. Sherman saw that, if he could ultimately establish his army in the Carolinas, Lee would be caught between two fires, and would be obliged to evacuate Richmond.

But in the meantime the question as to what should be the next movement called for much consideration. Sherman had partially fulfilled his allotted task in capturing Atlanta even though he had failed to destroy the Confederate army; but Canby's movement

¹ See Map VII. For Sherman's operations against Hood after the fall of Atlanta Cox's *Atlanta*, and for his march through Georgia, Cox's *March to the Sea* (Scribner's) have been closely followed. Hood's own account of his operations is contained in the fourth volume of *Battles and Leaders*. As in the last chapter, fresh information derived from Captain Liddell Hart's *Sherman* has been incorporated in the footnotes.

against Mobile had miscarried.¹ The divisions of the 16th Corps, under A. J. Smith, recently returned from the Red River Expedition, which were to have reinforced Canby, had been suddenly called away to aid Rosecrans in Missouri. The Confederate general, *Price*, had succeeded in organising a considerable force in that State, and was showing so bold a front that Rosecrans was obliged to call for reinforcements. Without Smith's divisions Canby had not considered himself strong enough to attack Mobile. The navy had, indeed, done its work. On August 5th Admiral Farragut forced his way past the forts guarding the entrance to the Bay, and though he lost one of his largest iron-clads, which at the very beginning of the fight was sunk by a mine, made himself master of the harbour, and destroyed the greater part of the Confederate squadron in it. The city itself lay at the top of the Bay, thirty miles from the open sea, and was too strongly fortified for a naval attack unsupported by a land force to have any chance of success. But the forts controlling the Bay were reduced, and almost their last harbour on the Gulf was thus lost to the Confederates.² Had Mobile itself fallen, Sherman from Atlanta would have been able to establish communications with Canby's army, either through Montgomery or by the lower Chattahoochee through Columbus. The two generals joining hands would have cut off another great section from the Confederacy, and the Southern troops in Mississippi and Alabama would have been prevented from taking any part in the operations going on further east.³

Grant had hoped to capture either Wilmington or Savannah, in which latter case Sherman could have safely ventured to march through the heart of Georgia, knowing that at the end of his march he would find a depôt of supplies waiting to receive him. But the fact that in September Mobile on the Gulf and Savannah and Wilmington on the Atlantic coast were still in the hands of the Confederates, decidedly complicated the position.

Georgia had become the granary of the Confederacy. As cotton could no longer find a market, the inhabitants grew bread-stuffs instead, and since the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson had deprived the East of the products of the Trans-Mississippi region, the Confederates had come largely to depend upon Georgia for

¹ On Map I.

² Galveston, in Texas, was still in Confederate hands and they could use the Mexican port of Metamoros. But both of these were useless for the purpose of operations east of the Mississippi.

³ A small force under Gordon Granger was sent by Canby to co-operate with Farragut, and took part in the reduction of the forts.

their supplies. The horrors of war had as yet barely made themselves felt in that fertile State. If a Federal force were to march through it, laying waste the crops and destroying the railway system, a staggering blow would be inflicted on the Confederacy. Sherman, anxious as he was to strike this blow, decided that his immediate task should be to keep *Hood* fully occupied, until Grant had reduced the Atlantic seaports. Then he could march eastward, leaving *Hood* to follow him or not as he chose. But till then it would be dangerous to push into a hostile country, where it would be impossible to keep open his lengthening lines of communication, and *Hood's* army would still constitute a serious obstacle. Sherman, therefore, was not unwilling to let his army rest at Atlanta until *Hood* gave some indication of his intentions. He had not long to wait.¹

On September 22nd President *Davis* delivered a speech at Macon, which clearly foreshadowed an attempt to transfer the war back again to the valley of the Tennessee. *Hood* had concentrated the bulk of his forces at Lovejoy Station. But his cavalry under *Wheeler* had been raiding in Northern Georgia, trying with but slight success to break up the railway from Chattanooga, and was now in East Tennessee; and on September 20th *Forrest* with his cavalry started on a raid into Middle Tennessee and sought to destroy the railway from Nashville to Decatur.² This attempt also was attended with but little success, and on October 6th *Forrest* recrossed to the south bank of the Tennessee.

Though neither of these cavalry raids had done any serious damage to the Federal lines of communication, yet when coupled with the Confederate President's speech at Macon, they caused Sherman to apprehend an attack by *Hood* in force against the railway in his rear. He ordered Thomas to return to Chattanooga, whither he also sent two divisions: and another division was sent to Rome, where it might protect the railroad north of the Etowah.

The wisdom of these precautions was quickly proved. On September 29th *Hood* crossed the Chattahoochee twenty-four

¹ Macon was 100 miles from Atlanta and Augusta was 175. Sherman did not propose to move against either along a single railroad whilst *Hood's* army lay on his front ready to obstruct his advance, and his line of communications, stretching 450 miles from Atlanta back to Louisville, was exposed to the raids of the Confederate cavalry. He would wait until Grant could cause a diversion and create a fresh base of supply, either in the enemy's rear on the Savannah river or on their flank at Columbus on the lower Chattahoochee, with Canby's troops. *Hood's* march westwards for the invasion of Tennessee entirely altered the situation.

² On the Tennessee, 100 miles south-south-west of Chattanooga.

miles south-west of Atlanta. It was not at first certain whether he was marching westwards into Alabama with a view to invading Tennessee, or would turn northward against the Chattanooga-Atlanta railroad. Sherman waited a day or two for the Confederate movement to declare itself definitely. By October 2nd it was plain that *Hood* was marching to strike the railroad in the neighbourhood of Marietta. Sherman left one Corps to hold Atlanta and the railway bridge over the Chattahoochee, and with the rest of his army started in pursuit.

On the 3rd *Hood's* main army was in the neighbourhood of Lost Mountain. *Stewart's* Corps was sent to strike the railway north of Marietta and to capture, if possible, Allatoona and the railway bridge over the Etowah. *Stewart* on the morning of the 5th rejoined *Hood*, having destroyed two small posts on the railroad and having left *French's* division to capture Allatoona and destroy the Etowah bridge. The Army of the Cumberland led the pursuit, and on the evening of the 4th was bivouacking at the foot of Kenesaw Mountain.¹ The Army of the Tennessee was at Smyrna on the railroad, whilst the Army of the Ohio, which had to come from its encampment at Decatur and had been detained by swollen streams, rested for the night at Pace's Ferry on the north bank of the Chattahoochee.

On the morning of the 5th Sherman, from the top of Kenesaw Mountain, could see that *Hood's* main army was encamped near Dallas. But he also saw the fierce fight which was raging round Allatoona, eighteen miles away. The original garrison of Allatoona consisted of three regiments. General Corse, with three more regiments, arrived from Rome just in time to take the command before the attack began. *French* was beaten off after a desperate struggle lasting for several hours, in which both sides lost heavily. He also failed to capture the blockhouse, which protected the railway bridge over the Etowah.

Sherman, when he commenced the retrograde movement from Atlanta, had hoped that he might find *Hood's* army on the railroad, and so have a chance of hemming his opponent in between the Etowah and the Federal army. But when he found that *Hood* had been too wary to make such a mistake, and that there was but little chance of forcing him to a decisive battle, his thoughts turned back to the movement on Savannah: and he wrote to Grant proposing to break up the line from Chattanooga southwards and turning his back on *Hood* to march through Georgia for the Atlantic coast.

¹ The Army of the Cumberland was commanded in Thomas's absence by Stanley.

But on the 10th came the news that *Hood* was crossing the Coosa several miles below Rome, and seemed to be threatening Corse, who with one division held that town. Accordingly Sherman ordered a concentration of his armies at Rome, whilst at the same time orders were sent to Thomas to concentrate all available troops at Stevenson, forty miles west of Chattanooga, in case *Hood*, turning north-west, attempted to cross the Tennessee. On the next day he learnt that *Hood* had not approached Rome, but had marched in some direction at present unknown. Again he wrote to Grant asking for permission to march on Savannah. But in a day or two definite information was once more to hand of *Hood's* movements. After crossing the Coosa below Rome he had sent his trains and reserve artillery fifty miles west to Gadsden¹ and was now moving north with his army in light marching order to strike the railroad at Resaca. As his right flank would be covered by the Oostanula, he hoped to carry that post by a *coup de main* and destroy the railway bridge over the Oostanula.

Hood reached Resaca on the 12th, but when the garrison refused to surrender, did not venture upon an assault. Leaving one Corps before Resaca, he moved along the line of railway and captured both Tilton and Dalton. He failed, however, to do any permanent damage to the railroad, and on the 14th Sherman, with Howard's and Stanley's troops, reached Resaca, and *Hood* at once retreated west in the direction of Villanow.

Finding that Sherman was in full pursuit, *Hood* retreated still further west to Gadsden, which he reached on the 20th. Sherman followed him, and on the same day that the Confederates arrived at Gadsden had his army concentrated at Gaylesville, thirty miles to the north-east. For seven days the two armies remained in their respective positions watching each other.²

The result of the operations in October had been to bring Sherman back from Atlanta over a hundred miles to his rear. But *Hood's* dash against the Federal line of communications had failed to do any permanent damage to the railroad; and it was still open to Sherman to march eastwards towards the Atlantic coast whenever he chose. The experience of October had convinced him that this move was the right one. The rapidity with which *Hood's*

¹ Seventy miles west-south-west of Chattanooga.

² *Hood* (4 B. & L., 426) states that it was his intention after leaving Villanow and finding that Sherman was following in pursuit, to stand and deliver battle, but he was bitterly disappointed to learn from the unanimous opinion of his principal officers that the morale of his troops had not sufficiently improved to justify a battle against Sherman's superior numbers.

army had moved showed how difficult it would be to overtake it and bring it to bay. If *Hood* now crossed the Tennessee at any point east of Gunter'sville (thirty miles NNW. of Gadsden), Sherman was prepared to follow in pursuit;¹ but if, on the other hand, *Hood* continued to move west, and tried to cross the river at Decatur or Florence, he was resolved not to throw away all that had been gained during the recent campaign, but to turn eastwards. He believed that *Hood* would feel himself obliged to follow him in that case; and he was the more strongly inclined to hold that view when he learnt that *Beauregard* had been assigned to the command of all the Confederate troops between the Mississippi and Middle Georgia.

After the termination of the Atlanta campaign *Hood* had been writing first to General *Bragg* and then to President *Davis*, begging that all the troops in Georgia might be placed under his command, and that *Hardee*, to whom he attributed almost all his misfortunes, might be relieved of duty, and Lieutenant-General *R. H. Taylor*, commanding the forces in Alabama and Mississippi, might be substituted for him. The Southern President visited *Hood* at his headquarters on September 25th and made the following arrangements. *Hardee* was promoted to the command of a Department embracing East Georgia and the adjoining portions of Florida and South Carolina, whilst *Beauregard* was assigned to the command of *Hood's* and *Taylor's* Departments, which were now consolidated into one Military Division.² But it seems to have been distinctly understood between *Hood* and *Davis*, and impressed by the latter upon *Beauregard*, that he was not to interfere with *Hood's* plan of campaign, but must leave him the personal control of his own troops. *R. H. Taylor* was the President's brother-in-law, and he feared that to put him in *Hardee's* place would cause the charge of favouritism to be brought against him, and he was painfully conscious how much already his influence was waning. For Governor *Brown* of Georgia was asserting for his State those very rights which had formed the basis of secession, and had granted to the State militia a furlough for the purpose of gathering in the harvest, whilst he also claimed the right to confine their operations to their native State and to appoint their officers himself.

On October 20th and 21st *Beauregard* and *Hood* discussed at Gadsden the next move, and it was agreed to invade Tennessee by way of Gunter'sville. But when *Hood* had only made a single day's march in that direction, he suddenly turned off westwards,

¹ Such a move on *Hood's* part would have left his line of retreat at Sherman's mercy.

² *Cheatham* succeeded to the command of *Hardee's* Corps.

showing how lightly he regarded *Beauregard's* supposed authority over him, and attempted to cross the river at Decatur.¹ R. S. Granger, who commanded the Federal force in that neighbourhood, repulsed an attack upon Decatur, whereupon *Hood* moved still further west to Tuscumbia near to the Mississippi border line.² Sherman was anxious to see whether *Hood* would, as he expected, turn and follow him, if he moved east, and with that end in view marched his army back in the first days of November into Georgia, and concentrated it about Rome and Kingston. On November 2nd he received from Grant the long desired permission to march eastwards through the heart of Georgia.

The credit of conceiving this plan of marching to the coast *at this particular juncture* belongs solely to Sherman.³ Thomas and Grant were both opposed to it. The latter believed and, rightly, as events proved, that *Hood* having once parted company with Sherman would, instead of following him, invade Tennessee, and he did not share Sherman's confidence in Thomas's ability to beat *Hood* back. Thomas himself had been reluctant to accept a charge of such great responsibility,⁴ yet there was certainly no one better qualified than himself to undertake it. His natural qualities pre-eminently fitted him for carrying out a Fabian policy, and at the same time no one was better able, as he proved afterwards at Nashville, to strike a crushing blow, when in his opinion the proper time for such a blow had arrived. Lincoln also viewed Sherman's

¹ *Hood's* own explanation of his sudden change of plan is that it was due to the news that *Forrest* with his cavalry was near Jackson, Tennessee, and owing to the high water in the river could not join *Hood* in Middle Tennessee. Therefore he turned west in order to effect a junction with *Forrest* before crossing to the north bank of the Tennessee (4 B. & L., 427). This explanation Cox pronounces 'more specious than sound' on the ground that the same orders 'which apparently stopped *Forrest* at Jackson could have brought him back to Tuscumbia or to any other place where the Tennessee could be more easily crossed and a junction with *Hood* more easily made.'

² *Hood*, however, only admits that he made a slight demonstration against Decatur in order to cover the movement to Tuscumbia (150 miles west of Chattanooga).

³ A letter from Sherman to Grant written before the commencement of the Atlanta campaign shows that from the very first Sherman had been contemplating a march to the Atlantic coast (Cox's *Atlanta*, 19). The peculiar circumstances under which he carried out the details of a plan, the broad outlines of which had undoubtedly presented themselves to Grant, were these: first, he left behind him as yet undefeated the Confederate army of the West; secondly, he started for the Atlantic coast before the Federal forces in the East had secured for him any place which might serve as a new base.

⁴ Cox, 7.

proposed march with much uneasiness, though, true to his settled policy, since the appointment of Grant to the supreme command, of not interfering with the operations of the armies in the field, he raised no objection.¹

Whilst he still believed that *Hood* would follow him to the east, Sherman had proposed only to send back the 4th Corps for service under Thomas, but when he found that *Hood*, so far from following him, was moving still further west, he determined to detach the 23rd Corps as well. Schofield, its commander, was ready enough to agree. He was still in command of the Department of East Tennessee, and if he were placed under Thomas's orders, there would be no need to make any fresh alterations in that Department, and at the same time he anticipated that Tennessee would be the scene of an interesting and important campaign, in which he could find full scope for the display of his military abilities.² Both Corps were sent back to report for duty to Thomas, and Schofield was assigned by that general to take command of them, with his headquarters at Pulaski (seventy miles south of Nashville), on the Nashville-Decatur railroad.

Hood, from Tusculum, crossed the river to Florence on the northern bank. He had at that time under his command an army of 44,700 men, whilst *Forrest's* cavalry, which were placed under his orders, amounted to 9,200.³ The latter at the end of October had started for a raid into Tennessee, hoping to draw Thomas's attention away from *Hood's* passage across the river by threatening his lines of communication in rear of Nashville. On the 29th he struck the Tennessee a few miles above Fort Henry, and moving up the left bank of the river, joined *Hood* at Florence on November

¹ See his letter to Sherman, quoted in 4 B. & L., 256. Rawlins, Grant's own chief of staff, 'went behind Grant's back and begged the President to intervene' (Liddell Hart). Halleck also, Chief of Staff at Washington, favoured a movement against Montgomery, Selma, and Mobile as 'in a military point of view' more important than the proposed march to the Atlantic coast.

² Schofield himself suggested the assignment of his Corps to duty under Thomas.

³ These are the figures given by Cox 'from the official returns in the Adjutant-General's office at Washington.' *Hood's* own estimate of his forces is very much lower. He states that he crossed the Tennessee with only 30,600 men (excluding *Forrest's* cavalry). Captain Liddell Hart accepts *Hood's* estimate and reckons *Forrest's* numbers as 'probably 7,700.' Cox's figures give those 'present,' *Hood's* only the effectives. *Beauregard's* estimate is even lower, an aggregate of all arms of 35,000. 'The present' include the sick, details for 'extra duty' and men under arrest. 'The effectives' are the fighting men, ready to take their place in battle, less the officers.

16th. *Hood* had been obliged to remain for three weeks at Florence in order to accumulate a store of supplies for his next movement. These supplies were collected at various points along the Mobile and Ohio railroad, brought to Corinth, and then conveyed eastward to Chrokec Station along a section of the Memphis and Charleston railroad, which *Forrest* had been able to keep open. From there they had to be transported in wagons to Tusculumbia, a distance of about fifteen miles, over a wretched country road, quickly converted by the rain into a morass. But probably *Hood* was in no hurry to advance until he had satisfied himself as to what Sherman's next move would be. If that general marched into Alabama and struck the Confederate lines of supply, *Hood* might find himself caught between Sherman in the rear and Thomas in front among the 'barrens' of Tennessee, where little subsistence for man or beast could be found.¹ He hoped against hope that Sherman would yet abandon his hold upon Georgia and fall back to protect Nashville, and the fact that Sherman did not follow that course, but continued to march east, probably rendered him desperate, and partially explains the recklessness which marked his disastrous campaign against Thomas.² Before he moved from Gadsden he had agreed with *Beauregard* to send back *Wheeler's* cavalry, which had rejoined from East Tennessee, to hold Sherman in check, and *Beauregard* reckoned on being able to collect a force of about 30,000 men in all, counting in the Georgia militia and some troops which might be brought from the Carolinas, to meet Sherman's eastward march, if that possibility became an actual fact.

The army with which Sherman started for Savannah numbered 62,000 men.³ It consisted of two Corps of the Army of the Cumberland and two of the Army of the Tennessee. The former were placed under the command of Slocum and constituted the left wing. The Corps commanders were Davis and Williams. Howard, commanding the Army of the Tennessee, was at the head of the right wing. Blair still commanded the 17th Corps, but Logan, the commander of the 15th, had not returned from the North, whither he had gone to take part in the Presidential election, and his place was filled by Osterhaus. The cavalry force was under the command of Kilpatrick and only consisted of a single division.

Sherman, having received permission from Grant for his march

¹ Cox, 16.

² Cf. Liddell Hart, 360.

³ The army was in light marching order. Each Corps was to be independent for supplies, to move on a separate road, and had a 900-foot section of the 'wing' pontoon train given it (Liddell Hart).

through Georgia, had as a necessary preliminary to break up the railway back from Atlanta. He wished to leave with Thomas a force sufficient to hold *Hood* in check, until the fresh levies arriving from the North should give him a decided superiority of numbers.

Thomas, when reinforced by the 4th and 23rd Corps, had an army about equal to *Hood's*, although the Confederates had a very distinct superiority in cavalry. A. J. Smith's three divisions were on their way from Missouri, and the detachments in Northern Georgia and also some in East Tennessee were to be called in to reinforce Thomas's army.¹

It was Sherman's intention to hold no post beyond Nashville except Chattanooga. The supplies accumulated in Chattanooga would suffice for the garrisons retained in East Tennessee. Accordingly, as soon as the 23rd Corps had been sent back to Tennessee and a supply of provisions had been collected at Atlanta for the march eastwards, Sherman set to work to destroy the railway back from Atlanta to the Etowah. The foundries, factories, and machine shops at Rome were also destroyed, and the same fate befell Atlanta. Immediately after its capture in September, before he had yet fixed his future plans, Sherman had determined to convert that city into a 'place of arms,' and for that purpose had directed that the lines of fortifications should be contracted, so that the place could be held by a smaller garrison, and had ordered that the whole of the population should be removed either north or south, as individuals preferred. This measure, harsh indeed, yet amply justified on military grounds, had led to an angry correspondence between Sherman and *Hood*, in which the former had had the better of the argument. Now that he had definitely decided to advance through Georgia, he determined to make it not worth the while of the Confederates to regain possession of Atlanta, as it was no part of his plan to leave a large garrison to hold it, when he required every available man to take part in the advance.

Entering a more or less unknown country, also not knowing exactly what opposition he might encounter, he did not definitely declare what route he would follow. He told Halleck that he would either come out on the Atlantic coast near Charleston or Savannah, or else reach the Gulf near Mobile and Pensacola. He could reach the vicinity of Charleston by way of Augusta and

¹ Cox gives as 'present for duty' on October 31st, infantry and artillery 48,975 and cavalry 5,591. J. H. Wilson had been sent by Grant after the fall of Atlanta to be Sherman's chief of cavalry and Sherman before starting for the Atlantic coast sent him to serve in the same capacity under Thomas.

the left bank of the Savannah River. The route through Milledgeville, Millen, and the Ogeechee Valley would bring him out close to Savannah; and if his progress east were effectually barred, he could still move west of Macon and reach the ports upon the Gulf.

On November 12th all communication with the rear was broken, and on the 14th the whole army was concentrated at Atlanta. On the following morning the great march commenced.¹ At first the movement was made in two columns. The right wing feinted at Macon, the left wing at Augusta. Sherman himself accompanied the left wing, in order that he might be on the spot to decide whether Charleston or Savannah should be the point aimed at.

The two columns were to come into communication with each other in the neighbourhood of Milledgeville, the State capital. On the evening of the 22nd the advanced guard of the left wing entered that city, and the next day the whole of Slocum's column was concentrated there. During the march of this column seventy miles of railroad to the east of Atlanta had been torn up, and the bridge over the Oconee River, some miles further on, destroyed. Sherman did not, however, cross the river at that point, but moved down the right bank until he was within reach of Howard's column. During the march towards Augusta he had made up his mind that the easier route to follow would be that which led through Milledgeville and Millen to Savannah, instead of attempting to reach Charleston, in which case he would have to cross numerous deep rivers and swamps, at any one of which a determined opposition might make the passage almost impossible.

The right wing, which was accompanied by Kilpatrick's cavalry division, advanced some distance south along the railroad towards Macon. Then the infantry crossed the Ocmulgee marching eastwards, and on the 22nd was closed up near Gordon on the Central railroad, some twenty miles east of Macon, and within easy reach of the other column at Milledgeville.²

The cavalry, after capturing the works at Lovejoy Station, which were held by two brigades of *Wheeler's* cavalry, pressed on after the retreating enemy close up to Macon, so as to give the impression that that city was threatened by the Federal advance, and subsequently rejoined the infantry.

¹ Sherman and his staff following next morning with the last Corps of the left wing (Liddell Hart).

² Milledgeville was not on the main line of the Central railway from Macon to Savannah, but connected with it by a branch line from Gordon, ten miles distant.

The Confederate authorities were at their wits' end. *Beauregard*, from his headquarters at Corinth, addressed grandiloquent appeals to the people of Georgia to rise *en masse* against the invader.¹ On the 21st *Hardee* visited Macon, coming from Savannah. He correctly decided that Macon was in no danger, but wrongly inferred that Sherman's objective was Augusta.² He himself returned to Savannah, having directed *Smith's* Georgia militia to move eastward with all speed and try to get between Sherman and Augusta, while *Wheeler's* cavalry were ordered to continue to harass the Federal right flank and rear. The Georgia militia marched in obedience to these orders to reach the Central railroad at Gordon, and on the 22nd, when eight miles out from Macon, came up with the rearguard of Sherman's right wing.³ The militia promptly attacked, but after several assaults were repulsed with considerable loss.

The day after *Hardee's* visit to Macon a Council of War, consisting of *R. H. Taylor*, Governor *Brown*, his Adjutant, *Toombs*, and *Howell Cobb*, commanding the Georgia 'reserves,' assembled there. On learning the news of *Smith's* engagement the Council directed the militia to take a roundabout route to reach Savannah, where they reported for duty to *Hardee* on the 30th.⁴ *Wheeler* also received orders from *Hardee* to abandon his position on the right flank of Howard's column, and getting in front of Sherman to endeavour to cover all the roads by which he might advance. This change of policy on *Wheeler's* part led to a corresponding change in the movements of the Federal cavalry, and Kilpatrick was directed to leave Howard's right flank and move in front and to the left of the infantry advance.

On the 24th the left wing was again in motion from Milledgeville, and after striking the Central railway and following it for a short distance, crossed the Ogeechee and encamped on the 29th at Louisville. The right wing continued to advance along the Central railroad, tearing up the rails as they advanced, to Millen, which was reached on December 3rd. The direct line of railway between Augusta and Savannah was severed by the Federal occupation of Millen.

From Louisville and Millen the army moved towards Savannah

¹ *Beauregard* himself arrived at Macon on the 24th and on December 6th was at Augusta.

² Liddell Hart, 350.

³ Battle of Griswoldville.

⁴ They were first withdrawn to Macon, then took the rail to Albany, marched thence sixty miles across country to Thomasville, and from that point reached Savannah by the Savannah and Gulf railway (4 B. & L., 667).

as its next objective. Three Corps marched down the corridor between the Ogeechee and the Savannah, and the 15th Corps kept along the right bank of the Ogeechee. On December 9th and 10th the whole Federal army was closing in upon Savannah. Cavalry and experienced infantry scouts were sent out to make communication with the fleet, which was off the coast, and also to cut the railroad from the Gulf to Savannah.

During the march through Georgia Sherman had set himself to break up thoroughly the railway system of the State. If that were effectually performed, then the resources of Georgia, probably the richest State left to the Confederacy, would be completely lost to the Richmond Government. The work of destroying the railroads was pursued in a most business-like manner. A special corps of pioneers had been formed for the purpose, but it was soon found that the infantry could do the work sufficiently well. A single Corps could in one day's march thoroughly destroy some ten or fifteen miles of track. In every direction the work of destruction went on unsparingly. From the Etowah through Atlanta, as far south as Lovejoy Station, one hundred miles of track were torn up: another hundred miles were destroyed from Fairburn, on the Montgomery railway, through Atlanta as far as the Oconee River. The Central railroad was completely wrecked from Gordon for 160 miles, almost to the suburbs of Savannah; and the branch lines from Gordon to Milledgeville and from Millen to Augusta were also destroyed beyond any possibility of speedy repair.

The country itself through which Sherman marched fared very little better: over a belt of land, some fifty or sixty miles broad, a clean sweep was made of all supplies. Along the line of march every article which could be regarded as possessing a possible military value was seized. Sherman was determined to bring home to the inhabitants of the smiling fields of Georgia the horrors of war. 'War is cruelty,' he said, 'and you cannot refine it.' The same policy, ruthless as it seemed at the time, yet perhaps most merciful in the end, which had desolated Atlanta, now laid bare the granary of the South. Sherman beyond doubt strove to hold tight the reins of discipline and to prevent the legitimate requisitioning of supplies from degenerating into mere lawless robbery and violence. Every day each regiment detailed about one-twentieth of its strength, under an officer, to collect off the country the necessary supplies. Though the trains carried twenty days' rations, and herds of beef cattle accompanied the army, it was Sherman's policy to live as far as possible off the country and to tax the supplies of the trains

only when absolutely necessary. The Vicksburg campaign had convinced him that it was quite possible for an army moving rapidly to some given destination to dispense practically with supply trains, and live off the country in the more fertile regions of the South: and if it had been possible in the Mississippi Valley, it was a still simpler process in the rich lands of Georgia.

In spite, however, of Sherman's endeavours to regulate and keep within the limits of military discipline his extensive scheme of subsisting his army off the soil, it is impossible to deny that very grave hardships were entailed upon the inhabitants by this system. Discipline was not equally strict throughout the army; Kilpatrick in particular earned an invidious reputation for rapacity and lawlessness.¹ Much of the blame must be shared, however, by *Wheeler's* cavalry: for, as they began to realise the hopelessness of the struggle, they flung aside the ties of discipline and plundered the unhappy inhabitants with scant mercy.

As the Federal army closed in on Savannah, *Hardee* found himself with a force of about 17,000 men with which to defend the place.² It was quite impossible to provision Savannah against a long siege, and the Confederate general had no intention of letting the same fate befall him as had overtaken *Pemberton* in Vicksburg. He intended to evacuate Savannah before there was any chance of his line of retreat being cut off, and he then proposed to rally all the troops available for the purpose of resisting Sherman's march northwards. Throughout this campaign *Hardee* displayed a sound military judgment and no ordinary ability in reading the designs of his opponent. He fully recognised that the garrisons must be withdrawn from the Atlantic coast, and a great effort made to prevent Sherman from marching through the Carolinas and closing in on *Lee's* rear, whilst Grant held the Army of Northern Virginia fast in front. It was not *Hardee's* fault that Sherman was enabled to march ultimately with comparative ease through the Carolinas northwards.³

As *Hardee* did not propose to stay in Savannah till the place was completely invested, it was naturally his object to keep open the line of retreat to Charleston. For this purpose he drew his first line of defence round the city some distance out with his right

¹ The worst outrages were committed by the stragglers, whom Sherman found it impossible to keep under control.

² Cox, 51.

³ On November 30th *Beauregard's* command of the Military Division of the West had been extended to the Atlantic coast. But a month later at his own request he was relieved of the command of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida.

covering the Charleston railway bridge over the Savannah and his left the Gulf railway bridge over the Ogeechee.

But the advance of a Federal Corps down the right bank of the latter river turned his flank and compelled him to fall back upon an inner line of defence. After thus contracting his lines his only road of retreat lay by the Union Causeway, which ran to Hardee-ville, a station on the Charleston railway in South Carolina about six miles distant from the Savannah River.¹

General J. G. Foster, who was in command of a Federal force at Beaufort, had on November 29th sent Hatch's division to strike the railway at Grahamville some twenty miles from the Savannah crossing. If the Federals could have effected a lodgment in force on the line, it is hard to see how *Hardee's* army could have escaped from Savannah. But Hatch's movements on the 29th were dilatory, and gave time for *Smith's* Georgia militia to arrive and take up a position covering the threatened point. There was some sharp fighting in which the Federals lost heavily, on the 30th, but Hatch failed to reach the railroad and fell back at the close of the day.

As the Federal army approached the coast the supply of bread-stuffs grew scarcer. Rice swamps took the place of cornfields, and Sherman was anxious as quickly as possible to establish a line of communication with the fleet, by which supplies could be brought up the Ogeechee River. But before that was possible it was necessary to reduce Fort McAllister, which lay on the right bank of the Ogeechee commanding the approach from Ossabaw Sound. This fort was armed with seven heavy and eight field guns, was provisioned for fifty days, and occupied by a garrison of 200 men. On the afternoon of the 13th it was captured at the first assault by Hazen's division of the 15th Corps:² and the question of a base was thereby solved. A large store of provisions had been accumulated by Foster, and these could now be brought by water to Sherman's rear.

On arriving in the vicinity of Savannah, Sherman had received two despatches from Grant, directing him to establish an entrenched camp in a suitable position, and be prepared to come by sea with the bulk of his forces to join the Army of the Potomac before Richmond.³ Sherman, whilst declaring his readiness to

¹ *Hardee* flooded 'the country on his front so as to confine Sherman to five narrow causeways, which could be easily swept by artillery' (Liddell Hart, 355).

² Sherman's old division at Shiloh.

³ Captain Liddell Hart suggests that Grant, when he sent this order to Sherman, was contemplating the despatch of troops to safeguard the Ohio, in consequence of Thomas's delay in attacking *Hood* (Sherman, 364).

carry out his instructions, expressed his opinion both in writing to Grant and more emphatically by word of mouth to the staff officers who had brought the despatches, in favour of laying siege to Savannah, and then moving by land through the Carolinas to join Grant. The Commander-in-Chief, upon further reflection, had already decided to leave his subordinate free to act according to his own judgment, but before Sherman was informed of the change of plan, Savannah had already fallen. The effect of the earlier despatches, however, was to cause him to hesitate before embarking upon a siege which, if once commenced, it would be difficult to abandon, and to leave to Foster the task of cutting off *Hardee's* retreat by the Charleston railroad. He abstained, therefore, from sending any considerable force across to the Carolina bank of the Savannah. Foster, indeed, succeeded in establishing himself in a position where his guns commanded the railway. But this did not prevent the Confederates using the line, as they could run the trains over the section commanded by the Federal artillery during the night. On the 19th one brigade of Sherman's army crossed the Savannah. The rice-fields were under water, and but little progress was made. However, a hint was enough for *Hardee*, who had determined on no account to be besieged in the city. On the 20th he commenced to withdraw his troops, and the evacuation was completed that night. On the following morning the Federals entered Savannah.

Thus on December 21st Sherman's great 'march to the sea' was brought to a successful termination. Three hundred miles had been covered in twenty-four days.¹ The railway system of Georgia was completely broken up, and its resources from that time forth lost to the Confederate Government. The losses incurred during the campaign had been very slight, amounting in all to only 531 killed and wounded and 1,616 missing. Famous as this march has become, and enormous as were its consequences, it must yet be admitted that it was little more than a military promenade through Georgia. The weather had been, except for one or two days towards the end of November, most favourable, and in December the Indian summer set in. *Hood's* reckless invasion of Tennessee had practically freed Sherman from all opposition. Except for the rearguard action on November 22nd with the Georgia militia, the only organised force encountered consisted of *Wheeler's* cavalry.² There was some fierce fighting

¹ November 15th–December 9th.

² At the opening of the campaign *Wheeler's* force comprised thirteen brigades, about 7,000 men in all (Liddell Hart). But it had been considerably reduced by stragglers and deserters. Kilpatrick's division numbered 5,000.

towards the end of November between that force and Kilpatrick's cavalry in the neighbourhood of Waynesboro and Briar Creek to the left of the main line of advance. But from Millen onwards little opposition was met with, as *Wheeler* soon withdrew his troops to the left bank of the Savannah. In point of hard fighting this campaign cannot compare with the Atlanta campaign which preceded it, nor in hard marching with the Carolina campaign, which followed it.

Among the spoils of Savannah were over 150 heavy guns and 31,000 bales of cotton.¹ President Lincoln could not complain of the Christmas present which Sherman sent him.

NOTE

ON SHERMAN'S STRATEGY

Grant in his instructions of April 4th had directed Sherman 'to move against *Johnston's* army, break it up and get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources.' That Sherman realised that the destruction of *Johnston's* army was to be his primary objective is shown in his *Memoirs*: 'Neither Atlanta, nor Augusta, nor Savannah was the objective, but "the army of Jos Johnston, go where it might."' Accordingly, he opened his campaign by a manœuvre, which aimed at placing two Corps across *Johnston's* line of retreat and forcing him eastwards away from his sole line of supply. If *Johnston* were driven to abandon the railway, he would be forced to give battle under most unfavourable conditions, and the breaking up of the Confederate army might be achieved at the very outset of the campaign. Undeterred by McPherson's failure, Sherman sought to repeat the manœuvre by moving him across the Oostanaula on to *Johnston's* rear, although the element of surprise was now lacking. The opportunity was again lost and *Johnston*, instead of standing to fight at Resaca, as he had at first intended to do, slipped away in the night. From now on the alternative objective of Atlanta began to bulk ever larger before Sherman's eyes. Instead of trying to force a battle upon *Johnston*, he sought by outflanking movements to manœuvre him out of the strong defensive positions, which he successively took up. Atlanta was in itself a prize worth winning. 'The Gate City of the South' was 'one of the few manufacturing centres for munitions in the Confederacy, the greatest railway centre of the South, and the inner back gate, as

¹ Sherman, in his letter to the President, speaks of 150 heavy guns. Cox says: 'The heavy guns, mounted and in store, which were captured, were found to number over two hundred and fifty' (*March to the Sea*, 61).

Chattanooga was the outer, to the Atlantic States, which were the foundation of the hostile power and will' (Liddell Hart). But 'Atlanta was too strong to be assaulted, too extensive to be invested' (Johnston). It remained to force *Hood* to evacuate it by cutting his lines of supply. This Sherman succeeded in doing, but in the process let *Hood* escape. His reasons for discontinuing the offensive were as follows: '*Hood's* position [at Lovejoy Station] is too strong to attack in front and to turn it would carry me too far from my base at this time. Besides, there is no commensurate object, as there is no valuable point in his rear, till we reach Macon, 103 miles from Atlanta. We are not prepared for that' (Liddell Hart, 317). This explanation shows how far the breaking up of the Confederate army, once the primary objective of the campaign, had receded into the background with Sherman.

After the capture of Atlanta Sherman was at a loss as to his next move. He had counted upon Canby being able to take Mobile City and open the Alabama river; in that case he would have moved his whole army down to West Point and Columbus and opened a fresh campaign from there. Then *Hood* seized the initiative and led Sherman on a wild-goose chase over 100 miles back from Atlanta to the Alabama frontier. He would have followed him into Tennessee, if *Hood* had crossed the river east of Guntersville, but when *Hood* bore away westwards to Tusculum, he urged Grant to let him leave *Hood* to be dealt with by Thomas, while he himself invaded Georgia. He despaired of catching *Hood*, who 'can twist and turn like a fox and wear out any army by pursuit.' To follow *Hood* farther meant to give up all he had gained and to make good Jefferson Davis's Macon prophecy. But to Grant the prospect of *Hood* marching at will through Tennessee and perhaps entering Kentucky and threatening the Ohio line was most unwelcome; it might derange his whole plan of campaign against Lee, and on November 1st he wrote urging Sherman to 'entirely settle *Hood* before starting on your proposed campaign. With *Hood's* army destroyed you can go where you please with impunity. If you can see the chance of destroying *Hood's* army, attend to that first, and make your other move secondary.' But next day he had changed his mind: 'I say then, go on as you propose.' Sherman's decision to leave Thomas to cope with *Hood* and march himself through the heart of Georgia to the sea coast is highly commended by General Fuller, and the grounds on which he commends it are well worth quotation, as affording a clue to Sherman's mental exercises. 'He saw that *Hood's* army was only his primary objective as long as it covered Georgia, the Carolinas and Lee's rear, and because it covered them. Now that they were no longer covered, these vital localities became in themselves his primary objective, and as long as he could guarantee the security of the country in rear of him, he would have violated the principle of direction had he continued in pursuit of *Hood*.' Whether the force which he left with Thomas was or was not a sufficient guarantee, must be considered in a later chapter.

CHAPTER VI

THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY IN 1864-5¹

The Federal operations in West Virginia—Sigel's advance up the Valley—Sigel defeated by Breckinridge at Newmarket—Hunter advances on Staunton—Federal victory at Piedmont—Federals occupy Staunton—And advance on Lynchburg from the West—Early arrives in time to save Lynchburg—Hunter retreats to the Kanawha Valley—Early invades the North—Early crosses the Potomac—And occupies Frederick City—Early defeats Wallace on the Monocacy—Early appears before Washington—Early retreats—Early makes good his retreat into the Valley—Early retires to Strasburg—The 6th Corps recalled by Grant—Early resumes the offensive—The Confederate cavalry cross the Potomac—Destruction of Chambersburg—McCausland defeated by Averell—Grant sends reinforcements—Grant urges the appointment of a single commander against Early—Sheridan appointed to the command—Sheridan's earlier career—Composition of the Army of the Shenandoah—Sheridan threatens Winchester—Early falls back beyond Strasburg—Reinforcements sent by Lee to the Valley—Sheridan retreats down the Valley—Early advances to the Potomac—Early falls back to Bunker Hill—Sheridan again menaces Winchester—Anderson leaves the Valley—Grant holds a conference with Sheridan—Early's defective strategy—Sheridan prepares to attack—Battle of the Opequon (or Winchester)—The Confederates attempt a counterstroke—The Confederate left driven in—The Confederate army routed—Early takes up a position at Fisher's Hill—Battle of Fisher's Hill—Rout of the Confederate army—Kershaw rejoins Early—Sheridan occupies Harrisonburg—Difference of opinion between Grant and Sheridan—Devastation of the Valley—Sheridan falls back to Strasburg—Early follows in pursuit—Confederate cavalry routed at Tom's Brook—Difference of opinion between Halleck and Sheridan—Early resumes the offensive—Sheridan starts for Washington—Early's plan of attack—Battle of Cedar Creek—Federal left surprised and routed—Federal centre retreats—The 6th Corps forms a new line—Arrival of Sheridan—Attack on the Federal right repulsed—Sheridan attacks—The Confederate army routed—The 2nd Corps returns to Richmond—Depletion of both armies—Further cavalry operations—Sheridan again moves up the Valley—Early routed at Waynesboro—Sheridan rejoins Grant.

THOUGH the two chief theatres of war during 1864 were Eastern Virginia and Georgia, there was yet a third, where events of no slight importance and with a distinct bearing upon

¹ See Map V. The text is mainly based upon Pond's *The Shenandoah in 1864* (Scribner's). Sheridan's account of his campaign against Early

the final issue, which was being fought out between *Lee* and Grant, were taking place.

The Shenandoah Valley was again the scene of a campaign, which was decisive in its results and full of strategical interest. In 1862 *Stonewall Jackson* had conducted that Valley campaign, which exercised so profound an influence upon the fate of McClellan's Peninsular campaign. In 1863 it was down the Shenandoah Valley that *Lee*, after Chancellorsville, had marched the Army of Northern Virginia for the invasion of Pennsylvania, and it was at Winchester that the greater part of Milroy's command had capitulated. In 1864 the Valley was once more the scene of a campaign, which lasted longer and was more decisive in its results than either of its predecessors. But the tide of fortune had turned and the Federals, to whom hitherto the Valley had so frequently been the scene of disaster, found themselves at the close of the campaign in undisputed possession of almost the whole of it.

In the spring of 1864 Major-General Sigel was in command of the Department of West Virginia, of which the Shenandoah Valley formed a part. The chief function of the commander of that Department was to stand on the defensive and cover the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, the great line of communication between Washington and the West. But at the same time it was possible to assume the offensive against two Confederate railways, the Virginia Central, which passed through Staunton, and the Virginia and Tennessee running through Lynchburg. Grant's plan of campaign for 1864 designed an offensive movement to be made from the valley of the Kanawha River¹ against the latter railway by the forces of Crook and Averell,² whilst Sigel was to advance up the Shenandoah Valley and create a diversion by threatening Staunton and the Virginia Central railway.³

is contained in the second volume of his *Memoirs* and *Early's* version in the fourth volume of *Battles and Leaders*. Gordon, who commanded one of *Early's* divisions, has described the operations in his *Reminiscences of the Civil War*; but his narrative must be accepted with considerable reserve, as the recollections of his old age. More reliance can be placed upon Keifer's *Slavery and Four Years of War*, Vol. II. Keifer commanded first a brigade and then a division of the 6th Corps, and his version of the Battle of Cedar Creek has been closely followed in this chapter.

¹ See Map I.

² Crook was commanding, under General Sigel, in the Kanawha Valley, and Averell was Crook's cavalry commander.

³ Grant's main object in directing this movement from West Virginia was the destruction of the Virginia and Tennessee railway and of the

Averell, with two brigades of cavalry, started on May 1st to destroy the salt works at Saltville,¹ whilst Crook, with about 6,000 men in all, advanced, on May 3rd, to destroy the Virginia and Tennessee railway bridge over the New River at New Bern. On approaching Saltville, Averell decided, from the information which reached him, that it was too strongly held to be successfully attacked. Accordingly he turned towards Wythesville,² on the Virginia and Tennessee railway, in the hope of destroying the lead works there. But the Confederate general, *John Morgan*, promptly transferred a part of his force from Saltville to the threatened point, and drove him off with some loss.

Crook, in the meanwhile, had been more successful. On the 9th he attacked and inflicted a severe defeat upon a Confederate force strongly posted on Cloyd's Mountain,³ and the following day reached New Bern, gained possession of the railway bridge, and burned it. Having accomplished his object, he withdrew to Union,⁴ where he was rejoined by Averell, and the united command went into camp at Meadow Bluff (twenty-five miles north of Union).

On April 30th Sigel commenced his advance up the Shenandoah Valley.⁵ He, however, regarded his force, numbering about 6,500 men, as too small for offensive purposes, and had but a vague idea of the part which he was expected to play. He would have much preferred that Crook's force should have co-operated with his own in a movement upon Staunton. He expressed the opinion that with so small a force it would not be safe to advance beyond Strasburg unless his left flank was protected against a Confederate movement by way of Front Royal. Though Grant, in reply, assured him that he did not want him to move beyond Cedar Creek, yet Sigel pushed southward, on May 11th, through Woodstock, and on the 14th came in contact with *Breckinridge's* force advancing down the Valley from Newmarket, a village of some strategical importance, as the Front Royal-Luray turnpike after crossing the Massanuttons, connected with the main Valley turnpike at that point.

salt-mines at Saltville. Sigel's advance up the Valley was of secondary importance. On the one hand it would protect the Baltimore and Ohio railway, on the other it would draw off the attention from Crook's movement, and in certain circumstances Sigel might join hands with Crook at Staunton.

¹ Sixty miles west-south-west of New Bern.

² Thirty-five miles east of Saltville.

³ To the north of New Bern.

⁴ Thirty miles north of New Bern.

⁵ See Map V.

The numerical strength of the two armies actually engaged on the following day was fairly equal, about 5,000 troops on either side. But Sigel's lack of any definite plan of campaign had caused him to string out his troops along the turnpike, and in the battle of the 15th he was at a distinct disadvantage. *Imboden's* cavalry brigade turned his left flank, and he was forced to retreat with the loss of five guns. *Breckinridge* did not press the pursuit far, and Sigel withdrew his defeated force to Cedar Creek. He was preparing to advance again up the Valley when he was relieved of the command of the Department by General Hunter.¹

On May 26th the new commander advanced up the turnpike from Cedar Creek. His force numbered 8,500 men of all arms, with twenty-one guns. Sigel had been left to hold the line of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad with the reserves. Hunter's directions were to march on Staunton, and there join hands with Crook's and Averell's forces for an advance upon Charlottesville and Lynchburg. In order to march with all speed he was instructed to levy supplies from the inhabitants of the Valley, and depend as little as possible upon trains.

Since Sigel's defeat at Newmarket, *Lee* had called *Breckinridge's* command to the line of the North Anna, and the Confederate forces left in the Valley were no match for Hunter's force. The Federal general, on June 2nd, left the Valley turnpike and took a road running south-east to Port Republic, in order to outflank *Imboden's* cavalry, which was holding the line of the North River across the turnpike at Mount Crawford.

On the 5th the Confederate main body, which had marched from Lynchburg, under General *W. E. Jones*, was encountered at Piedmont, a small village on the road between Port Republic and Staunton.

Hunter's superiority of numbers enabled him to turn *Jones's* right, whilst pressing heavily on his left, and the Confederates were driven from their position in rout, leaving their commander dead upon the field, and three guns and 1,500 prisoners in the

¹ According to Sigel's account (4 B. & L., 487), Grant had originally assigned General Ord to command the Field Force operating against Staunton; but that general 'became so diffident in regard to the whole matter that he asked to be relieved.' Sigel's reason for moving beyond Cedar Creek was because he heard that there were only about 3,000 troops in the Shenandoah Valley opposed to him, and he hoped by threatening Staunton to force *Breckinridge* to detach troops, and thereby weaken the opposition to Crook. Sigel attributed his defeat to the fact that two of his regiments were not up in time to take part in the battle. The Federal loss was 831, the Confederate 577 (4 B. & L., 491). Sigel admitted the loss of five guns: other accounts say six.

hands of the victors.¹ The remnant of the beaten army, under *Vaughan*, abandoning all hope of saving Staunton, fled eastwards to Waynesboro, where they covered the road to Charlottesville.

Hunter entered Staunton without further opposition on the 6th, where he was joined on the 8th by Crook with his own and Averell's forces, a reinforcement about 10,000 strong, with two batteries.

On the 10th Hunter, having now under his command an army of 18,000 men, with thirty guns, moved out of Staunton after destroying the Virginia Central railroad for several miles, and advanced against Lynchburg. Instead, however, of moving by way of Charlottesville, as Grant had intended, he chose to follow the route which led through Lexington, and approached Lynchburg from the west.²

Lexington, thirty-six miles distant from Staunton, was reached on the 11th. When starting from Staunton, Hunter had sent a cavalry division to break up the Charlottesville and Lynchburg railway. This was done at Arrington Station. But Hunter remained at Lexington till the 13th, waiting for his cavalry to rejoin him and also for a convoy of supplies to arrive. This delay proved fatal to his chance of capturing Lynchburg, by affording time to *Breckinridge* and *Early* to reach that city. As soon as *Lee* heard of *Jones's* defeat at Piedmont, he ordered *Breckinridge* to return to the Valley, and shortly after sent the 2nd Corps, now under *Early's* command, to cross the Blue Ridge at either Brown's

¹ Pond, 27. The Federal loss was only 420. *Imboden* (4 B. & L., 485) gives the Confederate strength at 4,500; *Vaughan*, however, estimated it at 5,600.

² Grant's original object had been to destroy the Virginia Central railway at Staunton, through which place supplies were reaching *Lee* from the Valley. That done, Hunter with Crook's and Averell's forces added to his command was to move on Charlottesville and, if possible, Lynchburg to destroy the railroads and the James canal. Having ruined them 'beyond the possibility of repair for weeks' he might either return to his base or join the Army of the Potomac by way of Gordonsville. But after the Battle of Cold Harbour Grant decided to send Sheridan with two cavalry divisions to Charlottesville to complete the ruin of the Virginia Central railway, already begun when the Army of the Potomac was on the North Anna. So fresh orders were sent to Hunter, directing instead of striking for Lynchburg to turn east against the Lynchburg branch of the Virginia Central and move eastwards along it, destroying it down to Charlottesville, where he would effect a junction with Sheridan, and the two forces thus united would then proceed to join the Army of the Potomac. But if on the receipt of these instructions Hunter found himself already near Lynchburg, he was authorised to use his discretion and either go to Lynchburg or move east towards Charlottesville as he thought best.

or Swift Run Gap and fall upon the rear of Hunter, who was supposed to be still at Staunton.

Breckinridge passed through the Blue Ridge at Rockfish Gap, joined *Vaughan's* command at Waynesboro, and hastened to Lynchburg. *Early* left Richmond on the 13th, and on the 17th half his Corps reinforced *Breckinridge* at Lynchburg. On the same day the Federal army appeared before the city. Hunter had decided that to try and drive *Breckinridge* from Rockfish Gap might cause fatal delay, and determined to push straight for Lynchburg through the Peaks of Otter. On the 15th his cavalry advance occupied Liberty, twenty-four miles west of Lynchburg, and was there joined by two hundred of *Averell's* troopers, who had been sent to ride round Lynchburg and break up the Charlottesville and Southside railways.

On the night of the 16th Hunter encamped seven miles east of Liberty, and on the following day an advanced line of Confederate entrenchments five miles out of Lynchburg was carried. Although Hunter knew that Confederate troops were entering Lynchburg, he did not despair of success, provided that a whole Army Corps had not been sent from Richmond to reinforce the garrison.

On the 18th he advanced against the city, and after driving in the Confederate skirmish line attacked in force. *Early's* infantry sallied out to meet him, but were driven back.¹ Although the operations on that day were, on the whole, favourable to the Federals, yet it became plain that *Early's* Corps was now confronting them, and on the same night Hunter ordered his army to retreat. The choice of the Lexington route to Lynchburg was now found to add to the difficulties of the situation. For the natural route up the Shenandoah Valley was now practically closed to the Federals, as *Early* could send troops by the railroad, which had been sufficiently repaired to admit of his troops being brought from Charlottesville to Lynchburg by train, and operate through Rockfish Gap against Hunter's line of retreat. Similarly, a road running west of and parallel to the Shenandoah Valley through the valley of the South Branch of the Potomac, which would have brought the Federals to the Baltimore and Ohio railway at Cumberland, was considered impracticable owing to the difficulty of getting supplies, and the possibility that the enemy might move by Staunton and Harrisonburg and cut that line of retreat. Accordingly no alternative was left to Hunter but to retreat westwards into the Kanawha Valley, leaving the Shenandoah Valley at the mercy

¹ Pond, 37. But *Early* (4 B. & L., 493) says that on the 17th he checked the enemy about two miles from Lynchburg, and that on the 18th a Federal attack was 'handsomely repulsed.'

of *Early*. He was already two hundred miles away from his base, his supplies were almost exhausted, and his stock of ammunition was running short.

The Federal retreat was conducted by forced marches, owing to the necessity of reaching with all possible speed a *dépôt* of supplies. *Early* abandoned the pursuit on the 22nd, having no intention of entangling his troops in the mountainous region of the Kanawha Valley,¹ and on the 27th Hunter's army arrived within a day's march of Gauley Bridge,² and finding supplies awaiting them went into camp.³ Though the expedition had failed to get possession of either Charlottesville or Lynchburg, and the damage done to the railways was quickly repaired, yet it had been by no means barren of result. In the first place it had called away from Richmond a considerable portion of *Lee's* army, and it had also destroyed at Staunton a large amount of valuable property. Unfortunately the necessity of retreating to the Kanawha gave Hunter's retrograde movement the appearance of a hurried flight, although even during the retreat the Federal soldiers lost no opportunity of damaging the railway as long as opportunity offered.⁴ However, the troops were so exhausted by their forced marches and insufficient supply of food, that it was found impossible to utilise them for the defence of Washington when menaced by *Early*.

When *Early* started from Cold Harbour for Lynchburg, *Lee* had suggested to him the possibility of marching down the Shenandoah Valley and threatening Washington. Such a move would perhaps cause Grant to detach a considerable force to the relief of the Capital,⁵ and would in any case force the Federal troops in West Virginia to abandon their plan of operations against Lynchburg, and evacuate the upper Valley. As Lynchburg was the third largest city in Virginia,⁶ an important railway centre, and also the

¹ See Map I.

² 110 miles west of Staunton.

³ Hunter expected to meet his supplies at Meadow Bluff, but the officer in charge of the *dépôt*, frightened by guerrilla demonstrations, had fallen back forty miles to Gauley Bridge.

⁴ Even after *Early* abandoned the pursuit, the retreat was conducted 'with the same headlong speed, not through fear of the enemy, but through the necessity of reaching supplies' (Pond).

⁵ There was also the possibility that Grant might take advantage of *Early's* absence and attack *Lee* in his Petersburg lines. Such an attack *Lee* would have welcomed.

⁶ Richmond and Petersburg were the two largest cities in Virginia. Lynchburg was the meeting-place of three railways, the Virginia and Tennessee from Chattanooga and Knoxville, the Virginia Central to Charlottesville, and the Southside railway to Petersburg.

chief depôt of a fertile district, upon which Richmond largely depended for supplies, it was of great importance to the Confederates that a Federal force should not be allowed to remain in the neighbourhood. But Grant's passage of the James somewhat changed the situation : and it was left to *Early's* discretion whether under the altered circumstances he would carry out the suggested invasion of the North.¹ Being of an adventurous temperament, he determined to take immediate advantage of Hunter's evacuation of the Valley and push straight for the Potomac. The force, which was about to invade the North for the third time, consisted of four divisions of infantry, one division of cavalry, and about forty guns, exclusive of a few pieces of horse artillery attached to the cavalry. *Breckinridge* was second in command, and two infantry divisions were placed under his orders : the other two divisions and the cavalry reported direct to *Early*. The whole Confederate force numbered about 17,000 men.²

Early's army reached Staunton³ on June 27th and Winchester on July 2nd. Sigel, who was posted at Martinsburg to protect the railway, made good his retreat across the Potomac in spite of *Early's* attempts to cut him off, and on the 4th took up a position on the impregnable Maryland Heights. The occupation of these heights prevented *Early* from carrying out his original plan of crossing the river at Harper's Ferry. On the 6th he crossed with two divisions at Shepherdstown, *Breckinridge's* command having passed the river in pursuit of Sigel on the previous day. After a fruitless demonstration against Maryland Heights, *Early* moved eastwards towards Frederick City,⁴ which he occupied on the 9th. Three miles beyond General Lew Wallace was holding the line of the Monocacy. His position was well chosen : for by holding Monocacy Junction he covered both the Baltimore and Ohio railway and also the two turnpikes from Frederick City to Baltimore and Washington. But the force at his disposal was miserably inadequate to contend with the Confederate army. When first he took up his position, he had only about 2,500 men, mainly provisional troops and 100-days' militia, under General Tyler, but on the 8th he began to be reinforced by Ricketts's division of the 6th Corps, 3,350 strong, which Grant had sent from City Point to Baltimore. Grant for some

¹ 4 B. & L., 493.

² Pond, 47. But *Early* only estimated his strength at 10,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry (4 B. & L., 493).

³ See Map V.

⁴ See Map I., Frederick City is twenty miles east-north-east of Harper's Ferry, on the Monocacy River.



time was under the impression that *Early's* Corps had returned to Richmond, and that the Washington authorities had nothing worse to fear than a plundering raid. But on July 5th he discovered that *Early* had not left the Valley, and directed that one division, to be followed if necessary by the rest of the 6th Army Corps, together with all the dismounted cavalry that Meade could lay his hands upon, should be sent north. The dismounted cavalry proved however, of very little use, being mere disorganised details largely unfit for active service.

Having occupied Frederick City at dawn of the 9th, *Early* pushed forward at once to drive Wallace out of his path. The Federal general had placed Ricketts's division on the left, covering the Washington turnpike, and Tyler's division on the right, holding the railway bridge and the Baltimore turnpike. The Federal made a stout resistance, but with *Early's* superiority in numbers and still more overwhelming superiority in artillery,¹ there could be but one issue to the battle, and when Ricketts was in danger of being outflanked on the left by *Gordon's* division, which had crossed the river lower down, Wallace ordered a retreat along the Baltimore road. The Federal losses were nearly 2,000, falling chiefly upon Ricketts's division, which lost nearly half the force with which it went into battle. *Early* reported his own loss as killed and wounded as about 700. But judging from the number of wounded, over 400, whom he left behind in the hospitals at Frederick City to fall into the enemy's hands, it is possible that his loss was somewhat heavier.

With the Washington road lying open before him, *Early* pushed forward at full speed through Rockville² and shortly after noon of the 11th his leading division, under General *Rodes*, was deploying a skirmish line within range of the artillery in the Washington forts. The rest of his army was all up about 6 p.m. But the men were exhausted with the long marches made on very dusty roads and by the great heat, and to attack that day was impossible. About the same time that *Early's* troops began to appear before Washington, reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac also began to arrive. On the evening of the 9th the other two divisions of the 6th Corps left the lines before Petersburg for City Point. Reaching Washington on the afternoon of the 11th, they found that some 800 men of *Emory's* division of the 19th Corps from New Orleans had just arrived and that same night part of the 6th Corps relieved the raw troops on the piquet line. *Early* had

¹ Wallace had only eight guns.

² Fifteen miles north-north-west of Washington.

concentrated most of his forces on the Seventh Street road facing Fort Stevens. The defences of Washington on that side consisted of detached forts connected by rifle pits and so sited that, if one fell into the hands of the enemy, it would be exposed to a cross-fire from its neighbours. Before the arrival of reinforcements the forces available for the defence of Washington amounted to 20,000. But only 9,600 of these formed the actual garrison, and nearly all the troops were either raw recruits or reservists.¹

Early, from the prisoners whom he had captured on the 9th, knew that part of the 6th Corps had been fighting him on the Monocacy, and naturally imagined that the rest of the Corps had already reached Washington. In any case his troops were too exhausted to attack on the 11th, and on the following day there was no chance of a successful assault after the arrival of veteran reinforcements. Had *Early* immediately after crossing the Potomac pushed straight for Washington, instead of wasting precious time in demonstrating against Maryland Heights, he might have had just a chance of capturing Washington. But not arriving before the Capital till the 11th, he wisely judged that any such attempt could not lead to permanent success, and might involve his whole army in utter destruction. There was some sharp skirmishing on the 12th in front of Fort Stevens, and one brigade of the 6th Corps moved out and drove back the Confederate piquet line. That evening *Early* withdrew through Rockville, and marching all night halted near Darnestown. It is hardly likely that *Lee* expected with so small a force to capture Washington.²

The invasion of the North had had the effect of withdrawing a whole Corps from Grant's army, and had given both Washington and Baltimore a sudden fright. But it had failed to disorganise Grant's plans, though it made him all the more determined to

¹ 4 B. & L., 498, note.

² According to *Early* (4 B. & L., 492, note) *Lee* never expected him to do more than threaten Washington. Yet *Early* seems to have hoped to take by surprise the works defending Washington on the 11th, and had determined to order an assault on the 12th, when during the night he heard that reinforcements from Grant had arrived. These consisted of the other two divisions of the 6th Corps and 800 men forming the advanced guard of the 19th Corps. Grant thought that had *Early* arrived one day earlier he might have entered the city before the arrival of these reinforcements. But it seems certain that he could not have held the city against the fresh troops of the Army of the Potomac. *Early* explained his delay on the Potomac by the necessity of either driving Sigel from, or 'safely housing' him, in the fortifications on Maryland Heights.

regain and hold possession of the Shenandoah Valley, in order to prevent a repetition of the invasion.

It had proved impossible to bring up Hunter's army in time to aid in the relief of Washington. Both in order to gain time and to give the exhausted soldiers some opportunity for rest, Hunter decided to transport his troops by water down the Kanawha¹ and up the Ohio to Parkersburg, and thence by the Ohio and Baltimore railway to Cumberland. But the rivers were very low and progress was slow. The troops were frequently obliged to leave the transports in order to get them over the shoals, and when the railway was reached, further delay was caused by the necessity of repairing the damage to the line, which *Imboden's* cavalry had done. It was not till July 11th that Hunter's leading division reached Martinsburg.²

On the 13th Wright, with his two divisions of the 6th Corps, followed by Emory's division of the 19th Corps,³ marched out from Washington in pursuit of *Early*. The Confederates had, however, got a good start, and on the morning of the 14th crossed the Potomac at White's Ford⁴ and went into camp at Leesburg.⁵ The evening of the same day Wright reached Poolesville,⁶ and the two armies remained watching each other on opposite banks of the Potomac till the morning of the 16th. Wright did not consider that he was strong enough to cross the river in the face of the enemy, until he had received definite information of Hunter's movements.

The general tendency of the Washington Government at this time was to leave everything to Grant, who at City Point could not possibly have exact knowledge of the actual state of affairs on the Potomac, as it changed from day to day. Consequently no combined movement was made against *Early*, who on the 16th left Leesburg and marched to Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps in the Blue Ridge.⁷ Grant, though at first eager that an attempt should be made to cut off *Early* from retreating south, quickly realised that in all probability *Early* would make good his escape. Accordingly he wrote to Halleck to the effect that Wright, to whom by his orders had been given the command of all the troops engaged in

¹ See Map I.

² Fifteen miles north-west of Harper's Ferry.

³ The 19th Corps had come from New Orleans to join the Army of the Potomac, but on reaching Hampton Roads was hurried on without disembarking to Washington.

⁴ Thirty miles above Washington.

⁵ Three miles from White's Ford.

⁶ Four miles from White's Ford.

⁷ See Map V.

the pursuit of *Early*, should be sent back to City Point with the 6th and 19th Corps, as soon as it was plain that the Confederates were really retreating. He also suggested that Hunter should move up the Valley with the view of either preventing *Early* from returning to Richmond, or in case *Lee* judged it expedient to withdraw *Early* in consequence of the return of Wright's force to the Army of the Potomac, of advancing against Charlottesville and Gordonsville and getting possession of the railroad between these two places. The knowledge that Grant wanted him back as quickly as possible may have caused Wright to press the pursuit with less vigour than he would otherwise have shown.

Hunter left Martinsburg on the 13th, and the following day moved part of his troops across the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, but on the same night received directions from Wright, that he should join him at Leesburg. The next morning he despatched a force of about 9,000 infantry and cavalry back across the Potomac. It seems plain that with properly concerted action Wright, who had under his immediate command some 15,000 men, whilst Ricketts with 5,000 more troops was hurrying from Baltimore to join him, as well as Hunter's force of 9,000 men, ought to have succeeded in seriously embarrassing *Early's* retreat. But Wright and Hunter did not join hands till the 16th, by which time *Early* was already across the Blue Ridge. Crook had now arrived to take command of Hunter's field force, and by Wright's orders advanced part of his troops to Snicker's Gap.

On the 18th *Early* was at Berryville, holding the fords of the Shenandoah. On that day one of Crook's divisions crossed that river, but was driven back again by the superior force which *Early* brought against it. On the 19th *Early* abandoned the line of the Shenandoah in consequence of a movement of Averell's cavalry, supported by one infantry brigade from Harper's Ferry, which cut his line of retreat to Winchester and threatened his trains. The Confederate army moved to the east of Winchester, and then marched towards Strasburg.

Wright crossed the Shenandoah on the 20th, and seemed at first inclined to press on in pursuit, but being hampered by Grant's expressed desire to have him back again as soon as possible at City Point, and considering that he had sufficiently verified the fact of *Early's* retreat, recrossed the river on the same day and returned to Leesburg. In the meantime, *Early* had sent *Ramseur's* division to Winchester to hold Averell in check; but the Confederate division was suddenly attacked by Averell and driven back with the loss of four guns. *Early*, therefore, sent back *Rodes's* division to

cover *Ramseur's* retreat ; and on the 22nd the Confederate army was concentrated at Strasburg, and on the same day Averell, marching through Winchester to Kernstown, was joined by Crook from Berryville.

On the 23rd orders were received by Halleck from Grant, directing that the 6th Corps should be immediately returned to him, but that the 19th Corps might be retained at Washington. Grant in giving these orders acted upon the supposition that *Lee* would follow the precedent of 1862, when he summoned *Jackson* from the Valley, and would recall *Early*. But *Lee*, not considering that *Early's* presence was imperatively called for at Richmond, preferred to leave him in the Valley, where he constituted a standing menace to Maryland and Pennsylvania, and would also be useful in protecting the gathering in of the harvest.

As soon as *Early* learnt that Wright's Corps was returning towards Washington, he determined to resume the offensive, and on the 23rd moved out to attack Crook and Averell at Kernstown. On the following day he drove Crook's army back through Winchester to Bunker Hill, and on the 26th Crook retreated across the Potomac, and by Hunter's orders took up his position at Sharpsburg to hold the Gaps in the South Mountain. *Early* again found himself undisputed master of the Valley.

With his infantry he proceeded to break up the railroad at Martinsburg, whilst he sent his cavalry on a plundering raid across the Potomac. *McCausland*, who commanded two brigades, was instructed first to move on Chambersburg, and, unless it consented to pay the ransom demanded, to burn it to the ground : then to move against Cumberland and repeat the same process, and at the same time destroy the machinery of the coal-pits there.

McCausland crossed the Potomac on the 29th, occupied Chambersburg on the 30th, and, as the ransom demanded¹ was not forthcoming, set it on fire. Averell's cavalry had started in pursuit of the raiders, and *McCausland* withdrew to the Potomac, which he reached on the 31st at Hancock. Being attacked there by Averell, he rode westward, and on August 1st appeared before Cumberland, where, however, he encountered a Federal force under Kelley. Finding himself in danger of being caught between two fires, he drew off to the east and crossed the Potomac at Old Town, near the junction of the South Branch. Failing in an attempt on August 4th to capture the railway post at New Creek, he withdrew to Moorefield. But on the 7th Averell, who

¹ The ransom demanded was 500,000 dollars in currency, or 100,000 in gold (Pond).

had steadily followed in pursuit, suddenly dashed in upon him and routed his command, capturing all his guns and over 400 prisoners.

The news of Crook's defeat at Kernstown caused the 6th Corps to be sent back to Harper's Ferry, and Grant despatched 4,600 more men of the 19th Corps to Washington, at the same time insisting that someone in Washington must undertake the control of the troops on the line of the Potomac, in order to deal with sudden emergencies. On July 29th the 6th Corps was at Halltown covering Harper's Ferry, and on the same day was joined by Crook's command. The news of *McCausland's* raid across the Potomac caused the united force to be withdrawn across the river to hold the line of the Monocacy at Frederick City, whither Emory's division of the 19th Corps was also sent.

Grant was quite determined that *Early's* force must either be crushed or driven southward, and in the latter case, in order to prevent the Shenandoah Valley from serving again as an avenue, by which a Confederate force might invade the North, that the Valley must be systematically devastated, so that an army could no longer live off the country.¹ To ensure his object the first step was to put an end to the system, by which a multiplicity of Departmental commanders were operating more or less independently against a single united command, and concentrate all the Federal forces available for field operations in the hands of some one reliable officer. He had already written to Halleck on July 18th, suggesting the advisability of merging the Departments of West Virginia, of the Susquehanna, of Washington, and the Middle Department² into one, and of calling to the chief command of the forces in these different Departments General Franklin.³

This suggestion, however, by no means found favour in the eyes of the Washington authorities. Franklin was still regarded by them as responsible for Burnside's disaster at Fredericksburg, in December, 1862; nor did the degradation of the Departments into

¹ As the Shenandoah Valley has a general direction from south-west to north-east, it was of great importance to the Confederates as affording a line of advance for an invasion of the North. But it was of comparatively little value to the Federals, as any movement up it would lead away from Richmond. Therefore it would be a clear gain to the Federals to devastate it so thoroughly that no army could find subsistence there (4 B. & L., 500).

² This Department included Delaware and a part of Maryland.

³ Grant had a high opinion of Franklin, and would have been glad to have him in command of the right wing of the army besieging Petersburg (4 B. & L., 106, note). Franklin had commanded the 19th Corps in the Red River expedition, until he was wounded.

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mere districts, which must necessarily follow upon their being merged into one Department, commend itself to them.

Grant's next proposal was that the dignity of the Departmental commanders might be preserved by creating a single Military Division to include the four Departments in question, just as the Military Division of the Mississippi had been created for him in 1863, and that General Meade should be assigned to the command.¹ But as this suggestion met with no response, he directed Sheridan to report for temporary duty to Halleck, asking the Chief of the Staff, unless Hunter should himself take the field in person, to place Sheridan in command of the field forces. Grant had already ordered 'Torbert's division of cavalry to Washington; and, on Sheridan's request that more cavalry might be sent, as the country in the Valley and on the Potomac line was much more favourable for cavalry operations than the neighbourhood of Richmond, he promptly despatched Wilson's division.

On August 4th the Commander-in-Chief himself left City Point and hastened to Frederick City to hold a conference with Hunter. As a result orders were issued on the 5th that the 6th, 19th, and 8th² Corps should concentrate at Halltown: that *Early's* force was to be followed wherever it went, and that if only a small portion of it had crossed the Potomac, then Hunter should move up the Valley and destroy all the provisions and forage which his army did not require for its own consumption.

On the 7th a further order was issued, constituting the Middle Military Division to consist of the four Departments already named and appointing Sheridan to the temporary command of the new Division. During the conference at Frederick City Grant had expressed his wish that Sheridan should have command of the forces operating in the field, and Hunter readily falling in with his wishes, had declared his willingness to be relieved entirely of command.³

Philip H. Sheridan, who was now assigned to conduct the operations in the Shenandoah Valley, was born in 1831. He graduated at West Point in the class of 1853,⁴ standing thirty-

¹ Grant proposed that Hancock should succeed Meade in command of the Army of the Potomac, and that Gibbon should be appointed to command the 2nd Corps.

² The 8th Corps, also called the Army of West Virginia, was commanded by Crook.

³ Sheridan was only appointed to the temporary command, because Secretary Stanton opposed his permanent appointment on the ground that he was too young for such an important post (4 B. & L., 501).

⁴ Sheridan entered West Point in 1848, and would have graduated in the natural course of events in 1852, but he was condemned to lose a year's seniority for a serious breach of military discipline (1 Sheridan, 11-13).

fourth in a total of fifty-two, and received a commission in the infantry. He served in Texas and California and Oregon, and had a considerable experience of Indian warfare. The outbreak of the Civil War accelerated the rate of promotion, and when ordered east in September, 1861, he had just been made a captain. In the war itself, in which his earlier service was with the Western armies, he had won his laurels as commander of an infantry division in the Army of the Cumberland. His division played an important part in the battles of Murfreesborough and Chattanooga, and he had since increased his reputation as chief of the cavalry in the Army of the Potomac. But his military genius and qualifications to be regarded as a great leader of men had not yet been revealed in their fullness.

The Army of the Shenandoah, as it was officially designated by Sheridan, consisted of three infantry Corps, the 6th under Wright, the 19th under Emory, and the 8th under Crook, and the three cavalry divisions of Torbert, Wilson, and Averell. At the moment when Sheridan assumed the command a large part of the second division of the 19th Corps had not yet arrived, and both Wilson's and Averell's cavalry divisions were still absent.¹ One of his first actions as an army commander was to form the cavalry divisions into a Corps, to the command of which Torbert was assigned, being succeeded by Merritt in the command of his division.

On the 10th Sheridan moved from Halltown towards Winchester. The first day's march placed him in a strong defensive position reaching from Clifton to Berryville and covering Snicker's Gap. The next day he pushed forward towards the Opequon. *Early* had moved from Bunker Hill on the 4th, and crossed the Potomac the following day. His object was to gather in the corn on the farms near Sharpsburg, to cover *McCausland's* retreat from Maryland, and to mystify the Federal commander. But on the 6th he hastily withdrew to Martinsburg, probably in consequence of the concentration of the Federal army at Halltown. When Sheridan commenced his movement against Winchester, *Early* fell back to cover the threatened town. But he had no intention of fighting for its protection. He knew that his adversary had been reinforced, whilst his own reinforcements, which had *Lee* despatched from Richmond, were still on their way. His obvious policy was to fall back beyond Strasburg, where the reinforcements could join him by way of Chester Gap and Front Royal.

¹ Torbert's and Wilson's divisions had been sent from the Army of the Potomac, but the latter did not arrive until August 17th. Averell was still in West Virginia.

Accordingly on the 11th he continued his retreat through Winchester, and on the evening of the 12th took up a very strong position at Fisher's Hill, two miles south of Strasburg, with his right flank resting on the North Fork of the Shenandoah and his left stretching towards Little North Mountain.

Sheridan on the same night halted on the left bank of Cedar Creek just north of Strasburg. Conflicting reports were at this time reaching him as to the strength of his opponent. On the one hand, Grant from before Petersburg was assuring him that no troops at all had been detached from *Lee's* army to the Valley: on the other hand, he was informed on good authority that a strong force was on its way from Richmond.

The uncertainty ended on the 14th, when a staff officer arrived in hot haste, bearing a despatch from Washington, in which it was stated, on Grant's authority, that two infantry divisions, some cavalry, and twenty guns had been sent to join *Early*. As a matter of fact the reinforcements consisted of one infantry division, *Kershaw's* of the 1st Corps, one cavalry division under *Fitzhugh Lee*, and *Cutshaw's* battalion of artillery. This force was commanded by *R. H. Anderson*, the commander of the 1st Corps, and his presence with it caused its strength to be exaggerated, a fact on which *Lee* had probably counted.¹

It was now Sheridan's turn to retreat. It was now his reinforcements which were on their way, whereas those of his adversary were close at hand. Accordingly he determined to fall back to the Clifton-Berryville line, where he would cover Snicker's Gap, through which his reinforcements were expected. He gained this position on the night of the 17th, but the activity of the enemy in assaulting his rearguard in Winchester caused him to fall back to a more compact line of defence at Charlestown.

In his retreat down the Valley Sheridan had laid waste the country between Strasburg and Winchester. North of Winchester, however, the country had not been devastated, and *Early's* great object was to hold a position where he could supply himself with food and forage, and also prevent any repairs being made on the Baltimore and Ohio railway. He moved his own troops to Bunker Hill, whilst *Anderson* with his forces guarded Winchester. An attempt to make a combined movement on the 21st against the Federal position, though it failed from want of concerted action, decided Sheridan to fall still farther back, and he retired to Halltown, where with his flanks guarded by the Potomac and Shenandoah, and within range of the guns of Harper's Ferry, he held a position practically impregnable.

¹ Anderson's column was at or near Front Royal on the 16th.

On the 25th *Early*, finding that *Sheridan's* position was too strong to attack, left *Anderson* with *Kershaw's* division, *Cutshaw's* artillery battalion and a cavalry force to watch the Federal lines at Halltown, and himself moved with his four divisions towards Shepherdstown, whilst *Fitzhugh Lee*, with the bulk of his cavalry, started to cross the Potomac at Williamsport. The object of this movement was to keep before the eyes of the Washington Government the possibility of another invasion of Pennsylvania and Maryland.

Sheridan despatched *Wilson's* cavalry division across the Potomac to hold the South Mountain Gaps; and *Fitzhugh Lee*, on finding that the fords in the neighbourhood of Williamsport were held by *Averell's* cavalry, drew off towards Shepherdstown. *Early*, recognising that it was impossible to attack *Sheridan* in his present position with any hope of success, and that it was too dangerous a step to invade the North, when there were three cavalry divisions ready to operate against his trains, determined to withdraw to his old position at Bunker Hill, west of the Opocquon.

As soon as *Early* fell back, *Sheridan* in his turn moved forward to reoccupy his old position on the Clifton-Berryville line, where he was able to menace *Early's* line of retreat through Winchester.

On September 3rd he was in position, and on that day *Anderson's* command, which was returning to Richmond, blundered in upon the Federal left. A short encounter, terminated by the speedy approach of night, ensued between the Confederates and the 8th Corps. *Anderson* was obliged to return to Richmond by a different route, crossing the Blue Ridge higher up at Chester Gap.

As *Grant* had foreseen, the steady pressure which the Armies of the Potomac and James were keeping up against *Lee* in Richmond was bound sooner or later to necessitate the recall of some portion of the troops in the Valley. During August the Federals had both gained ground on the north bank of the James and established themselves on the Weldon railroad. *Lee* judged it necessary to recall *Anderson*, before *Grant* should stretch his lines farther west and menace the Southside railway. *Anderson* took back with him *Kershaw's* infantry and *Cutshaw's* artillery, leaving *Fitzhugh Lee's* cavalry with *Early*.

Anderson's departure, which took place finally on September 14th, left *Sheridan* once more greatly superior in numbers. As soon as he found that *Lee* was reinforcing *Early* in August, he had resolved to stand strictly on the defensive until *Grant's* pressure upon Richmond should compel the recall of the Confederate

reinforcements. Therefore he had fallen back from Cedar Creek to Berryville, to Charlestown, and finally to Halltown. He had refused to be drawn from his strong position by *Early's* threat of crossing the Potomac.

Grant was in general agreement with his lieutenant's policy.¹ Halleck was not, however, so well satisfied. *Early*, at Bunker Hill, effectually closed the railway and the Ohio and Chesapeake Canal. For as often as the Federal cavalry approached the railway at Martinsburg *Early* marched out with a powerful infantry force and drove them off. Upon the canal both Washington and Baltimore largely depended for their coal supply. The gas companies and the railway company were demanding of Halleck that *Early* should be driven south.² So strong had become the feeling in the Capital that Grant left City Point and hurried to Sheridan to see what could be done to satisfy public opinion. He arrived just after *Anderson's* departure, and found Sheridan preparing to strike. He had brought with him a plan of campaign, but was so satisfied with Sheridan's that he did not even mention his own to him. As a result of the conference he gave his instructions in two words, 'Go in.'

Sheridan 'went in' with the rapidity and vigour which are the characteristics of a plan thoroughly digested and complete in every detail. *Early's* mistaken policy made his task comparatively easy. Instead of retiring south of Strasburg to the strong defensive position of Fisher's Hill, a movement which prudence imperatively demanded as the corollary of *Anderson's* departure from the Valley, the Confederate general remained with the rest of his forces at Stephenson's Depôt, about six miles north of Winchester.

Sheridan's original plan was to move south of Winchester to Newtown and force his adversary to battle by striking at his line of retreat. But on the 17th *Early* moved out from his camp with

¹ Grant had certainly expected that Sheridan would carry out what Hunter and Wright had failed to do, viz. drive *Early* up the Valley and possibly reach the Virginia Central railway. But on learning that *Lee* had sent reinforcements to the Valley, he issued instructions that Sheridan must be cautious and act on the defensive, until the situation on the James should compel their recall. When, however, he found that he had over-estimated the size of the reinforcing force he became urgent that no favourable opportunity should be missed of striking a sudden and heavy blow, though still warning Sheridan against attacking enemy entrenchments. That he was, however, generally satisfied with his lieutenant's policy may be inferred from his telegram of September 9th: 'I would not have you make an attack with the advantage against you, but would prefer just the course you seem to be pursuing.'

² Pond, 150, note.

two infantry divisions and advanced towards Martinsburg to drive off Averell's cavalry, who had again appeared on the railway.¹ He was so impressed with the importance of preventing the railroad being put into working order that he lost sight of all other considerations, and deliberately divided his forces, when a hostile army considerably stronger than his own was close at hand. He under-estimated his younger opponent, and misconstrued his retreat down the Valley and subsequent inactivity as the signs of feeble generalship and a halting policy.² He was destined to be terribly undeceived.

Sheridan, finding that his opponent was playing into his hands, determined to march straight on Winchester, in the hope of annihilating the two divisions under *Ramseur* and *Breckinridge*, which were posted near the town and at Stephenson's Depot respectively. At 3 a.m. on the 19th the Federal army advanced. Wilson's cavalry division led the way along the Berryville pike. His orders were to cross the Opequon, which was about six miles distant, and make a dash to secure the defile, through which the turnpike runs for two miles after crossing the Creek, so as to clear the way for the 6th and 19th Corps, which were to follow. The 8th Corps was to remain at the crossing of the river in reserve. Torbert, with Merritt's cavalry division, was to cross the Opequon by a ford further down and push forward so as to connect with Averell's division, which was expected to move down the Martinsburg pike.³

Wilson carried out his task admirably, dashing through the defile and capturing a breastwork at the southern end of it about 5 a.m. The two infantry Corps were, however, greatly delayed in getting through the defile,⁴ and it was almost noon before Wright got them deployed in line of battle, the 6th Corps on either side of the Berryville pike, the 19th Corps to the right, and Wilson's cavalry on the left.

¹ *Early* marched on the 17th, with *Rodes's* and *Gordon's* divisions, to Bunker Hill, and on the 18th continued on to Martinsburg with *Gordon's* division. Having driven off Averell, he returned the same night to Bunker Hill, where he left *Gordon*, with orders to march to Stephenson's Depot next morning. *Rodes* started to return on the night of the 18th.

² 'The events of the last month had satisfied me that the commander opposed to me was without enterprise and possessed an excessive caution which amounted to timidity' (4 B. & L., 522).

³ The Martinsburg pike was simply the Valley turnpike north of Winchester. The main battle was fought on the east side of Winchester and the infantry fight began about two miles out from the town.

⁴ The 19th Corps was delayed by the guns and trains of the 6th Corps, which were preceding it (4 B. & L., 507).

This unavoidable delay frustrated Sheridan's plan of crushing his opponent in detail; for before the Federal line of battle was formed, *Rodes's* and *Gordon's* divisions, which *Early* had taken with him on the 17th, reached the field. Consequently Sheridan found himself called upon to fight the whole of *Early's* army, but he was fully equal to the task. When Wright attacked shortly before noon, the three Confederate divisions,¹ though making an obstinate resistance, were forced back. The Berryville pike, along which the 6th Corps were advancing, bears somewhat to the left, and as the Federals pressed forward, the gap between the right of the 6th and the left of the 19th Corps widened. Into this gap one of *Rodes's* brigades, which had just reached the field, was thrown, and being supported by *Rodes* on the right with the rest of his division and by *Gordon* on the left, threw the 19th Corps² and Ricketts's division of the 6th into considerable confusion, and compelled the whole Federal line to fall back towards the line on which they had deployed before attacking. For a moment the issue of the battle hung in the balance. But Russell's division of the 6th Corps, which had been hitherto held in reserve, was put in, and the lost ground recovered, the Confederates being forced back to the woods from which they had charged. In this encounter both *Rodes* and Russell were killed.

A brief lull now followed on this part of the field. But elsewhere the Federal cavalry and Crook's Corps were operating with deadly effect. Sheridan had at first intended to move Crook to the left, so as to cut off the Confederate retreat south of Winchester, but he now ordered him to the right to support Emory. Torbert, after crossing the Opequon, found himself confronted by *Wharton's* division, which, under the personal direction of *Breckinridge*, had advanced from Stephenson's Depôt to meet him. Averell in the meanwhile had moved along the Martinsburg pike, driving before him two brigades of *Lomax's* cavalry all the way from Darksville, whither they had fallen back the previous day from Martinsburg. Against the combined cavalry attack *Breckinridge* was forced to fall back, and with difficulty extricated his division, which he succeeded in bringing into Winchester about 2 p.m.³

¹ From left to right, *Gordon's*, *Rodes's* and *Ramscur's*.

² Only one division—*Grover's*—of the 19th Corps was thrown into confusion, the other—*Dwight's*—being in reserve (2 Sheridan, 23).

³ Averell's cavalry, moving down the Martinsburg road, came into the rear of the infantry who were facing Torbert, and forced them to abandon their position.

Early's position had now become one of great peril; in front a superior infantry force was steadily pushing his troops back, whilst on both flanks the Federal cavalry were advancing. In order to prevent Wilson from gaining possession of the Valley turnpike, and so cutting his line of retreat, *Early* was forced to detach from the cavalry on his left, which were already overmatched by Torbert's two divisions. The Confederates made their final stand about 5 p.m. behind a line of breastworks close to the town. At the same moment that Wright's and Crook's infantry advanced to the charge, Torbert's two divisions with drawn sabres bore down upon the left flank of *Early's* doomed army. The Confederates broke and fled, were 'sent whirling' through Winchester, leaving five guns on the battlefield.

The Federal infantry, who had been marching and fighting since the early hours of the morning, were too exhausted to press the pursuit, but Wilson's cavalry followed the flying foe along the pike to Kernstown. *Ramseur's* division had, however, preserved its organisation and effectually covered the retreat, and at 10 p.m. the pursuit was abandoned.¹ The Federal loss amounted to about 5,000, and *Early's* losses nearly reached 4,000. The Confederate loss was considerably the greater in proportion to the actual strength of the two armies. For Sheridan put into the field about 40,000 men to *Early's* 17,000.² Though the number of troops engaged was not large, yet the victory was a decisive one. The lower Valley was definitely secured to the Federals. All danger of another invasion of the North vanished. *Early's* army had been badly beaten, and was thoroughly demoralised, as was shown at Fisher's Hill three days later. In recognition of his victory Sheridan was promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General in the regular army, and assigned to the permanent command of the Middle Division.

On the following day *Early* withdrew to Fisher's Hill, two miles south of Strasburg. The position which he took up was as strong as any that could be found in the Valley. The sudden uprising of the Massanutton chain there narrows the Valley to a width of four miles. The right flank of the Confederates rested on

¹ *Early* brought off all his trains and artillery less the five guns captured on the battlefield.

² These are approximately the figures given by Pond from the official returns. Keifer estimates Sheridan's force on the battlefield at 25,000, deducting nearly half his men as being employed 'guarding railroads and various positions,' and puts *Early's* strength as approximately the same, but in this estimate he includes *Kershaw's* division, which had left the Valley. *Early* estimated his own force at 11,500. Sheridan must have outnumbered *Early* by over two to one (Fuller).

the North Fork of the Shenandoah, which washes the western face of the Massanuttons. Along the front of *Early's* line ran Tumbling Run, a tributary of the North Fork, whilst the left was extended across the Valley to the foot of Little North Mountain. Fisher's Hill itself was a precipitous bluff overhanging Tumbling Run, and, strengthened by artificial works, was impregnable to a frontal attack.¹ Earthworks had been thrown up across the Valley westwards, and artillery placed in position behind them. The only way in which the Confederate lines could be broken was by a flank movement against their left.

On the night of the 20th Sheridan's army arrived in front of Strasburg. Next day the infantry was being put in position, and the Confederates were driven from a ridge of high ground running along the north bank of Tumbling Run. Sheridan's intention was to repeat the movement which had been so successful on the 19th, and turn the Confederate left. For this purpose the 8th Corps was held back out of sight, and on the 22nd marched under cover of the thick woods to and along the foot of Little North Mountain until it had reached a position from which an attack could be made on the Confederate left rear, and their line of earthworks taken in reverse. In the meanwhile the 6th Corps and Averell's cavalry were demonstrating against the enemy's front. Torbert had already been sent through the Luray Valley to try and cross the Massanuttons in *Early's* rear and thus intercept his retreat.

Early was completely deceived as to Sheridan's plan of attack. He imagined that the main assault was about to be made by the 6th Corps against his left centre, and so completely had he lost confidence in his troops after their severe defeat on the 19th that, in spite of the strength of his position he gave orders for a retreat to be commenced after dark.² Suddenly, but a short time before sunset, Crook's Corps rushed from its place of concealment against the left flank. The troops in that part of the Confederate line were dismounted cavalry. Taken in reverse, they broke and fled. As the Confederate infantry divisions tried to change front to the left to meet Crook's advance, the other two Federal Corps rushed to the attack.³ The Confederates fled in great confusion. In the

¹ So secure did *Early* feel himself that the ammunition chests were taken from the caissons and placed behind the breastworks (2 Sheridan, 34).

² 4 B. & L., 524.

³ As soon as Crook broke the Confederate left the other two Corps made a wheel half-left. This movement was commenced by Ricketts's division and taken up from right to left through the Federal line (Sheridan, ii. 35-8).

flight all organisation was lost. Sixteen guns became the spoil of the victors, though *Early* managed to save his trains.

The Federals pursued throughout the night as far as Woodstock. Sheridan's attempt to cut off *Early's* retreat with Torbert's cavalry was frustrated by the resistance of a Confederate cavalry force, which held a very strong position at Milford, and caused the Federals to fall back towards Front Royal.¹ On the right Averell's cavalry, instead of taking part in the pursuit, went into camp at dark, and did not reach Woodstock till after the infantry. On this account, and for similar conduct on the 23rd, Sheridan relieved Averell and assigned Powell to the command of his division. Sheridan's loss in this battle was only 528; *Early's* can hardly have fallen short of 1,400, the larger part of whom were prisoners.²

This second defeat, following so close upon the first, for the time being destroyed *Early's* army as a fighting force. The upper Valley lay at Sheridan's mercy. For *Early*, after hurrying through Newmarket with Sheridan close upon his heels, left the Valley turnpike and turned off to the east by a cross-road leading to Port Republic. He thus left the road open to Harrisonburg and Staunton. But he hoped by taking this route to form a junction with *Kershaw's* division, which *Lee* had ordered to return to the Valley on hearing of *Early's* defeat at Winchester.

On the 25th *Early* passed through Port Republic and took up a position covering Brown's Gap, where he was joined by *Wickham's* two cavalry brigades, which had fallen back from the Luray Valley after the defeat at Fisher's Hill, and by *Lomax's* cavalry, which had been driven along the Valley turnpike to Harrisonburg. On the 26th he was joined by *Kershaw's* infantry division.

On the 25th Sheridan pushed the 6th and 19th Corps on to Harrisonburg, whilst the 8th remained in reserve at the junction of the Valley turnpike and the Port Republic road. Merritt was sent to Port Republic to keep an eye on *Early*, and draw attention away from Torbert, who with a larger force was directed against Staunton and Waynesboro to destroy the Virginia Central railway bridge over the South river at the latter place.

When news reached *Early* of Torbert's movement, he left Port Republic, whither he had advanced on the 27th after receiving *Kershaw's* reinforcement, on the 28th, and hurried his army

¹ This Confederate force consisted of two brigades under the command of *Wickham*, who had succeeded *Fitzhugh Lee* in the command of his division after *Lee* had been wounded in the battle of the 19th.

² Pond, 180.

towards Rockfish Gap to prevent Torbert destroying the railway tunnel through the Blue Ridge. Torbert was engaged in destroying the railway bridge at Waynesboro, when *Early's* whole army moved against him. He withdrew his forces and returned on the 29th to Bridgewater on the North river.

Sheridan's plan of campaign had been brilliantly successful. He had administered to his opponent two crushing defeats, and driven him almost entirely out of the Valley. But his remarkable success did not blind him to the limitations of his plan. His swift advance up the Valley was after all only a raid. His idea now was to devastate the upper Valley so thoroughly that no Confederate army could henceforth draw any supplies from it, and, after leaving a sufficient force in the Valley to hold in check guerrilla leaders of the type of *Mosby*, to detach the bulk of his army to assist in Grant's operations against Petersburg. He had sent his cavalry to destroy all crops, forage, and supplies of all sorts between Harrisonburg on the north, and Staunton and Piedmont on the south and east.

Grant, however, was still anxious that an advance should be made against the Virginia Central railway between Charlottesville and Gordonsville. He considered that such a movement against the railroad and the James Canal would be a fitting termination to the Valley campaign. Orders were sent to Halleck that a railway should be repaired to serve as a line of supplies to Sheridan in the contemplated movement, and it was left to Sheridan to decide whether he would rather have the Manassas Gap or the Alexandria and Orange railroad repaired.

Sheridan, however, held that his campaign should end with the devastation of the Valley. He declared that it would be impossible, either to move through the Blue Ridge against Gordonsville and Charlottesville, or to advance still further up the Valley against Lynchburg, owing to the lack of supplies and want of transport for his army. He regarded the plan of repairing a railway as premature, and considered that a large force would have to be drawn off to protect the line under repair, which might be much more advantageously used elsewhere. He proposed to hold the lower Valley with Crook's Corps and send the 6th, the 19th, and a cavalry division to Grant.¹ The Commander-in-Chief wisely left the final decision to the 'man on the spot,' and on October 3rd wrote to Sheridan, authorising him to carry out his plan.

On the morning of October 6th Sheridan began to withdraw his troops from Harrisonburg and marched back down the Valley,

¹ He wished to send these troops by the ~~the~~ Baltimore and Ohio railway.

devastating it as he went from one mountain barrier to the other. Two thousand barns and seventy mills were destroyed, and a great number of cattle and sheep driven away or killed for the use of the troops.

On the 8th the Federal army reached Strasburg. *Early* had on October 1st marched across from Waynesboro to Mount Sidney on the Valley turnpike, and taken up a position about half-way between Staunton and Harrisonburg. The cavalry piquets of the two armies were confronting each other on opposite banks of the North river. Defeat had only served to fire *Early's* aggressive temper, and, having under his command with *Kershaw's* reinforcements a stronger force than he had had since his defeat on the Opequon, he was determined to try conclusions once more with Sheridan. He was only waiting for the arrival of *Rosser's* cavalry brigade, which, as he was informed by General *Lee*, was on its way from Petersburg to join him.

The expected reinforcement arrived on October 5th, and *Early* was preparing to move on Harrisonburg, when he learnt that Sheridan was falling back down the Valley. He immediately started in pursuit, and on the 7th entered Newmarket. His cavalry pressed on after the retiring Federals. *Rosser*, who had relieved *Wickham* of the command of *Fitzhugh Lee's* division, followed in pursuit along the roads to the west of the Valley turnpike, whilst *Lomax* pushed forward on the turnpike.

Sheridan, annoyed at the pressure of the Confederate cavalry and wishing to read *Rosser* a much-needed lesson, ordered Torbert to move out on the 9th and fight the pursuing force. The superiority of the Federal cavalry quickly made itself felt. Custer, who had succeeded to the command of Wilson's division, drove *Rosser* before him, whilst Merritt chased *Lomax* up the Valley turnpike. The Federals pursued the flying foe for twenty-six miles, captured eleven guns and over 300 prisoners. This cavalry affair is known as the battle of Tom's Brook, or the Woodstock Races, owing to the precipitancy of the Confederate flight.¹

The sudden reverse put an end to *Rosser's* claims to be considered 'the Saviour of the Valley,' the title which the Southern Press was already conferring upon him, and convinced *Early* of the worthlessness of his cavalry in comparison with the Federal squadrons. Throughout the campaign the Confederate cavalry had suffered a succession of reverses, commencing with the rout of *McCausland's* command at Moorefield. The defeats both at Winchester and Fisher's Hill had been mainly due to the weakness of the cavalry, who were holding the left wing in either battle;

¹ 2 Sheridan, 56-9.


and now the new commander, from whom so much was expected, had proved no more successful than his predecessors.

On the 10th Sheridan withdrew across Cedar Creek, and the 6th Corps was sent to Front Royal *en route* to Washington. Halleck, with Grant's approval, had ordered the Manassas Gap railroad to be repaired when Sheridan had made it plain that he was opposed to any advance through the Blue Ridge against the Charlottesville and Gordonsville line. It had been put into working order as far as Piedmont, within fifteen miles of Front Royal. Halleck wished the 6th Corps to march to Piedmont and entrain there for Washington. But Sheridan decided instead to march the 6th Corps to Washington as a real saving of time. At the same time he directed General Augur, who was in charge of the troops guarding the railway, to fall back from that line—an order which, if carried out, involved the suspension of the work on the railroad.

But both Halleck and Stanton were very anxious that the railroad should be repaired, because they thought that its completion would be a proof of the permanent occupation of the Lower Valley, and urged Sheridan to come to Washington to confer upon the points at issue. Grant was still hankering after an advance against the Virginia Central railway between Gordonsville and Charlottesville, and though on October 3rd he had accepted Sheridan's arguments against any such movement, yet eight days later he was urging that Sheridan should take up as advanced a position as possible toward the Virginia Central railway, and hold himself in readiness to move against it as soon as the enemy showed any signs of a diminution of force in that direction.

A complete change in the military situation was produced by *Early*, who on the 13th, hearing that Sheridan was preparing to detach troops to Grant's assistance, broke up his camp at Newmarket and moved forward to Fisher's Hill, whilst his advance guard pushed through Strasburg to Hupp's Hill, where it had quite a sharp engagement with one of Crook's divisions. This advance of *Early's* army took Sheridan by surprise, for till then he had supposed that the bulk of that army was either at Charlottesville or Waynesboro. Orders were at once sent to the 6th Corps to return from Front Royal; and it reached the camp on Cedar Creek on the afternoon of the 14th.

On the 15th Sheridan left his army and started with Merritt's division of cavalry for Front Royal. In accordance with instructions just received from Grant, he intended to send that division, reinforced by Powell's from Luray Valley, through Chester Gap against the Virginia Central railway, and himself to go on to Washington to confer with the War Secretary. But no sooner



had he reached Front Royal than he received a startling communication from Wright, who had been left in command of the troops on Cedar Creek. A message had been read from the Confederate signal station on Three Top Mountain to the effect that *Longstreet* was marching to *Early's* assistance to crush *Sheridan*. The latter at once ordered the cavalry to return to Wright, but suspecting, in the light of other information, that *Longstreet's* supposed message might after all be only a ruse, and deeming his business at Washington of great importance, continued his journey to the Federal capital.

Early, at Fisher's Hill,¹ found that his supplies, which had to be brought by wagon from Staunton, were running short, and that he must either forthwith advance against *Sheridan* or else retire up the Valley. He decided to adopt the former alternative.² A reconnaissance to Hupp's Hill reported that the Federal position was entrenched. Accordingly he determined to make an attempt to turn its left flank. He was guided in his selection of this flank by the fact that the dreaded Federal cavalry were posted on the right.³ From the summit of Three Top Mountain a view of all the Federal camps could be had, and *Early* made his plans accordingly. *Gordon*, with his own, *Ramseur's*, and *Pegram's* divisions, was to cross the Shenandoah, march under cover of the thick timber along the foot of Three Top Mountain, and recross the river just below the point where Cedar Creek falls into it. *Kershaw* was to turn off the Valley pike to the right and strike Cedar Creek just above its junction with the Shenandoah, whilst *Wharton's* division with all the artillery was to advance over Hupp's Hill against the bridge over the Creek as soon as the attack on the Federal left commenced. *Rosser* was to demonstrate against *Torbert's* cavalry on the extreme Federal right, whilst *Lomax's* cavalry from the Luray Valley was ordered to elude *Powell's* force and strike into the Valley turnpike in rear of the Federal lines. The troops took up their allotted positions under cover of the darkness on the night of the 18th.

The Federal army was quite unconscious of the blow which was being prepared against it. Reconnaissances on the 18th had shown that there were no hostile troops in their immediate front, and it was even reported that *Early* was retiring up the Valley.⁴ The Federal line following the course of Cedar Creek

¹ See plan of the Battle of Cedar Creek.

² 4 B. & L., 526 (*Early's* account of the battle).

³ A further reason for not attacking the Federal right was that on that flank the banks of Cedar Creek were high and precipitous (4 B. & L., 526).

⁴ Pond, 220.

faced south. The different Corps were posted in echelon, so that the line from left to right had a trend northwards.¹ The extreme left was held by the 8th Corps, the first division on a round hill commanding the fords over Cedar Creek, and the second on another hill² close to the pike. The 19th Corps extended the line from the pike to Meadow Brook, and on its right was formed the 6th Corps. Beyond that the two cavalry divisions of Custer and Merritt were posted, Custer on the extreme right watching the fords, where the Back and Mine Bank roads cross the Creek. On the extreme left was one brigade of Powell's cavalry division, two miles beyond Crook's left, watching Buckton's Ford, where the Front Royal road crosses the Shenandoah on its way to Middletown.³

Long before sunrise on the 19th, in a dense fog,⁴ *Kershaw's* division, having forded the Creek unperceived, charged into the entrenchments of the 1st division of the 8th Corps, which was completely taken by surprise, and fled, leaving behind seven guns, which had not fired a shot. An attempt to form a line of battle on the position of the 2nd division was frustrated by the appearance of *Gordon's* column advancing against the Federal left flank, and the whole Corps was driven in full retreat down the pike.⁵ Their flight uncovered the flank of the 19th Corps, which, attacked in front by *Wharton's* division and the Confederate artillery, and taken in reverse by *Gordon's* and *Kershaw's* troops, was forced to abandon its lines and follow Crook's troops in a hurried retreat.

By sunrise two of the three Federal Corps were streaming to the rear, and the victorious Confederates were pushing across the pike to deal with the 6th Corps.⁶ The three divisions of this Corps had been hastily faced about and formed along Meadow Brook. But there was no time to form a properly connected line, and each division was left to fight an independent battle, having

¹ 'This formation was owing to the bends of the Creek (Pond, 222).

² 'Or another part of this same hill' (Pond, 222).

³ Only the 19th Corps and the 1st division of the 8th were sheltered by entrenchments.

⁴ *Kershaw* was ordered forward at 4.30 a.m., and 'precisely at 5 a.m. his leading brigade swept over the enemy's left work' (4 B. & L., 526). At 3.30 a.m. the moon was shining, but a thick fog came up just in time to screen *Kershaw's* movement.

⁵ *Early* states (4 B. & L., 527) that there had been a delay of an hour at the river on the part of *Gordon's* Corps, and that consequently it encountered a more obstinate resistance than it would otherwise have met with.

⁶ General Emory claims for his Corps that it repulsed the first attack, but fell back in perfectly good order when its left was turned (4 B. & L., 518, note).•

continually to change front to repel flanking movements. This disjointed line faced east and extended from Cedar Creek to a point west of Middletown, covering the trains. From 6 a.m. till 9 a.m. a fierce contest raged all along this front; but in spite of all their efforts the Confederates could gain no ground, and the Federal left was gradually extending towards the turnpike so as to secure a line of retreat if necessary.

About 10 a.m. when the Confederate assaults had died away, Getty's division established itself with its left on the pike about three-quarters of a mile north of Middletown. The other two divisions came into line on its right. The 6th Corps, for the first time since the battle began, was united, and held a line fronting south.¹ Torbert's cavalry divisions had been brought over from the right to the left and were posted east of the pike, three regiments having been left to keep Rosser occupied.

The tide of Confederate success was checked. They had captured twenty-four guns, over 1,300 prisoners,² and driven the Federal army back about four miles, capturing its camps. But the Federals had now formed a strong line of battle with the 6th Corps and Torbert's cavalry, which had not shared in the stampede of the other two Corps. Their line of retreat along the turnpike was secured, and Wright, calmly confident, was preparing himself to assume the offensive as soon as the ammunition boxes of his troops were replenished. Instructions had been given to his division commanders to be in readiness to attack at noon.

The presence of the Federal cavalry on the east side of the pike warned Early that the turning movement against that flank must cease. Anxious to complete the victory, which he believed to be well within his grasp, he sent orders to Gordon to take his own and Kershaw's divisions and turn the Federal right. But to his intense disappointment he learnt that so many of the soldiers had left the ranks to plunder the captured camps that it was impossible to get together enough troops for an immediate advance.³ The move-

¹ But Sheridan says that on reaching the field he found the cavalry and Getty's division of the 6th Corps the only troops in the presence of, and resisting, the enemy. 'They were apparently acting as a rear-guard' (*Memoirs*, ii, 82).

² Pond, 228. Early claims that he captured and brought off 1,500 prisoners (4 B. & L., 529).

³ General J. B. Gordon, in his *Reminiscences*, chapter xxv, denies the 'bad conduct' on the part of the men. He states that Early stopped him from carrying out an attack on the 6th Corps, saying: 'No use in that; they will all go directly.' He supports his statement by extracts from the diary of Captain Hotchkiss. But for this the 6th Corps might have been overwhelmed like the 8th and 19th.

ment was postponed until Early returned from Middletown, whither he had gone to organise resistance against the Federal cavalry.

In the meantime Sheridan had reached the field. He had arrived at Washington on the morning of the 17th, and after a consultation with Halleck and Stanton left the same afternoon and spent the night at Martinsburg. On the 18th he was at Winchester, and hearing reports of heavy firing in the direction of Middletown, started about 8.30 a.m. on the 19th to rejoin his army. As he rode along the turnpike he met terror-stricken fugitives with exaggerated reports of the disaster which had overtaken the army, and found the road crowded with a huge mass of camp followers and flying trains. He quickly rallied the fugitives, and the stream began to flow back towards Middletown, whilst he himself, with his cavalry escort, pressed forward at full speed. He reached the battlefield about 10.30 a.m., when Wright had already succeeded in forming a strong line of battle, and had ordered an attack to be made at noon.

Sheridan on resuming the command decided to postpone the attack till 3 p.m., in order to give time for the broken Corps to re-form, and sent Custer's division back to cover the right flank.¹ About 1 p.m. *Early* made his deferred attack against the Federal right. But by that time the 19th Corps had been re-formed and placed on the right of the 6th Corps, and a hasty breastwork had been thrown up. The Confederate assault was easily repulsed.²

Early now saw that there was no likelihood of gaining further success. Both *Rosser's* and *Lomax's* cavalry had failed to come in on the Federal rear. But the Confederate leader resolved to hold his ground and keep possession of the field, which he had won in the morning. The hours which elapsed between the repulse of his 1 p.m. attack and the advance of Sheridan's whole army were spent in strengthening his position, which was naturally

¹ Sheridan states that only one division of the 6th Corps was in line of battle, and that his first task was to bring up into line the other two divisions of that Corps and the 19th. After the repulse of *Early's* attack on the 19th Corps, Sheridan decided to wait for the arrival of Crook's rallied troops. A further delay was caused by a false report that *Longstreet* was marching on Winchester by the Front Royal road (*Memoirs*, ii, 84-7).

² This attack was made by *Gordon's*, *Kershaw's*, and *Ramseur's* divisions on the 19th Corps. *Early* goes so far as to say that no attack was made at all, but that *Gordon*, finding that he had before him a line of battle behind breastworks, after some skirmishing, abandoned the idea of an attack (4 B. & L., 528).

a strong one on an amphitheatre of hills. *Rosser's* cavalry held his left flank and *Wharton's* division was posted east of the turnpike to cover the right.

It was not till 4 p.m. that Sheridan advanced to the attack. *Early* had made ample preparation to meet it, and so deadly was the fire of his infantry, posted chiefly behind stone walls, that it seemed as though the Federal assault must fail and *Early* would be left in possession of the battlefield.¹ The sun was already sinking behind the mountains, when a small party of soldiers belonging to *Keifer's* division of the 6th Corps² succeeded in entering a gap in the Confederate lines under cover of a stone wall which ran from the Federal front to the Confederate position. At the same time the rest of the division charged. *Gordon's* line, in which the breach had been made, turned and fled.³ The panic spread to *Kershaw's* and *Ramseur's* divisions, and *Custer's* cavalry, swooping down from the right upon the broken ranks, drove them in wild confusion across Cedar Creek. The day was won: *Pegram's* and *Wharton's* divisions on the Confederate right were involved in the general rout, and, as the sun set, the Federal infantry re-entered the entrenchments of the 19th Corps which had been lost in the morning.⁴

The infantry did not pursue beyond the Creek, but the cavalry continued to press the flying army. A bridge over a small brook between Strasburg and Fisher's Hill broke down, the road was blocked, and a great haul of spoil was made by the pursuing cavalry. The Federal loss was about 5,700; the Confederate loss may have slightly exceeded 3,000.⁵ Twenty-four Federal guns captured in the morning were retaken, and twenty-four of *Early's* guns also fell into the hands of the victors.

With the exception of *Thomas's* rout of *Hood* at Nashville on December 16th, no such decisive victory as *Sheridan's* at Cedar Creek was gained throughout the war. The dramatic arrival of *Sheridan*, which seemed to pluck victory out of defeat, enhanced the victor's fame. On September 19th he had 'gone in,' and within thirty days had won three great victories, the last of which

¹ 'I hoped that the day was finally ours' (4 B. & L., 528).

² *Keifer* was in temporary command of *Ricketts's* division.

³ This successful attack is attributed by *Pond*, 238, to a portion of *Dwight's* division of the 19th Corps. General *Wright*, the Corps commander, in his report associates *Dwight's* and *Keifer's* troops in this attack.

⁴ General *Emory* (4 B. & L., 519, note) says that his troops reoccupied their camp an hour before sunset.

⁵ *Pond*, 239.

might fairly be counted a 'crowning mercy'.¹ A few weeks later Sheridan was promoted to the rank of Major-General in the Regular Army.

Early's army, though routed at Cedar Creek, was not, however, done with.² On falling back to Newmarket he was reinforced by a large number of conscripts and convalescents and by *Cosby's* brigade from the Department of South-West Virginia. Grant was still pressing Sheridan to advance against the Virginia Central railway, but the latter stuck tenaciously to his original opinion, that a movement against Charlottesville through the Blue Ridge Gaps was practically out of the question. On November 9th the Federal army fell back to Kernstown in order to shorten its line of supplies. *Early*, apprehending that this retrograde movement was preliminary to detaching troops to Grant's aid, promptly followed in pursuit and advanced as far as Middletown. On the 12th there was a sharp engagement between the cavalry of the two armies, in which the Confederates were worsted, and under cover of the night *Early* withdrew to Newmarket.

Lee now ordered *Kershaw's* division to be returned to Richmond and *Cosby's* brigade to be sent to Breckinridge in South-West

¹ The account in the text of the battle of Cedar Creek is largely based upon General Keifer's *Narrative* (vol. ii, cap. x). His version may be regarded as representing the reaction against the Sheridan legend. The founders of that legend, in order to magnify the exploits of their hero, belittled the good work done by Wright and the 6th Corps, exaggerated the extent of the disaster which had overtaken the Federals, and minimised the obstinacy of the resistance offered by *Early* to Sheridan's own attack. The fact that Sheridan was on the field for five hours before making an attack must not be ignored. Keifer's contention is, that before Sheridan's arrival Wright had definitely checked the enemy, formed a fresh line of battle, and given orders for an attack, which Sheridan postponed for several hours, during which time *Early* was fortifying his position. It is perhaps a fair argument to say that though Wright ordered an advance, it was only Sheridan's arrival which gave the men spirit enough to go forward. But this argument, though it may apply fairly to the 8th Corps and possibly in a slight degree to the 19th, cannot be extended to the 6th Corps and the cavalry. Sheridan, by recommending for brevet rank Getty and the cavalry generals Merritt and Custer, gave an undue prominence to the part played by the cavalry. Cedar Creek was an infantry battle and won by infantry. The cavalry converted the Confederate retreat into a rout. *Early's* charge against his own men of stopping to plunder the captured camps was ill-founded. He must be held responsible for the long delay after the initial success. On the other hand *Gordon* exaggerated the extent of that success and did less than justice to the stout resistance of the 6th Corps. It may be suggested that *Early's* fighting spirit was somewhat quenched by the appearance of the bulk of the Federal cavalry on his right flank.

² See Map V.

Virginia. In December still further reductions of *Early's* army were made. The whole of the 2nd Corps was recalled to Richmond, and *Fitzhugh Lee's* cavalry division followed in January. Infantry operations were in fact terminated by the approach of winter in the Valley, and the 6th Corps left Sheridan's army for City Point. Shortly after Crook's Corps was also detached, one division to Grant, and one to West Virginia; and early in January one division of the 19th Corps was sent to join the Army of the Potomac.

Cavalry operations, however, were continued for some little time longer in the Valley. Towards the end of November Sheridan sent Merritt's division across the Blue Ridge into Loudoun County to devastate it, and by so doing to prevent it any longer affording shelter to the guerilla leader *Mosby*. At the same time *Early* sent *Rosser* with two brigades to attack once more the Baltimore and Ohio railway, and a garrisoned post at New Creek, south-west of Cumberland, was captured by the Confederates.

On December 19th Sheridan, at Grant's urgent request, sent Torbert with 8,000 cavalry to strike the Virginia Central railway. With two divisions Torbert passed through Chester Gap on his way to Gordonsville, whilst Custer's division advanced up the Valley against Staunton. *Early*, after the 2nd Corps was summoned away, had fallen back to Staunton with *Wharton's* division. He now despatched *Wharton* with his infantry and *Rosser's* cavalry towards Harrisonburg, which was threatened by Custer's advance. On the night of the 20th *Rosser* dashed into the Federal camp, taking it by surprise, and Custer withdrew down the Valley. Torbert arrived before Gordonsville, but, finding that place held by infantry sent from Richmond, also retired. The cavalry suffered greatly during this expedition from the cold, and it was plain that operations in the Valley were over for the winter.

As soon as a resumption of hostilities was possible, Sheridan on February 27th started up the Valley with 10,000 cavalry. By this time *Early* had only two infantry brigades under his command and six guns, whilst *Rosser's* brigade, which constituted his sole cavalry force, had been temporarily disbanded, most of the men having returned to their homes owing to the difficulty of getting forage for their horses.¹ *Rosser* hastily collected a handful of his troopers, and attempted to check Sheridan's advance at Mount Crawford, but was swept out of the path. The next day Sheridan occupied Staunton and found that *Early* had retired to Waynes-

¹ *Lomax's* cavalry had been sent to West Virginia. *Rosser's* brigade had been very hard worked, as it had crossed the mountains in the snow and surprised Beverley on January 11th.

boro. On March 2nd Custer's division attacked *Early's* position. There was little or no fighting, and the greater part of *Early's* command with the artillery was captured. There was no longer any force in the Valley to dispute Sheridan's advance. He occupied Charlottesville and thoroughly broke up the railway both towards Gordonsville and Lynchburg. His instructions had directed him to capture Lynchburg if possible. But delay in bringing up the trains of supplies, due to the incessant rains, caused him to abandon that part of his programme, as there had been time for reinforcements to reach Lynchburg. For a similar reason he did not attempt, as Grant had originally suggested, to form a junction with Sherman in the Carolinas, but determined to march direct to Grant, destroying the James Canal as he advanced.¹ He reached White House on March 19th in time to take a decisive part in the final operations round Richmond.

Sheridan's Shenandoah campaign was as brilliant as any conducted during the war. Though the forces engaged were not large, yet the results were decisive. The Confederates were completely driven out of the Valley, which, till Sheridan took command, had nearly always been associated with disaster to the Federal arms. The desolation of the Valley, though a harsh measure, was justified on grounds of military expediency. Not only did the Valley cease to be a source of supplies to Richmond, it was no longer even capable of maintaining an army within its own confines; and its devastation produced a further very important result by causing widespread desertion in *Lee's* ranks, which were largely recruited from the Valley. The duty which a man owed to his starving family proved in many cases stronger even than his patriotism.²

¹ A further reason which prevented Sheridan from marching to join Sherman was the fact that the James was in flood and he would have been obliged to wait for its waters to sink. Grant's orders were to destroy the Virginia Central railway and the James River canal, capture Lynchburg if practicable, and then join Sherman in North Carolina or return to Winchester. Finding it impracticable to reach Sherman, and knowing that his presence at Winchester was no longer required, Sheridan assumed the responsibility of going direct to Grant (*Memoirs*, ii, 112, 113, 119).

² Though Sheridan in this campaign bore off the triple crown of victory, yet his conduct of the campaign as a whole is open to criticism. If the campaign could be regarded simply as a duel between Sheridan and *Early* for the possession of the Valley, then there could be no question of Sheridan's complete success. But the operations in the Shenandoah Valley did not constitute an independent campaign but formed an essential part of Grant's strategical plan for the discomfiture of *Lee*. The task set the successive commanders of the Department of West Virginia, Sigel and Hunter, was the destruction of *Lee's* railway

NOTE

ON CEDAR CREEK

An entry in Captain *Hotchkiss's* journal throws a ray of light upon the obscurity enveloping the Battle of Cedar Creek. On October 23rd he was in Richmond with despatches from *Early* to *Lee* and had a long interview that night with *Lee*. The entry for that day closes thus: 'General *Early* told me not to tell General *Lee* that we ought to have advanced in the morning at Middletown, for, said he, we ought to have done so' (*Official Records*, Vol. 90, p. 582). This admission discredits *Early's* official report. Nor can any credence be given to his charge against his own soldiers of plundering the Federal camps. There was plundering, but it was not done by the men under arms, 'they were soldiers more or less disabled and not on duty,' who poured from their camps down the pike behind *Wharton's* division after the initial rout of the Federal 8th Corps. *Early*, then, must be held responsible for the long delay on the morning of the battle. The thick fog intensified the effects of the Confederate surprise and left the Federals more or less helpless. On the other hand, whilst the Confederates were following on the predetermined lines of attack westwards, they swept away under cover of the fog all opposition, but when the fog rose, they were themselves surprised to find a line of battle formed across the pike at Middletown with the dreaded Federal cavalry threatening their right flank. Sheridan reported that the only infantry on this line was *Getty's* division of the 6th Corps, but the evidence seems decidedly in favour of the view that the rest of the Corps was on *Getty's* right. Nevertheless the chief honours of the day rest with that division.

communications, the Virginia Central between Charlottesville and Lynchburg, and the Virginia and East Tennessee on the other side of Lynchburg. When Sheridan was appointed to the command of the Middle Military Division, his objective still remained the same. He would have first to dispose of *Early*, but the force under his command was ample for that purpose. Throughout the campaign his strength was double that of *Early*. After his victory at Fisher's Hill, he could have pushed his troops through the Blue Ridge gaps and captured Gordonsville and Charlottesville. But he preferred to regard the campaign as having come to an end at Harrisonburg with the desolation of the Valley, as he retraced his steps northwards, his sole remaining duty. His decision probably prolonged the war by several months.

CHAPTER VII

HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE—SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN THE CAROLINAS¹

Hood advances into Tennessee—Thomas decides to concentrate at Nashville—Schofield makes a stand at Columbia—Hood crosses Duck River—Hood misses his opportunity at Spring Hill—Schofield retreats to Franklin—Battle of Franklin—Schofield falls back to Nashville—Hood follows in pursuit—Excitement at Washington—Impatience of the Federal Government with Thomas—Battle of Nashville—Thomas's plan of battle—The first day's fighting—Thomas 'puts in' his reserve Corps—Hood's fresh position—Position of the Federal army—Thomas's plan of battle—The battle of the second day—The Confederate left broken—Rout of Hood's army—Results of the battle—Pursuit of the flying army—Grant's plan of campaign—Unsuccessful attempt on Fort Fisher—Second and successful attempt on Fort Fisher—Federal movements against Wilmington—Fall of Wilmington—Importance of Newbern as a Federal base—Bragg's unsuccessful attack on Cox—Sherman's advance through the Carolinas—Destruction of Columbia—Fall of Charleston—Sherman occupies Cheraw—And Fayetteville—Engagement at Averysboro—Battle of Bentonville—Johnston retreats to Smithfield—Sherman occupies Goldsboro.

ON November 15th Sherman started from Atlanta on his march to the sea. By that date *Forrest* had joined *Hood* with his cavalry at Florence on the north bank of the Tennessee. At Pulaski, eighty miles from Nashville and forty-four from the Tennessee at Decatur, Schofield was stationed with the 4th Corps and one division of the 23rd Corps with the cavalry covering the front and right towards Florence and Waynesboro.² *Hood* had been detained for some time by the necessity of accumulating supplies, but Sherman's advance from Atlanta necessitated a

¹ See Map II. Both these campaigns are covered by Cox's *March to the Sea—Franklin and Nashville*. General Cox won great distinction in the Battle of Franklin, where he commanded the Federal forces on the south side of the Harpeth. Volume IV of *Battles and Leaders* contains *Hood's* account of his campaign and *Cheatham's* rejoinder; also *Wilson's* account of the operations of the Federal cavalry under his command. For Sherman's campaign in the Carolinas frequent references are made in the footnotes to Liddell Hart's *Sherman*.

² The strength of Schofield's force at Pulaski did not exceed 23,000 (4 B. & L., 441).

prompt movement of the Confederate army, if the Federal invasion of Georgia was to be stopped by a counter-invasion of Tennessee; and on the 20th *Beauregard* telegraphed to *Hood* to move forward immediately.¹ On that day *S. D. Lee's* Corps advanced from Florence, and on the next day the whole army was in motion along the Lawrenceburg and parallel roads.

It had been assumed by Sherman, and his belief was shared by Grant and the Washington authorities, that Thomas would at once concentrate all his available forces and meet *Hood* at some point south of the Duck River; and there is no doubt that, had Thomas chosen to call in his outlying garrisons, he could have put into the field against *Hood* a force numerically as strong as that which ultimately routed him at Nashville. Thomas, however, always deliberate in his movements and loath to leave anything to chance, decided that it was impracticable to assume the offensive against *Hood's* veteran army, until the arrival of Smith's Corps from Missouri. That reinforcement was not expected at Nashville till the 25th at the earliest; and Thomas's orders to Schofield were to retreat as little and as slowly as possible, in order to secure time for a concentration at Nashville. These instructions placed Schofield in a very awkward position, and his attempt to carry out his orders nearly brought about the destruction of his force, and rendered its extrication from a position of the greatest peril an extremely difficult task.

As soon as news arrived of *Hood's* advance, Schofield commenced to withdraw. The Federal position at Pulaski was plainly untenable, when *Hood* was turning the right flank by his advance on the Lawrenceburg road, and Schofield fell back slowly to Columbia, where he hoped to cover the railway bridge over the Duck River. The two armies were moving on parallel roads, and Schofield moderated his pace to that of his opponent, lest *Hood* should suddenly move to the right and strike the railway at some point in his rear. But on the night of the 23rd news came that *Forrest* was pressing the Federal cavalry back into Columbia, which caused Schofield to quicken his march and push forward with all speed towards that town. Early on the 24th Cox's division of

¹ *Hood's* three weeks' delay at Florence should have proved fatal to any ~~chance of~~ success his invasion might have had. The capture of Nashville was a necessary preliminary to the invasion of Kentucky. His one chance was to effect this before Sherman could send reinforcements. If after reaching Florence on October 30th he could have at once pushed ahead with the bulk of his army, he could have swept Stanley out of his path, who till November 5th had only one division of his Corps at Pulaski, and reached Nashville before Schofield's whole Corps could have been brought up from Resaca.

the 23rd Corps arrived just in time to prevent *Forrest* forcing his way into Columbia from the west, and on the same day the whole of Schofield's little army took up a strong position on the south bank of the river, covering the railway and pontoon bridges.

Hood was unable to get his troops to march more than about ten miles a day, and his army was not concentrated in Schofield's front till the 26th.¹

At Columbia some reinforcements joined Schofield: one brigade of the 23rd Corps was garrisoning the town, another brigade of the same Corps came up from Johnsonville.² During the march from Pulaski he had been joined by Wilson, sent by Sherman to be Thomas's chief of cavalry, and reinforcements of that arm were being slowly sent up from Nashville. The weakness of Schofield's position at Columbia was that he had the river behind him. This was rendered necessary in order to safeguard the bridges: for on the northern bank the ground falls away, and would be commanded by batteries placed on the higher ground of the southern bank.³ The fords below the town were held by infantry detachments, whilst above the town Wilson's cavalry piqueted the river bank. The preparations which *Hood* made for crossing above the town compelled Schofield to abandon the south bank, and on the night of the 27th the whole Federal army was brought across the river and the bridges were destroyed.

On the 28th *Forrest* succeeded in passing his cavalry over the river above the town and drove Wilson's cavalry, most of which was posted farther east, along the Lewisburg turnpike.⁴ Wilson by adopting this line of retreat left the rest of Schofield's army in a very precarious position, with its left flank exposed and its line of retreat along the Franklin turnpike at the mercy of the Confederate cavalry.⁵

¹ Cox, 66. *Hood's* march was delayed by the rain, snow, hail, and frost, which rendered the roads almost impassable.

² A third brigade had also been sent by Thomas from Johnsonville to cover a crossing of Duck River thirty miles west of Columbia.

³ Thomas was anxious that the railway bridge should be preserved for use when he came to take the offensive.

⁴ Wilson's cavalry were strung out eastwards along the line of Duck River as far as Shelbyville (Cox, 69). Three of his regiments were below Columbia.

⁵ Wilson had his hands full trying to hold back *Forrest's* cavalry pressing forward on the Lewisburg pike towards Franklin. At 1 a.m. on the 29th he wrote a despatch to Schofield advising him to get to Spring Hill with all his army by 10 a.m., otherwise he might find himself anticipated there by *Hood's* infantry. The despatch was not, however, sent till two hours later and only reached Schofield at daylight. Stanley was at once ordered to march to Spring Hill.

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On the 29th *Cheatham's* and *Stewart's* Corps with one division of *Lee's* Corps crossed the river about five miles above Columbia, and were directed upon Spring Hill eleven miles in rear of Columbia on the Franklin road. *Lee's* other two divisions with the artillery of the whole army were retained on the south bank confronting Cox's division, which, withdrawn a short distance from the river, held the north bank opposite Columbia.

Owing to the absence of Wilson's cavalry, Schofield's information as to *Hood's* movements on his left was very slight, and only one division of the 4th Corps was sent to hold Spring Hill, whither the trains of the army had already been sent.¹ This division just arrived in time to prevent the trains becoming *Forrest's* prey; but presently found itself confronted by the whole of *Cheatham's* Corps.

On this day *Hood* had an unique chance of crushing Schofield's army. Only one Federal division was holding Spring Hill, a point absolutely vital to the safety of the army. The nearest reinforcement, Kimball's division of the 4th Corps, was seven miles distant at Rutherford's Creek.² Cox's division was facing Columbia. Ruger's division of the 23rd Corps was engaged in obstructing the fords below the town, whilst Wood's division of the 4th Corps was posted about a mile in rear of Cox's position. But a sudden fit of indecision seized *Hood*, and instead of at all costs securing Spring Hill, and thus getting possession of the Federal line of retreat, he at first withheld *Stewart's* Corps and *Johnson's* division from the attack on Spring Hill, and formed them in line of battle south of Rutherford's Creek, facing west, under the impression that Schofield might be meditating a movement to get between his two widely separated wings.³ The solitary division at Spring Hill made so brave a show, aided by the fortunate presence of six batteries, which originally retreating towards Franklin, were detained and put in position on the west side of the turnpike,⁴ that *Hood*, who was with *Cheatham's* Corps,

¹ Schofield first ordered two divisions of the 4th Corps to Spring Hill, but subsequently ordered Kimball's division to halt at the Rutherford Creek crossing of the Franklin road.

² 4 B. & L., 446.

³ Or he may have intended to attack the three Federal divisions, which were with supporting distance of each other in extension of Cox's left, but changed his mind when he found that *Cheatham* was encountering an obstinate resistance (Cox, 74). Van Horne, Thomas's biographer, states that '*Hood* had left four divisions of his infantry under *Stewart*, at the crossing of Rutherford's Creek, on his line of march, two and a half miles from Spring Hill, to guard against Schofield's escape to the defences of Murfreesboro.'

⁴ Cox, 75.

imagined that he had a much larger force than one division to deal with, and instead of pressing the attack ordered *Stewart's* Corps to reinforce *Cheatham*.¹ But *Stewart* did not reach the scene of fighting till night had put an end to the combat. Thus, at the close of the day, the Federal line of retreat still remained open, and during the night, as no attempt was made by the Confederates to seize the turnpike north of Spring Hill, Schofield withdrew all his forces from their perilous position and marched to Franklin, twelve miles from Spring Hill, which was reached by the leading division before daybreak.²

Franklin is a village lying on the south bank in a bend of the Harpeth River. It was no more than Columbia a tenable position against a foe greatly superior in numbers. But Schofield's request, that a pontoon bridge might be sent there, as both the railway and wagon bridges had been damaged or partially destroyed, had been ignored, and he was consequently obliged to form line of battle and await attack, until the bridges could be repaired and his trains and artillery got across. By noon two bridges had been sufficiently repaired to permit of the passage of the trains, and a ford had also been made available by scarping the banks, although the crossing there was a bad one. On the north bank was a fort commanding the bridges and also the railroad cut, which runs close to the river.³ Here several batteries of the artillery of the 23rd Corps, which had been sent across the river first of all, were posted. South of the river one division of the 23rd Corps held the line from the Columbia pike to the railway and river on the left. The other division of that Corps extended the line to the

¹ The fighting on *Cheatham's* part was mainly done by *Cleburne's* division, supported on its right by *Brown's*. The Federal force consisted of three brigades under Stanley, the Corps commander.

² It is impossible to reconcile the conflicting statements of *Hood* and *Cheatham*. The former says that he gave explicit orders to his lieutenant to secure Spring Hill, but that *Cheatham* failed to carry out his orders because he thought that the line confronting him was 'a little too long for him,' and waited for *Stewart's* Corps. He also blames *Cheatham* for not delaying the Federal retreat during the night. *Cheatham* says that *Hood* was with him, or near by, most of the afternoon, and that he was about to attack, though it was already dark, with his own and *Stewart's* Corps, when *Hood* ordered the movement to be postponed till the following morning. He also denies that he received any explicit orders from *Hood* during the night (4 B. & L., 429-32, 438-9). Cox considers that *Hood* was seeking a scapegoat for a failure, for which he was himself solely to blame.

³ The Nashville-Decatur railway enters Franklin from the south, running 500 yards east of and parallel to the turnpike. For a thousand yards before crossing the river it runs close to the bank, and on the eastern edge of the village (Cox, 82).

right to the Carter Creek pike ; beyond that pike one division of the 4th Corps was placed with its right resting on the river west of the village. Another division of that Corps was brought across to the north bank, whilst two brigades of Wagner's division,¹ which had formed the rearguard during the withdrawal from Spring Hill, held an advanced position across the Columbia pike about half a mile in front of the main line, but they had been ordered to fall back as soon as the enemy advanced in force, and joining the third brigade of that division, which had passed within the works, to act as a general reserve. Wilson's cavalry were on the north bank to prevent any Confederate force crossing east of the village. The whole line was entrenched, but the Columbia turnpike was left open to admit of the passage of the trains and artillery. The trains were nearly all over by 3 p.m., and Schofield gave orders that the infantry should be prepared to cross at 6 p.m., if the enemy did not attack before sunset. But Hood had no intention of letting his foe escape a second time without a battle. For the failure of the 29th he held Cheatham responsible, and had bitterly reproached Cleburne, one of Cheatham's divisional commanders. Cleburne's fiery spirit was roused by the undeserved censure : for Hood had no one but himself to blame for not pressing the assault against the small Federal force on Spring Hill. The whole Confederate army seemed animated by a determination to prove to their commander that they knew how to fight to a finish, and were prepared to annihilate the Federal army, whatever the cost. The fighting on the 30th was as desperate as any in the war. The slaughter of the Confederates was enormous.²

About 4 p.m. the Confederates advanced to the attack. Cheatham's Corps moved along the pike with a division on either side of the road, and the third division in echelon on the left flank of the left division. Stewart's Corps continued the line to the right, and Johnson's, the only one of Lee's divisions as yet up, was held in reserve. The Federal position was, however, so strong, that probably a frontal attack would have had but little chance of success, and Hood, recognising the fact, might have suspended the attack after the first failure. But the misconduct of General Wagner gave Hood a better chance of carrying his enemy's lines than he could have reasonably hoped for, and caused him to persevere in the endeavour long after all chance of success had vanished. Two of Wagner's brigades were holding, as already described, a post of observation in front of the main line, and the

¹ Of the 4th Corps.

² Casement's brigade of the 23rd Corps, armed with magazine breech-loaders, did terrific execution.

third brigade was within the lines in reserve. Though he had been ordered to withdraw the two advanced brigades as soon as the enemy threatened to attack, yet in the moment of excitement he forgot the orders which he had received, and directed them to hold their ground. Enveloped on either flank by the overwhelming force of two divisions,¹ they were driven in wild confusion back into their own lines. As they rushed along the turnpike and flung themselves over the parapets on either side of the road, the troops constituting the first line of defence were thrown into some confusion. On both sides of the pike a considerable breach was made in the Federal line, and it seemed as if the hotly pursuing Confederates might fight their way in. The gap was filled by the charge of the one brigade in reserve and of the second line of one of the brigades² of the 23rd Corps, which occupied that part of the line, and after a desperate struggle the Confederates were driven out. How great the peril had been was shown by the fact that Confederate corpses were found fifty yards inside the entrenchments.³ *Cleburne*, smarting under *Hood's* reproaches, was one of the first to fall at the ditch in front of the Federal entrenchments, as he led his division forward on the east of the turnpike.⁴

That day the air was still and hazy, and the smoke hung thick and low over the battlefield. It was impossible to see any distance, and *Hood*, probably believing that the success of his first onslaught had been greater than it really was, renewed the attack again and again with fearful loss to his gallant troops. On the Confederate right *Stewart's* troops, though advancing with the greatest bravery, could make but little impression on the Federal line, and their attempt to force an entrance by the railway cutting was defeated by the heavy fire of the artillery posted in the fort on the north bank of the river. On the Confederate left the attack was not pressed so fiercely as on other parts of the line, and was easily repulsed. The fiercest fighting was in the centre across the turnpike, where the temporary breach had been made. Here *Cleburne's* and *Brown's* divisions made repeated attacks. The larger gap was on the west side of the road, and *Brown's* men had succeeded in establishing themselves on the outer line of the Federal parapets, and held on to them desperately. The Federals extemporised a retrenchment twenty-five yards to the rear, and

¹ *Cleburne's* and *Brown's* of *Cheatham's* Corps.

² *Reilly's*.

³ *Cox*, 89.

⁴ But according to another account (4 B. & L., 439). *Cleburne's* body was found fifty yards from the Federal works. *Cleburne*, the finest divisional commander in the Army of Tennessee, had once been a corporal in the 41st Foot of the British Army.

across this narrow space a sanguinary conflict raged till far into the night. *Johnson's* division, hitherto held in reserve, was put in at that point, when *Brown's* division had been fought out, but they could make no headway and only swelled the slaughter.

It was not till 9 p.m. that the Confederates were at length withdrawn from an attempt which had long been hopeless. Their losses amounted to 6,300, including twelve general officers, whilst those of their opponents amounted to 2,326, nearly half of which were in the two brigades, which had so nearly been the cause of a great disaster.¹ During the afternoon *Wilson's* cavalry were engaged in sharp skirmishing with *Forrest's* troopers, who vainly endeavoured to force a passage across the river to the left of *Schofield's* lines.

At midnight the Federals were withdrawn to the north bank and continued their retreat, reaching Nashville, twenty miles distant, the following morning.²

On the same day the last of *Smith's* detachments reached Nashville, the whole Corps amounting to nearly 12,000 men. At the same time *Steedman* arrived from Chattanooga with over 5,000 men. General *Donaldson*, the chief Quartermaster, had also organised a division of the employees out of his own and the Commissariat Departments, which could be used for garrisoning the city, and would set free a corresponding force of regular troops for offensive operations. Another division was organised under General *Cruft* of convalescents and men returning from furlough, who belonged to *Sherman's* army, and this, united with the men of the same description, who had accompanied *Steedman* from Chattanooga, made up a total of over 5,000 men.³ At Murfreesborough a force of 8,000 men under General *Rousseau* was concentrated.

Hood, in spite of the severity of his losses at Franklin, was bent on tempting Providence. It is probable that the discovery that *Sherman* had not allowed himself to be called back from his march through Georgia, and that consequently the Confederate invasion of Tennessee had been a fatal mistake, had made him well-nigh

¹ Cox, 96-7. But *Hood's* official report stated his loss at 4,500. Colonel T. L. Livermore estimates the Confederate force at 5,550.

² ~~Schofield~~ was ready to stay on at Franklin for another day; but owing to the delay in the arrival of the troops from Missouri *Thomas* required him to hold *Hood* for three days. *Schofield* pronounced this beyond his power: 'A worse position than this for an inferior force could hardly be found.' On receiving *Schofield's* reply *Thomas* directed him to fall back on Nashville.

³ Cox, 101. *Steedman's* command at Nashville consisted of *Cruft's* provisional division and two coloured brigades.

desperate, and impaired his powers of cool judgment. He may have really believed that Schofield's army had retreated before him in confusion, and that he need not any longer take serious account of his forces in reckoning up the odds against him. But if that was his belief, he was very much mistaken. Schofield's army had improved in morale as the result of the battle of Franklin, and was quite prepared to hold its ground there, if reinforcements could have been sent up from Nashville in time to prevent its flanks from being turned.

Hood, with an army reduced to about 23,000 men,¹ followed Schofield, and appeared before Nashville on December 2nd. Although confronted by a force stronger than his own, he seemed bent on retaining the offensive, and sent two cavalry divisions under *Forrest's* command with *Bate's* infantry division to break up the railway between Nashville and Murfreesborough.² On the 7th *Forrest*, having been reinforced by two more infantry brigades, advanced against Murfreesborough, but was driven back. After this *Bate's* division was recalled to *Hood's* lines before Nashville, but a third infantry brigade was sent to support *Forrest*, whose field of operations lay along the south bank of the Cumberland above Nashville. His third division under *Chalmers* was operating along the river below the city, and *Hood* even sent a cavalry detachment and one infantry brigade to hold the mouth of the Duck River, where it empties into the Tennessee, and thus close the latter river to the Federals. The presence of *Forrest's* cavalry along the Cumberland put a stop to the usual steamboat traffic, but gunboats patrolling the river both above and below Nashville effectually prevented the Confederates from crossing to the opposite bank.

Hood's advance on Nashville caused the Washington authorities to demand that Thomas should forthwith give him battle. It had been the universal expectation that the invading army would have been met and crushed south of the Duck River. Already that river had been passed, and there seemed a possibility that a Confederate army might again be seen on the banks of the Ohio. Something of the same apprehension, which had been excited by *Bragg's* invasion of Kentucky in 1862, was now felt again, as *Hood* was

¹ Cox estimated *Hood's* army at 44,000, but Colonel T. L. Livermore, an acknowledged authority, accepts *Hood's* figures. To this total must, however, be added *Forrest's* two cavalry divisions and three infantry brigades operating in the vicinity of Murfreesboro.

² From General Wilson's account (4 B. & L., 466) it would appear that these two cavalry divisions had been detached before the battle of Franklin, and only *Chalmers's* division took part in that battle. *Forrest's* official report shows that all three divisions were engaged at Franklin.

pushing northward, and Thomas appeared to be making no effort to check him.

On December 2nd Grant telegraphed to Thomas, advising him to leave the fortifications of Nashville in charge of Donaldson's division of armed employees, and with all available forces march out and attack Hood. Though the language of Grant's telegram was so urgent as to be almost tantamount to a direct order, Thomas took upon himself the responsibility of waiting a few days longer in order to provide remounts for his cavalry.

Then just as he was preparing to assume the offensive, on December 8th a storm of snow and sleet came on, which covered the hill slopes, over which the advance against Hood's position would have¹ be made, with sheets of slippery ice, rendering military operations impracticable, until a thaw came. When this fact was urged as a reason for delay, Grant and the Federal Government regarded the plea as only a part of Thomas's general dilatory policy, and peremptory orders were sent him either to attack at once or else turn over the command to Schofield.¹

But neither remonstrances nor threats could hurry Thomas into taking a course, which, after personal observation, he had decided to be premature. He called his Corps commanders to a council of war, explained to them that he was required to fight or resign his command, and asked their advice. They unanimously declared that, until there came a change in the weather, active operations were impossible. Thomas replied to Halleck to this effect, expressing at the same time his perfect readiness to be relieved of the command. The patience of the General-in-Chief was exhausted. On the 13th Logan, commander of the 15th Army Corps, who had been on leave of absence at Washington and was returning by way of City Point, was ordered to proceed to Nashville and relieve Thomas of the command of the Department and the Army

¹ Cox, 105-6. The Official Records show, however, that on December 9th by Grant's direction an order was issued by the Secretary of War relieving Thomas and appointing Schofield in his place. But the order had not yet left the Adjutant-General's office when a telegram was received from Thomas describing the change of weather which rendered an offensive impossible. Halleck, who was well disposed to Thomas, sent on by telegraph this despatch to Grant, and enquired whether in the circumstances he still wished the order relieving Thomas to be sent to Nashville. In reply to Halleck Grant suspended the order 'until it is seen whether he will do anything.' In a telegram of the previous night Halleck had told Grant that, so far as he knew, no one at Washington wished for Thomas's removal. Thomas's telegram seems to fix the 9th as the day on which the storm began. But Cox's journal records on the 8th freezing cold and snow, covering the ground with ice and making movements impracticable.

of the Cumberland; and Grant himself, who was daily growing more anxious lest *Hood's* invasion should break up his own carefully matured plans for the reduction of Richmond, started from City Point to assume the command in person against *Hood*. But on reaching Washington he received the welcome intelligence that Thomas had at last moved out of his fortifications, and that the first day of fighting had been altogether in favour of the Federal army. Logan had only reached Louisville when he heard the news of the victory at Nashville.

On the 14th a warm rain set in, and it was plain that operations would be possible the following day. *Hood* had already decided on the 10th that it was undesirable to remain longer threatening Nashville, but the same change of weather, which prevented Thomas from attacking, prevented the Confederates from retreating. It is not easy to fathom the reasons which caused *Hood* to remain so long in a position of considerable peril. He himself claimed that he was expecting reinforcements from Texas.¹ As no considerable force from Texas had succeeded in crossing the Mississippi since the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson in the summer of 1863, *Hood's* expectation of any aid from that quarter was unreasonable. But it is more probable that the true reason which detained him before Thomas's lines was the desire to raise recruits and gather supplies in Tennessee. That was the special work which *Forrest* with his cavalry was directed to carry out; and

¹ On December 2nd *Beauregard* had written to *Kirby Smith*, commanding the Trans-Mississippi Department, urging him to send two or more divisions to *Hood's* aid, or to make a threatening movement against Missouri to prevent reinforcements being sent from there to Thomas. He also caused a scheme of his own devising to be forwarded for securing the passage of the troops by the construction of 'detached floating booms, armed with torpedoes,' which should be anchored in two rows, 100 feet apart, across the river at the point selected for the passage; by these booms the Federal gunboats, he thought, could be prevented from interfering with the transfer of the troops. The scheme was pronounced quite impracticable at that season of the year. It was pointed out that during the summer when the conditions were more favourable, attempts had been made under the direction of General R. H. Taylor to effect a crossing, but they had been baffled by the vigilance of the land and naval forces under the command of General Canby. It was the necessity of keeping a close watch on the Mississippi to frustrate such attempts, which had prevented Canby from sending a larger force to Mobile. The reference to Texas is explained by the fact that the troops, who it had originally been proposed to use for the purpose, came from *Ma-gruder's* command in Texas. Any such transfer to the eastern bank of the river would have been intensely unpopular with the troops on the western side and would have been followed by widespread desertion and the demoralisation of any troops who might have got across.

Hood was accompanied by the Confederate Governor (so-called) of Tennessee, whose presence in the camp might have, so it was hoped, a stimulating effect upon the recruiting.¹

Strategically *Hood's* threat of investing Nashville was unsound, and his tactical dispositions were equally faulty.

Some four miles south of Nashville rise the Brentwood Hills.² From these hills flow two streams, Brown's Creek and Richland Creek, which after running parallel for some little distance turn to the right and left and fall into the Cumberland on either side of Nashville. Along a low and broken line of hills crossing the space between these two creeks the Confederate line was arrayed. *Cheatham's* Corps held the right, reaching beyond Brown's Creek across the ~~M~~elnsville pike to the Chattanooga railway and beyond. *Lee's* Corps, which had suffered the least in the battle of Franklin, formed the centre, stretching across the Franklin turnpike, and *Stewart's* Corps continued the line across the Granny White pike to the Hillsboro road. *Stewart's* left wing, on reaching the Hillsboro road was sharply refused and found cover behind a stone wall running for a thousand yards along the roadside. To strengthen his position still further a strong skirmish line was thrown forward terminating in an entrenched position on Montgomery Hill close to the Hillsboro pike. To the south-west and beyond Richland Creek redoubts had been thrown up on detached hills, and *Chalmers's* cavalry division was charged with the almost impossible task of covering the ground between the Hillsboro road and the river.

Hood's weak point was his left flank, which was practically 'in the air,' and Thomas determined to hurl the greater part of his army obliquely against it. According to his original dispositions the interior defences of Nashville were held by Donaldson's extemporised division. Steedman's division was posted on the extreme left between the Chattanooga railway and the Lebanon turnpike close to the river. In the centre the 4th Corps, commanded in the absence of Stanley by Wood, reached from the Granny White turnpike across the Hillsboro pike to the Hardin pike. This line where it crossed the Hillsboro road formed a salient angle at Laurens Hill opposite to and within six hundred yards of *Stewart's* advanced line on Montgomery Hill.³

The Federal right was formed by the 16th Corps under A. J. Smith, reaching across the Charlotte pike, and between that road


¹ Cox, 101. *Hood* says that he hoped if Thomas attacked him in his entrenched position to defeat him and 'enter the city on the heels of the enemy' (4 B. & L., 436).

² See Plan of Battle of Nashville.


³ 4 B. & L., 457.

BATTLE OF NASHVILLE

Scale of Miles



Federals	morning	15 Dec 1864	1864
Confederates	"	16	"
Entrenchments	"	16	"



and the river the whole of Wilson's Cavalry Corps was posted. The 23rd Corps was held in reserve within the interior line of defences, filling the gap between Steedman's and Wood's positions, and Thomas intended to make a telling use of this Corps at the fitting moment. The Federal leader's plan of battle was to make a grand left wheel with the whole of his right wing pivoting upon Wood's position on Laurens Hill, and to aim at overlapping and crushing the Confederate left, whilst Steedman by a brisk demonstration was to hold *Hood's* right fast. Wood in the centre was to threaten and, if opportunity offered, attack Montgomery Hill, and Schofield's Corps was held in reserve till the decisive moment.

Early on the morning of the 15th a thick fog obscured the field of battle, but about 8 a.m. Steedman advancing along the Murfreesborough road attacked the Confederate right. So vigorously was the Federal demonstration pushed, that *Cheatham's* Corps was for the whole of that eventful day held fast in its position across the Nolensville pike and Chattanooga railroad. Not only was the Confederate right neutralised for that day, but the centre, consisting of *Lee's* Corps,¹ was prevented from detaching any considerable force to the support of either flank by the fear lest the Federal force occupying the interior line of defences might sally out along the Franklin turnpike and cut the Confederate line in twain.

The movement of the Federal right wing was considerably delayed by Smith's infantry crossing the front of Wilson's cavalry,² and it was noon before that part of Thomas's army came into close contact with the enemy. On the Confederate left *Chalmers's* cavalry division, supported by a single infantry brigade, vainly endeavoured to hold its ground against a vastly superior force. Half a mile south-east of the Hardin turnpike the first of *Hood's* detached works was stormed by a combined attack of dismounted cavalry and infantry.³ At this juncture the solitary infantry brigade was recalled to extend *Stewart's* line southward upon some hilly ground covering the Granny White pike. The withdrawal of the infantry force left the other detached works at the mercy of the two Federal Corps, which, after capturing them, pressed on against *Stewart's* main line.

In the centre about 1 p.m.⁴ Post's brigade of the 4th Corps gallantly captured the Confederate advanced position on Montgomery Hill; so Thomas, now satisfied that the offensive lay

¹ ' *Lee's* Corps, after sending two brigades to the assistance of *Stewart* on his left, was held in place by the threatening position of the garrison troops and did not fire a shot during the day ' (4 B. & L., 457).

² 4 B. & L., 468.

³ Cox, III.

⁴ Cox, 112.

wholly with him, ordered Schofield's Corps to move round behind Wood's and Smith's Corps and take position on the right of the latter. At the same time Wilson was directed to push straight up the valley of Richland Creek, and, if possible, plant himself across the Granny White turnpike. Under this combined assault *Stewart's* line crumbled away. Smith carried the southern end of the stone wall. Wood, with the 4th Corps, attacked the salient angle in *Stewart's* lines on the Hillsboro road and broke through at that point. The Confederate left at once outflanked and, broken by a frontal attack, fell back in great confusion to the Granny White turnpike.

The delay which had occurred in the earlier part of the day prevented the Federal right from reaping the full fruits of its victory, but when the short December day came to an end, sixteen guns and 1,200 prisoners had been captured and the Confederate left forced back two miles, and this great success, promising still greater results for the morrow, had been achieved with but slight loss.¹

Hood had now good cause to regret that in his ill-judged desire to hold as much country as possible he had detached two cavalry divisions and three infantry brigades from his main force. He sent orders to *Forrest* to return with all speed. But as the cavalry commander could not rejoin until twenty-four hours at least had elapsed, he resolved to form a second line and hold on for another day.

The line which *Hood* took up during the night was two miles south of and much more contracted than that which he had already tried unsuccessfully to hold. The right rested on Overton Hill across the Franklin pike. The line then stretched to the left across the Granny White turnpike to Shy's Hill, which had been held with the utmost difficulty against Schofield's advance. From Shy's Hill the Confederate line turned sharply to the south and extended to the Brentwood Hills along a line of lesser heights. *Cheatham's* Corps was brought from the right to the left, and *Lee's* Corps now held the right of *Hood's* position.

Parallel to the Confederate line the Federal army was arrayed. The 4th Corps² and Steedman's division faced Overton Hill and reached across the Franklin pike, till they connected with the left

¹ Cox, 114. The 23rd Corps advancing on Smith's right across the Hillsboro road 'carried the left of a series of hills parallel to the Granny White turnpike,' but was unable to drive *Colman's* brigade from Shy's Hill.

² Wood on the previous evening had been ordered to move his Corps to the left and reach the Franklin pike (Cox, 114).

of the 16th Corps, whose right was in front of Shy's Hill. Schofield's Corps occupied the line of hills which ran parallel to the sharply refused left flank of the Confederates, and extended across Richland Creek: Wilson's cavalry were on the extreme right, threatening *Hood's* line of retreat by the Franklin pike.¹

The Confederate left flank was nearly as much exposed as on the previous day to a turning movement by the greatly superior cavalry force of their opponents, and the salient angle at Shy's Hill was a very weak point. The entrenchments on that hill, which had been thrown up during the night, were too far back from the brow of the hill to command the slope, and they could be enfiladed and taken in reverse by the Federal artillery, and during the day a considerable part of the parapet was destroyed by the fire of Schofield's and Smith's artillery from the opposite ridges.²

Thomas's plan of battle for the 16th aimed at pushing his cavalry round and beyond the Confederate left and securing possession of the Franklin turnpike, the sole line of retreat for the Confederate army. Schofield and Smith were to attack the Confederate left, when a favourable opportunity offered, and by breaking it force the whole of *Hood's* army to retreat by the Franklin turnpike. Thomas did not direct an assault to be made at any particular part of the enemy's entrenchments, but left his Corps commanders to use their own discretion.³

The Federal battle opened with a heavy cannonade all along the line, which made itself specially felt on the Confederate left, where the rifled guns of the Federal artillery, firing across the narrow valley between the two parallel ranges of hills, quickly gained the mastery over the smooth-bore weapons of their opponents. At 3 p.m. (the earlier part of the day having been spent in marching the troops to their respective positions over the muddy and broken ground), an attempt was made by Wood, commanding the 4th Corps and Steedman's division, to storm Overton Hill. But the position proved too strong to be taken by a frontal attack, and the attempt was repulsed with considerable loss to the attacking force.

In the meanwhile Wilson's cavalry had been steadily gaining ground on the right, occupying hill after hill, and *Hood* became seriously alarmed for his line of retreat. In his endeavour to extend his line further south to hold Wilson in check, *Hood* was obliged to still further weaken his left wing. One division had

¹ On the morning of the 16th Wilson made a wide *détour* beyond the Confederate left and secured a footing on the Granny White pike (4 B. & L., 462).

² Cox, 120.

³ Cox, 118.

been already sent to the right to reinforce *Lee* on Overton Hill, and one brigade was detached to the left to support *Chalmers's* cavalry against *Wilson's* advance. The Federal commanders on the right saw that their opportunity had come. The Confederate line had been stretched too far to offer any effective resistance. About 4 p.m. *Smith* assaulted and captured *Shy's* Hill. At the same time *Schofield* attacked and carried an embraasured work on the extreme left of the hostile line, and the whole Confederate army, seeing its left broken, took to flight. *Wilson* was already across the *Granny White* turnpike, but the fugitives streamed eastwards to the *Franklin* pike, by which they made their escape. The obstinate resistance of two brigades, which still retained their organisation, secured the passes through the *Brentwood* Hills long enough to save the larger part of *Hood's* army from capture.¹

In the two days' fighting on December 15th and 16th the Federals captured fifty-three guns and about 4,500 prisoners.² It is difficult to determine what *Hood's* losses in killed and wounded were. The Federal loss just exceeded 3,000, and as the Confederates were throughout acting on the defensive, it is probable that their losses in killed and wounded were less than those of their opponents.

The victory of Nashville was the most decisive gained by either side during the war. In the North an intense sense of relief was felt; and in the reaction which followed the previous irritation against *Thomas*, the idea arose that the victory was won in consequence rather than in spite of the dilatory measures which had characterised the earlier stages of the campaign. That *Thomas* was to blame for allowing the invading army to advance so far north seems probable. It is true that by letting *Hood* hurl his army in repeated and futile assaults against *Schofield's* lines at *Franklin* the efficiency of that army as a fighting force was greatly impaired. But that advantage cannot be regarded as adequately counterbalancing the serious derangement which was threatened by this delay to *Grant's* plans; and it is a fair supposition that, had *Hood* been fought and defeated in November, a more effective pursuit could have been made than was possible in December after the change of weather had broken up the roads.³

No attempt at organised resistance was made by the flying

¹ These two brigades and *Chalmers's* cavalry covered the passes through the *Brentwood* Hills from the *Granny White* road, along which the Federal cavalry were advancing to its intersection with the *Franklin* turnpike.

² Cox, 126.

³ But see Note at end of chapter.

army until Columbia¹ was reached.² There *Forrest's* cavalry rejoined, and with the assistance of eight infantry brigades formed an efficient rearguard which covered the line of retreat until on the evening of the 27th *Hood's* army reached the south bank of the Tennessee. *Hood* rallied the remnants of his army at Tupelo in Mississippi, and applied to be relieved of his command. His request was granted. The three Corps of the defeated army subsequently took part in the campaign against Sherman in the Carolinas; but though their organisation continued the same their numerical strength was enormously reduced. During the campaign over 13,000 prisoners were taken, and seventy-two pieces of artillery, and the Confederate strength was still further diminished by desertions.³

Thomas, after *Hood's* escape across the Tennessee, issued orders assigning winter quarters to his various Corps. But Grant was determined to give the enemy no breathing space; and Thomas, revoking his order, made preparations for a fresh campaign.

The 23rd Corps was ordered to go by water by the Tennessee and the Ohio to the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and then proceed by rail to Washington, with a view to being transported by water to North Carolina, of which department Schofield was now placed in command.

Grant had decided to unite Sherman's army with those of the Potomac and the James in a final effort against the Army of Northern Virginia; and in order to make Sherman's task the easier and provide him with a base, in case the resistance which he might encounter on his march through the Carolinas, should prove too strong to be easily overcome, Grant intended to capture Wilmington⁴ and thus enable Sherman, if he deemed it necessary to turn aside from the direct road to Richmond, to open up communication with the Federal fleet. It was for this purpose that Schofield's corps was summoned from the west.

Wilmington lies on the left bank of the Cape Fear River about thirty miles from its mouth. The entrance to the river was commanded by Fort Fisher, a strong post mounting fifty guns⁵ on the

¹ See Map II.

² The pursuit was held up at Duck River, as bridges had to be rebuilt. By a slip of the tongue Thomas had sent the pontoon train out on the Murfreesboro pike instead of the Granny White pike (Liddell Hart, 363).

³ *Hood* stated in his report that his losses, including prisoners, for the whole campaign did not exceed 10,000. But Thomas claimed 13,000 prisoners and 2,000 deserters (4 B. & L., 474).

⁴ See Map VII.

⁵ The armament consisted of forty-five heavy guns, three mortars, and two field pieces in a small outwork (Cox, 140).

left bank of the river close to the sea, reaching across the narrow spit of sand which separates the river from the sea. The capture of Fort Fisher would at once close Wilmington to the blockade runners, and thus seal up the last port left open on the Atlantic coast, and at the same time furnish a suitable base for further operations against Wilmington.

Towards the end of December an attempt had been made to capture Fort Fisher, but it had failed owing to the misconduct of General Butler. Grant had intended that the land forces engaged in the expedition should be under the command of General Weitzel, one of Butler's Corps commanders. But Butler, in defiance of Grant's orders, himself decided to assume the command of the expedition. Great reliance was placed upon a powder ship freighted with 215 tons of gunpowder, which was to be exploded close to the fort. But this novel experiment in warfare proved a complete failure. There was a general lack of co-operation between the land and naval forces, and much recrimination between Admiral Porter and General Butler. The latter eventually withdrew his troops, who he had landed, without making any attempt to entrench and hold a position. Butler, who during the war had held various commands, but had never shown any signs of military ability, was, in consequence of this failure, relieved of the command of the Army of the James, and succeeded by General Ord.

Porter's report, however, made it plain that with proper co-operation the fall of the fort ought to be certain. So in January a second attempt was made. The land force now employed was under the command of General Terry, and consisted of two divisions and one brigade. This force landed on the 13th under cover of the fire of the fleet about five miles north of the fort. The fleet, consisting of sixty war vessels and gunboats,¹ kept up a very heavy fire upon the fort on the 13th, 14th, and earlier part of the 15th, concentrating its efforts upon dismounting the heavy guns on the land face.

The navy did its work so well that at 3 p.m. on the 15th, when the land forces advanced to the attack, only one heavy gun remained serviceable in their front.² An entrance was quickly effected near the river bank. A naval force of some 2,000 sailors and marines, which attacked at the sea angle, was repulsed. Once inside the fort the Federal infantry had still a hard task before them, as the gun-pits and traverses afforded excellent cover for the defenders. But the fleet after the repulse of the naval contingent reopened fire, and the garrison was at length driven to

¹ Cox, 142.

² 4 B. & L., 649.

seek shelter in Fort Buchanan, a small work at the very end of the sandspit, where that same evening the Confederate force capitulated, numbering about 2,000 officers and men. This signal success was won at a cost of less than 1,000 killed and wounded.¹

On February 9th Cox's division of the 23rd Corps from Nashville reached Fort Fisher. *Hoke's* division had been sent from Wilmington to prevent any advance against the city by the left bank of the river, and held a strongly entrenched position between the river and Myrtle Sound, a long shallow bay, which is only separated from the sea by a narrow stretch of sand a few hundred yards broad. The fall of Fort Fisher gave the Federals control of the mouth of the river, and enabled them to establish themselves on the right bank as well. But on that bank Fort Anderson, held by one of *Hoke's* brigades, which was about in a line with his entrenchments on the left bank, constituted a considerable obstacle. Two unsuccessful attempts were made on the nights of the 12th and 14th to turn *Hoke's* left by laying a pontoon bridge across Myrtle Sound in his rear. After the second failure Schofield transferred two divisions and a brigade to the right bank of the river: a naval force moved up the river in co-operation.

On the 18th Fort Anderson was abandoned by the Confederates in consequence of a flanking movement carried out by Cox, who was in command of the forces on the right bank, threatening the line of retreat of the garrison. The next stand was made at Town Creek, some eight miles further back, but Cox turned the Confederate left by transporting three brigades in a single rice boat over the stream out of sight of the enemy, and attacking the defenders in the rear, captured a number of prisoners and both their guns.²

On the 21st Cox's force was in front of Wilmington, though on the opposite bank. A battery of rifled guns was, however, able to pitch its shells into the city,³ and during the night the Confederates evacuated it. *Hoke's* troops, which had firmly held their entrenchments on the left bank against Terry's forces, were withdrawn the same night. With but slight loss the Federals had secured the last Confederate harbour on the Atlantic coast, and

¹ According to *Bragg's* official report the garrison numbered about 2,500, of whom about 500 were killed and wounded. Terry reported the capture of 2,083 prisoners (4 B. & L., 661). The Federal loss is given at 955. Cox makes the total casualties only amount to about 650. *Bragg* had been appointed to the command of 'the military department of North Carolina east of the Blue Ridge' without being formally relieved of his duties as 'Commander-in-Chief.' His activities were not, however, limited to his new department; from November 24th to December 14th he was in command at Augusta.

² Cox, 151-2.

³ Cox, 153.

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in case of need a fresh base was secured for Sherman's advancing army.

It was not, however, Sherman's intention to turn aside to Wilmington unless compelled to do so. There was a chance that *Lee* might succeed in giving Grant the slip, and coming south with the Army of Northern Virginia concentrate a superior force against his army marching through the Carolinas. But unless *Lee* succeeded in accomplishing this extremely difficult task, Sherman intended to push straight for Goldsboro.

With a view to facilitating this movement, it now became Schofield's duty to open up the line from Newberne¹ to Goldsboro. Newberne, lying forty miles up the Neuse River, had been in the hands of the Federals ever since its capture by Buyside in March, 1862. As a base it had several advantages over Wilmington. The harbour at the mouth of the Neuse River was a better one than that which had been secured at the mouth of the Cape Fear River. A railway was in working order between Newberne and its port with cars and locomotives, whilst no rolling stock at all was to be found at Wilmington; and the railroad from Newberne to Goldsboro could be more easily repaired than that, which ran to the same point from Wilmington.²

On the last day of February Cox arrived at Newberne from Schofield's camp, and made immediate preparations for commencing the repairs upon the railway. He organised two divisions out of convalescents belonging to Sherman's army and garrison troops, and was also joined by a division of new troops, which was assigned to the 23rd Corps. With these he moved out to cover the work of repairing the railroad through Dover Swamp.

Lee had been recently appointed by Act of Congress General-in-Chief of all the Confederate forces, and on February 23rd he had summoned *Joseph Johnston*, who had remained unemployed since July, when he was relieved of the command of the Army of Tennessee at Atlanta, to take command of all the troops which were being concentrated to check Sherman's advance. *Johnston* detached *Bragg* with *Hoke's* division and such portions of the Army of the Tennessee as had by that time arrived from the West, to crush Cox's three divisions advancing from Newberne.³ He expected that *Bragg* would have time to effect that object and still rejoin the main army, which was being concentrated about Smithfield.

¹ Spelt New Berne on Map VII.

² Cox, 154-5.

³ *Johnston* states that the reinforcements from the Army of Tennessee which joined *Bragg* numbered less than 2,000 (*Narrative*, 379). They were under the command of *D. H. Hill*.

Bragg took up his position at Kinston, on the Neuse River, about three miles beyond Dover Swamp, and, moving out of the town, arrayed his army along the South West Creek. On March 8th, 9th, and 10th there was some sharp fighting along that Creek. *Bragg* gained an initial success on the 8th by suddenly falling upon an advanced force of two regiments, which he routed, capturing nearly three-quarters of the whole command.¹ But he was unable to gain any further advantage against Cox's line, which was formed along the right bank of the Creek at the head of the swamp, and on the night of the 10th withdrew his forces and hastened through Goldsboro to rejoin *Johnston*.

Kinston was occupied by the Federal forces on the 14th, and the railroad quickly repaired as far as that point. The rest of the 23rd Corps joined Schofield at Kinston, having marched from Wilmington by land.² Terry's Corps in the meantime had advanced from Wilmington along the railroad to Goldsboro : and Schofield was now ready to march on Goldsboro and join hands with Sherman, as soon as that general came within reach.

Sherman, at Savannah, had been hoping that by the middle of January the weather might be sufficiently favourable for his Carolina campaign. His plan was to feint simultancously at Charleston and Augusta, but Columbia, the capital of South Carolina, was his real objective.³ With a view to deceiving his opponents he sent the right wing early in the month by water to Beaufort, and directed Howard, its commander, to concentrate at Pocotaligo. Slocum was directed with the left wing to march some forty miles up the Savannah on both banks, and then reunite his command at Robertsville in readiness to join Howard. By these movements not only was the appearance of threatening Augusta and Charleston kept up, but the two wings at Robertsville and Pocotaligo could be easily supplied by water, and thus would be able to start on their march for Columbia with their trains full. But the weather proved exceptionally unfavourable : rain fell day after day, converting the country almost into a lake. At Sister's Ferry, where Slocum was to cross the Savannah, the river was swollen to a breadth of three miles. On the last day of

¹ Cox, 158.

² Schofield himself had come by sea from Wilmington to Newberne on March 7th.

³ Sherman during his march through Georgia had 'left Augusta untouched on purpose, because the enemy will be in doubt as to my objective point, after we cross the Savannah river, whether it will be Augusta or Charleston.'

January, Howard's wing was concentrated at Pocotaligo, and the following day the advance commenced.¹

A series of rivers, deep and bordered by swamps, run through South Carolina into the Atlantic, keeping a line parallel to the Savannah. A small force skilfully handled might make the crossing of any one of these rivers in their lower reaches an extremely difficult task. Sherman therefore decided to move his army up the ridge between the valleys of the Savannah and the Salkehatchie, till he reached the upper and narrower waters of the latter river.² He also intended to break up the railway system of South Carolina, as in the previous campaign he had done that of Georgia, in order to prevent a rapid concentration of the Confederate forces against him.

At the same time as Sherman commenced his advance, a Council of War was being held near Augusta, at which *Beauregard*, *Hardee*, *G. W. Smith*, commanding the Georgia militia, and *D. H. Hill*, who had recently been appointed to the command of a division in *S. D. Lee's* Army Corps, were present. The Confederate generals reckoned that a force of 33,450 men could be concentrated at Augusta by February 4th or the following day.³ The Richmond Government would seem, however, to have been unable to resign itself to the evacuation of Charleston at so early a date, and Sherman advanced with such speed through swamps deemed impassable by his opponents that the opportunity for concentration was lost. While the Confederate leaders were deliberating, Sherman was marching through the Salkehatchie swamps, some ten or twelve miles every day by mud roads, nearly every mile of which had to be corduroyed to admit the passage of his train of 2,500 wagons. *Wheeler's* cavalry was the only force available at the moment to check his advance: and though every effort was made to delay the Federal march by burning bridges and holding the long causeways over the swamps, the leading division of a column was generally found strong enough to outflank the cavalry and force its retreat.

Sherman's army went steadily forward. On February 7th Howard struck the Augusta and Charleston railroad at Midway; on the 12th both forks of the Edisto were crossed, and the

¹ One of Howard's divisions had been forced by the high water to join temporarily Slocum's wing.

² On February 3rd the right wing, which had started before the left, suddenly wheeled to the right and forced a passage over the upper reaches of the Salkehatchie (*Liddell Hart*, 375).

³ Cox, 169. But 3,000 men of this force did not reach Augusta till nearly a week later.

Columbia branch line was broken up at Orangeburg. The speed of Sherman's advance necessitated the abandonment of the proposed concentration at Augusta.¹ The Georgia militia were left to hold that city, where they were quite useless, but they refused to serve outside the bounds of their own State. *Beauregard* hurried by a lengthy *détour* to Charlotte, in North Carolina, where it was proposed to make the next attempt at concentration, with that part of the Army of Tennessee which had reached him.

On the 17th the Federals reached Columbia. General *Wade Hampton*, as a South Carolinian of great popularity and influence, had been sent south by *Lee* in the hope that he might arouse the flagging spirits of his countrymen. His cavalry evacuated Columbia on the approach of the Federal forces, after burning the two railway-stations and setting fire to the cotton-bales piled in the middle of the street, to prevent them falling into the hands of the enemy. A strong wind rose which fanned the flames, and, in spite of the efforts of the Federal soldiers, the greater part of the city was destroyed. In the South the destruction of Columbia was represented as Sherman's deliberate act. But that general, though merciless in his destruction of everything which could be regarded as of military value to the Confederate cause, in all his orders forbade the destruction of private property and dwellings. It is true that intoxicated soldiers aided the spread of the conflagration, and, doubtless, there were many in the army who considered that the destruction of the capital was a fitting punishment for the State, which had been the first to secede, and aided at its ruin.² But the charge of incendiarism cannot justly be brought against the Federal commander, and before continuing his march he took steps to provide the starving population of the ruined city with food.

On the same day that Columbia fell into the hands of Sherman, *Hardee* commenced to evacuate Charleston. The systematic destruction of the railroad, which connected the South Carolinian

¹ 'Sherman did not move on Branchville, the railway junction a few miles east of Midway, because the enemy would be expecting him there. Taken by surprise the Confederate forces folded back towards Branchville on the east and Augusta on the west' (Liddell Hart), leaving the road open to Columbia. The occupation of Orangeburg 'effectually separated the Confederate forces and prevented any chance of the two halves reuniting' (Liddell Hart, 377).

² The inhabitants seeking to propitiate the invader brought out drink 'pailfuls of neat whiskey,' which they offered to the soldiers marching through the streets. Federal prisoners just released also contributed their share of destruction. Only one Federal Corps entered the city, marching straight through, but leaving a brigade to furnish guards. More brigades were brought in to fight the flames.-

seaport with Augusta, warned him that he had no time to waste if he wished to withdraw his forces by the sole remaining railway through Florence. He took his army by rail to Cheraw, on the Great Pedee River, where he proposed to make his next stand. On February 18th Federal troops occupied Charleston.¹

Though *Hardee* had constructed strong works behind the Great Pedee, he had not a sufficient force to prevent Slocum, with the left wing of the Federal army, turning his position; and on March 3rd the right wing occupied Cheraw. Immediately after capturing Columbia Sherman had made a demonstration in the direction of Charlotte, tearing up the railway for a distance of forty miles.² Besides the simple destruction of the railway track, his object was by threatening Charlotte to delay the concentration of *Johnston's* forces for the protection of Raleigh, which was the point that he was really aiming at.

Hardee from Cheraw fell back to Fayetteville on the Cape Fear River, but he was too weak to attempt to hold that line, and on the 11th Slocum entered Fayetteville. The occupation of this town brought Sherman into communication with the Federal forces holding Wilmington. But he resolved to press on to Goldsboro, as he saw that *Hardee* was unable to offer any effective resistance, and learnt that the railway from Newberne was being rapidly repaired.

When at Cheraw, Sherman had heard of *Johnston's* appointment to command the forces in his front, and the news that his old antagonist was again in the field warned him that he would probably have to encounter a better organised opposition than he had yet met. On leaving Fayetteville, where he waited for a day or two in the vain hope of getting from Wilmington shoes and clothing, of which his soldiers were sorely in need, he ordered that four divisions of either wing should march light, whilst the rest should accompany the trains and help them along.³ By this

¹ Sent by General Foster from Savannah.

² Having thoroughly destroyed the railways round Columbia, Sherman reunited his army at Winnsboro, forty miles to the north on the Charlotte railway, and from there sent the cavalry and one Corps still farther up the line to threaten an advance on Charlotte. With the rest of the army he suddenly wheeled to the right on the 22nd and 'next day crossed the broad Catawba river, unopposed, in an easterly direction' (Liddell Hart, 382).

³ To persuade *Johnston* that Raleigh, and not Goldsboro, was his objective, he moved the cavalry and the four 'light' divisions of the left wing northward up the Raleigh road with orders to swerve eastwards on the second day (16th) and converge to meet the right wing at Bentonville, ten miles short of Goldsboro (Liddell Hart).

arrangement he hoped to have a sufficient force to check any attempt that *Johnston* might make against either column.

On the 16th a sharp encounter took place at Averysboro, where *Hardee* had entrenched a position¹; but Slocum deploying two divisions of the 20th Corps drove *Hardee* back to a second entrenched position, which was abandoned during the night. Sherman argued from this engagement that *Hardee* had stood to fight in order to give *Johnston* the more time to concentrate in front of Raleigh, and the fact that only *Hardee's* troops were engaged seemed to indicate that *Johnston* could not be sufficiently strong to advance south of the Neuse River in time to prevent him reaching Goldsboro.²

There were, however, certain facts, essential to the formation of a right judgment, of which Sherman was necessarily in ignorance. He did not know that *Johnston* had detached a strong force under *Bragg* against the Federal force operating from Newberne, or that the object of *Hardee's* stand at Averysboro had been to give time for *Bragg* to return from his unsuccessful expedition. *Johnston*, being in telegraphic communication with his subordinates, could form a truer estimate of the military situation than was possible for Sherman, who on leaving Fayetteville had again cut himself off from communication with Schofield. *Johnston* saw that if a blow was to be struck at Sherman, before he could be joined by the forces of Schofield's Department, it must be struck at once. He issued orders accordingly for a general concentration at Bentonville on the 18th. This was a small village on the road from Smithfield to Clinton, about three miles west of the point where that road was crossed by another from Averysboro to Goldsboro, along which the left Federal column was advancing. *Johnston's* information was to the effect that Slocum's two Corps were nearly a day's march apart and that distance away from Howard's wing.³ By advancing from Bentonville and striking Slocum's left flank he hoped to overwhelm the left wing in detail.

With a force of about 22,000 men,⁴ *Johnston* took up a position

¹ Covering the road to Raleigh.

² Cox, 185.

³ Cox, 186.

⁴ Cox estimates the Confederate force at 22,000 infantry besides cavalry, whose strength is stated as 5,500. *Johnston* gives his strength on the 19th in infantry and artillery as 14,100. According to his account the cavalry were not engaged on that day, *Butler's* division, which had been engaged on the 18th, having been sent to watch the movements of the Federal right wing (*Narrative*, 392). But *Wade Hampton*, the Confederate cavalry commander, states that both *Butler's* and *Wheeler's* cavalry were engaged and that they numbered about 3,000 men (4 B. & L., 705).

right across the Averysboro road with the two wings swung forward, the right hidden in the woods. The right wing consisted of the troops of the Army of Tennessee and one division of *Hardee's* command; the left was held by *Bragg* with *Hoke's* division, reinforced by *Hardee's* other division.¹ On the 19th Slocum was pushing on towards Bentonville with the 14th Corps leading. The 20th Corps was eight miles behind.² It had proved impossible, owing to the wretched condition of the roads from incessant rain, to keep the two Corps closed up, and the right wing was several miles away marching by parallel roads.

The Federal advance first encountered *Johnston's* cavalry, and thinking that he had only cavalry in his front, Davis, the Corps commander, pressed forward with his leading division under Carlin and directed Buell's brigade to move to the left of the road so as to outflank the supposed position of the Confederates. The capture of some prisoners revealed the fact that *Johnston's* whole army had to be encountered. Slocum, on reaching the front, ordered up the second division under Morgan and deployed it on the right of Carlin's, being ignorant that a strong force was concealed in the woods on his left. Suddenly the Confederate right rushed to the attack. Buell's brigade was swept away. Carlin's other brigades were taken in flank and successively driven back, and a gap made in the Federal line. As the Confederate centre pressed along the road in pursuit of Carlin's retreating troops, they were themselves taken in flank by a vigorous charge of one of Morgan's brigades. The pursuit was checked; and the 20th Corps, which on the sound of the guns in front, had hurried forward, now began to arrive on the battlefield. A fresh line was formed, on which Carlin's division rallied, about a mile in rear of the point where the fight commenced, and the repeated efforts of the Confederate right to drive back this line were repulsed. Between the right of the re-formed line and the left of Morgan's division, which on the right of the road had entrenched itself in

¹ The troops of the Army of Tennessee, commanded by *Stewart*, consisted of the remnants of his own Corps and *S. D. Lee's*, which latter was commanded by *D. H. Hill*. They numbered 3,950 (*Johnston's Narrative*, 384). It had been originally intended that *Hoke's* division should form the left wing, posted across the road at right angles, whilst the other two were to be deployed 'obliquely *en échelon* to the right' (4 B. & L., 703). But the battle had already commenced before *Hardee's* two divisions had come up, and in consequence of *Bragg's* urgent and, as it would seem, unnecessary appeal for reinforcements, one of *Hardee's* divisions was ordered to form on *Hoke's* left. *Johnston* and *Wade Hampton* both seem to regard this departure from the original plan as one of the chief reasons why the Confederates failed to gain a decisive success.

² Cox, 185.

front of *Bragg's* line, a gap existed ; and some of the Confederate troops penetrated this interval and tried to take Morgan's line in reverse but without success.

Johnston, seeing that the fury of his attack had spent itself upon Davis's Corps, and that heavy reinforcements were coming up to Slocum's aid, called off his troops and withdrew the right wing to its former position, but *Bragg's* wing was drawn back and faced to the east to meet Howard's expected advance from that direction.¹ *Johnston's* sole object now was to hold Bentonville and cover the bridges over Mill Creek in his rear, whilst he was sending off his wounded and preparing for a retreat to Smithfield.

On the 20th Howard's two Corps came up and took a position fronting *Bragg's* line. But Sherman, who had sent orders by couriers to Schofield to move at once to Goldsboro, and to Terry with the 10th Corps to march on Cox's bridge over the Neuse, was not disposed to waste valuable life in attacks upon *Johnston's* entrenched position ; even, when on the 21st a favourable opportunity presented itself of breaking through *Johnston's* left and capturing the bridges in his rear, he declined to avail himself of it, and ordered Howard to recall his troops.² He knew that *Johnston* must retreat and that it was an absolute certainty that the whole of the Federal forces could be united on the north bank of the Neuse in open country, and, therefore, refused to take any unnecessary risks.³

¹ For the details of the battle of Bentonville see Cox, 188-93. *Johnston's* account of the battle differs in several points. He says that the charge of the right wing conducted by *Hardee* drove the Federals from two lines of entrenchments, but the victorious troops, owing to the denseness of the thicket through which they were advancing, were ordered to halt and re-form their line : then the Federals made an attempt to assume the offensive and attacked *Stewart's* troops, but were easily repulsed, and with this repulse the action really ceased. Throughout the engagement *Bragg* on the left was held in check by the troops confronting him, and in *Wade Hampton's* opinion handled his troops feebly. Only two brigades of the 20th Corps seem to have taken part in the fighting. Cox speaks of the Confederate general *Bate* as commanding two divisions of *Cheatham's* Corps of the Army of Tennessee and forming the extreme right of *Hardee's* line, but according to *Johnston's* account no troops of *Cheatham's* Corps joined him till the 20th. It would appear from *Johnston's Narrative*, 394, that a considerable number of troops from the Army of Tennessee joined him after the battle of Bentonville.

² The force which penetrated *Johnston's* lines was Mower's division of the 17th Corps. Both *Johnston* and *Hampton* claim that it was driven back by a sudden attack made by a small force under *Hardee* and *Hampton*.

³ Cox, 195. His object was defensive rather than offensive ; not to bring on a battle in this blind and sodden country, but to frighten *Johnston* back, so that he could slip safely into Goldsboro and reprovision himself as a preliminary to a fresh spring upon *Johnston* from that secure base (Liddell Hart).

On the night of the 21st *Johnston* retreated across Mill Creek to Smithfield, and on the 22nd Sherman resumed his march. Schofield had already on the 21st entered Goldsboro, and on the same day Terry had reached Cox's bridge and laid a pontoon bridge over the Neuse, by which Sherman crossed the river and himself entered Goldsboro on the 23rd. With the addition of the 23rd Corps, which was now reunited with the Grand Army of the West, and the 10th Corps, he had under his command a force of nearly 90,000 men.¹

From Savannah to Goldsboro the Grand Army of the West had marched 425 miles in fifty days, of which ten were allotted to rest. Though but little interfered with by the enemy's forces and attended by but slight loss (at Averysboro, 554 : at Bentonville, 1,646),² yet the march through the Carolinas had been one continuous battle with the elements, and must be reckoned a much greater achievement than the more famous march through Georgia, which by comparison was a mere pleasure trip. As a triumph of physical endurance and mechanical skill on the part of the army and of inflexible resolution in the general, it stands unrivalled in the history of modern war ; and it had as direct an influence upon the final issue of the campaign round Richmond as if it had been conducted within sound of *Lee's* guns.³

NOTE

ON THOMAS IN TENNESSEE

Modern professional opinion, represented by such able writers as Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, Captain Liddell Hart, and A. L. Conger, appears to censure Thomas for unnecessary delay and lack of enterprise. He is charged with 'sacrificing the interests of the whole

¹ Cox, 196.

² 4 B. & L., 698.

³ It is true, as Ropes (10 *Massachusetts M. H. S.*, 149) points out, that it was not until the battle of Five Forks had been lost, that *Lee* commenced his retreat, and that it was the movements of the Armies of the Potomac and James which led up to the capitulation of Appomattox ; but Sherman's march through the Carolinas prevented any reinforcements being sent to *Lee*, and would have compelled him to evacuate Richmond very soon, if Grant's operations had not already produced that result. 'I think our campaign of the last month [March to the Sea,] as well as every step I take from this point [Savannah] northward, is as much a direct attack upon *Lee's* army as though we were operating within the sound of his artillery, (Sherman to Halleck, quoted by Liddell Hart).

to that of a part' and with failure to 'rise to the higher conception of loyalty which tells a subordinate that half a loaf at the desired time is better than a whole loaf later' (Liddell Hart). That Grant found his plan of campaign against *Lee* in possible danger of derangement owing to the popular outcry likely to be aroused by the prospect of a Confederate army again threatening an advance to the Ohio, was in the circumstances inevitable. But it can be argued that Sherman, not Thomas, was responsible for the circumstances being what they were. Sherman chose to take away over 60,000 veterans with him and to leave Thomas with at the most 25,000 to finish the task, which he himself had left undone. Sherman was right to take a large force with him on his holiday march through Georgia, because he looked beyond Savannah and already, before leaving Atlanta, his gaze was fixed upon Columbia, Goldsboro, and *Lee's* rear. It was a great strategical conception and goes far to justify the claim that Sherman was the super-strategist of the war. But it required as an essential condition, that Thomas should be made strong enough to hold *Hood* in check beyond all possibility of doubt. This condition Sherman neglected to fulfil. He left with Thomas two weak Corps, one of which did not belong to the Army of the Cumberland; the Corps, with which Thomas had so long been closely connected and for which he specially asked, was withheld because it was too good to be spared. Sherman also left a large body of cavalry, but they required remounting, as he had taken their horses to mount Kilpatrick's division. At the outset of the campaign Thomas had only one mounted brigade with which to watch *Hood's* movements on the Tennessee. Thomas's role was at first intended to be purely defensive. He was to hold *Hood* in check, until the arrival of A. J. Smith's Corps from Missouri and the re-equipment of his cavalry should make him strong enough to take the offensive. It was not originally proposed, that with only two Corps and a small mounted force he should take the field against *Hood's* three veteran Corps and *Forrest's* horde of cavalry. It was entirely uncertain when, if ever, Smith's troops would arrive. At the moment they were engaged under Rosecrans's command in chasing *Price* out of Missouri, and Rosecrans proved very reluctant to dispense with their services. Neither Thomas nor Halleck believed that he would let them go. Probably it was only the pressure exercised by Rawlins, Grant's Chief of the Staff, sent for the purpose to St. Louis, that secured their transference to Tennessee. As it was, the first two divisions only reached Nashville on November 30th, a fortnight after Sherman turned his back upon Atlanta. Yet Sherman was conveying the impression to Grant that they would reach Thomas early in the month. It may be fairly suggested that Sherman ought not to have left Atlanta until he knew for certain that the whole Corps was close at hand.

A number of new regiments reached Thomas during November, but most of them were 'one year' regiments, raw troops 'greener than grass,' fit only for service as railway guards, so the numerical gain did little more than counterbalance the losses caused by the discharge of

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'time expired' regiments and the furloughs granted to soldiers, especially of the Illinois regiments, to go home and vote at the Presidential Election. It would have been worse than useless to pit troops of such indifferent quality against *Hood's* veterans and would only have jeopardised the safety of the two Corps, to which they might have been attached. General Cox and other writers following him have blamed Thomas for not concentrating a larger force south of Duck River, which might have given battle to *Hood*, before he could advance far into Tennessee. No doubt Thomas could have collected by drawing upon the garrisons of Decatur and Chattanooga a larger force than *Hood's* at either Pulaski or Columbia. But until a cavalry force adequate to cope with *Forrest's* horsemen could be provided, there was little chance of permanently checking *Hood's* advance. At Columbia Wilson had under his command a division and two brigades of cavalry, but even so Schofield reported that Wilson could do nothing against *Forrest*. Thomas was fully justified in waiting for the reorganisation of his mounted arm before attacking *Hood*. The decisive part at Nashville was played by the cavalry with their novel method of getting on the enemy's flank and rear, and then attacking dismounted even entrenched positions. There might have been a different tale to tell had *Forrest* with the bulk of his cavalry been on the battlefield. Would a partial victory have been worth the risk of a reverse, which might then have justified Grant's worst fears? Had not 'the half loaf' been already delivered at Franklin?

CHAPTER VIII

THE WAR ON THE WATER AND NAVAL OPERATIONS (1861-5)¹

Distribution of the U.S. navy in 1861—The Eads gunboats—Naval success at Fort Henry—Failure of the navy at Fort Donelson—The navy at Island No. 10—Gunboats at Shiloh—Navy at Fort Pillow—Confederate rams sink the *Cincinnati*—The Ellet rams—Battle of Memphis—Importance of New Orleans—Strength of the Federal force in the Gulf—The Confederate defences of New Orleans—The Battle of April 24th—Fight above the Forts—Fall of New Orleans—Advance on Vicksburg—Farragut passes Vicksburg, June 28th—The Confederate ram *Arkansas*—Destruction of the *Arkansas*—Porter relieves Davis—Capture of Arkansas Post—Importance of the Red River—Loss of the *Indianola*—Farragut passes the batteries at Port Hudson—Porter runs past the Vicksburg Batteries—Unsuccessful attack by the navy on Grand Gulf—Porter ascends the Red River to Alexandria—The navy in the North Carolina Sounds—Capture of Hatteras Inlet—Capture of Roanoke Island—Capture of Port Royal—The *Merrimac*—The *Merrimac* attacks the Federal fleet, March 8th—Destruction of the *Cumberland* and *Congress*—The *Monitor*—The battle of March 9th—Operations in Charleston harbour—Raid of the Confederate ironclads—Battle of April 7th—Confederate use of submarine boats—The Confederate ironclad, *Albemarle*—Mobile Bay—Delay imposed upon Farragut—The Confederate ironclad, *Tennessee*—Farragut's ironclads—Battle of Mobile Bay—Sinking of the *Tecumseh*—Farragut takes the lead—The fight with the gunboats—Surrender of the *Tennessee*—Capture of Fort Fisher—The Confederate commerce-destroyers: the *Alabama*, the *Florida*, the *Shenandoah*—The blockade of the Southern coast.

IN the spring of 1861 the United States navy was practically obsolescent. Of the ships on the navy list more than half were sailing vessels. Though some of these, like the *Cumberland* and the *Congress*, were the finest of their respective types, they belonged to an age which was past, and were quite unfitted for the

¹ See Maps I and VII. For the naval operations on the Mississippi and its tributaries, except where special reference is made to other authorities, Mahan's *Gulf and Inland Waters* has been followed throughout.

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conditions of naval warfare as it had developed with the introduction of steam. Of the forty steamships, one was stationed on the Great Lakes, five were unserviceable, nine were 'laid up in ordinary' and it would be several months before they could be made fit for sea. Seventeen were on foreign stations and to recall them took considerable time. Some, again, were very small and used as tenders for the sailing frigates. The Home Squadron, the sole force at the immediate disposal of the Naval Department, consisted of seven steamers and five sailing ships. The six screw-frigates built in 1855 were regarded as the finest ships in the navy, but they proved of little use in the shallow waters of the Southern coasts. More useful for general purposes were the twelve screw sloops-of-war, built in 1858, three of which formed the backbone of Farragut's West Gulf Squadron. As, however, the Confederates started with no navy at all, the Federal Naval Department was able, by buying up almost any ship, which could float and carry guns, to put in force the blockade proclaimed by President Lincoln, although that blockade hardly became effective before the summer of 1862. The waters of the principal rivers were soon controlled by Northern flotillas. These consisted of two types of vessel, gunboats and rams. Three converted river steamers, carrying no armour but strengthened with oak bulwarks five inches thick, were the first gunboats in commission on the Mississippi, and two of them in November, 1861, played their part in Grant's first engagement at Belmont. The following January they were reinforced by seven 'ironclads' built by Eads. These were partially protected by armour and carried a casemate pierced for thirteen guns. But their stems were entirely unprotected, and the armour over the boilers was too weak to afford adequate protection. The three wooden gunboats and four of the ironclads (crews could not be found for more) accompanied Grant's expedition against Fort Henry on the Tennessee and without aid from the land force captured the fort. Against Fort Donelson on the Cumberland a few days later they were less successful. They seemed to be on the point of silencing the Confederate batteries when two of the ironclads were simultaneously put out of action. With the capture of the two forts the control of the Tennessee up to Florence (Alabama) and of the Cumberland to Nashville was secured by the Federal navy. On the Mississippi in April six ironclads co-operated with Pope in the capture of Island No. 10, and one of them was the first to perform the feat of running past heavy batteries. The fleet continued the descent of the Mississippi and Ellet's rams now made their first appearance. Ellet had been instructed by the Federal Govern-

ment to purchase some river steamers and convert them into rams on a plan of his own, which he had been long urging. He bought seven vessels, selected for their speed and strength, and built on to each three solid timber bulkheads, whilst a two-foot bulkhead of oak protected the boilers. The Confederates had been unable to offer any resistance to the Federal flotilla on the Tennessee and Cumberland other than that of the batteries of the two forts. But at New Orleans they had converted fourteen river steamers into rams by strengthening their bows with iron casing and protecting the engines with cotton bales and pine bulwarks. Eight of these rams had been sent up to Memphis to close the river against the Federal descent. They gained a minor success on May 10th at Fort Pillow, eighty miles below Island No. 10, sinking one ironclad and driving another on shore. Both, however, were repaired and ready for action again by the end of the month. By this time two of Ellet's rams had joined the Federal flotilla. On June 6th a naval action was fought off Memphis. The Confederate rams were completely defeated and only one escaped. On July 1st the Federal vessels joined hands above Vicksburg with Farragut's squadron which had ascended the river from the Gulf. In the early hours of April 24th, Farragut, the Nelson of the Federal navy, had performed the notable feat of running past the two forts, which on opposite sides of the river, ninety miles below the city, formed the first line of its defences. His squadron was composed of wooden screw-steamers (with the exception of one side-wheeler), sloops of war, corvettes (or second class sloops) and gunboats. His largest vessel, one of the screw-frigates, could not be got over the bar and had to be left behind. All but three of the gunboats got through. These were forced to retire downstream. But the rest of the squadron having passed the forts made short work of a scratch force of a dozen vessels, which constituted the second line of defence. Of these the *Louisiana* was a powerful ironclad mounting sixteen heavy guns. But she was not yet ready for action and was still in the hands of the artificers; her engines, taken from an old river steamer, were defective and she had been brought down stream by two tugs and moored just above one of the forts to serve as a floating battery. When the forts surrendered on April 28th her commander set her on fire. On the 25th Farragut's fleet continued up the river and having easily silenced two weak batteries four miles below New Orleans appeared before the city before noon. The city authorities had no alternative but to surrender. Almost all the troops had been withdrawn to take part in *A. S. Johnston's* attack on Grant at Shiloh, and the small force left

behind had already evacuated the city, which was formally taken possession of by Federal troops under General Butler on May 1st. A second ironclad more powerful than the *Louisiana*, which was nearing completion and had been launched six days before Farragut's arrival, now shared the *Louisiana's* fate. The capture of New Orleans, entirely the work of the navy, was the heaviest blow which had yet befallen the Confederacy. It was the largest city and the commercial capital of the South. It contained the most skilled workmen and the largest workshops. The Mississippi now lay open as far as Vicksburg, four hundred miles higher up. The fall of New Orleans was quickly followed by the evacuation of Pensacola, another port on the Gulf, which was abandoned by its garrison on May 10th.

The batteries of Vicksburg were safely run in the early morning of June 28th, although one of the sloops and two gunboats, owing to a misinterpretation of their orders, after engaging the batteries for two hours dropped downstream again. It was now plain to Farragut that he could run past the Confederate fortress without much risk whenever he chose but that he could not do more than temporarily silence its guns. On July 15th he again ran past Vicksburg in the hope of destroying by gun-fire a large ironclad ram which had come down the Yazoo and sought shelter under its guns. This time he intended to make the passage in daylight, but the necessary preparations were not completed till night had fallen and under cover of the darkness the ram had changed her position. As there was no prospect of a sufficiently large land force becoming available for the reduction of the fortress, Farragut returned to New Orleans, and soon after the gunboat flotilla above Vicksburg ascended the river as far as Helena. The Confederates were thus left in control of the Mississippi between Vicksburg and Port Hudson. This section of the river was of special importance to them, as it secured the mouth of the Red River, down which the bulk of the Trans-Mississippi supplies, especially grain and cattle, was brought for the service of the Eastern States. During the winter the defences of Vicksburg were strengthened and powerful batteries erected on the east bank at Port Hudson, just below a sharp bend of the river. The position was a formidable one; the bluffs beginning at the bend extended a mile and a half downstream and were from eighty to a hundred feet high; just below the bend opposite to them a spit ran out from the west bank, contracting the passage. On the night of March 14th, 1863, Farragut attempted to run past these batteries. He was less successful than on previous occasions; of the four sloops and three gunboats only his own flagship, the *Hartford*, and the gun-

boat lashed to her got through and without suffering serious injury. But these two war vessels sufficed to close the mouth of the Red River and to restore to the Federals the control of the Mississippi between Vicksburg and Port Hudson.

For the success of Grant's campaign against Vicksburg it was essential that some portion of Porter's fleet above Vicksburg should run past the batteries in order to transport the troops across the river and if possible silence the guns at Grand Gulf. On the night of April 16th seven ironclads, each with a coal barge lashed to her starboard side in order that they might not lack fuel in their operations below the town, escorting three transports laden with stores, got safely through with the loss of one transport and one barge. Though they did not succeed in silencing the guns at Grand Gulf, they transported the land forces over the river at a point farther down and provided a base for the army, until another was secured on the Yazoo above the city with the help of the rest of Porter's fleet.

On the Atlantic coast the first duty of the Federal navy was to enforce the blockade. It was found that that purpose was best effected by seizing a port and holding it with only one or two vessels. The Federals first sought to gain control of the North Carolina Sounds by capturing Hatteras Inlet, which afforded the best sea-entrance to the Sounds, and this was effected by a naval squadron at the end of August. The next step was to capture Roanoke Island separating the two Sounds. For this purpose military assistance was required and in January, 1862, a large expedition sailed with Burnside in command of the land force. The island was captured on February 8th, giving the Federals complete control of the Sounds, and Burnside went on to capture Newberne, the second commercial city in North Carolina, in March, and a month later Fort Macon, commanding the channel from the Atlantic to Beaufort (N.C.) was reduced, and the Federals were now firmly established on the North Carolina coast. It had been hoped that from Newberne operations might have been undertaken against Wilmington, the chief port of the State, but the initial success was not followed up and no attempt was made during the War to strike at Richmond's southern railways from the coast. In the meantime another combined expedition had sailed for the South Carolina coast, and Port Royal, commanding the approach to Beaufort (S.C.), one of the finest harbours on the Atlantic seaboard, was captured on November 7th, 1861, and Beaufort itself two days later. With Beaufort in their possession the Federals had a secure base from which to maintain the

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blockade of Charleston, and the capture of Fort Pulaski in April, 1862, closed the entrance to Savannah.

The Confederate Secretary of the Navy, *Mallory*, had been for several years before the War Chairman of the Senate Committee on naval affairs. He entered office with clearly defined views. The chief problem was how to keep open commercial intercourse between Europe and the Southern ports. It was useless to challenge the Federal command of the sea with wooden vessels. He resolved to concentrate upon the construction of ironclads 'which could traverse the entire coast of the United States, prevent all blockade and encounter, with a fair prospect of success, their entire navy.' Ever since the French had used armoured floating batteries in the Crimean War, the idea of ironclad fighting ships had been present in the minds of naval constructors. The French had already built an armoured frigate, and the British a battleship and were working on another. *Mallory* gave orders for the *Merrimac*, one of the screw frigates, which had been set on fire and sunk by the Federals, when they evacuated Norfolk, to be raised. She was then cut down to the old berth-deck, and on the hull was erected amidships a rectangular casemate, 170 feet long. The sides of this casemate which was rounded at both ends, were composed of twenty-four inches of wood, overlaid with four inches of iron, rolled from rails, and sloped at an angle of thirty-five degrees. The iron plating was continued for two feet below the waterline. Ten heavy guns were mounted in the casemate. A cast-iron ram projecting four feet was fitted to the stem. The weak spot in the *Merrimac*, as it was the weak spot in all the Confederate ironclads, was her defective engine power. The Confederate artificers lacked the skill to build marine engines, and in most cases the engines for the ironclads had to be taken from other vessels. The *Merrimac* had her own engines and boilers, but these had been condemned after her last cruise and had not been improved by their recent experience. Not more than five knots an hour could be got out of them, and they could not be relied upon for more than six hours at a stretch. She drew 22 feet of water and steered so badly that it took 30 to 40 minutes to turn her. On the first day (March 8th, 1862) of her appearance in Hampton Roads the *Merrimac* destroyed the *Congress* and the *Cumberland*, both sailing vessels. The sides of her casemate had proved impenetrable, and though she had lost her ram, when she struck the *Cumberland*, she was only waiting for the morrow to complete the destruction of the Federal squadron of wooden vessels off Fortress Monroe. The news of the engagement created a panic at Washington. The Cabinet feared the appearance at any

moment of the ironclad in the Potomac. McClellan, the General-in-Chief, foresaw that his Peninsular Campaign might be ended before it had begun. But during the night of the 8th the Federal ironclad *Monitor* arrived in Hampton Roads. The Federal Navy Board had been slow to appreciate the possibilities of an ironclad warship and had allowed *Mallory* to get a three-months' start. Then, as alarming news of the progress made with the *Merrimac* reached them, they invited designs for the construction of a war vessel, which might prove her match. Three designs were approved and three ironclads were soon in process of construction; the one, which was first completed and alone had any successors, was the *Monitor*, built to the design of the Swedish inventor, Captain John Ericsson. It was an entirely novel design, described by the inventor as 'an impregnable steam-battery of light draught, suitable to navigate the shallow rivers and harbours of the Confederacy.' She carried two 11-inch smooth-bores in a revolving turret, was 172 feet long and drew only 10½ feet of water. The hull was almost entirely submerged; there were only two feet of freeboard, and the ship's side above the waterline was protected by five inches of iron. The turret itself was a cylinder, nine feet high, 'composed of eight thicknesses of wrought-iron plates, each one inch thick, firmly riveted together.' The pilot house (conning tower) was not, as in the later *Monitors*, on the top of the turret, but forward: consequently the captain in the pilot house and the executive officer in the turret, were separated, communication being maintained by means of a speaking-tube. The ventilation throughout the ship was entirely artificial. The *Monitor* was only about one knot faster than the *Merrimac*, but drawing less water and a hundred less feet in length she was a much easier ship to handle. On March 9th the first ironclad action in history was fought. It was a drawn battle. After several hours' hard fighting at closest quarters, each trying to ram the other, they parted company without a man killed or serious injury inflicted on either side. But the fruits of victory were the *Monitor's*. She had prevented her opponent from destroying any more wooden vessels; the blockade of the James river was maintained and McClellan could pursue his plan of landing at Fortress Monroe. British public opinion, greatly incensed over the *Trent* incident, suddenly cooled down, when the *Merrimac* failed to repeat her first success. Neither combatant was destined to have a long life. When *Johnston* evacuated the Peninsula, the *Merrimac* was found unable to ascend the James and had to be destroyed; at the very end of the year the *Monitor* on her way to join the squadron blockading Charlestown foundered in a storm off Cape Hatteras.

The Confederates built¹ several more ironclads of the *Merrimac* type, but none of them had the same success. Two small ironclads were constructed at Charleston. They came out on January 31st, 1863, attacked the blockading squadron entirely composed of unarmoured vessels and forced the surrender of two, but the ironclads returned to harbour without waiting to secure their prizes and the blockade remained unbroken. What was thought to be a very powerful ironclad was reconstructed out of an English Clyde-built steamer in Ossabaw Sound and on June 17th, 1863, came out from Savannah to engage two monitors, which had been sent from the Charleston squadron to watch her. In an action lasting fifteen minutes with only one of the monitors she failed to make a single hit, whilst her armour was riddled by the heavier gun of the monitor, and running hard aground she was forced to make an ignominious surrender. Three ironclads were built in the James. One at least was very powerfully armoured, but they were never put to the test in actual battle.

The *Monitor* was adopted as the type of the new Federal ironclad fleet. The new vessels were larger, more strongly armoured and carried heavier guns. But though more than a match for the Confederate ironclads, they were quite ineffective against forts. In spite of three failures against Fort McAllister in Ossabaw Sound, the Government insisted that they should fight a pitched battle against the Charleston forts. The attack took place on April 7th, 1863, and resulted in the complete discomfiture of the monitors. No Federal war vessel entered Charleston Harbour until the garrison was withdrawn in February, 1865.

The unsuccessful attacks of the monitors showed up the inherent defects of that type of vessel when engaged with forts. Though but little susceptible of injury themselves, they were equally incapable of inflicting injury. In Du Pont's words 'whatever degree of invulnerability they might have, there was no corresponding quality of destructiveness as against forts.'¹

The Confederate ironclads in Charleston Harbour were no match for the monitors. In the hope of destroying the Federal ironclads by stealth, the Confederates resorted to submersible torpedo-boats. In February, 1864, the *Housatonic* was sent to the bottom. The submarine which accomplished this feat had lateral fins by which she could be raised or submerged, but carried no reserve of air, and therefore proved the coffin of her successive crews. Five times she had sunk and been raised again. On the sixth occasion she was manned by two army officers and five volunteers. These brave men, knowing that they were going to

¹ Admiral Du Pont was in command of the blockading squadron.

certain death, successfully performed their task and paid for their success with their lives.¹

Among the many daring episodes of the war, the destruction of the *Albemarle* by Lieutenant Cushing stands out conspicuously. With a view to recovering the command of the North Carolina Sounds, an ironclad of the *Merrimac* type, the *Albemarle*, was constructed some miles up the Roanoke River. She started down the river on April 18th, 1864, with the artificers still on board. The unusually high water carried her over the obstructions which the Federals had placed across the river to prevent her coming down. Continuing down-stream she encountered two wooden gunboats coming up. She rammed and sank one, and put the other to flight. Thus the control of the Roanoke River was regained by the Confederates, and the Federal garrison in Plymouth, which was besieged by General Hoke, surrendered the next day.

After this prompt though easy success, the commander of the ironclad determined to venture into Albemarle Sound and dispute the control of its waters with a squadron of wooden vessels, which the admiral commanding the North Atlantic Squadron had made haste to despatch there. On May 5th a sharp encounter took place between the *Albemarle* and seven gunboats.² The Federals seem to have made but poor use of their numerical superiority, and the combat resolved itself into a duel between the *Albemarle* and the *Sassacus*. The gunboat rammed her opponent, but was considerably damaged in the process, whilst a shot from the *Albemarle* penetrated her boiler. The *Sassacus*, rendered helpless, drifted clear of her antagonist, who withdrew to the river, and the engagement ceased by mutual consent.

The result of this action made it plain that wooden vessels were unequal to the task of destroying the ironclad. No monitor could cross Hatteras Bar and enter the Sounds. Lieutenant Cushing, already distinguished for various daring exploits, now proposed to attack the ram with steam launches. Two boats of this type were expressly constructed at New York, but one of them was lost on the voyage. Cushing took command of the survivor. His plan

¹ 'Fixed in the hole that it had itself created, sucked in by the enormous inrush of water, was the ill-fated submarine,' when discovered some three years later by divers sent down to the *Housatonic* (Burgoyne's *Submarine Navigation*, i, 57). In this work a very interesting account is given of the attempts made during the war at submarine warfare. Mr. Burgoyne describes the *Keokuk*, which was sunk off Charleston, as a submersible: 'When submerged to the utmost the turrets and funnel alone showed above water' (i, 62).

² 4 B. & L., 628.

was to land below Plymouth, off which town the *Albemarle* was lying, carry her by boarding, and take her down-stream before the alarm could be given. On the night of October 27th he ascended the Roanoke.¹ About a mile below Plymouth lay the wreck of the gunboat, which had been sunk in April. Here the Confederates had established a piquet to guard against any surprise. Cushing had intended to 'rush' this piquet before it could give the alarm. But the Confederates kept so bad a look-out that the launch stole by unseen. Fortune seemed to favour the enterprise. On a point just below the *Albemarle* the Confederates had been in the habit of lighting fires to prevent a surprise. But on that particular night the fires had burnt low. Cushing was approaching the shore to land his little crew when the alarm was given by a stray dog.² The Confederates were immediately on the alert, and the launch was discovered. Seeing that it was useless to land, Cushing made a rush at the *Albemarle*, in the hope of sinking her with his torpedo.³ On approaching he found her protected by a boom of logs. He backed the launch and charged the boom at full speed. The launch jumped the logs, and he found himself by the side of the ironclad. The torpedo was lowered and fired. The ironclad began to sink. But the launch was damaged beyond possibility of escape. Most of her crew were made prisoners. One man only—her gallant commander—escaped to rejoin the Federal fleet.

The destruction of the *Albemarle* bore immediate fruit. The undisputed control of Albemarle Sound was restored to the Federals, and on the last day of the month Plymouth was recaptured.

Mobile (Map I) was the most important port held by the Confederates on the Gulf after the fall of New Orleans and the evacuation of Pensacola. The city stands at the head of a bay which is thirty miles long and from six to fifteen miles broad. The main entrance lies between Dauphin Island on the west and Mobile Point on the east, and is nearly three miles broad. But from Dauphin Island a sand-bank runs out, narrowing the deep water

¹ The first attempt was made the previous night, but the launch ran aground and could not be got off till day was at hand (1 Wilson, 111).

² 1 Wilson, 112. Cushing simply says: 'Just as I was sheering in close to the wharf a hail came from the ironclad, and was repeated' (4 B. & L., 636). Captain Warley, commander of the *Albemarle*, is also silent on the subject of the dog's barking, and says: 'The launch was quite close to us when we hailed, and the alarm was given' (4 B. & L., 642).

³ The torpedo was a spar torpedo. In the infancy of torpedo warfare the torpedo was fitted to a spar, which could be run out from the stern of the vessel.

channel to less than 2,000 yards. On Dauphin Island was Fort Gaines, too far distant, however, to constitute a serious obstacle to a fleet trying to enter the Bay. On Mobile Point was Fort Morgan, mounting forty heavy guns with seven others mounted in a water battery thrown up close alongside. Another entrance into the Bay from Mississippi Sound was protected by Fort Powell, mounting six guns, but was not practicable for ships of heavy draught. A line of piles had been driven in from Fort Gaines across the sand-bank to prevent any light vessel from entering, and where the line of obstructions ceased a triple line of mines extended as far as a red buoy, which was little over 200 yards from the guns on Mobile Point.¹ This narrow passage had been left for the benefit of blockade runners, and by it alone could a Federal fleet enter the Bay.

Farragut, who had resumed the command of the Western Gulf Blockading Squadron in January, 1864, was anxious to take possession of Mobile Bay as quickly as possible. He knew that Mobile itself could not be reduced except by a considerable land force, but he also knew that the Confederates were building ironclads in the river above the city, and he wished to gain possession of the Bay before these formidable antagonists should be completed. Once in possession of the Bay he could prevent the ironclads from being brought over the Dog River Bar, and enforce the blockade more effectively than was possible from without; but to accomplish his purpose he required the co-operation of one brigade of troops to reduce the forts, after he had run past and isolated them, and of at least one ironclad to aid his wooden vessels in their encounter with the works on Mobile Point.² The task was a far harder one than that which he had so successfully surmounted two years earlier in the Lower Mississippi. Then the fall of New Orleans was inevitable, if once the fleet passed the Mississippi forts. But Mobile City was impregnable against a purely naval attack, and to maintain himself inside the Bay it was necessary for the forts commanding the entrance to be reduced. But the Government turned a deaf ear to his entreaties. The ironclads were required for blockading purposes at other points, and no land force could be spared, as the ill-fated Red River Expedition absorbed all the available troops in the Department.

Meanwhile the Confederates were pushing on the construction of their great ironclad, the *Tennessee*, with all speed. She was

¹ These details are taken from Mahan's *Gulf and Inland Waters*, Cap. VIII, whose account has been closely followed for the whole engagement.

² 4 B. & L., 379.

unquestionably the most powerful war vessel ever possessed by the Confederacy. Her hull had been constructed in 1863 at Selma, 150 miles up the Alabama River, and, when completed, was towed down to Mobile to receive the iron plating specially prepared in the rolling mills at Atlanta. Her length was 209 feet, and, when fully armed, she drew 14 feet of water. Midway between bow and stern the casemate, 79 feet long and 29 feet broad, was constructed of 25 inches of wood. Over this was laid the iron plating, 6 inches thick at the forward end and 5 inches everywhere else. She carried six guns, a 7-12 inch R.M.L. at each end and two 6-inch R.M.L. on either broadside. A solid knuckle, formed by continuing the sides of the casemate two feet below the water-line, and then inclining them inwards to meet the hull, protected the vessel against ramming. Covered with four inches of iron, the knuckle, when continued round the bows, became a ram. But powerful as was the vessel thus constructed, she still had two very grave defects. Her engines, which had been transferred from a river steamer, were too weak, and could not do more than six knots an hour on the day of battle; and her steering chains, instead of being carried under the armoured deck, ran over it, and were thus exposed to the fire of an opponent. In March, 1864, the *Tennessee* was ready for service, but it was two months later before she was got over the Dog River Bar and brought into the lower bay. Her commander, Admiral *Buchanan*, had hoped to take the blockading fleet by surprise, and intended on May 19th to cross the outer bar and attack Farragut's wooden vessels. But the ironclad was found to be aground when the anchor was weighed. Her presence in the Bay was discovered, and *Buchanan* contented himself, when the tide floated off his ship, with taking her down to Fort Morgan.

By August Farragut's repeated demands for troops and iron-clads had been at length answered. On the 3rd General Gordon Granger with a division of troops appeared off Dauphin Island, and four monitors had either arrived or were on the point of doing so. Two of these, the *Chickasaw* and *Winnebago*, came from the Mississippi; they carried four 11-inch guns in two turrets protected by eight and a half inches of armour. The other two, the *Tecumseh* and *Manhattan*, came from the Atlantic coast, and were larger vessels, carrying two 15-inch guns in a single turret protected by ten inches of armour. It had been intended to make a joint attack on the 4th, and on that day Granger disembarked his troops, but Farragut was unable to co-operate, as all his vessels had not yet arrived. On the morning of the 5th the fleet steamed in to attack. As at Port Hudson, the wooden vessels were lashed

together in pairs. The monitors formed a starboard squadron slightly in advance of the *Brooklyn*, the leading wooden vessel.¹

The first gun was fired at 6.47 a.m.,¹ and at 7.15 a.m. the action became general. The *Brooklyn* began to overhaul the monitors, which were steaming slowly to give full effect to their fire; and her captain, not wishing to pass them, stopped her engines and then began to back.² Orders were signalled from the *Hartford*, next in line, to go on. But the *Brooklyn* continued backing, and, as her bows fell off towards the fort, threatened to block the channel. The *Hartford* had stopped her engines, but the flood tide was carrying her on to the leader, and the *Richmond* was coming up close behind. A collision seemed inevitable. In the meanwhile a terrible disaster had overtaken the *Tecumseh*, leading the ironclad squadron. Her captain seems to have considered that his special task was to engage the *Tennessee*, which with three gunboats was stationed just above the mine field in the centre of the channel, from which position a raking fire was poured into the attacking fleet. As the *Tennessee* shifted her position slightly to the west, the *Tecumseh* passed on the wrong side of the red buoy³ in pursuit, was struck by a mine, and immediately sank.

It was at this crisis of the battle that Farragut took the lead of his fleet. There was no room to pass the *Brooklyn* in the main channel. Though he had just seen the *Tecumseh* sink, he ordered full speed ahead and steered to the west of the red buoy. As the *Hartford* crossed the fatal line, the primers of the mines were heard snapping under her bottom, but no explosion took place, and the flagship passed out of the range of the fort into the Bay.⁴ But she had still to reckon with the *Tennessee* and the gunboats.⁵

¹ 4 B. & L., 398, note.

² 4 B. & L., 387. It seems quite plain from the narrative of Lieutenant Kinney, who was acting as signal-officer on board the *Hartford*, that the *Brooklyn* stopped before the disaster, which overtook the *Tecumseh*. After the ironclad sank, Farragut signalled to the *Brooklyn* to go on, but the order was not obeyed. Mahan (p. 232) states that the *Brooklyn* stopped after the *Tecumseh* sank, and attributes her action to the appearance of 'certain objects in the water ahead, which were taken for the moment for buoys to torpedoes.'

³ Farragut had issued a special order, directing his captains to pass to the east of the red buoy.

⁴ Mahan suggests as a probable explanation that 'the tin torpedoes were poorly lacquered and corroded rapidly under the sea-water,' whilst 'those which sunk the *Tecumseh* had been [there is good reason to believe] planted but two or three days before.'

⁵ The three Confederate gunboats were paddle-wheel steamers, unarmoured except round the boilers. They were the *Selma*, carrying four guns, and the *Gaines* and the *Morgan* carrying six each.

The latter retreated as the *Hartford* advanced, and kept up a raking fire, which inflicted heavy loss. The *Tennessee* waited, intending to ram as soon as her opponent came within reach. But the *Hartford*, being the faster vessel, easily avoided her thrust, and continued up the Bay in pursuit of the gunboats. The *Tennessee* followed her for some little distance; then *Buchanan* suddenly changed his plan, and turning his ship steamed down to attack the other wooden vessels.

The *Tennessee* ran past the Federal line, exchanging broadsides with the successive vessels, but without ramming.¹ The *Monongahela* made a gallant effort to ram the ironclad, and struck her a slanting blow, which inflicted no injury. Last of the line was the *Oneida*, crippled by a shot in her boiler. In her the *Tennessee* hoped to find an easy victim, but the approach of the monitors drove her off under the guns of Fort Morgan.

Whilst the ram was running past the rest of the Federal fleet, the flagship and her consort, the *Metacomet*, were disposing of the Confederate gunboats. The *Metacomet*, the fastest vessel in the fleet, cut loose from the *Hartford*, and going in pursuit of the *Selma*, whose fire had been much the most deadly, compelled her to surrender. Of the other two gunboats, one was so disabled by the *Hartford's* fire that she was run aground under the guns of the fort and afterwards set on fire by her crew; the other retreated into the shallow water near the fort, and, when night came, escaped to Mobile.

It was now a little after 8.30 a.m. The Federal fleet, having successfully accomplished the passage, anchored about four miles above the fort. It was not expected that the *Tennessee* would come out from under the shelter of Fort Morgan, and the crews were just sitting down to breakfast, when the ironclad was seen steaming up for battle. It was a counsel of despair, though the *Tennessee* had suffered but little thus far. As she approached, Farragut signalled to his fastest vessels to try to run her down. He was determined not to let the ram escape, whatever it might cost him. First the *Monongahela* and then the *Lackawanna* rammed the *Tennessee*, but both suffered more damage than they inflicted. Next came the turn of the *Hartford*. The two admirals approached as if they would ram bow to bow. But at the last moment the *Tennessee* slightly changed her course. The vessels grazed each other as they passed.² The *Hartford* fired her port

¹ The *Tennessee* apparently tried to ram the *Monongahela*, but failed. It does not seem that she tried to ram any of the other vessels. She certainly avoided the first three, the *Brooklyn*, *Richmond*, and *Lackawanna* (4 B. & L., 393).

² 1 Wilson, 130.

broadside of seven 9-inch guns into her opponent, but, though the ships were only ten feet apart, no harm was done the *Tennessee*. The Confederate gunners only succeeded in replying with one gun, and this was the last shot fired by them during the action. The *Hartford* was preparing to ram again, when she came into violent collision with the *Lackawanna*, which was also seeking to ram the *Tennessee* a second time. The monitors now joined in the fight. The *Chickasaw* hung close under the *Tennessee's* stern, pounding her with her 11-inch guns. The fate of the Confederate ironclad was now settled. Her smoke-stack had been shot away and her speed reduced to barely four knots an hour.¹ The forward and aft port shutters had been jammed and her two heaviest guns thus rendered useless, whilst the broadside guns could not be brought to bear. The rudder chains had been cut by a shot from the *Chickasaw*, and the ship would no longer answer her helm. *Buchanan* had been severely wounded. The *Ossipee* was approaching to ram, and the other wooden vessels were getting into position for the same purpose. At 10 a.m. the *Tennessee* struck her flag, not having been able to fire a shot for over twenty minutes, and the battle of Mobile Bay came to an end. The fruits of victory were quickly gathered in. Fort Powell was evacuated and blown up the same night. Fort Gaines surrendered on the 7th and Fort Morgan on the 23rd, and the whole Bay passed under the control of the Federal fleet.

The capture of nearly all the important ports on the Confederate coast, with the exception of Charleston and Wilmington, enabled the Federal Government to concentrate for the two expeditions against Fort Fisher in December, 1864, and January, 1865, 'the largest fleet ever assembled under one command in the history of the American Navy.' It numbered nearly sixty vessels and carried over 600 guns.² Four monitors, the *New Ironsides*, and three of the largest steam frigates in the service were included. Admiral Porter was appointed to the command of this great fleet, owing to the ill health of Farragut, which obliged him to decline the command originally designed for him.³

The remarkable success which attended the Confederate commerce-destroyers was largely due to the neglect of the Federal Government to safeguard the principal trade routes. Small as was the number of the cruisers, the Federal merchant marine was

¹ 4 B. & L., 404.

² 4 B. & L., 655.

³ For the operations leading up to the capture of Fort Fisher, see Cap. VII.

driven from the seas and the carrying trade destroyed.¹ By far the most famous of these cruisers was the *Alabama*. At the outset of the war the Confederate Government, recognising that it was impossible with its very limited resources to build fast cruisers, sent agents to purchase vessels in Europe. Captain *Bulloch*, of the Confederate navy, arrived in England in June, 1861, and made a contract with the firm of Lairds, of Birkenhead, for the construction of the *Alabama*. Owing to the dilatoriness of the British Government in acting upon the representations of the Federal minister in London, the *Alabama* was allowed to leave port on a pretended trial trip on July 29th, 1862. Off the Azores she was met by another steamer with her outfit and crew, and commissioned as a Confederate cruiser by Captain *Raphael Semmes* on August 24th. Her cruise lasted for twenty-two months, and during that period she captured sixty-eight prizes. She began by capturing ten whalers in the neighbourhood of the Azores, then crossed the Atlantic and captured twelve corn vessels off the Newfoundland banks. Coming south, she captured the mail steamer *Ariel* off Hayti, and then learning of Banks's intended expedition against Galveston, *Semmes* crossed the Gulf, hoping to work havoc among the transports.² He found a naval squadron off Galveston, and the *Hatteras* gave chase to the *Alabama*. Having drawn his pursuer several miles away from the rest of the squadron, *Semmes* turned upon her, and in fifteen minutes compelled her to surrender, as she was in a sinking condition (January 11th, 1863). The *Hatteras* was a converted river excursion boat, and no match at all for the *Alabama*.³

After this victory *Semmes* judged it wise to leave home waters,

¹ Professor Channing (*History of the United States*, VI, 494) has pointed out that the destruction wrought by the Confederate cruisers only accelerated a process already begun: the supersession of the American wooden sailing vessels by British iron-built steamships. 'The United States could not, or at any rate did not, then compete with Great Britain as a maker of iron. It had fallen out therefore that the American merchant fleet was year by year giving place to that of Great Britain.' The process was still further quickened by the 'actions of British marine insurance underwriters in giving unduly favourable terms to iron hulls.'

² Galveston had been occupied by the Federals in October, 1862, but recaptured January 1st, 1863, by a force under General *Magruder*.

³ The *Alabama* was built for speed rather than battle. She carried one 100-pounder rifled gun pivoted forward, one 8-inch smooth-bore on a pivot aft, and six 32-pounders. The *Hatteras* carried four 32-pounders and one 12-pounder smooth-bore, with two 30-pounder and one 20-pounder rifles. The weight of her broadside was not half that of the *Alabama* (1 Wilson, 154).

and steered into the central Atlantic till he reached the junction of the African and South American trade routes. Following the latter southwards to the Brazilian coast, he made twenty-four prizes. Having spent two months in those waters, he crossed the Atlantic to Cape Town; thence he betook himself across the Indian Ocean to the China Sea. Making but few prizes in his eastern voyage, he returned back down to the east coast of Africa to Cape Town, and then went up the Atlantic to Cherbourg, entering that port on June 11th, 1864. Eight days later, having hastily refitted his vessel, he came out to fight the Federal warship *Kearsarge*.¹ The two ships were not unequally matched, but the Federal was in much better fighting trim, and after an hour's action the *Alabama* struck her flag, and immediately sank. It is curious to notice that this, the most famous of the commerce-destroyers, never entered a Confederate port.²

Next to the *Alabama* the *Florida* was the most successful of the commerce-destroyers. Built in England and designed as a warship, she left Liverpool in March, 1862. Having taken on board her armament in West Indian waters, she ran the blockade into Mobile. There she remained four months, completing her equipment and collecting a crew, and on January 15th, 1863, ran out to sea through the blockading squadron.³ Her principal cruising ground was in the North Atlantic between Brazil and the Federal States. She captured a mail steamer when within ten miles of the Delaware coast, and took in all thirty-seven prizes;⁴ but on October 7th, 1864, she was attacked, when totally unprepared, by the Federal sloop *Wachusett*, in the neutral harbour of Bahia, and in violation of international law captured.

The *Shenandoah* was another English-built cruiser, which met

¹ The *Kearsarge* had her engines protected by a 6-foot belt of armour improvised from chain cable, but carried one less gun than the *Alabama*, two 11-inch smooth-bores, one 30-pounder rifled, and four 32-pounder guns. Her 11-inch guns gave her a marked superiority, and her gunpowder was in a much better condition than that on board the *Alabama*. The weight of the Federal broadside was 366 pounds, that of the Confederate 305. Moreover, the crew of the *Alabama* during their long cruise had received no artillery practice. The fight lasted one hour and two minutes. The action commenced at 10.57 a.m., and the *Alabama* sank at 12.24 p.m. (4 B. & L., 616-621). For the details of the *Alabama's* voyage, 1 Wilson, 152-164, has been followed.

² In the Confederate commerce-destroyers steam-power was only an auxiliary. The speed of the *Alabama* under steam was eleven and a half knots, under sail ten. This helped to simplify the coaling problem.

³ 4 B. & L., 595.

⁴ 1 Wilson, 151.

with considerable success.¹ Originally built for the Bombay trade, she was secured by the indefatigable *Bulloch*, and left England in October, 1864. Her chief objective was to be the whaling fleet in the North Pacific. Being very shorthanded at the commencement of the voyage, she was obliged to stop at Melbourne, and there completed her crew. It was not till June, 1865, that she reached the Behring Sea. Having no authentic news that the war was over, her commander fell upon the whaling fleet, and in a week captured twenty-five prizes.²

For the damage done by these three cruisers the British Government in 1872 was condemned by the Geneva Arbitration Board to pay 15½ million dollars to the United States.

The successes achieved by the Southern commerce-destroyers had no effect upon the result of the war. Far otherwise was it with the blockade of the Confederate coasts maintained by the Federal navy. This blockade of over 3,000 miles of coast-line had two objects: to prevent the export of cotton, and to stop the import of military stores.³ At first, with the limited number of vessels at the disposal of the Federal Government, it was impossible to enforce the blockade strictly, and all sorts of vessels, sailing as well as steamers, went in and out of the Confederate ports. But as the great exertions of the North rapidly increased the size of their fleet by buying up all kinds of vessels and converting them into warships, the difficulty of running the blockade became increasingly great. The unseaworthy character of the hastily improvised ships, which formed the blockading squadrons, necessitated the occupation of Southern ports, which might serve as bases for refitting the vessels thus employed,⁴ and at the same time the occupation of such positions tended to interrupt the water intercourse between the chief centres of population in the South, a large proportion of which were on or near the sea-coast. By the middle of 1862 blockade-running was practically confined to steamers specially built, and all the efforts of the Federal navy failed to prevent blockade-running as carried on by these vessels from being a profitable speculation. It was the occupation of the Confederate ports, much more than the watch kept by the Federal

¹ 4 B. & L., 599.

² It has been pointed out by Dr. E. D. Adams (*Great Britain and the American Civil War*, I, 253) that to prevent the export of cotton in any considerable quantity the effective blockade of only seven Southern ports was required. These ports were Norfolk, Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, New Orleans and Galveston. Only large vessels were adequate for the transport of a bulky export like cotton.

³ 1 Wilson, 184.

cruisers, which put an end to the blockade-running. The occupation of Mobile Bay in August, 1864, closed what was virtually the last port on the Gulf, and with the fall of Charleston and Wilmington early in 1865 the last ports on the Atlantic coast were lost.¹

¹ A report of the Confederate Secretary of the Treasury shows that between October 26th and the end of the year 1864 there had been imported into Wilmington and Charleston '8,632,000 pounds of meat, 1,507,000 pounds of lead, 1,933,000 pounds of saltpetre, 546,000 pairs of shoes, 316,000 pairs of blankets, 520,000 pounds of coffee, 69,000 rifles, 97,000 packages of revolvers, 2,639 packages of medicine, 43 cannon.' Nearly all these imports must have come in through Wilmington, as Charleston was closely blockaded.

CHAPTER IX

FALL OF RICHMOND AND COLLAPSE OF THE CONFEDERACY¹

Richmond during the winter—Lee appointed Commander-in-Chief—Difficulties of Lee's task—Re-election of Abraham Lincoln—Slavery abolished by the Federal Congress—Federal movement against the Boydton road—Confederate attack on Fort Stedman—Fort Stedman in the hands of the Confederates—Fort Stedman recaptured—Grant prepares to strike in force the Southside railway—Instructions given to Sheridan and the Corps commanders—Lee's counter-preparations—Skirmishing on March 29th and 30th—Lee's failure to crush Warren's Corps—Fitzhugh Lee and Pickett drive back Sheridan's cavalry—Battle of Five Forks—The Confederate left turned—Warren relieved of the command of the 5th Corps—General assault on the Petersburg lines—Lee's lines broken—Death of A. P. Hill—Capture of Forts Gregg and Whitworth—Lee abandons Petersburg—Surrender of Petersburg and Richmond—Grant's pursuit—Battle of Sailor's Creek—Surrender of Ewell's Corps—The Confederates cross the Appomattox—Humphreys holds Lee fast—Sheridan intercepts Lee's retreat—Communications between Grant and Lee—The Confederates vainly attempt to drive Sheridan out of their path—Surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia—Collapse of the Confederacy—Surrender of Johnston's army—Wilson's successful expedition—Fall of Selma and Mobile—Surrender of Taylor and of Kirby Smith—Capture of President Davis.

THE winter of 1864-5 was a period of unrelieved gloom and depression in Richmond. Grant had been steadily extending his lines on the south side of the Appomattox towards the left. It was certain that, as soon as the return of spring rendered military operations possible, a determined attempt would be made by the Federals to secure possession of the Southside railway. Lee would be compelled to extend his lines still farther to the

¹ See Map IV. For the military operations in this chapter the chief authority is Humphreys's *Virginia Campaign*. He had recently been appointed to the command of the 2nd Corps. The sixth volume of the *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers* contains several papers on Five Forks, Sailor's Creek and the storming of the Petersburg lines. Colonel Livermore's study* of *The Generalship of the Appomattox Campaign* is of first-rate importance and disposes of certain current

right, and sooner or later the Confederate line of defence must become so thin that it could be broken at some point or other. The limits of conscription had been reached ;¹ the refusal of the Federal Government in 1864 to exchange prisoners prevented their opponents from filling the vacancies in their ranks ; and the already scanty numbers were being diminished by an increasing stream of deserters.

In the Confederate capital the stock of provisions was running short. *Lee's* troops were dependent for their supplies upon the two railways, the Southside and Danville lines, which alone remained open ; the rolling stock upon these lines was so worn out as to be inadequate to the heavy work now put upon it. There was not enough bread in Virginia to feed *Lee's* army, and meat had to be imported from abroad. When the capture of Fort Fisher closed the port of Wilmington, starvation stared the Confederate armies in the face.² It is probable, indeed, that a considerable store of provisions could have been brought into Richmond and Petersburg from the country districts if the Government had been able to pay for them in gold ; but the farmers refused to take the worthless Confederate paper money in payment. *Longstreet* went so far as to suggest the desperate expedient, that the Government should impress gold as well as bread and meal-stuffs. But the suggestion was not adopted.³

In various States the people were beginning more or less openly to dissociate themselves from the cause of their leaders. In Richmond itself there was a growing feeling of discontent with President *Davis's* administration. An Act of Congress was passed appointing a Commander-in-Chief of all the Confederate forces in

views as to *Lee's* reasons for holding on to Petersburg. On the whole it gives preference to Grant over *Lee* in their long-fought duel. Colonel Livermore was Acting Assistant Inspector-General on General Humphreys's staff during the campaign. General Horace Porter, a member of Grant's staff, was the author of an interesting contribution to 4 B. & L. on the Five Forks campaign, but his obvious admiration for Sheridan renders his narrative somewhat one-sided. Apart from Dr. Freeman's biography of *Lee*, Confederate accounts are meagre.

¹ Conscription, which in 1862 applied to men between eighteen and thirty-five, had been gradually extended, until it embraced all between the ages of seventeen and fifty, 'robbing alike the cradle and the grave.'

² In February the Commissariat arrangements had been so far improved that three and a half million rations of meat and two and a half million rations of bread had been collected in the reserve depôts at Richmond, Lynehburg, Danville, and Greenboro.

³ President *Davis*, in a message to Congress in March, proposed to impress the supplies needed for the army, if the owners would not sell,

the field. *Davis* ratified the Act and appointed *Lee* to the post.¹ The substitution of General *Breckinridge* for Mr. *Seddon* as Secretary of War was another concession which the sorely tried President had to make to public opinion.

The task, which *Lee* in his new position had to face, was one of stupendous difficulty. In no quarter was any gleam of hope to be seen. In the Shenandoah Valley *Early* had been hopelessly beaten; and *Sheridan* was free either to operate against Lynchburg and secure one of *Lee's* two lines of retreat, or else to join forces with *Grant* and still further increase the overwhelming superiority of the Federal armies round Richmond.

In Tennessee *Hood* had suffered a crushing defeat, and an advance into South-West Virginia or North Carolina by Thomas's victorious troops might be looked for. *Sherman* had occupied Savannah on December 21st; and whether he transported his army by sea to City Point or marched overland to effect a junction with *Grant*, his army would shortly have to be reckoned with.

To meet this overwhelming concentration of force *Lee* could draw upon no fresh troops. The ill-fed, ill-clad, ill-shod Army of Northern Virginia was practically the only organised army left to the Confederacy. Too late, President *Davis* recognised the error of tying down that gallant army to the defence of Richmond.² It

¹ The Confederate Congress in passing this Act was animated by hostility towards the *President*, and their object was to prevent his interference in the direction of military operations for the future. But the *President* cleverly evaded the intention of Congress by appointing *Lee* to the post of 'commander of the Confederate armies' which he had held in the spring of 1862 until his appointment to the command of the Army of Northern Virginia, and which *Bragg* had held since February 24th, 1864. *Lee* was thus restored to his old post, but now held it in conjunction with the command of his army; he regarded it, however, as before, as advisory in character and subordinate to the *President*, the titular Commander-in-Chief of the land and sea forces of the Confederacy. The *President* resented the action of Congress because he saw their motive; but his official and personal relations with *Lee* were not affected. *Lee's* loyalty to constituted authority led him to accept without demur the *President's* interpretation of his new appointment. During the two months, for which he held this post, he seems to have asserted himself only once, to secure the appointment of *Joseph Johnston* to the command of the troops which were being brought together to resist *Sherman's* advance through the Carolinas.

² The very prevalent view, that *President Davis's* veto alone prevented *Lee* from evacuating Richmond and Petersburg at an earlier date, is based upon a probably erroneous interpretation put upon a single utterance of *Lee's*. Colonel T. L. Livermore in a closely reasoned paper in the sixth volume of the *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers* shows that it was probably *Lee's* own choice which kept his troops within their fortifications until the Petersburg lines were broken. See Chapter X.

would have been no light matter to abandon the national capital with its arsenals, workshops, and foundries; and its evacuation would have been a heavy blow to the Confederate cause. But at any rate *Lee's* army, the chief bulwark of that cause, would have been set free to manœuvre in the open field, instead of being cooped up behind entrenchments, where its efficiency as a fighting force was being daily impaired.

Had *Davis* realised in time that the strength of a nation consists in its armies rather than its cities, the struggle might have been prolonged; and there was always a chance, whilst the Confederate armies remained in the field, that the North, weary of the gigantic efforts which it had been called upon to make, might recognise the independence of the Southern Confederacy. But the re-election of Lincoln to the Presidency by an overwhelming majority in November, 1864, was a proof that the North meant to see the war through. Lincoln's great victory at the polls over the Democratic candidate, General McClellan, was largely due to the successes which Sherman and Sheridan had been winning in Georgia and the Shenandoah Valley, whilst *Lee* was held to the defence of Richmond. Lincoln, encouraged by his re-election, about which he had at one time entertained grave doubts,¹ was confirmed in his determination to continue the war, until the restoration of the Union should be accomplished. He bore no rancour towards the Southern States, and was ready to make peace on the two conditions of the Restoration of the Union and the Emancipation of the Slaves. In this latter point his hand was immensely strengthened by an amendment to the Constitution, passed in Congress by the necessary two-thirds majority on January 31st, 1865, which made Abolition of Slavery a fundamental part of the Constitution.²

On February 3rd Lincoln consented to meet informally on board a steamer in Hampton Roads three Confederate commissioners to discuss the possibilities of peace. But it was quickly seen that no common understanding could be arrived at, as the Confederate commissioners made it a *sine quâ non* that the independence of

¹ On August 23rd Lincoln presented his Cabinet with a folded paper and asked his Ministers to initial it, unread, on the back. The paper was a memorandum to this effect: 'This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the President-elect as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration, as he will have secured his election on such ground that he cannot possibly save it afterward.'

² This amendment still required to be ratified by three-fourths of the States.

the South should be recognised. The negotiations came to nothing.

In December Warren had destroyed the Weldon Railway as far south as Hicksford, forty miles from Petersburg.¹ Information was received that supplies were still being brought by wagon from Hicksford by the Boydton road to Petersburg, and on February 5th Gregg's cavalry division was sent to strike that road at Dinwiddie Court House and interrupt the trains supposed to be upon the road. The cavalry was supported by the 5th Corps and two divisions of the 2nd Corps, now under the command of General Humphreys in place of Hancock, who had been sent to Washington to organise a new 1st Army Corps.

During the winter the Confederates had strengthened and extended their entrenchments on and about Hatcher's Run.² Their entrenched line now reached from Hatcher's Run on the south of the Appomattox to White Oak Swamp on the north of the James, a distance of thirty-seven miles. To protect his extreme right against Warren's threatened advance, *Lee* concentrated parts of *Hill's* and *Gordon's* Corps in the Hatcher's Run entrenchments, and some sharp fighting took place on the 5th and 6th. Warren, advancing to Dabney's Mill, was driven back; and Gregg on reaching the Boydton road found that it was but little used. The chief result of the three days' operations, from February 5th to the 7th, was that the Federals extended their lines as far as the Vaughan road crossing of Hatcher's Run.

Lee for some time past had envisaged the likelihood of his being forced, in order to save his army, to evacuate Richmond. His intention was to withdraw to Danville,³ unite with *Johnston's* force in North Carolina, and attack Sherman before Grant could come to his assistance. But the animals of the artillery and transport trains were in so emaciated a condition as to be useless for heavy work, until the roads should have recovered, and *Lee* feared lest before he could withdraw his army, Grant might extend

¹ See Map VI. The object of this expedition against the Weldon railway was to prevent it being used to reinforce Fort Fisher, and it was successful. *Hoke's* division, despatched from Richmond on December 19th, had to go round by the Danville and Piedmont railways (the latter a 'weak and uncertain' line from Danville *via* Greensboro into North Carolina). Only one brigade had reached Wilmington by December 25th, on which day Butler made his assault on Fort Fisher (Livermore, 6 *M.M.H.S.*, 468).

² See Map IV.

³ See Map VI.

so far to the left as to make retreat impossible.¹ He therefore determined to make a sortie in force against the Federal lines near the Appomattox, in the hope that Grant would be compelled to draw back his left to reinforce his right. The task was assigned to *Gordon*, commanding the 2nd Army Corps, whose reputation as a leader of dash and enterprise had been steadily growing. The point selected for attack was Fort Stedman, about a mile and a half south of the Appomattox, where the main lines of the two armies were but 150 yards apart and the piquet lines only a third of that distance. In addition to the 2nd Corps reinforcements were ordered to *Gordon* from *Hill's* and *Longstreet's* Corps as well as a detachment of cavalry, whose special task was to be the destruction of the Federal telegraph wires and pontoon bridges over the Appomattox.² As soon as Fort Stedman was carried, the attacking force was to push forward to the high ground in rear of the Federal lines, where it was erroneously supposed that three forts had been built, whose fire commanded Fort Stedman and the adjacent portion of the Federal lines. But as a matter of fact no such forts existed, the redoubts whose fire would sweep Fort Stedman and its approaches were in the main line of entrenchments. An infantry division was held in reserve which, as soon as the Federal lines were broken, was to sweep down their entrenchments to the Federal left, and this movement was to be supported by the other troops holding the Confederate lines as fast as their fronts were cleared.

At 4.30 a.m. on March 25th *Gordon* assaulted. As Confederate deserters were allowed to enter the Federal lines with their arms, the piquet posts were easily surprised, and the storming party, rushing forward to the main line, carried Fort Stedman and three adjacent batteries. There, however, the Confederate success ended. *Gordon's* attack was left almost entirely unsupported. The detachments, which were sent forward to seize the supposed forts,

¹ The wretched condition of the animals of his train and the state of the roads have been assigned by President *Davis* and *Fitzhugh Lee* as the reason why *Lee* clung so long to his entrenchments. But *Lee's* object in attacking Fort Stedman is clearly stated in his despatch to President *Davis* of March 26th. He hoped that 'Grant would at least be obliged so to curtail his lines, that upon the approach of General Sherman, I might be able to hold our position with a portion of the troops, and with a select body unite with General *Johnston* and give him battle. If successful, I would then be able to return to my position, and if unsuccessful I should be in no worse condition, as I should be compelled to withdraw from James River if I quietly awaited his approach' (*Lee's Confidential Dispatches to Davis*, edited by E. S. Freeman).

² Humphreys, 318.

penetrated to the military railroad from City Point, but were then driven back by Hartranft's division of the 9th Corps. Assaults made from Fort Stedman upon the forts on its right and left were repulsed : and as soon as there was sufficient light to distinguish friend from foe, the Federal artillery in the main works and from the high ground in the rear, where General Parke ordered part of his field artillery to be posted, opened fire upon Fort Stedman. So heavy a fire swept the space between the lines of the two armies that neither could reinforcements be sent from *Lee's* lines to *Gordon* in Fort Stedman, nor could the Confederates in their enemy's works escape.

Shortly before 8 a.m. Hartranft's division attacked and recaptured Fort Stedman. Of *Gordon's* command 1,949 were taken prisoners, and his loss in killed and wounded was also heavy.¹ Following upon *Gordon's* repulse the commanders of the 2nd and 6th Corps attacked and carried the Confederate piquet line, but found the main line of entrenchments too strongly held to justify an assault. *Gordon's* sortie, so far from relieving the pressure upon *Lee's* right, had enabled the Federals to gain an advanced position from which a few days later a successful assault was made.

Grant had come to the conclusion that it would be desirable, if possible, to leave to the Armies of the Potomac and the James the work of crushing *Lee's* army. If Sherman's army were to participate therein, sectional jealousy might be aroused.² Throughout

¹ Humphreys, 321, estimates the Confederate loss at nearly 4,000 and the Federal about 2,000. The Confederates captured Fort Stedman and Batteries X, XI, and XII. But they failed to gain possession of Fort Haskell to their right and Fort McGilvery to their left. This failure prevented *Gordon* from securing a broad front on which he might deploy his forces for a forward movement. It is not clear what was the force which reached the railway. Humphreys thinks that it was *Gordon's* three detachments. *Gordon* says that he never knew what became of these detachments, and Hartranft thinks that the force which he encountered was a heavy line and groups of skirmishers. From his account (4 B. & L., 584-9) it would follow that a considerably larger force pressed forward towards the railway than is generally recognised. Most accounts represent *Gordon's* main efforts as being directed against Fort Haskell and Battery IX, which latter effectually blocked the road to Fort McGilvery. *Gordon* accounts for his failure on the ground that the attack was delayed owing to the late arrival of *Longstreet's* troops from the north bank of the James, and daylight found 'the plan only half executed.' It is plain that the Confederate plan of attack miscarried, as *Lee* had concentrated about half his army to take part in the movement. General Parke, commanding the 9th Corps, was the senior officer in the absence of Meade on that part of the Federal lines which was attacked.

² What Grant feared was not any ill-feeling between the armies, but the jealousy of politicians from the different sections.

the war the Army of the Potomac had been pitted against the Army of Northern Virginia, but except at Gettysburg had failed to gain any marked success over it. It seemed but just that, as a reward for the years of toil and of dogged perseverance in the face of continued failure, it should have the honour of forcing its old antagonist to surrender at last. Grant saw that *Lee* must abandon Richmond within a few days at the latest. If *Lee* succeeded in effecting a junction with *Johnston's* forces, the struggle might be prolonged some time longer. But the Federal general was now on the point of striking a blow, which, if successful, would probably prevent *Lee* from reaching *Johnston*, and would leave him no alternative except to surrender. On March 24th Grant had issued orders for a general movement to commence on the 29th. The defeat of *Gordon's* sortie confirmed him in his determination : he had visited upon his enemy a very much heavier loss than he had himself suffered. On the 26th *Sheridan's* cavalry were brought from the north bank of the James and posted on the left of the Federal position, and on the night of the 27th, General Ord, commanding the Army of the James, made a secret march with three infantry divisions and one cavalry division, and, unknown to the Confederates, was placed in rear of the 2nd Corps. General Weitzel was left in command of the troops immediately threatening Richmond. Two divisions occupied the Bermuda Hundred entrenchments, and only one division held the lines on the north bank of the James.

Grant's purpose was to concentrate all his available forces on his left, and with them strike such a blow as would force *Lee* to abandon his lines. Abraham Lincoln had already arrived at Grant's headquarters in anticipation of the speedy fall of the Southern capital. On the 27th Sherman arrived at City Point by water. He was informed of Grant's plans for the reduction of Richmond, and it was settled that, if the co-operation of his army should after all be required, he should move from Goldsboro on April 10th, and after feinting at Raleigh (60 miles north-west of Goldsboro) turn sharp to the north-east and reach the Roanoke River near Weldon, where he would be within 60 miles of, and south of, Petersburg. Having arrived there, he would either move nor'-nor'-west to Burkesville, the junction of the Southside and Danville railroads, and prevent *Lee* escaping by either of these roads, or hold himself in readiness for any movement which Grant might direct. Grant, however, was full of hope that before the day fixed for the commencement of Sherman's co-operative movement *Lee's* army would have ceased to exist.

Sheridan on the 28th received orders to move with his cavalry

early on the following morning to Dinwiddie Court House. He was informed that the 2nd and 5th Corps would be within supporting distance, and was directed to try and force the enemy out of their entrenchments into open ground by threatening to turn their right. But if the Confederates clung to their entrenchments he was told to 'cut loose' and ride straight for the Danville railway. This he was to destroy thoroughly as near the Appomattox as possible, and he was then to break up the Southside railway west of Burkesville. Having ruined the two railroads, he could either return to Grant or join Sherman. These orders were, however, subject to modification, and actually were altered the following day. The 2nd Corps was ordered to cross Hatcher's Run¹ by the Vaughan road crossing on the morning of the 29th as soon as its entrenchments had been occupied by Ord's troops, and to move forward with its right on the Run and its left in communication with the 5th Corps, which was ordered to cross the Run lower down and move along the Quaker road towards the Boydton road. Wright was ordered to hold himself in readiness to withdraw his Corps from their entrenchments, which were then to be occupied by an extension of the 9th Corps to its left.

Lee, as soon as he discovered Grant's new movement, hurried up reinforcements to the extreme right. The works constructed in the neighbourhood of Hatcher's Run during the winter had not been permanently garrisoned, but were only occupied by a sentry line.² Now, as Grant's movement developed, troops from other parts of the Confederate lines came pouring into these entrenchments. *Anderson* with *Johnson's* division and *Wise's* brigade occupied the extreme right of the entrenchments along the White Oak road. *Pickett's* division was ordered to the same point. *Hill* extended to the right so as to connect with *Anderson's* left. Four of his brigades under *Heth* held the entrenchments on the south side of the Run, and *Wilcox* with four more brigades occupied those on the north side. *Fitzhugh Lee's* cavalry division was ordered from the extreme left across the James to the extreme right at Five Forks, as soon as *Sheridan's* movement to Grant's left was known to *Lee*. He reached Sutherland Station on the Southside railroad on the night of the 29th.

During the 29th *Sheridan* received orders from Grant not to

¹ See Map IV.

² These works started at the Crow House, and then ran from the Boydton road crossing along the south side of Hatcher's Run, covering the White Oak road to its intersection with the Claiborne road; they then turned northward, covering the latter road till they reached the Run (Humphreys, 310)

strike at the railways, but to co-operate with the 2nd and 5th Corps against the Confederate right. The only fighting on the 29th was done by the leading division of Warren's Corps, which being attacked on the Quaker road by two brigades of *Anderson's* command, drove them back into the White Oak road entrenchments. As rain fell heavily during the night of the 29th and throughout the 30th, rendering it necessary to corduroy the roads for the passage of the artillery and trains, the Federal infantry confined themselves to pushing close up to the entrenchments in their front without attacking. There was some sharp skirmishing on the road from Dinwiddie Court House to Five Forks, between *Sheridan's* and *Fitzhugh Lee's* cavalry.¹ On the evening of the 30th *Fitzhugh Lee* was joined by the cavalry of *W. H. F. Lee* and *Rosser*, from Stony Creek depôt, and *Pickett* reached Five Forks with five infantry brigades. General *Lee* directed *Pickett* with his infantry and all the cavalry to move from Five Forks on the 31st, and drive *Sheridan* from the Court House, whilst he himself proposed with the troops in the White Oak road entrenchments to fall upon the left flank of the 5th Corps. But in order to effect this concentration on his extreme right, he was obliged to leave the rest of his line but weakly defended. *Parke* and *Wright*, as the result of the reconnaissances made on the 30th, reported to *Grant* their confidence that they could carry by assault the works in their respective fronts.²

Grant now determined to reinforce *Sheridan* with one infantry Corps, so as to enable him to turn *Lee's* right, and with the rest of his infantry to attack the Petersburg entrenchments. But the heavy rain, which fell continuously, caused a postponement of the proposed operation.³ On the morning of the 31st *Warren* advanced with the 5th Corps to gain possession of the White Oak road. The Confederate entrenchments on the south side of *Hatcher's Run* were sited along that road for some distance and then turned northwards so as to cover the *Claiborne* road, until they again reached the Run. The White Oak road from its junction with the

¹ See Plan of Battle of Five Forks.

² *Humphreys*, 329. At one period on the 30th *Grant* had been so discouraged by the foul weather that he determined to suspend operations, but he was dissuaded by *Sheridan*, who rode over on purpose to expostulate, and *Rawlins*, his chief-of-the-staff (2 *Sheridan's Memoirs*, 142-5).

³ Orders were sent to the Corps commanders at 8.30 a.m. that there would be no movement of the troops that day, but in consequence of information received from *Warren*, the 5th Corps was ordered to gain possession of the White Oak road, if a reconnaissance, which *Warren* had already ordered, showed that it was practicable (*Humphreys*, 330).

Claiborne road extended four miles west to Five Forks, and if Warren could secure possession of this part of the road, which was not defended by entrenchments, *Lee's* extreme right at Five Forks would be separated from the troops holding the entrenchments in front of the Claiborne road. But at the same time as the 5th Corps was advancing to secure the White Oak road *Lee* was in person preparing to attack its left flank. The leading Federal division was close to the road, when it was assailed on the front and left flank by four Confederate brigades.¹ It was driven back in considerable confusion. Crawford's division, which was supporting Ayres's advance, shared the same fate, and both divisions were forced across a tributary of Gravelly Run, where the third division under Griffin was in reserve. But a sudden attack by Miles's division of the 2nd Corps struck the advancing Confederates on the left flank. Griffin's division moved against their right flank, and they fell back to the position south of the road, which Ayres had occupied earlier in the morning. In the course of the afternoon Warren again moved forward to the White Oak road and drove the enemy from the slight breastwork which they had thrown up, and gained the road, forcing the Confederate brigades, which had attacked him in the morning, to retreat to their fortified lines. Humphreys on Warren's right kept up a vigorous demonstration against the works south of Hatcher's Run and prevented the troops holding them from sending reinforcements to the brigades which were engaged by Warren.²

Fitzhugh Lee, on the morning of the 31st, started from Five Forks with his three cavalry divisions. His object was, whilst pressing the hostile cavalry in front with one division, to throw the other two against their left flank. But the crossings over Chamberlain's Creek, across which lay the approach to the Federal left, were so strongly held, that it was not until the arrival of *Pickett's* infantry upon the scene that the Federals were forced to retire. Part of Sheridan's cavalry were driven eastwards to the Boydton road, but rejoined their commander after nightfall. With the rest of his force Sheridan formed line of battle half a mile in front of Dinwiddie Court House, and, though hard pressed, succeeded in holding the enemy's superior numbers at bay, till night put an end to the combat. Warren on the White Oak road heard the sound of Sheridan's battle steadily receding southwards, and, judging that he was being driven back, sent a brigade across country to attack the enemy's flank and rear.

¹ These four brigades were drawn from three different divisions (Dr. Freeman).

² Mott's division attacked the works at the Boydton road crossing and Hays's, the Crow House redoubt, both unsuccessfully.

Sheridan finding that he could not hold on to Dinwiddie Court House unless reinforced, sent both to Warren and Meade for help. The situation was grave. The Confederate forces in front of the Court House were in a position to intervene between Sheridan and Warren's and Humphreys's Corps, and after leaving a force to hold the cavalry in check might move against the left rear of the infantry.¹ Warren was directed to fall back from the White Oak road to the Boydton road and to send one division by the latter road to Sheridan's aid. But the Boydton road bridge over Gravelly Run had been destroyed, and the stream was so swollen as to be unfordable for infantry.² Sheridan's purpose was to make a combined attack with his own cavalry and Warren's reinforcements upon the enemy in his front at daybreak of April 1st.

During the night *Pickett*, learning of the presence of a Federal force in his rear, withdrew his troops to Five Forks, where he entrenched a position.³ The Confederate line was about a mile

¹ At the same time, as Sheridan clearly saw, the Confederate infantry by following him to Dinwiddie Court House had completely isolated itself, and a rare opportunity was offered the Federal army (2 Sheridan's *Memoirs*, 154).

² Warren's operations on the night of the 31st were severely censured by Grant and Sheridan. But his position was a very difficult one. The order directing him to send one division to Sheridan and withdraw the rest of his Corps to the Boydton road was received about 9.30 p.m., the fourth order which he had had since 5 p.m. But at 10.50 p.m. he received another order directing him whilst sending one division down the Boydton road to move the other two across country into the road from Dinwiddie Court House to Five Forks, so as to fall upon the enemy's rear, whilst Sheridan attacked their front. A further order, received at 1 a.m., made it perfectly plain that in Meade's eyes the important thing was to send a division direct to Sheridan's help. But as it was very doubtful whether that reinforcement could possibly reach Sheridan by daybreak, at which hour he was expecting to be attacked, and as it was anticipated that without such reinforcement Sheridan would be obliged to retreat by the Vaughan road, Warren, instead of starting his two divisions at once against the enemy's rear, waited until he knew that his other division had established connection with Sheridan. Ayres's division was crossing Gravelly Run at 2 a.m., and the other two divisions did not commence their march till 5 a.m. For this delay Warren was censured by the Court of Enquiry which met many years later to investigate his conduct (Humphreys, 336-43).


³ *Pickett's* withdrawal seems to have been due to the movements of Bartlett's brigade, which, about 5 p.m. on the 31st, Warren had sent across country from the White Oak road to Sheridan's aid. This brigade struck the direct road from Dinwiddie Court House to the White Oak road near Dr. Boisseau's, and drove some Confederate skirmishers across Gravelly Run. Bartlett's presence in his rear became known to *Pickett* about 10 p.m., and he did not learn that the Federal brigade had subsequently been withdrawn, in accordance with Meade's orders (Humphreys, 342).

BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS

1st April 1885 about 4 p.m.

0 1/2 1 1 1/2 2 Miles

Federal Cavalry Brigade
Major General
Confederate Cavalry Brigade
as Infantry Division



and three-quarters in length, with a short return about one hundred yards long on its left. The infantry brigades occupied the entrenchments with *W. H. F. Lee's* cavalry division on the right, *Rosser's* in rear at the Ford road crossing of Hatcher's Run guarding the trains, and *Mumford's* on the left,¹ dismounted, covering the ground beyond the left flank of the infantry and connecting with a cavalry force which was covering the ground to the right of the Claiborne road entrenchments.

Sheridan, since daylight, had been following *Pickett* with two of his cavalry divisions. Finding that the Confederate generals intended to make a stand at Five Forks, he determined to demonstrate with his cavalry against the right of their line, whilst the 5th Corps, which was now concentrated near Gravelly Run Church, was to assault the left.² Mackenzie's cavalry division,³ which had been placed under Sheridan's command, was to strike the White Oak road, move along it in conjunction with and to the right of the 5th Corps, and try to cut off the Confederate line of retreat by securing the Ford road crossing over Hatcher's Run.

About 4 p.m. the 5th Corps advanced to the attack. Warren was under the impression that the Confederate line reached nearly half a mile further east than was really the case.⁴ Consequently only Ayres's division came at once into action. It assaulted and carried the return on the Confederate left. The other two divisions passed through the woods north of the White Oak road, where they had some sharp skirmishing with *Mumford's* dismounted cavalry and got right in the rear of the Confederate entrenchments, Crawford's division, which was leading, having reached the Ford road. Fronting south they moved on Five Forks.⁵ The Confederates with their line of retreat cut off made desperate efforts to repel the assaults, which were directed against them from three sides. On the extreme right *W. H. F. Lee* repulsed an attack of two of

¹ *Mumford* was commanding *Fitzhugh Lee's* division.

² As the 5th Corps had not been in time to intercept *Pickett's* retreat, it was halted by Sheridan's orders at J. Boisseau's, near the forks of the road. It was not ordered up to the front till 1 p.m.

³ This division belonged to the Army of the James, and had originally been commanded by Kautz. On joining Sheridan on the morning of the 1st, it was at first posted at Dinwiddie Court House, awaiting further orders.

⁴ An impression apparently shared by Sheridan (Humphreys, 346-7).

⁵ Crawford's division was facing south on the Ford road. Griffin's division, which formed Warren's centre, moved south-west against the enemy's rear, and after a hard struggle carried a new line of entrenchments, which the Confederate infantry on the left were trying to throw up in order to check Ayres's advance from the return, which he had already captured (Humphreys, 349).

Custer's brigades. But the infantry brigades successively changing front to the left, were forced back by the superior numbers of the 5th Corps, one upon the other, until at last the whole line gave way and fled west through the woods towards the Southside railway.

Neither *Pickett* nor *Fitzhugh Lee* was with his troops when the attack commenced : they had ridden to the north side of Hatcher's Run, and the density of the woods prevented the sound of firing from reaching them. *Pickett*, receiving information that the battle had begun, hastened to the scene of action ; but before he arrived, Ayres had broken the Confederate left, and all his efforts to retrieve the day were vain. *Fitzhugh Lee* only got back to Hatcher's Run in time to find that the Ford road was in the hands of the Federals, and consequently was prevented from taking any part in the engagement. After the battle he collected his three cavalry divisions on the north bank of Hatcher's Run and withdrew to Sutherland Station,¹ where he was joined during the night by four infantry brigades under *R. H. Anderson*, which *Lee* had sent from the right of his entrenchments to aid in rallying *Pickett's* beaten troops and to close that line of approach to Petersburg.² On the morning of the 2nd *Pickett*, with the remnants of his infantry, joined *Anderson* at Sutherland Station.

The battle of Five Forks was decisive of the fate of Petersburg. It gave the Federals possession of the Southside railway, and forced *Lee* to send such heavy detachments to prevent the Federals entering Petersburg by the line of that railway, that at other points he was unable to hold his lines in sufficient strength. It was, no doubt, a mistaken policy which required *Pickett* to fight at Five Forks at all.³ He was forced to hold an isolated position, four miles away from the nearest point of the Confederate entrenchments, without any strong natural obstacles to protect either flank, and if his left were turned he would be cut off from the rest of *Lee's* army. A strong defensive position might have been taken up on Hatcher's Run or at Sutherland Station, where the consequences of defeat would have been less disastrous. As it was, he lost at least 4,500 prisoners and six guns. On neither side were the losses in killed and wounded heavy.⁴

¹ See Map IV.

² *Fitzhugh Lee* thinks that if *Anderson* had marched by the direct road to Five Forks he would have come in on the flank and rear of the enemy's right, and would have 'probably changed the result of the uneven contest' (4 B. & L., 712). These troops, however, seem not to have been despatched to the right till after news had reached *Lee* of *Pickett's* defeat (Humphreys, 354).

³ Humphreys, 355 ; *Lee's Lee*, 376.

⁴ Humphreys, 353-4.

In the hour of victory, when the Confederate infantry were flying from the field, Sheridan relieved Warren of the command of the 5th Corps. He had been authorised by Grant early that day to take this step if he judged it expedient. Owing probably to the fact that the Army of the Potomac had practically two commanders, its Corps commanders had developed the habit of deciding at their own discretion the manner and time in which the movements ordered from headquarters should be executed. Warren was an engineer officer of high scientific attainments and with a brilliant war record, but his caution rendered him an unsuitable colleague for the fiery Sheridan, who was always eager to snatch at any opportunity which chance might present. In the battle of April 1st Sheridan did not consider that Warren had displayed sufficient energy in bringing his troops into action or in pushing the attack, and accordingly called Griffin to take his place at the head of the 5th Corps. In the Court of Enquiry held in 1879 after Warren's repeated requests, Sheridan, though readily admitting that Warren had displayed the skill and energy in handling his Corps which might be required of an *ordinary* commander (to which fact, indeed, overwhelming testimony was produced at the Court of Enquiry), justified his action on the ground that what was required at so critical a moment was an officer of *extraordinary* ability. Grant on April 3rd appointed Warren to command the forces left in Petersburg and City Point.¹

In anticipation of Sheridan's success Grant had ordered a general assault to be made by Parke, Wright, and Ord upon the Petersburg entrenchments as soon as it was light on the 2nd. Fearing, however, lest Lee in despair should withdraw during the night from his lines and fall upon Sheridan, who now lay across his right flank, he ordered his artillery to open fire along the whole length of his lines at 10 p.m. The Confederate guns replied, and for two hours a tremendous cannonade was maintained. It was

¹ Sheridan, in his *Memoirs*, is very unfair to Warren. He says (ii, 161) that Warren on the 1st exhibited distinct apathy and gave the impression that he wished the sun to go down before the battle could be begun. But as a matter of fact Warren attacked about 4 p.m., and it seems clear that Sheridan mistook for apathy an attitude of concentrated thought. Again, Sheridan complained that portions of the 5th Corps gave way owing to Warren making no effort to inspire his troops with confidence. But Sheridan was with Ayres's division and saw nothing of Warren, who was on the right with Crawford's and Griffin's divisions. No one after reading Sheridan's account would expect to find that Crawford's division suffered more heavily than either of the other two. For the finding of the Court of Enquiry, ordered in December, 1879, see 4 B. & L., 723-4, and Humphreys, 357-61.

indeed the death-knell of the Confederacy: for *Lee's* position on the morning of the 2nd was such that he could have but little chance of repelling a determined assault made all along the line. *Pickett's* defeat had necessitated the withdrawal of *Field's* division, accompanied by *Longstreet* in person, from the north bank of the James, and the Richmond defences were only held by two divisions under *Ewell*.¹ The Bermuda Hundred lines were manned by *Mahone's* division. Had Grant on the night of the 1st massed troops on the north bank of the James, Richmond would have been in his hands on the morning of the 2nd. But he did not know that *Field's* division had been withdrawn, and preferred to secure the evacuation of Richmond by the capture of Petersburg. South of the Appomattox *Gordon's* Corps, over 7,000 strong, held the entrenchments opposite the 9th Corps' lines. But from *Gordon's* right to Hatcher's Run only four brigades were available to meet the attack of Wright's and Ord's commands. South of Hatcher's Run four more brigades held the White Oak road and Claiborne road entrenchments. At Sutherland Station on the Southside line *Anderson* had four infantry brigades as well as *Pickett's* infantry and *Fitzhugh Lee's* cavalry. The weakest spot in the Confederate lines was on the north side of Hatcher's Run in front of the 6th Corps and Ord's divisions: if the line were broken there both the forces on the south side of Hatcher's Run and *Anderson* at Sutherland Station would be cut off from Petersburg.

At 4.40 a.m. the 6th Corps advanced to the assault. The advanced position captured on March 25th now proved invaluable as affording cover for concentrating a column of attack within striking distance of the enemy's lines. In fifteen minutes the 6th Corps carried the lines in its front with a loss of 1,100 killed and wounded. Some of the victorious Federals made their way across the Boydton road to the Southside railway, and it was by one of these parties probably that General *A. P. Hill* was killed as he was riding from *Lee's* headquarters to rally the soldiers of his Corps. Sweeping down the entrenchments to the left, the 6th Corps pressed on towards Hatcher's Run, where they met part of Ord's command, which had carried the entrenchments on the north bank of the Run. The two Corps were directed to march

¹ Even after *Pickett's* defeat *Lee* would not yet recognise the necessity of evacuation. *Field's* division was summoned to strengthen his right against Sheridan and if possible to recover the lost ground. *Lee* still was hoping that Grant would not assault his lines on the Petersburg front, or that if he did, they could be successfully defended. It is possible that he did not know at the time the full extent of the disaster at Five Forks (Eckeyrode and Conrad).

straight on Petersburg with Ord's troops leading. About 4.30 a.m. Parke had assaulted the lines held by *Gordon's* Corps with two columns moving from either side of Fort Sedgwick. He carried the first line of entrenchments, capturing twelve guns and 800 prisoners, and secured possession of the Confederate lines for a distance of nearly a quarter of a mile on either side of the Jerusalem plank road, but found himself confronted by a second line of works which he vainly endeavoured to carry. Later in the day *Gordon* made several attempts to recover the lines lost in the morning, but Parke repulsed all his attacks.

On the south side of the Run the 2nd Corps had unsuccessfully attacked the Confederate works on the night of the 1st. Humphreys was afterwards ordered to send one of his divisions to report to Sheridan. It was not intended that he should attack on the 2nd, but finding that the lines on the north side of the Run had been carried, he attacked in his front with his two remaining divisions.¹ The entrenchments on the south side of the Run were carried, and the Confederates withdrew from the White Oak road works, as their position was now rendered untenable by the breaking of their lines to the east. Humphreys was called off from the pursuit of this force and ordered to march direct on Petersburg. Miles's division of the 2nd Corps, however, which Sheridan on the morning of the 2nd had sent back to join Humphreys, came up with *Heth's* retreating brigades, and after two unsuccessful attempts carried the entrenchments which they had hastily thrown up. The Confederates retreated in great disorder westwards, a part crossing the Appomattox, but the majority joined *Anderson's* command, which was moving along the south bank of the river in the direction of Amelia Court House.² Sharp skirmishing went on throughout the day between Sheridan's cavalry and *Anderson's* rearguard.

Lee in Petersburg was now forced back into his last line of entrenchments within the suburbs of the city. On the west side, where the hostile pressure was heaviest, his line ran from the Appomattox along the east bank of Old Town Creek.³ On the further bank were some advanced works, the strongest of which were Forts Gregg and Whitworth. Grant determined to crown the day's work by capturing these two redoubts, and Ord was directed to assault them. Fort Gregg was captured after a desperate struggle. Its garrison of 300 was either killed or captured, and the Federal loss was over 700. Fort Whitworth was more easily gained possession of, as *Wilcox*, to save useless bloodshed, ordered his troops to abandon it. A final assault

¹ Humphreys, 366.

² See Map VI.

³ See Map IV.

was ordered to be made, upon *Lee's* lines both at Petersburg and Richmond early on the 3rd, but during the night the Army of Northern Virginia withdrew from its works and commenced its retreat westwards.

Lee had sent a message to President *Davis* immediately after the 6th Corps carried his lines, that Richmond would have to be abandoned.¹ All that he could possibly hope to do was to hold on to the Petersburg lines till night, and thus gain time for organising the retreat. To attempt to hold Richmond after the loss of Petersburg was not to be thought of for a moment. For *Sheridan* would have quickly secured the Danville railroad, and the fate of the Southern capital would then have been sealed. By abandoning Richmond forthwith there was at any rate a chance that the Army of Northern Virginia might yet be saved for active operations in the field. At 8 p.m. the evacuation commenced. As the southern bank of the Appomattox was now in the hands of the Federals, *Lee* had to withdraw his troops in Petersburg to the north bank, and march along it until he could recross out of reach of *Grant's* army. *Longstreet* with *Field's* division and what still remained in Petersburg of *Heth's* and *Wilcox's* divisions led the way. *Gordon* with the 2nd Corps followed; *Mahone* withdrew during the night from Bermuda Hundred and marching by Chesterfield Court House crossed the Appomattox after *Gordon* at Goode's bridge,² where *Longstreet's* troops had also crossed. *Ewell* withdrew his two divisions across the James and crossed the Appomattox by the Danville railway bridge. *Anderson's* command marched along the south bank of the river. Amelia Court House was named as the point of concentration.

Very early on the 3rd the Federals discovered that the enemy had retired, and possession of Petersburg was quietly taken. In Richmond during the night fires broke out in different parts of the city in consequence of the destruction of the military stores which *Ewell* had ordered.³ The same fate which had overtaken Columbia threatened the late capital of the Confederacy. At 8.15 a.m. on the 3rd the city was formally surrendered by its mayor to General *Weitzel*, and Federal troops quickly extinguished the

¹ Humphreys, 371. This message apparently was in the shape of a telegram to the *Secretary of War* despatched before 10.40 a.m. The biographers of *Longstreet* antedate this telegram by twelve hours and speak of a second telegram sent to the *President* on the morning of the 2nd. There is, however, no doubt that *Davis* received the first intimation of *Lee's* decision in church at morning service on the 2nd.

² See Map VI.

³ The fire seems to have been caused by the Confederates setting fire to the stores of tobacco (*Lee's Lee*, 381).

flames and restored order. On the following day Abraham Lincoln visited the city which had so long defied him, and almost unattended, leading his little boy by the hand, walked through its streets, amid the adoring salutations of the negroes, to the Grey House, where his rival had so lately ruled. *Jefferson Davis* had left Richmond on the evening of the 2nd for Danville, which was proclaimed as the new seat of government. *Lee* hoped to lead his army to the same place, whence a junction could be effected with *Johnston's* army by the railroad through Greensboro.

Grant bent all his energies to prevent his enemy from making good his escape. *Sheridan* with the cavalry and the 5th Corps was directed to reach the Danville railroad at some point between the Appomattox and its junction with the Southside line.¹ Meade with the 2nd and 6th Corps followed, moving west in the direction of Amelia Court House, whilst *Ord* with his command, to be followed by the 9th Corps, marched towards Burkesville along the line of the Southside railway.

Lee had hoped to get all his army concentrated at Amelia Court House on the night of the 4th. But *Longstreet's* Corps was the only one which actually reached the Court House on that day: *Ewell* and *Anderson* did not come up till the following morning.² *Lee* has stated that he was delayed a whole day at the Court House, because the provisions, which he had ordered to be sent from Danville, were not forthcoming, and a day had consequently to be spent in collecting food and forage for the men and animals. But whatever were the facts about the missing rations—and the Danville authorities denied that any requisition from *Lee* for supplies ever reached them³—it seems plain that *Lee* was not able to effect his

¹ *Sheridan* was to keep near to the Appomattox, 'so as to feel *Lee's* army constantly' (Humphreys, 373).

² *Ewell* did not arrive before noon.

³ Dr. *Freeman* has carefully investigated the question. No orders for the forwarding of supplies to Amelia Court House were sent from *Lee's* headquarters prior to April 2nd. His final despatch to the War Department, received at 10.40 a.m., did not mention Amelia Court House. On receipt of this despatch the Commissary-General telegraphed to *Lee's* 'chief commissary,' asking what should be the destination of the reserve rations then in Richmond. A second telegram from *Lee* giving indirect notice to the Secretary of War to provide supplies at Amelia Court House ('the troops will all be directed to Amelia Court House') was only received at 7 p.m. By that hour the railway cars, which were to have carried the supplies to the army, had been requisitioned by the President for himself and his Cabinet, the most indispensable records and the Government's bullion. The reply to the Commissary-General's question was not received till still later in the night. No requisition for supplies upon the Danville railway authorities

concentration at as early an hour as he had hoped. There had not been time before the hasty flight from Richmond to see that the trains were made as light as possible and only ammunition and medical supplies carried in the wagons. The roads were still very bad, and the speed of the retreat was delayed by the slow progress of the heavily laden trains. The loss of a day proved fatal to *Lee*. For Sheridan with the cavalry and 5th Corps reached Jetersville on the Danville railroad, some eight miles south-west of Amelia Court House, on the afternoon of the 4th. The infantry entrenched a position, and the 2nd and 6th Corps were pushed forward as fast as possible to reinforce Sheridan. They did not, however, reach Jetersville till the afternoon of the 5th, and Meade gave orders for an advance to be made against *Lee's* army at 6 a.m. on the 6th.¹

Lee had himself moved out from Amelia Court House on the afternoon of the 5th to sweep Sheridan out of his path, of whose presence he had learnt the previous evening. But on receiving information that he had not merely cavalry to deal with, but that a strong infantry force was entrenched across his road, he turned to his right and directed his line of march towards Rice's Station and Farmville.² Though forced to abandon the direct road to Danville, he still hoped that he might be able to reach that place by a roundabout route, passing through Prince Edward Court House, whilst if that road was also found to be blocked he could still continue to retreat from Farmville to Lynchburg.

But already Stoneman's cavalry of Thomas's army was tearing up the railway on the further side of Lynchburg, and the 4th Army Corps was advancing in the same direction from East Tennessee. These forces would have been able to hold the mountain passes long enough to enable Grant to catch up the rear of *Lee's* retreating army. Consequently *Lee's* only chance of escape was to reach Danville and join *Johnston*. As Meade was advancing towards Amelia Court House on the morning of the 6th, the rearmost Confederate columns could be seen in motion on the left. The order of march was changed, and the three Army Corps were soon heading west in pursuit. *Longstreet's* Corps, to which *Mahone's*

was made. *Lee* was relying solely upon the reserve rations in Richmond (300,000 rations of bread and meat). Not only was precious time lost at Amelia, but very little food or forage could be found in the vicinity.

¹ Sheridan with only his cavalry and the 5th Corps would not risk an attack; but on the arrival of the 2nd Corps in the middle of the afternoon he urged Meade to order one; but Meade insisted upon waiting for the 6th Corps, which came up that evening too late for an attack.

² Rice's station was on the Lynchburg railway, sixty-two miles from Lynchburg.

division had been assigned, reached Rice's Station by a night march at sunrise of the 6th. But the progress of the other three Corps, which were encumbered with the trains, was very much slower. Sheridan's cavalry was hanging on their left flank and rear, making dashes, when opportunity offered, at the trains, whilst *Gordon's* Corps, which formed the rearguard, was hard pressed by the 2nd Corps.

At Sailor's Creek the Confederates were finally brought to bay. A mile on the north side of the Creek the road forks: one branch goes straight on across the Creek to Rice's Station, the other runs west and crosses the Creek close to its junction with the Appomattox. This latter road was taken by the Confederate trains and *Gordon's* Corps. The 2nd Corps followed in close pursuit. In the running fight, which continued till nightfall, *Gordon* lost heavily. A great part of the trains, which he was endeavouring to save, were captured, and in his own Corps he lost 1,700 prisoners and four guns. During the night he marched to High Bridge on the Appomattox.

Anderson's and *Ewell's* Corps had kept straight on the road to Rice's Station, but anxiety for the safety of the trains and the rearguard caused them to halt after crossing Sailor's Creek.¹ Sheridan's cavalry seized the opportunity, and secured the road in advance of *Anderson's* Corps, whilst the 6th Corps closed in upon *Ewell*. The Confederates had no artillery. *Ewell's* Corps being attacked in front by the 6th Corps and on the flank by a cavalry brigade, in spite of a brave resistance, found itself forced to surrender, when *Anderson's* Corps in its rear was driven from its temporary entrenchments by Sheridan's cavalry. Very nearly the whole of *Ewell's* Corps was captured: out of a total force of 3,600 not more than 250 escaped. *Anderson* did not lose so heavily, as his line of retreat was not entirely cut off, but of about 6,000 men in his command he probably lost 2,600.² *Ewell*, with

¹ It does not seem quite clear whether Sheridan's cavalry gained possession of the Rice's Station road before or after *Anderson's* force halted on the south side of Sailor's Creek. Sheridan (2 *Memoirs*, 180) claims that Merritt's and Crook's divisions (three in all) secured the road and cut off *Anderson* from *Longstreet*, and that also one cavalry brigade and a battery cut in between *Ewell's* rear and the head of *Gordon's* column, forcing the latter to take the right-hand road. *Ewell* (4 B. & L., 721) states that it was the presence of Federal cavalry in force on the road which compelled *Anderson* to halt. Humphreys, 382, says that 'Crook moving to the left found General *Anderson* strongly posted with temporary breastworks running across the Rice's Station road, and sent Gregg to take possession of and form across the road.'

² For these figures see Humphreys, 383-4.

eleven general officers, was amongst the prisoners. *Johnson's* division of *Anderson's* Corps retained its organisation, and on rejoining *Lee* was assigned to *Gordon's* Corps. But the battle of Sailor's Creek virtually destroyed two out of *Lee's* four small Corps.

Throughout the day *Longstreet's* Corps with *Lee* in person had been waiting for the other Corps to come up. At length *Lee* took *Mahone's* division and returned towards Sailor's Creek to see what had become of the rest of his army. Shortly before dusk, on reaching the crest on the south side of the Creek, he discovered the appalling nature of the disaster which had overtaken his rear. *Longstreet* was ordered to march from Rice's Station to Farmville, where he crossed the Appomattox on the morning of the 7th. At Farmville a supply of rations had been accumulated, and the starving Confederates got their first regular meal since the retreat began.¹ *Gordon* and *Mahone* crossed the river at High Bridge below Farmville. *Ord* after reaching Burkesville had marched on the 6th along the Lynchburg railroad and found *Longstreet's* Corps encamped at Rice's Station. But it was then too late in the day to organise a line of battle. A small force, which he had sent on in advance, before he knew of *Longstreet's* position, consisting of two infantry regiments and the Headquarters' cavalry, less than 600 men in all, to destroy High Bridge and the bridges at Farmville, was overtaken by *Rosser's* and *Munford's* cavalry divisions, and after a brave resistance forced to surrender to overwhelming numbers. By the morning of the 7th *Lee's* army, now reduced to two infantry Corps and one cavalry Corps, was once again on the north bank of the Appomattox. To delay pursuit the bridges were set on fire. But the Federal 2nd Corps, which resumed the pursuit at 5.30 a.m. on the 7th, arrived in time to save the railway and wagon bridges at High Bridge.² The Farmville bridges were destroyed, and the ford, by which *Crook* crossed his cavalry over the river, was too deep for the passage of infantry.

Lee, having marched four miles along the Lynchburg road, halted and formed line of battle.³ His object was to give his trains time to get on in advance. But the delay proved fatal. *Humphreys*, with two divisions of his Corps, attacked the Confederate line. Though *Miles's* division was roughly handled by *Mahone*, *Humphreys* succeeded in detaining *Lee*, and thus gave time to *Sheridan*

¹ *Humphreys*, 386 ; *Lee's Lee*, 385.

² The railway bridge was saved chiefly by the exertions of Colonel *Livermore*. *Humphreys*, 387

³ *Lee's Lee*, 386.

to head him off at Appomattox Station. Crook's cavalry, having crossed by the ford above Farmville, had some fighting with *Fitzhugh Lee's* cavalry. The Federals were driven back, and General Gregg, commanding the leading brigade, was taken prisoner. On the night of the 7th *Lee* resumed his march. Had he not felt himself obliged to halt and offer battle to Humphreys's Corps, he could have reached Appomattox Station on the 8th, where he would have found rations waiting him, and Lynchburg on the following day.¹ For the two infantry Corps² under Ord would not have been up in time to prevent Sheridan's cavalry from being driven out of *Lee's* path.

The Federal cavalry reached Appomattox Station on the evening of the 8th, and captured four trains, which had been sent with supplies from Lynchburg.³ Sheridan took up a position for the night across the road, which *Lee* was marching on, south-west of Appomattox Court House, which was occupied by *Lee's* advanced guard that same night. During the day's march *Gordon's* Corps had exchanged places with *Longstreet's*, which now formed the rearguard. Though there was no heavy fighting on the 8th, Humphreys's Corps was all the time in close pursuit, and went into camp for the night within three miles of Longstreet.⁴

Communications had already been opened between the two commanding generals as regards the surrender of the Confederate army. On the 7th Grant had written to *Lee*, pointing out the hopelessness of further resistance, and asking for the surrender of his army to avoid needless bloodshed. To this *Lee* replied that, though he did not share Grant's view of the hopelessness of his position, yet he should like to know what terms Grant would offer in the possible event of his surrender. Grant's answer on the 8th was to the effect that he should be satisfied if the army surrendering was disqualified for bearing arms against the United States until duly exchanged. To this *Lee* replied late the same day that he did not think that the time had yet come to treat of surrender, but, as the object of both was peace, he should be glad to meet Grant, and discuss any propositions which might tend to the

¹ Humphreys, 391.

² The 5th and the 24th.

³ The presence of these trains at Appomattox Station was due to a telegram sent to Lynchburg by Sheridan in *Lee's* name (2 Sheridan's *Memoirs*, 176, 189). It is true that Sheridan had caused a bogus telegram to be sent from Burkesville to Lynchburg, and Keifer supports Sheridan's claim. But *Lee* himself had been sending instructions from Rice's Station and Farmville for the forwarding of supplies.

⁴ Humphreys, 392. There was some skirmishing in the vicinity of Appomattox Station.

desired end. Not unnaturally Grant declined the proposed interview : as he stated in his answer of the morning of the 9th, he had no authority to treat on the subject of peace. *Lee*, though several of his general officers were pressing him to surrender,¹ determined to make one last effort. *Fitzhugh Lee* and *Gordon* were directed as early as possible on the 9th to move out against *Sheridan*. If only cavalry were encountered, they were to attack and clear a way for the rest of the army. But if, as *Lee* feared, *Sheridan* had been reinforced by a strong body of infantry, then they must abandon the attempt, and no alternative would be left but to surrender.

At daybreak *Fitzhugh Lee* and *Gordon*, with thirty guns, moved out against the Federal cavalry, and it was *Lee's* intention, if the attack on *Sheridan* was successful, to send the bulk of his trains and part of his artillery to Lynchburg, and with the rest of his artillery and the ammunition wagons to march his army to Campbell Court House with the purpose of ultimately reaching Danville.² At first the attack seemed likely to be successful. *Sheridan* only had cavalry at his disposal, and in spite of an obstinate resistance they were being gradually forced back. But between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m., *Ord*, with the 5th and 24th Corps, reached the battlefield. From *Ord's* report it would seem that he was only just in time.³ The Federal cavalry were falling back in confusion before the advance of *Gordon's* infantry. But on the appearance of such heavy reinforcements, the Confederate leaders, in accordance with their instructions, began to withdraw their troops from the engagement.

The contingency, which *Lee* had feared, had come to pass. Close on his rear was the 2nd Corps : in front a strong force of infantry and cavalry blocked the road : the time for surrender had arrived. The closing scene of the long duel between the Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia took place at Appomattox Court House about 1 p.m., and at 4 p.m. the surrender of the Confederate army was formally announced to the Army of the Potomac. Grant proved himself a generous foe : the terms which he had offered on the 8th formed the basis of the capitulation. Rations were distributed from the Federal stores to the hungry Confederates, and those of the Confederate cavalry and artillery who owned their own horses were allowed to retain them. The total number of officers and men paroled on the 9th was 28,356. To such meagre proportions was the once great Army of Northern Virginia reduced.

¹ *Lee's Lee*, 392.

² *Ibid.*, 387.

³ *Humphreys*, 397.

With the surrender of *Lee's* army, the Confederacy collapsed. The only organised army left in the field was *Johnston's*, in North Carolina.¹ On April 10th Sherman moved out from Goldsboro against it, and on the 13th occupied Raleigh, *Johnston* slowly retiring before him. The following day the Confederate general opened negotiations for an armistice, and military operations came to an end. The assassination of Abraham Lincoln in Ford's theatre at Washington, on the night of the 14th, though by depriving the South of one of its best friends it greatly complicated the political situation, had no effect upon the military position. It tended to make Sherman and *Johnston*, both of whom were sincerely desirous of peace, more eager to come to terms. Between these two generals an armistice and a convention, which they fondly hoped might serve as a basis for the general pacification of the South, were arranged. But the Federal Government refused to ratify either armistice or convention. Stanton, who was at the moment predominant in Washington, charged Sherman with treachery, and ordered Grant to hasten to Raleigh and take charge of the negotiations with *Johnston*. On April 26th *Johnston* formally surrendered his army at Greensboro on the same terms that had been granted to *Lee*.² The number of officers and men paroled amounted to 37,047. But about 8,000 men had already deserted the ranks since the armistice of the 18th, for fear of being made prisoners of war.³

Further south, General Wilson had conducted a very successful cavalry expedition into Alabama, defeating *Forrest* and capturing Selma,⁴ the last great manufacturing arsenal of the South,⁵ on April 2nd. General Canby, commanding the Department of the Gulf, reinforced by the 16th Corps of Thomas's army, had commenced a campaign against Mobile, the last stronghold on the Gulf held by the Confederates. On April 9th Fort Blakeley was taken by storm, and Mobile itself surrendered on the 12th. On May 4th General *Richard Taylor* surrendered the remaining Confederate forces in Mississippi and Alabama to General Canby. In the Trans-Mississippi Department the last actual fighting of the war took place on May 13th in Texas, and on May 26th

¹ See Map VIII.

² Grant executed his delicate task with great tact. 'On arrival, instead of superseding Sherman, he informed him of the President's (Andrew Johnson) instructions, and instructed him to negotiate a fresh one on the basis of the same terms as had been granted to *Lee*' (Liddell Hart). Thus *Johnston's* surrender was made to Sherman.

³ Cox, 243.

⁴ See Map I.

⁵ Cox's *March to the Sea*, 204.

General *Kirby Smith*, commanding in that Department, surrendered all his forces. On May 10th a squadron of Wilson's cavalry had captured *Jefferson Davis* near the Florida borderline.

With the capture of its President, and the surrender of all its forces in the field, the resistance of the South came to an end. The Restoration of the Union and the Abolition of Slavery were accomplished facts.¹

¹ Jefferson Davis was imprisoned for two years, and then indicted for treason, but in May, 1867, he was released on bail, and the case never came to trial. He lived more than twenty years longer at his home in Mississippi.

CHAPTER X

RETROSPECT

WHEN the great struggle came to an end, the exhausted combatants on either side might well marvel at the vast proportions which it had assumed. This had been no ninety-days' affair, no picnic march to Richmond; for four years the North had been pouring out its blood and treasure in an endeavour, which had often seemed hopeless but at last was crowned with signal success, to force back into the Union the seceding States, whose military resources had at first been regarded with a contempt wholly unjustifiable in the light of subsequent events. The South, too, must have realised that it had altogether failed to grasp at the outset the dogged resistance, the inflexible determination, the obstinate refusal to bow to disasters, however heavy and however numerous, of an opponent whose strength and staying power had been greatly underestimated.

The struggle had been colossal, a war of giants: no previous war had ever in the same time entailed upon the combatants such enormous sacrifices of life and wealth¹: and perhaps no previous war had ever been so completely decisive in its results. To the men of that day who saw the Southern Confederacy beaten to its knees after almost superhuman efforts and in spite of many a victory, the greatest marvel of all was perhaps that the South had held out so long against such enormous resources and overwhelming odds. Those who contrasted the total disappearance of the Confederate armies with the fact that the North had in 1865 over a million of men under arms might indeed feel wonder that the struggle had not terminated long ago. The utter collapse of the Confederacy caused men for the time to blind themselves to the

¹ Dodge gives the deaths in the Federal armies during the war at 359,528, and this estimate does not include 'the great number who died at home, from the results of exposure, wounds, or diseases contracted in the line of duty. Counting all losses directly due to the war, it would be safe to say that half a million men were lost in the North and close upon the same number in the South.' The same authority estimates the total cost of the war to the North at 3,400,000,000 dollars or nearly two and a half millions a day (*A Bird's-Eye View of our Civil War* 324-6).

tremendous power which the defeated combatant had wielded, and to ignore the enormous difficulties of the task which the victor had at last triumphantly surmounted.

But to men of a later generation the wonder rather is that the North ever succeeded in the gigantic work of subjugation which had been imposed upon it. The conquest of such a vast expanse of territory, held by a nation in arms, has no parallel in history.

Some Southerners have found a melancholy consolation for defeat in the reflection that their cause was from the outset hopeless without foreign help. The intervention of Great Britain and France—for Louis Napoleon was only waiting for a lead from Britain—might have broken the blockade; but unless these Powers had been ready to back up their intervention with military force as well, it may be doubted whether the ultimate result would have been affected, especially if Russia had intervened on behalf of the Federal Government. This she threatened to do in the autumn of 1863, when she sent two naval squadrons to New York and San Francisco, and the Polish Insurrection seemed likely to embroil Europe. If Britain's intervention had not taken place till the third year of the war, it seems not unlikely that Canada would have been lost. The raising of the blockade would have depended upon the ability of the British and French navies to cope with the Federal monitors. 'The large improved monitors could have sent to the bottom any vessel in the British or French navies' (Channing). The hope of intervention in favour of the Confederacy seems to have been nearest fulfilment in the autumn of 1862; if *Lee* after defeating *McClellan* and *Pope* could have won another victory on Northern soil, *Palmerston* and *Russell* would have pressed for recognition of the Confederacy. Recognition would probably have been followed by an offer of mediation accompanied by a threat of war in case of refusal by the Northern Government, and in any case the Confederacy would have found it easier to raise loans in Europe.

But the cause of the South, even in a single-handed combat with the North, was far from hopeless. Her failure to achieve her independence must be regarded as mainly due to her own mistakes. In spite of her reverses at *Gettysburg* and *Vicksburg*, both of which should have been avoided, the South came very near to winning her independence in the summer of the following year. In 1864 war weariness was spreading in the North, and the Democratic Party was steadily gaining strength. If *McClellan* had won the election and not *Lincoln*, it seems almost certain that the 'stop the war' party in the North would have had their way despite *McClellan's* repudiation of the 'plank,' which declared the

war a failure. A Democratic victory at the polls would have given fresh heart to the Confederates and have brought back into the ranks thousands of soldiers who had absented themselves without leave. Though Lincoln was successful by 212 to 21 votes in the Electoral College, in the three States with the largest electoral vote Lincoln only had a majority of 86,000, 5 per cent of the total vote cast ; and these three States carried eighty votes in the Electoral College. A comparatively slight change in the tide of public opinion would have given the victory to McClellan, and this change was only prevented from taking place by Sherman's capture of Atlanta (which again should have been avoided), reinforced by Sheridan's victories in the Valley.

The fundamental cause of failure is to be found in the very nature of the Confederate constitution. Composed as the South was of Sovereign States, it fought the war, not as a nation, but a league of nations. A modern American historian, himself of Southern birth, has written that the Confederate cause 'died of States' Rights.' For a while the States were willing to waive the assertion of their Sovereign Rights. The adoption of conscription in the spring of 1862 was a fine proof of their loyalty to the common cause. Yet it is to be noted that the Governor of Virginia at the time 'informed his legislature that it was his deliberate conviction that the conscription act was unconstitutional, but in the existing condition of affairs, he would not debate the question.' As long as *Lee's* victories in the East, the political theatre of war, could be set off against the losses in the West, the strategical theatre, the States as represented in Congress continued to acquiesce, though with growing uneasiness, in the infringements of their Rights by the Central Government. But when the tide turned, and Gettysburg and Vicksburg sounded the knell of the Confederate hopes, the strain upon the individual States grew too heavy to be borne. The tie which bound together Sovereign States in a league, can never be so strong as that which holds together the members of a single nation. In 1864 the 'home front' in the South was beginning to crack. It is probably impossible to estimate the size of the minority in the Southern States which was originally opposed to secession. 'Not a single cotton State but Texas dared to submit its Ordinance of Secession to a direct vote of the people' (Nicolay).¹ Certainly in Georgia,

¹ Probably it was not a question of 'daring' ; there was no time to lose, if Lincoln was to be confronted on March 4th by an established Confederate Government. In Texas a referendum was rendered necessary by the irregularities in the election of the Convention. The minority in Georgia were not Unionists, but wanted a Southern Convention to be summoned in the hope of making satisfactory terms with the Federal Government.

the most important of these States, opposition to secession was widespread. Now all the disaffected began to rear their heads and found no lack of followers. As each State realised itself left without adequate support by the Central Government against the threat of invasion, its instinct was to seek the means of defence within itself, and for that purpose to disregard its obligations to the Confederacy as a whole. By the middle of 1863 the Trans-Mississippi had been virtually lost. The Southern President refrained from making any direct call upon its States to send reinforcements across the river to the aid of Vicksburg. It may be presumed that he knew that any such orders would be ignored. Apart from the physical difficulties of transferring troops from one bank to the other, service on the eastern side was intensely unpopular with the soldiers west of the Mississippi. Only small squads could be got across at a time and the tendency was for these men to seize the opportunity to desert and disappear. East of the Mississippi, Louisiana, ever since the fall of New Orleans, had been for the most part under Federal control, and Alabama set the example of forming an army of her own for home defence. In Georgia and South Carolina, bitter rivals of long standing, the soldiers of either State were reluctant to serve in the territories of the other. In the last months of the war the Governors of Georgia and North Carolina were almost at open variance with the *President*.

In the second place, it was a real misfortune for the Confederacy that secession took place in two waves. If the four States, including two of the most powerful in the Confederacy, Virginia and North Carolina, had seceded simultaneously with the original seven, two grave mistakes might have been avoided. Richmond might not have become the capital of the Confederate States. It was a mistake of the first class to choose for a capital a city which was so near the frontier and accessible from the sea. The Federals could not help themselves; strategically, Washington was as bad a place as could have been found for the Federal capital in a war between North and South; but tradition had made it the symbol of the Union and to have removed the seat of Government to Philadelphia or elsewhere would have weakened the prestige of the Federal Government in the eyes of Europe. But there was no excuse for the Confederacy's voluntary adoption of a capital equally disadvantageously situated. Atlanta was the obvious choice, and though Virginia must have been one of the main theatres of war and the Tredegar Ironworks would have rendered the defence of Richmond a matter of first-rate importance, still the selection of Georgia's railway centre would have ensured a fuller recognition of the importance of the Western theatre of war.

Instead of the war being fought, as it was on the Confederate side, in two watertight compartments, a comprehensive plan of campaign covering both theatres of war might have been evolved. In that case the victory of the First Bull Run would have been reduced to its proper proportions and the position in Kentucky and Tennessee would not have been left as hopeless as it was in the spring of 1862. Adequate defence, too, for New Orleans might have been provided.

A second consequence, which would have most probably followed upon the simultaneous secession of the eleven States, would have been that *Jefferson Davis* would not have been elected President. There has always been something of a mystery about his election. He had not been one of the leading Southern champions of secession; indeed, his utterances on the subject had been at times strangely ambiguous; nor was he a member of the old planter aristocracy of the South. His military reputation might have been a reason for making him commander-in-chief of the Confederate forces, if ever they had to take the field, though it would almost certainly have proved a disastrous selection; probably he would have been best placed as Secretary of War. But the most likely reason for his elevation to the Presidency is the jealousy with which South Carolina regarded the probable election of one of the Georgian leaders, *Howell Cobb*, *Toombs* or even *Alexander Stephens*. With a wider field for choice, it seems probable that the intrigue of a handful of politicians from South Carolina, a State regarded, if not with actual dislike, at any rate with considerable distrust by the politicians of Virginia and North Carolina, would have been baffled and a wiser selection would have been made, though it might still have been a Georgian, probably *Howell Cobb*, who had been Secretary of the Treasury in Buchanan's Administration. There can, indeed, be no question of *Jefferson Davis's* ardent patriotism; no one could have exerted himself more whole-heartedly in the cause of which he had become the head. But he was hampered by bad health; his temperament was dictatorial; he never understood the virtues of decentralisation; and he had an unfortunate talent for making enemies. He had hardly assumed the Presidency than Congress began to express its resentment at his appointment; his Cabinet was curiously lacking in distinction; not one of its members was bound to him by ties of friendship or intimacy.¹ Of the six, three were actually of foreign birth, and only two could be regarded as representing the planter aristocracy, and these two resigned at

¹ An exception might perhaps be made in the case of *Benjamin*, in succession Attorney-General, Secretary of War, and Secretary of State,

a very early date. 'As things were, in February, 1861, it would seem as if the bacilli of peaceable demise were already germinating within the body of the Confederate States' (Channing). When two months later war broke out, *Davis* attempted to take the entire control of military operations into his own hands. The Secretary of War became merely his chief clerk. *Beauregard* has drawn attention to the strange fact, that never once during the war did *Davis* summon the five generals originally appointed in a body to a conference. From the time of his appointment as virtual chief of the staff in March, 1862, *Lee* did undoubtedly exercise a great influence upon the military operations in Virginia, but his influence did not extend to the Western theatre of war, and for the Confederate reverses in that theatre the President must be held mainly responsible. There his two favourites, *Pemberton* and *Bragg*, by their unskilful handling of the military situation were allowed to ruin the Confederate cause at Vicksburg and (after Chickamauga) at Chattanooga. But the President's greatest military mistake was reserved for 1864, when he superseded *Johnston* in favour of *Hood*, and thereby made a present of Atlanta to Sherman. Had *Johnston* been retained in command, it is altogether probable that the fall of Atlanta, if ever it came to pass, would have been postponed so long that it would have been too late to affect the fate of the election, and Sheridan's victories, which were strategically defensive in character and only affected a limited area, would have been insufficient in themselves to turn the tide of public opinion in Lincoln's favour. *Davis's* strained relations with *Beauregard* as well as *Johnston* also contributed to the downfall of the Confederacy.

Davis's military policy was fundamentally unsound, because it was a defensive policy, which ignored the value of the counter-stroke. His fixed resolve of attempting to check invasion at every point where it was threatened, in preference to concentration at the decisive point, was perhaps dictated by a desire to avoid friction with the State Governors, perhaps by an inability to decide what was the decisive point. As General Grant phrased it, 'on several occasions he came to the relief of the Union Army by means of his superior military genius.' It was, however, an embarrassing position, when the *President* was wedded to a defensive policy and his chief general, *Lee*, was a votary of the offensive. It would have been better for the Confederacy, that *Lee's* invasion of Pennsylvania should never have been undertaken, if the Government was unable or unwilling to provide him with an adequate force for the purpose. Indeed it has been held that *Lee's* offensives so weakened the Confederacy by inflicting upon it losses which

it could not stand, as not to give *Davis's* defensive policy a fair chance. It seems possible that the Confederacy might have been better served in 1864, if it had had in Virginia a master of Fabian tactics like *Joseph Johnston*. The military policy of the Confederacy in fact 'fell between two stools.' But it could hardly have been foreseen that the 'home front' at the North would come so near to cracking in the summer, and *Johnston's* tactics might have proved less successful against Grant's hammering methods than they did against Sherman's more subtle manoeuvring.

In other departments, finance, economics, and foreign affairs, *Davis's* critics complained that he had no constructive policy and simply drifted from beginning to end. This seems equivalent to a charge, that in statesmanship the President did not rise above the level of the average Southern politician. In the South oratory had largely taken the place of statesmanship, and its leaders had failed to keep up with the times. The march of progress had passed them by, unmoved and unaware that the world was changing. They still stood in 1860 where they had done a generation before. *Davis* still shared the current belief of the South in the inalienable sovereignty of cotton. He counted upon a cessation of exportations driving Great Britain and France into granting recognition of the Confederacy within a few months, or at most a year. This traditional belief was contrary to existing facts. In 1861 the cotton market was overstocked. The cotton manufacturers had large stocks of cotton goods on hand and were only too pleased to close down their factories and wait for the inevitable rise in prices. 'It was the closing of the factories owing to the over-supply of manufactured goods on hand that threw the operatives on their own resources. It was not until the winter of 1862-3 that there was a cotton famine in England.' (Channing.) In 1862 seventy thousand bales of cotton were shipped from Liverpool to New York, and in the early months of 1863 a hundred thousand bales were exported from England to America. By the time that there came to be a serious shortage of cotton fibre in England, the lack of which was partially met by increasing importations from India, 'King Cotton' had been deposed from his throne and his place taken by 'King Corn.' A succession of bad harvests all over Europe from 1860 onwards had made England's dependence upon the wheat of the Northern States of America greater than her need of cotton from the Southern States. A study of the statistics in the *London Economist* would have rectified the miscalculation, which ruined Confederate finance, because with the capital of the South practically locked up in its slaves there was no alternative but to fall back upon a

paper currency, which rapidly depreciated. The foreign policy of the Confederacy was also injuriously affected, because apart from cotton it had nothing with which to bargain, and President *Davis* had given no authority to the emissaries, whom he sent to England and France, to hold out the offer of a commercial treaty on favourable terms.

It is also charged against the *President* that his preparations in the event of war, which became highly probable after Lincoln's inaugural speech on March 4th, were wholly inadequate. At first he confined himself to making contracts for the delivery of munitions of war with the Northern manufacturers, until this traffic was forbidden by the Federal Government. It was not till May that agents were sent to Europe for the purchase of arms, and the amounts which they succeeded in purchasing were quite insufficient to meet the needs of the thousands of volunteers who flocked to the Confederate standards. The evil result was seen early in 1862, when the army, with which *A. S. Johnston* was to defend the country between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi, was wretchedly equipped as well as numerically weak. But whether the sins of omission are justly or unjustly laid to the charge of *Jefferson Davis*, it still remains that he was guilty of a terrible error in superseding *Johnston* for *Hood*, a mistake which quite possibly cost the Confederacy its independence, and that his personal relations with his generals, whether unfriendly or the reverse, had most unfortunate consequences.

Various other explanations of the downfall of the Confederacy have been advanced, such as want of food and lack of the munitions of war, both of which may be attributed in great part to the blockade. Certainly after the fall of Wilmington both *Johnston's* and *Lee's* armies were brought to the verge of starvation, and throughout the winter of 1864-5 *Lee* had experienced great difficulty in finding food for his soldiers and fodder for his horses. But the evidence available goes to show that there was a considerable amount of food still to be found in different parts of the Confederacy east of the Mississippi—in the Trans-Mississippi there seems to have been no real shortage. The difficulty was in transporting it to the armies. 'On April 1st, 1865, there were at Richmond three hundred thousand rations of bread and meat; at Danville five hundred thousand rations of bread and one and a half million rations of meat; at Lynchburg and Greensboro together one million six hundred and eighty thousand rations of bread and meat. In February, 1865, as *Joseph Johnston* stated, there were in the depots between Danville and Weldon rations for sixty thousand men for more than four months.' (Channing.)

Yet *Johnston's* and *Lee's* armies were starving, because transport by rail had practically broken down. 'In 1864 the Quartermaster-General stated that a train could not run more than one hundred miles a day on the main line from Georgia to Richmond and that a car could not go more than five hundred miles without breaking down.' (Channing.) The Confederates could not build engines or roll rails;¹ if fresh rails were required to repair any part of a line, they could only be provided by taking up some other railway line which was less in use. The Piedmont line from Danville to Greensboro, which formed a link between Richmond and Weldon, after the Federals secured possession of the main line from Weldon, was rendered impassable for twenty miles by a flood in January, 1865, and 'this mishap led to virtual starvation in *Lee's* army.' The systematic destruction of the Georgia Central railway by Sherman in 1864 and of the railway systems of the Carolinas in 1865 prevented the food supplies from the richest parts of the South becoming available for the needs of other parts, which were in sore distress. This shortage of food was the cause of widespread desertion in the ranks of the two Confederate armies. The soldiers could just keep body and soul together on their meagre rations; loyalty to their leaders and pride in their own martial fame kept them in the ranks, until the appeals from their starving families claimed obedience to a higher loyalty. They could not desert the wives and children in the home; therefore they must desert their leaders in the field. The flow of desertion rapidly increased as Sherman pursued his march of destruction through Georgia and the Carolinas; presently these deserters began to take their arms with them, an ominous warning that in various parts of the South law was becoming a dead letter and the social structure was breaking down. They banded together to prevent arrest and maintained themselves by plundering their weaker neighbours; especially in the hill country of North Carolina a reign of terror had been so far established that its Governor was threatening to withdraw the North Carolinian troops from the regular army to protect the inhabitants of the State from the depredations of these lawless bands, unless the Confederate Government sent a force to hold them in check.

That shortage of munitions of war was a cause of the Confederate collapse seems disproved by the evidence of *General Gorgas*, chief of the ordnance of the Confederate army. From his

¹ Rails were rolled at the Tredegar Works, but not in sufficient quantities to meet the emergency. Later in the war a rolling mill was installed at Atlanta, but the supply of iron was running short and railway iron could not be imported.

report it would appear that the Confederates had never been so well equipped for battle as in 1864; all the demands of the armies could be fully met; in the three years during which *General Gorgas* had been head of the Ordnance Department, arsenals, foundries and factories had been established in various parts of the South, a superb powder mill had been built at Augusta, although the "quantity production" of powder was only just beginning when the war ended; so far as munitions were concerned, the Confederacy seemed able to carry on the war for an indefinite period. *General Alexander*, however, has stated that it was very near the end of its resources in the supply of copper, which was essential for the manufacture of percussion caps; "all the turpentine and apple-brandy stills in the country had been collected and sent to Richmond to be cut up and rolled into copper strips," but by the end of the war the stock of copper stills was exhausted.

Nor was it from lack of men that the Confederacy collapsed. It was the inability of the Government to lay hands upon them which led to disaster. In September, 1864, *President Davis* in a speech at Macon after the fall of Atlanta had declared that two-thirds of the soldiers who should have been with the armies in the field, were absent, most of them without leave. In the ensuing months the rate of absenteeism rapidly increased.

The will to fight was broken, not by defeat in the field but by the sudden revelation of the real weakness of the Confederacy. The spectacle of Sherman marching with practically no opposition through the richest, and therefore at that stage the most important, State in the South, not only gave the lie to *Davis's* boast and promise of protection in his Macon speech, but also revealed the essential truth of Sherman's prediction: "Pierce the shell of the C.S.A. and it's all hollow inside." It was a sudden revelation and the resultant collapse was hardly less sudden.

In the campaign of 1864 the enormous resources of the North were at last brought into full play under a single direction. Grant was not merely in name but in reality General-in-Chief of all the Federal forces, and Lincoln, who for three weary years had been seeking a soldier fit to undertake the responsibility of the post, gave him whole-hearted support. The orders which Grant issued for the campaign of 1864 reveal a man who had fully thought out his course of action and was determined to carry it through. "That we are now all to act on a common plan converging on a common centre, looks like enlightened war" (Sherman), and in Sherman's view this was the first year in which the professional soldiers had really taken charge of military operations. Control had passed

from the "Aulic Council" at Washington, where Halleck had been content to play a subservient part, into the hands of a commanding general in the field, who knew his own mind and meant to have his own way. From one point of view this campaign might be regarded as the triumph of the "unified command." But as the two main Federal armies were at the beginning of the campaign 500 miles apart, and as it progressed their respective courses steadily diverged, "unity of command" came to mean "unity of will." Grant, recognising this at the outset, deliberately refrained from laying down any plan of campaign for Sherman in the West, and contented himself with explaining what he wanted done and leaving his lieutenant free to do it in his own way. Sherman's way was not Grant's way. With Grant, *Lee's* army was the first objective, the capture of Richmond only a secondary consideration. To Sherman Atlanta was the main objective and to gain that he let the Confederate Army of Tennessee escape and left its destruction to Thomas to effect. But his strategy was justified by the paralysing effect which the "March to the Sea" produced upon the Southern mind. Though not a soldier in Sherman's army took part in the operations round Richmond, yet *Lee's* ranks were thinned by the desertions caused by Sherman's operations in Georgia and the Carolinas, and the result was just the same as if they had been killed by the bullets of Sherman's men. A similarly wide discretion was also given by Grant to Sheridan in the Valley, though it was not attended with quite the same happy results, because Sheridan was no strategist, though a brilliant tactician. Sheridan was perhaps the most prominent figure in the Appomattox campaign, but if he could have grasped the full significance of Grant's strategy the war might have ended some months earlier.

Grant started out with the intention of hammering *Lee's* army and expected to effect his object before the Presidential election took place. In this he failed, largely owing to the failure of his subordinates, especially Butler, to play the subsidiary parts assigned to them. As a tactician he cannot compare with *Lee*, who parried every thrust until Grant transferred his army to the south side of the James. Then by sheer bad luck, through an accident arising out of the circumstances attaching to the divided command of the Army of the Potomac, Grant just missed capturing Petersburg. The despatch of *Early* to the Valley necessitated a corresponding reduction in the forces before Petersburg, and Grant's main object was now to prevent reinforcements being sent to *Early*, by threatening *Lee's* line of supply. The despatch of two corps and two divisions of cavalry, in combination with

the continual discharge of "time-expired" troops, caused the numerical superiority of the Army of the Potomac over its opponent to shrink in August to 25 per cent, and to continue for some time "below the danger-line for a besieging force." It had been agreed between Grant and Sherman that their armies should keep their respective opponents so busily occupied that no reinforcements could be sent from one to the other. Grant was very solicitous for Sherman's welfare, and after his own repulse at Cold Harbour feared that *Lee* would send reinforcements to *Johnston*; he at first suspected that *Early's* destination might be Atlanta. Consequently he could not afford to relax his efforts to occupy *Lee's* attention. In striking continually at the enemy's railways, after his anxiety for Sherman's and Sheridan's safety was allayed, Grant's object was not to starve Richmond into surrender but to starve *Lee* into evacuation. He wanted to get him out of his entrenchments into the open field, just as he had tried to do in the Wilderness campaign. His aim still remained the same, to hammer *Lee's* army, though changed conditions required a change of method. Similarly his object in extending his entrenchments to the left round Petersburg was not to invest that city but to provide himself with a screen of strong works behind which he might move a large force on to *Lee's* flank. After the Burnside mine fiasco he had learnt that fortifications could be depended upon pretty well to defend themselves; he concluded that only a thin line of riflemen was required to hold them, especially if there was a reserve kept near at hand. In his final movement round *Lee's* right, which led to the battle of Five Forks and the storming of the Petersburg lines, he was launching no less than 80,000 troops against his opponent's flank. Grant was greatly perturbed by *Hood's* audacity in laying siege to Nashville. He feared that *Forrest's* cavalry would cross the Tennessee into Kentucky and threaten the line of the Ohio and that *Hood's* main army might give Thomas the slip and follow *Forrest*. He might himself have to detach troops to the Ohio, if only to prevent a panic. It has been suggested, that when he first directed Sherman, who had just appeared before Savannah, not to commence siege operations but to bring the bulk of his army by sea to Virginia, he was thinking of sending troops to protect the Ohio Valley. When *Hood* had been defeated at Nashville and driven back across the Tennessee, Grant made admirable use of Thomas's victorious troops for various purposes. To move Schofield's corps from the Tennessee to North Carolina, where he could stretch out a helping hand to Sherman and secure for him railway communication with the recently captured Wilmington, was a master-stroke; at the same time Stoneman's cavalry was

brought from East Tennessee into south-west Virginia, where it broke up the railway from Wytheville to Lynchburg, completing the work which Sheridan had left unfinished, and then turning into North Carolina destroyed the railway south from Danville. A larger body of cavalry under Wilson crossed the Tennessee, captured Selma, the Confederate last great arsenal, and Montgomery, and from Alabama invaded Georgia and took Macon. While Grant was waging war against the railways of Virginia and striking at *Lee's* soldiers through their stomachs, Sherman was methodically destroying the railways of Georgia and the Carolinas, but with a different object: he was striking not so much at the armed forces of the enemy as at the whole mass of the defenceless population. He realised that the nature of war had changed, now that it was waged no longer by professional armies but by nations in arms; if the will to resist in the people is crushed, that in the armies will not long survive. "This may not be war, but rather statesmanship."

Although "the March to the Sea" has an enduring fame, whilst the march through the Carolinas has attracted much less notice, yet the second was far the greater achievement. Sherman himself "in retrospect rated the relative difficulty and importance of the second as ten to one" (Liddell Hart). But the first produced a tremendous moral effect, not only by the impression which it made on the Southern mind, but perhaps even more by the shock that it gave foreign opinion, which till then had hardly envisaged the possibility of the Confederacy's defeat.

It is probably futile to try to draw any comparison between *Lee* and Grant. The odds against which the former had to contend were too heavy. *Lee* was the champion of a cause already lost when he was called upon to confront the greatest general on the victorious side. Though his tactical technique retained its brilliance unimpaired, his health was failing, and he had to depend too much upon his subordinates for the execution of his plans. They too often failed to rise to the height of the occasion. *Jackson* had left no successor; *Longstreet*, his "old warhorse," on whom in spite of all his faults *Lee* relied most after *Jackson's* death, was stricken down on the second day of the first battle and only returned to service when the Confederate cause was hopeless. *Ewell's* health virtually incapacitated him for command from the very outset of the campaign. Neither *A. P. Hill* nor *Anderson* was an efficient corps commander. Much of the credit which has been given to *Hill* really belongs to his divisional commanders, *Mahone* and *Wilcox*. There seems to be a strange impression that the "West Pointers" who joined the South were better leaders

than those in the Federal service. Sherman was much better served by his subordinates, and the Corps commanders in the Army of the Potomac were probably superior to their "opposite numbers" in *Lee's* army. At first they fell short of Grant's exacting standard, but under his guidance they improved. Grant and Sherman seem to have got better results from their subordinates because they maintained a stricter discipline.

Why *Lee* hung on so long to Richmond is difficult to explain. His one chance was to join *Johnston* before Sherman effected his junction with Schofield. *Johnston* and *Davis* both urged that the Confederate armies should unite to give battle to Sherman before he reached the Cape Fear river. But *Lee* refused to quit Richmond until *Johnston* crossed the Roanoke. Grant himself thought that it had come to be a point of honour with *Lee* that the last stand should be made in defence of the Confederate capital. Major-General Fuller has suggested that *Lee* was afraid to withdraw his army from their entrenchments because the soldiers might desert as soon as they got away from immediate danger; as long as they faced the enemy, they would fight, but if once the hostile pressure relaxed, the temptation to break altogether might prove too strong. Colonel T. L. Livermore's view seems more probable, that *Lee* overestimated the fighting power of his army and believed, almost to the last, that he could defeat Grant, if he were given an opportunity of meeting him in the open field under favourable conditions.

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